

JPRS-UPA-89-068
19 DECEMBER 1989



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-068

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Geographical Breakdown of Deputy Election Results

90UN0313A Moscow IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK
SSSR: SERIYA GEOGRAFICHESKAYA in Russian
No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed to press 13 Sep 89) pp 5-24

[Article by A.V. Berezkin, V.A. Kolosov, M.E. Pavlovskaya, N.V. Petrov, and L.V. Smirnyagin, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography, Moscow State University: "Geography of the Elections of USSR People's Deputies in 1989 (Initial Results)"]

[Text] *The results of the election campaign and the elections of USSR people's deputies are an enormous, unique, and totally new array of information for Soviet scientists. Analysis of it may lead to important social- and political-geographic conclusions about our society, the course of perestroika, and development of the political system. Scientists of many specialties have already begun to assimilate this material.*

Elections as an Object of Study of Social Geography. Not at all having pretensions of completeness and exhaustive analysis, we will state a number of thoughts concerning the "geographic" results of the elections and the problems associated with studying them. We think that this is of theoretical and practical interest at least for the following reasons: 1) It is important to analyze the state of the economy, the social sphere, and the ecological situation in regions and to bring to light critical areas; 2) It is necessary to comprehend the spatial tactics and behavior of various social groups and strata; 3) Tasks of improving the organization of elections in the future are quite timely—the divisions of electoral districts and implementation of the entire aggregate of principles of social, including territorial, fairness; 4) Geographic analysis of the elections is a powerful means of gaining knowledge about the political culture of society in its differences from place to place; 5) This analysis undoubtedly would provide a great impetus to development of the entire social geography. We should particularly emphasize the latter, for it is the elections of USSR people's deputies that provide an opportunity for the first time to study the social processes on a nationwide level, considering not only the "quantity" and "quality" of the population but also the individual qualities of a person.

Elections are a traditional object of research of Western geographers. The problems of electoral geography as a special field of political geography, its structure, and methods have been well elaborated, and certain general patterns have been brought to light.¹ Together with all political geography, electoral geography is now experiencing an upsurge. British geographer P. Taylor, reflecting the prevailing opinion among his colleagues, recently wrote that globalistics, area studies, and political geography have become the most "fashionable" topics in geography. Its prestige is also high in Western politology, where long ago the opinion was formed that it is impossible to count on success in elections without

in-depth and accurate knowledge of the political-geographic aspects of the situation. Therefore, political geography is well financed, many scientists work in it, and specialized journals and many reference books and scientific monographs are published.

Western political geography has at its disposal a high-quality research program. It is aimed primarily at discovering the political culture of various parts of the country—its historical-cultural roots, socio-economic causality, the system of political values and preferences (above all, party preferences), the structure of the electorate, and its specific reactions to various political slogans, events, and forms of behavior of politicians—and, of course, at forecasting, including in the form of direct recommendations regarding the most effective running of a campaign or other political struggle in a given region.

Political-geographic regionalization of a varied degree of breakdown often becomes the crowning achievement of such research. In the United States, for example, the notion developed by D. Elazar of three political sub-cultures has become ingrained: moralist, individualist, and traditionalist. It is believed that the first one is predominant in the northern states; the second in the most populated middle region; and the third in the South. There are also considerable political-geographic differences within these zones, especially between large cities, suburbs, and remote rural areas. Candidates to elected posts always take such differences into account in their political campaigns. It is known that presidential candidates, in traveling around the country, carefully proofread the texts of their speeches, taking into account precisely where they are to be speaking. They usually use a large staff of specialists for this proofreading, among which political geographers hold a place of honor.

The electoral geography research program is by no means limited to analyzing the fever pitch of the struggle (the ratio of votes cast for the various parties and their candidates), the activeness of voters (election turn-out), and so forth. Much greater importance is given to a far more complex analysis of precisely what slogans and platforms voters prefer, what namely to what problems their reaction has been particularly sharp, and to what extent did they respond to the personal "image" of politicians. All this is considered more important than a politician's personal affiliation with a specific social group or class, to which so much attention is being given in our press today when assessing the results of the elections of USSR people's deputies.

Western scientists have at their disposal excellent political-geographic information. All election results are published quickly and widely, and not only by districts but also in a more detailed breakdown. Thus, the results of the U.S. presidential election held in November 1988 already appeared in the WORLD ALMANAC in early 1989 with a breakdown for 3,000 counties [6]. An abundant amount of socio-economic and demographic information is gathered for each district (and their grid

does not at all coincide completely with the administrative grid), which can be easily and productively compared with political information. Parliamentary debates and voting (including the work of commissions) are completely recorded, and all these minutes are published for the general public. This is a quite costly and cumbersome undertaking, but it is given fundamental importance as a guarantee of openness of the political process. Special periodicals (mainly independent ones) are devoted to its current analysis.

Numerous and well thought-out exit polls and also plump reference books, literally stuffed with information, are a most valuable support of scientists. Thus, the quite authoritative reference book *ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS* is published twice a year in the United States. It contains lively politological essays about each state or district, political portraits of senators, congressmen and their main opponents, and also an abundance of statistical information about the districts and politicians.

Computer election data banks were created long ago. Thus, in Sweden, data on elections by electoral precincts for the country's entire history together with socioeconomic indicators pertaining to these units were transferred to magnetic medium back in the 1970s [4]. It is obvious that this makes it possible to turn out in a very short period of time analytical information about elections that were held, including cards for the mass media and specialists.

"Complete" political-geographic study of elections usually includes the following parts: 1) analysis of the division of territory into electoral districts: differences in the population density of districts (for the country as a whole and for regions, between urban and rural areas), in their configuration, compactness, methods of division, correlation with the administrative-territorial division, and so forth, including calculations of a number of special indicators; 2) study of the course of an election campaign: the mechanism of nominating candidates in various regions; the correspondence of their social composition to the structure of the districts, the personal popularity and other individual distinctive features, the role and sympathies of the press and other mass media, access to them and other means of campaigning of individual candidates, their financial and organizational support, including examining the territorial structure of parties and other social organizations; and also analysis of the party programs, slogans, and election platforms, the real political actions of candidates and their support groups, the attitude of authorities to them, and the opportunity to conduct the campaign freely, and many other things; 3) study of the elections proper—the level of non-participation and the percentage of invalid votes in various regions, the reasons for such behavior by voters, the results of voting, and their relation to objective and subjective factors which predetermined people's choice: the sex, age, and social and class composition of the population; the differences in the ethno-cultural and

confessional characteristics of the population, its historical traditions and experience, political awareness, the distribution over populated areas of various density and functions, and factors of "proximity."² This part of the work also includes an analysis of such spatial features in the variations in voters' views as the variegation, contrast, and correlation of the positions of voters in various areas of urban agglomerations, and so forth, the dependence of election results on the dynamics of economic development and changes in the demographic potential, and so forth.

Specialists in electoral geography attach much importance to analyzing the dynamics of influence of parties and the popularity of their political programs among the voters. You see, in some countries such changes take place relatively evenly throughout the entire country, but in others changes in various regions have a different magnitude and orientation. Another issue, quite important for political forecasting and assessing the situation, is also related to this—that of the role and correlation of the influence of nationwide, regional or local factors on the position of voters and the role of long-term processes and temporary, short-term fluctuations. It is also important to study the positions and activities of individual deputies and bodies of power, formed on the basis of the elections, with respect to their electoral districts. It is important for the geographer whether the composition of the executive body of power corresponds to the results of the elections (in a multiparty system, it often turns out that its candidates have insufficient convincing success in the elections in order to become part of this body and to have a real effect on its political policy).

For a politologist and political geographer, the question of who, in accordance with established tradition or existing practice, the deputy is—a representative of his district or territorial community or a statesman who associates his activities comparatively little with supporting the interests of a specific territorial or social group of his voters on the national level. The actions of a deputy when considering economic projects, state appropriations, and so forth may depend on his interest in strengthening his influence in the electoral district and the strength of his positions among the voters.

The Distinctive Quality of Elections to the USSR People's Deputies. Given all the importance of the experience of electoral research accumulated by Western geography, it can hardly be applied directly to analyzing our elections in 1989—the political life in our country is too distinctive. Suffice it to note that we held elections of this nature for the first time. Therefore, neither the voters nor the candidates had experience or traditions in this area, and the researcher had no dynamic ranks for analyzing the situation. It is even more important that we obviously did not have a struggle between parties, and this makes it extremely more complicated to isolate the differences of the candidates according to their political positions. Although pluralism of political preferences is proclaimed, it has not yet taken shape, and its

early stages are barely distinguishable in the program declarations of the candidates, and by no means all of them.

Of course, it would be a mistake to deny the political essence of our elections, since their tremendous importance is indisputable for the entire course of perestroika and for the increased political activeness of the citizens. However, it is no simple matter to distinguish this political essence because the well-established tradition of "unity" forces nearly all candidates largely to standardize their platforms.

Virtually no anti-perestroika sentiments were openly expressed anywhere in the form of campaign platforms. The campaign platforms appear very similar everywhere and usually come down (entirely and partially) to several slogans: give perestroika a chance; down with bureaucrats; all power to the Soviets; feed the country at any price and above all; ecology, butter instead of guns; a law-governed state; down with gigantic economic projects; down with privileges of the apparatus; face the common man; mercy for groups living in poverty; specific local problems. Some of these slogans were omitted from the programs, but they were never challenged. The differences boiled down to the order of importance and to emphasis.

Such similarity of programs and triteness of open confrontation of the political positions of the candidates led to an increase in the importance of the personal characteristics—place of residence, affiliation with a certain social stratum, position on the "chief-subordinate" axis. According to the election results, the negative reaction to the rank of official position and the disliking of "apparatchiks" were quite noticeable. Knowledge of the subtleties of the election campaign, which were extremely difficult to discern from the dry statistics on the results, play a determining role in analyzing the elections. Pains-taking work with the local press, voter surveys, and other methods which have long been the norm in Western political geography are needed. Before carrying out this work, which will require considerable time and efforts of many researchers, judgments about the geography of our elections and especially about local political cultures, traditions, and preferences should be extremely cautious.

Another, quite unusual feature of our elections is the "third house of curiae," that is, elections for public organizations. Without going into an overall assessment of this particular feature, it must be emphasized that it is very important from the political-geographic standpoint. Insofar as "elections by curiae" are openly aimed at ensuring representation of individual sections of society, the rest of the elections are obviously freed from the need to take into account this representation and are even more rigidly aimed at the main representation, for the sake of which they are held—representation from the localities (territorial districts) and nationalities (national-territorial districts). Thus elections from the localities essentially must take place as an act of uniting

a given territorial community for the purpose of resolving problems common to its members. And the winner in the elections will be that candidate who is able better than the others to bring to light these problems, suggest better ways to resolve them, and show himself to be the right person for this. This involves not only and not even so much purely local problems, as it does broader problems in a geographic context. The broader the problem, the more social groups it affects in a given region.

In this light, territorial elections cannot be reduced to a confrontation of local social structures where the candidate from the most numerous structure wins, intending to champion namely its interests (even to the detriment of other structures of this region). Otherwise, we would have a repeat of that structuring of society which set by the elections by curiae.

The important question for political geography of who the candidate from a territorial district is has proved to be pointed: a statesman who is delegated by a territorial community of people to resolve unionwide problems; a representative of the most numerous section in this community; or a member of parliament guarding the interests of a given region (even to the detriment of unionwide interests). The course of the elections showed that before the "sifting" at the district meetings, many prospective candidates presented themselves as politicians of either the second or third type, but after the "sift" candidates of the first type clearly began to predominate. This shows both the sharpness of the many pressing unionwide problems and the unexpectedly high level of political awareness of the electorate. True, the number of candidates of the second type increased sharply and suddenly in repeat elections and especially in re-elections—probably as a reaction to the reduced representation of certain sections of the masses (above all, workers). Apparently, this more adequately reflects the level of political maturity of the electorate, where prejudices are still alive, according to which the interests of "one's own" stratum are above the interests of society and can be represented only by someone who comes namely from that stratum.

Finally, another particular feature is the extreme paucity of information by the political geographer can judge the elections that have been held. The general press published only information about the grid of districts and the winners (indicating the position and party membership, place of residence). The local press contained official reports on the results for each electoral district indicating (alas, not always) the number of voters, their turn-out at the elections, and the distribution of votes among the candidates. A painstaking analysis of local newspapers provides an opportunity to learn much more about the course of the elections, including information about the platforms of the candidates, their age, nationality, and position; however, this work takes a long time if it is done fully and for the entire country. Attempts to obtain more detailed materials from the Central Electoral Commission by official means initially met with a

decisive refusal, and besides with strange references to some "secrecy of voting" and the need to obtain special permission at the highest level, and then an endless run-around. There is no socio-economic information by electoral districts. True, the districts were divided with strict observation of the boundaries of administrative-territorial division; apparently, this made it easier to hold elections, although it also led to the most severe violations of the "one person—one vote" rule. But this proved to be quite convenient for political geography—one can compare election data with official statistics, which are tied to the administrative division grid. Unfortunately, only the modest collection of data by oblasts and cities with a population of over 50,000 residents is widely accessible; there are virtually no open statistics with a more detailed breakdown.

In such conditions it is impossible to launch detailed political-geographic research or give an approximate analysis of the elections held. Nevertheless, certain conclusions can and must be drawn.

Division of Electoral Districts. This is a traditionally geographic problem, which without fail many countries enlist the help of prominent scientists to solve. The well-known American geographer Richard Morrill, who managed to develop a special computer algorithm for this purpose, has been very much involved with this problem [2, 3].

In practically all countries with rich traditions of elections, the deputy mandates are distributed among districts according to the total population. This means that the "people" whom parliament is called upon to represent is a broader concept than simply "voters"; they also include those population groups which for some reason or other do not have the right to vote (primarily children). In federative states, the distribution of districts among individual parts of the country is done very carefully, usually based on reliable information obtained from population censuses. It is worthy to note that in the United States, population censuses are conducted specially for this purpose. Our mandates are distributed among republics based solely on the number of voters, and then it is not according to the census but according to approximate data of the current population estimate. If the present districts would have been divided based on the population figures of the 1979 census, it would have been necessary to transfer 14 and in 1989 even 28 of the territorial districts from some republics to others (in particular, their number in the RSFSR would have been reduced by 16, and 13 whole districts would have been added to Uzbekistan, for example). Nevertheless, the current distribution of mandates by republics more or less is in keeping with the existing election law.

The division of districts within republics is another matter. Here, there have been significant deviations in the number of voters and flagrant violations of the "one person—one vote" rule. This issue was raised at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies by V.I. Alksnis. He

noted that in Latvia there are very considerable differences between the number of voters in rural and urban national-territorial districts: in one of the sparsely populated rural districts it is 28,000, and in the largest urban district it is 137,000. Since the indigenous Latvian population predominates in the rural area and the Russian-speaking residents of the republic are concentrated mainly in the cities, these differences have taken on a political importance. As was stated at the congress, such differences also exist in other regions.

This is caused primarily by the reluctance to "cut" oblast boundaries. Thus, in Ivanovo Oblast, 4 districts were allocated for 1,145,000 voters, an average of 286,200 people per district. If the same representation standard were maintained for Moscow, it would have had 24 districts instead of the 26 it has now. The voters of Irkutsk, Kostroma, Lipetsk, and Chita oblasts are represented even more unfavorably.

We will leave within "parentheses" oblasts whose representation deviates severely from the standard due to their small population (for example, Tuva ASSR has 1 seat allocated for 172,300 voters, and Kamchatka Oblast has 1 seat for 346,500 voters)—these are flaws in the system. However, how do you explain the astonishing facts of transferring to the Georgian SSR, as a minimum, two extra deputy seats (15 seats for 3,481,900 voters, or 1 seat for 217,000; even if Georgia had only 14 seats, the norm of representation would be below the established norm of 248,700 voters), and shorting Gorkiy (283,100 voters—1 seat) and Crimean (296,800 voters—1 seat) oblasts each 1 seat? Or an even stranger pair of oblasts and republics in which, contrary to common sense, the oblast with the smaller number of voters is represented by a larger number of seats: Irkutsk Oblast (1,890,000 voters)—7 seats; Novosibirsk Oblast (1,846,300 voters)—8 seats; Pskov Oblast (635,700 voters)—3 seats; Yakut ASSR (668,900 voters)—2 seats; Kirov Oblast (1,162,700 voters)—5 seats; Estonian SSR (1,165,200 voters)—4 seats; Kzyl-Orda Oblast (399,300 voters)—1 seat; and Ural Oblast (375,800 voters)—2 seats? Can it be explained by the pointed disregard for the principles of territorial fairness in the elections of 1989 that were for the first time filled with real content, or perhaps by the extreme inaccuracies of the current population estimate on the basis of which the dividing of districts took place, or by the simple reluctance to recarve the old grid of districts passed on from some past elections?

Table 1. Variation of Voter Population by Districts in Certain Cities and Oblasts of the RSFSR

City, Oblast	Number of voters in largest district	Number of voters in smallest district	Coefficient of variation (percent)
Moscow	379,900	139,200	217
Moscow Oblast	353,200	220,200	85
Leningrad	325,200	165,500	196
Voronezh Oblast	449,200	213,700	306

Table 1. Variation of Voter Population by Districts in Certain Cities and Oblasts of the RSFSR

City, Oblast	Number of voters in largest district	Number of voters in smallest district	Coefficient of variation (percent)
Gorkiy Oblast	358,800	229,200	183
Kuybyshev Oblast	264,900	224,400	49
Rostov Oblast	307,600	222,200	57
Tula Oblast	419,200	258,100	291

The situation is even worse with the division of districts within oblasts (see Table 1). Here the deviations are even more severe—also due to the reluctance to disrupt the grid of already existing administrative rayons. In many cases this has resulted in almost impasse situations. In Moscow, for example, they still had to divide the three largest areas, and one of the resulting territorial electoral districts (TIO-4) ended up being a record-breaking small size—only 139,000 voters, while another Moscow district, No 14, had 380,000 voters. As a result, the voters of district No 14 had only one-third the representation at the congress than the voters of district No 4 had. It is not clear what prevented them from dividing up Perovskiy Rayon of Moscow into roughly equal districts and why one of the districts (No 4) formed on its territory had only 139,000 voters and the other (No 19) had 222,000. The variation in the size of the districts in Moscow is 22 percent. This is very much, but the proximity of the large and small districts here is such that it is virtually impossible to reduce the variation within the framework of the rayon grid. Moscow is almost the best example of the absurdity of preserving the rayon grid when dividing electoral districts. Meanwhile, Estonia has experience in dividing the territory into districts without taking into account internal administrative boundaries.

There is reason to believe that in many cases such deviations were by no means the inevitable contribution of preserving administrative boundaries. Thus, in Sverdlovsk Oblast which has 13 districts, their present grid clearly tries to reflect the actual intra-oblast territorial differentiation, but commits great violations. The coefficient of variation of the number of voters by districts is over 15 percent. Nizhniy Tagil District No 302 has 334,000 voters, and the Irbit District No 297 has only 187,000; some districts (particularly Alapayev District No 296) are distinguished by intricate contours, and for some reason or other the adjacent territories have been joined to two Sverdlovsk districts.

A much more rational grid can be proposed even without violating the administrative boundaries. In this alternative grid, district Nos 298-300 remain unchanged; Sverdlovsk is allotted four districts, but only in city boundaries; District No 292 is formed from Leninskiy Rayon; and three others have an equal number of voters, but without taking into account the boundaries of the rayons (the only exception). Alapayev District No 296 with its

winding configuration is being eliminated. Parts of it include: Verkhnesaldinskiy Rayon with the city of Verkhnyaya Salda—into Kushva District No 301; Nevyskiy Rayon with the city of Nevysk—into Pervouralsk District No 303; and Rezhvskiy Rayon with the city of Rezh—into the new Asbest District No 296, which also includes the city of Verkhnyaya Pyshma (from District No 303) and the territorial units which before belonged to Sverdlovsk districts—the cities of Asbest and Berezhovskiy and Beloyarskiy Rayon. Nizhniy Tagil District No 302 remains in the city boundaries, but Prigorodnyy Rayon which was part of it is transferred to Kushva District No 301. However, to keep it from being too big for this, Novolyalinskiy Rayon was excluded from it and transferred to Serov District No 304.

Table 2. Division of Districts in Sverdlovsk Oblast

District Number	District Name	Number of Voters	
		Existing Grid	Alternative Grid
292	Sverdlovsk	276,000	247,000
293	Sverdlovsk	286,000	238,000
294	Sverdlovsk	295,000	239,000
295	Sverdlovsk	276,000	239,000
296	Alapayev	224,000	-
297	Irbit	187,000	258,000
298	Kamensk-Uralskiy	271,000	271,000
299	Kamyshlov	222,000	222,000
300	Krasnoufimsk	226,000	226,000
301	Kushva	208,000	283,000
302	Nizhniy Tagil	334,000	290,000
303	Pervouralsk	270,000	253,000
304	Serov	244,000	265,000
296	Asbest	-	279,000
Total		3,319,000	3,319,000

The results of reshaping the districts are reflected in Table 2. It is easy to see from them that deviations from the average number of voters in the current grid were +31 and -26 percent, and in the alternative grid were only +17 and -13 percent. The correlation of the largest and smallest districts was reduced to 1.3 and the coefficient of variation to 8 percent.

Thus, by some rearranging of administrative areas, they managed to cut approximately in half the differences between the size of the districts. In addition, the districts became much more compact, corresponding more to the intra-oblast economic regionalization. It is hardly possible to achieve greater correspondence of districts with one another without disrupting the administrative boundaries.

It would be a violation of the constitution to leave the existing grid for the next elections.³ The population census just conducted provides excellent opportunities for a radical revision of this division, and geographers should become actively engaged in this.

Certain Election Results. How can one explain the regional variations in the nature of the election campaign and in the voting results—the controversial nature, voters' interest in the elections, the social composition of the candidates running for office and of the holders of deputy mandates, the gap in the percentage of votes between the winner and his opponents? Some patterns can already be seen in the corresponding cartograms made later, although they were compiled according to data in the section of the ASSR's, krays and oblasts, and also union republics not divided into oblasts and, consequently, conceal the fever pitch of passions that raged in many electoral districts.

The connection between the peculiarities of the elections and the level of urbanization, sectorial structure of the economy, and the social composition of the population is obvious. Correlation, regression, and factor analysis, and other quantitative methods of research are opening up great opportunities for more accurate evaluation of these connections. Table 3 shows the results of calculations of pair correlations between variable characteristics describing the election results and certain socio-economic characteristics for the same territorial units, which were used in compiling the cartograms (A.I. Treyvish kindly provided part of the data). For sampling this dimensionality, the value of the statistically significant coefficients of correlation with a confidence range of 95.5 percent is 0.25.

Table 3. Coefficients of Correlation of Certain Characteristics of the Elections and Election Campaign with Socio-Economic Indicators by Oblasts

Number		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	Population according to 1989 census	1.00000							
2	Number of candidates from public organizations	0.60210	1.00000						
3	Proportion of urban population	0.45346	0.30086	1.000					
4	Average number of candidates per mandate for each territorial electoral district (TIO)	0.38707	0.37640	0.42020	1.00000				
5	Proportion of districts with 1 candidate for each TIO	-0.27322	-0.14957	-0.35719	-0.78732	1.00000			
6	Proportion of districts with 3 or more candidates for each TIO	0.24303	0.32441	0.35048	0.74250	-0.27552	1.00000		
7	Proportion employed in industry	0.27025	-0.04553	0.52829	0.15595	-0.17704	0.15863	1.00000	
8	Proportion employed in agriculture	-0.13136	-0.12108	-0.37377	-0.15326	0.11914	-0.14051	0.23071	1.00000
9	Proportion employed in science and scientific services	0.63904	0.76679	0.46230	0.35498	-0.16007	0.32667	-0.27908	1.00000
10	Proportion employed in management	-0.14385	0.48498	-0.35088	0.02127	0.12671	0.12418	-0.37077	0.26192
11	Proportion of individuals with higher education	0.56924	0.71792	0.48873	0.31753	-0.09938	0.35449	-0.05199	-0.31710
12	Proportion of CPSU members in population	0.32579	0.48932	0.51908	0.34520	-0.24660	0.34521	0.35306	0.03282
13	Proportion of voters participating in voting	-0.29136	-0.15964	-0.61479	-0.33403	0.25871	-0.31531	-0.15035	0.47391
14	Proportion of voters voting against all candidates	0.02871	-0.00605	-0.00153	-0.29281	0.25283	-0.21905	-0.04606	0.05871
15	Proportion of votes cast for winner exceeding 50 percent (by TIO)	-0.16451	-0.11279	-0.34146	-0.45132	0.61162	-0.13019	0.01613	0.18340
16	Average "rank" of winners by TIO	0.08687	-0.05718	-0.18187	-0.27626	0.37328	-0.10419	-0.00127	0.14684
17	Correlation of "ranks" of winners and losers by TIO	-0.19148	-0.01560	-0.41043	-0.50431	0.62760	-0.21515	-0.24492	0.10823
18	Average "rank" of candidates by TIO	-0.13952	-0.01639	0.09858	-0.06997	0.15415	0.05608	0.03672	0.05655

Table 3. Coefficients of Correlation of Certain Characteristics of the Elections and Election Campaign with Socio-Economic Indicators by Oblasts (Continued)

Number		9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1	Population according to 1989 census										
2	Number of candidates from public organizations										
3	Proportion of urban population										
4	Average number of candidates per mandate for each territorial electoral district [TIO]										
5	Proportion of districts with 1 candidate for each TIO										
6	Proportion of districts with 3 or more candidates for each TIO										
7	Proportion employed in industry										
8	Proportion employed in agriculture										
9	Proportion employed in science and scientific services										
10	Proportion employed in management	0.2088	1.00000								
11	Proportion of individuals with higher education	0.83008	0.22170	1.00000							
12	Proportion of CPSU members in population	0.52112	0.18062	0.47158	1.00000						
13	Proportion of voters participating in voting	-0.30689	0.24237	-0.30503	-0.12854	1.00000					
14	Proportion of voters voting against all candidates	-0.09067	0.03264	-0.14019	-0.05999	1.00000					
15	Proportion of votes cast for winner exceeding 50 percent (by TIO)	-0.25022	0.08722	-0.15713	-0.12549	0.32009	-0.15558	1.00000			
16	Average "rank" of winners by TIO	0.11463	0.11246	-0.12814	-0.11740	0.03183	0.22139	0.14749	1.00000		
17	Correlation of "ranks" of winners and losers by TIO	-0.11728	0.26904	-0.13179	-0.24183	0.19538	0.29166	0.69901	1.00000		
18	Average "rank" of candidates by TIO	-0.04825	0.12406	-0.01158	0.06482	-0.16076	0.20335	0.05266	0.54703	0.163886	1.00000

The authors have tried to find out whether the elections of part of the deputies from public organizations resulted in an increase in the representation of some regions at the detriment of others. The correlation analysis revealed the presence of pronounced connections between the distribution of deputies from public organizations by regions and the size of their population ($r=0.60210$). The lists of members of parliament from public organizations show that the place of residence of candidates was particularly carefully taken into account by trade unions and the Committee of Soviet Women. Such a distinct observance

of the principles of proportional representation of regions instinctively evokes associations with the bad memory of orders by sex, age, sectors, and so forth in the elections to the old Supreme Soviet. There clearly exists a certain contradiction between the democratic nature of elections of deputies by the governing bodies of public organizations and the proportionality of representation of regions. Its most radical resolution is the change to the Election Law proposed by many deputies by mandate of the electors. It calls for balloting all candidates exclusively by territorial and national-territorial districts.




Figure 1. Proportion of voters taking part in voting on 26 March 1989, by TIO on average by regions:

Key:

1. Less than 80 percent
2. 80.0-84.9 percent
3. 85.0-89.9 percent
4. 90.0-95 percent
5. Over 95 percent
6. Information not available




Figure 2. Proportion of voters voting against all proposed candidates on 26 March 1989, by TIO on average by

Key:

1. Less than 5 percent
2. 5.0-9.9 percent
3. 10.0-13.9 percent

The fluctuations in the number of deputies from public organizations by regions are generally associated with the high education level of the voters and the proportion of them employed in science, scientific services, and management. Together with the population figures, these factors account for three-fourths of the variation in the number of deputies from oblasts and republics.

The percentage of voters taking part in the elections indicates the activeness of the population in the elections, although by no means always directly. This is the very indicator whose almost utmost importance was considered for many decades by ideologists of the command-administrative system as a reflection of the completeness of its control over the consciousness of key people. Only in five republics did the percentage of those who voted remain traditionally high: Azerbaijan (98.5 percent), Georgia and Kirghizia (97 percent each), Turkmenistan (96.1 percent), and Uzbekistan (95.8 percent). It was somewhat lower in Tajikistan (93.9 percent), Kazakhstan (93.7 percent), the Ukraine (93.4 percent), Belorussia (92.4 percent), and Moldavia (90.5 percent); it was substantially lower in Estonia (87.1 percent), the RSFSR (87.0 percent), Latvia (86.9 percent), and Lithuania (82.5 percent). It was the lowest in Armenia (71.9 percent), which has not yet had time to recover from the severe earthquake.

The picture also appears quite mixed on the oblast level (Figure 1). Thus, for the RSFSR alone the scope of the fluctuations is over 20 percent—from 76 percent in Murmansk Oblast to 96.6 percent in Tambov Oblast. Two main electoral structures catch the eye: the zonal structure (North—South) and against its background the azonal or capital-city structure. The vast and for the most part sparsely populated northern regions, with a low percentage of voter participation (the Northwest, the northern and central Urals, almost all of Siberia, and the Far East), and the southern regions, with a high percentage of voter participation (this includes Belorussia, Central Russia, and Kazakhstan) clearly stand out. In the major urban centers, voter participation almost everywhere was 5-10 percent lower than in their surrounding oblasts. For comparison: Moscow Oblast—88.1 percent, Moscow—83.5 percent; Leningrad Oblast—84.7 percent, Leningrad—75.9 percent; Kharkov Oblast—96.8 percent, Kharkov—84.9 percent; Tashkent Oblast—94.7 percent, Tashkent—86.0 percent. A correlation analysis also confirms the pattern of territorial differences in the percentage of voter participation: its variation more than by half is explained by the percentage of urban population also employed in agriculture, and also by the average number of candidates per mandate.

The paradox of the situation is that the correlation of the percentage of voter participation with the relative number of citizens and individuals with a high education level is negative. This is a direct result of the previous elections that for more than a half-century held the plank of voter participation at a level of 99.8-99.9 percent. The relatively low percentage of voter participation indicates precisely the high social activeness in the corresponding

regions. It appears that this inversion is typical only for the first, initial stage of the transition to democratic elections. In the future, the percentage of voter participation will stabilize at some "socio-normal" level, and variations of this percentage will be directly and not inversely proportionate to social activeness.

Up to one-fourth of the voters in Tyumen and Murmansk oblasts and in Leningrad did not come to the electoral precincts. Those participating in the elections can be divided into three groups according to degree of activeness: 1) those who dropped invalid ballots in the ballot boxes (in our conditions, they simply did not mark anything on ballots with two or more candidates candidates); 2) those who voted against all candidates; 3) those who voted for one of the candidates. It is obvious that all three groups are represented only where there was a choice of more than one candidate. The data on the second group of those voting were the most informative. In the first group, the correlation between those who consciously cast invalid ballots and those who did so out of ignorance, inattention, or complete indifference; the third group included both active voters who had "their own" candidate and conformist-traditionalists.

Therefore, it is quite important to analyze the distribution by regions of the second group of voters who voted "against everyone" (Figure 2).

It is noteworthy that the proportion of "negative"-voters, the results of voting for party leaders of krays and oblasts, the percentage of voter participation, and the degree of competition in the elections vary roughly equally by territory in basic terms. The relative number of those voting "against everyone" is greatest in highly urbanized and capital oblasts. It was up to 10.3 percent in Moscow (9.4 percent in Moscow Oblast) and up to 7.65 percent in Leningrad (7.2 percent in Leningrad Oblast). And this was with a choice of the greatest average number of candidates. At the oblast level, such oblasts as Amur, Tomsk, Lvov, and Brest oblasts, and also the Latvian SSR stand out. The correlation of those voting "against everyone" with the total number of voters is most significant not in all districts and, of course, not on the average for a region, but only in districts with two or more candidates. In some of the districts, 35-40 percent of the voters expressed distrust toward all candidates (in Moscow Oblast's TIO No 45, in Leningrad's Kolpino District No 52, in Tomsk TIO No 313, and so forth), and for Poltava Oblast's Kremenchug TIO No 505 even 51.1 percent of the voters did so.

But, certainly, the reasons for such behavior of voters in various regions differ. The small number of "negative" voters may also indicate a distinct division of sympathies and antipathies among the electorate and also that the candidates skillfully conducted the election campaign and won the trust of voters (for example, in Lithuania, Estonia, and Arkhangelsk Oblast). This is yet another confirmation of the need for extremely cautious handling of election statistics in which the same indicator is often the result of various causes.




Figure 3. Average Number of Candidates per Mandate for a TIO as of 26 March 1989 on the average by regions:
Key:

1. Districts with 2-3 or more candidate are predominant, and the average number of candidates in the districts exceeds 2;
2. Districts with 2 candidates are predominant, and the average number of candidates is 1.5-2.0;
3. Districts with 1 candidate are predominant, and the average number of candidates is 1-1.5;
4. Districts with 1 candidate are show exclusively.




Figure 4. "Intensity" of Political Struggle in Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies on 26 March 1989 by TIO on the average by regions. Amount votes cast for the winner exceeded 50 percent:

Key:

1. 0-5.9 percent;
2. 6.0-13.9 percent;
3. 14.0-22.9 percent;
4. 23.0-29.9 percent;
5. Over 30 percent;
6. Information not available.

The degree of competition in the elections is reflected by the average number of candidates in one electoral district of a region and the percentage of TIO's with one candidate and also with three or more candidates. All these indicators are closely intercorrelated (see Table 3); Figure 3 shows their spatial variation. This cartogram isolates all the same regions where the population has a high sociopolitical activeness: the Baltic region, the Northwest, the Urals, Western Siberia, the Far East, and also their capitals and their oblasts—Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Alma-Ata oblasts. Here there were almost no districts with one candidate against whom the broad masses of voters spoke out sharply. Under pressure from representatives of labor collectives and territorial voters' groups, the district electoral commissions more often left a large number of candidates on the ballots, leaving it up to the voters themselves to single out a candidate from them. In the elections on 26 March, a record number of candidates ran for election in Moscow's Gagarin District—12; one of the Leningrad districts "became famous" in the repeat elections with more than 30 candidates on the ballots. A runoff is virtually inevitable with such a large number of candidates.

It is striking that in entire oblasts (mainly in Kazakhstan, the Central Asian republics, and also in Tuva ASSR and

Bryansk Oblast) there was not a single district in which the elections were uncontested.

The similarity of the territorial distribution of indicators of competitiveness and the comparatively low level of voter participation is also confirmed by the correlation analysis. These indicators are most closely related to the percentage of citizens and individuals in the population with higher education.

This also largely explains the geographic differences in the "successfulness" of voting (the correlation of districts where the elections were concluded on 26 March and those in which it was necessary to hold a runoff or repeat elections, which also ended up with a runoff in some cases). It was possible to declare winners on 26 March in 590 of the 790 TIO's in which elections were held. A runoff was held in 46 districts, in each of which more than two candidate ran for office. Repeat elections were ordered in 113 districts in which 1-2 candidates ran for office and none received the necessary majority. There was 1 candidate on the ballot in 196 districts. For national-territorial districts for the country as a whole, the corresponding indicators were 636, 30, and 84 (in 2 of them the elections were considered invalid, since less than half the registered voters took part). There was 1 candidate on the ballot in 203 districts.

Table 4. "Successfulness" of Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies by Territorial Districts

Republic, Region	Number of TIO's	Election Results					
		Number of Districts			Percentage of Total Number of Districts		
		Deputy Elected on 26 March	Runoff	Repeat Elections	Deputy Elected on 26 March	Runoff	Repeat Elections
RSFSR	403	298	35	70	73.9	8.7	17.4
Northwest	40	22	9	9	55.0	22.5	22.5
Central	87	64	10	13	73.6	11.5	14.9
Volga-Vyatsk	23	18	-	5	78.5	-	21.5
Central Cherno zem	22	17	1	4	77.3	4.5	18.2
Volga	45	34	4	7	75.5	8.9	15.6
North Caucasus	44	34	1	9	77.3	2.3	20.4
Urals	54	42	3	9	77.7	5.6	16.7
Western Siberia	41	33	3	5	80.5	7.3	12.2
Eastern Siberia	24	19	-	5	79.2	-	20.8
Far East	20	13	3	4	65.0	15.0	20.0
Kaliningrad Oblast	3	2	1	-	66.7	33.3	-
Baltic Republics	22	19	1	2	86.3	4.6	9.1
Belorussian SSR	28	19	2	7	67.8	7.2	25.0
Ukrainian SSR	143	118	4	21	82.5	2.8	14.7
Donetsk-Dnieper	61	45	2	14	73.7	3.3	23.0
Southwest	62	54	2	6	87.1	3.2	9.7
South	20	19	-	1	95.0	-	5.0
Moldavian SSR	11	8	-	3	72.7	-	27.3
Transcaucasian Republics	39	38	-	1*	97.4	-	2.6*
Kazakh SSR	41	35	2	4	85.3	4.9	9.8
Central Asian Republics	63	55	2	6	87.3	3.2	9.5

*TIO No 734 of the Armenian SSR. Elections were not valid, since less than half of the voters entered on the voting lists participated.

As can be seen from Table 4, the least number of territorial districts in which elections were limited to "one round" on 26 March were in the areas with the greatest competitiveness of the election campaign: in the Northwest (the minimum indicator in the country), in the Far East, and also in Belorussian and Kaliningrad Oblast. Conversely, Transcaucasia, the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Urals, and the Southern and Southwestern Ukraine stand out for their high "successfulness," although the reasons for this differ. In the Northwest and Central regions, the percentage of districts in which runoffs were ordered is clearly higher than in other regions, which reflects the numerous districts with a large number of candidates.

The diagrammatic map in Figure 4 shows the **degree of unanimity of voters by regions** of the country, assessed as the proportion of votes received by the winner above the mandatory threshold of 50 percent. Naturally, this indicator alone is clearly not enough to analyze the intensity of the pre-election campaign, which can be judged only on the basis of a much deeper study of the course of events according to local press materials and, probably, conversations with participants in the elections. Nevertheless, the unanimity of voters when voting makes it possible in the most general terms to judge the intensity of the election campaign.

As on the other cartograms, the average indicators were taken for the TIO's of autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts. The picture is the same: Regions stand out where the most candidates were nominated per mandate and a runoff was conducted more often—the Northwest, Far East, Eastern Siberia, and to a somewhat lesser degree Western Siberia, the Urals, Latvia, and also a number of oblasts of the Donetsk-Dnieper region of the Ukraine. On the contrary, in Central Russia and the Volga region, in Transcaucasia, in many oblasts of the Ukraine, and in the republics of Central Asia, as a rule, the elected deputies greatly surpassed their opponents in the percentage of votes received.

A correlation analysis showed a comparatively close connection of the degree of unanimity of the voters with the percentage of urban population and the average number of candidates per mandate. And this is understandable: The higher the degree of urbanization of an oblast, the greater the average number of candidates on the ballot by districts and the smaller the winner's edge. This pattern is also confirmed by the calculations for the TIO's of the capitals of the union republics and Leningrad. The election campaign was considerably more intense in all these cities than in the surrounding oblasts, which was also reflected in the insignificant edge the winners had over opponents.

In the initial commentaries concerning the elections, the press repeatedly pointed out that the voters clearly gave a preference to candidates holding a rank-and-file or low official position. To check this hypothesis, all candidates by TIO's were rated by points depending on position in the management structure. The points ranged from 1 to

6. One point corresponded to a rank-and-file position not associated with any leadership functions (arc welder, milker, physician; scientific associate, writer, and so forth); two points corresponded to a position in the lower levels of management (brigade leader, chief physician, department chief, officer, and so forth). The rank of leaders of enterprises (directors, kolkhoz chairmen, and so forth) was given three points. In exceptional cases, when it involved especially large enterprises of union importance or gorkoms of capital cities, the rank of candidate was given four points. However, four points were mainly given to key positions of the oblast level of management (obkom secretary, oblispolkom chairman, military district commander) and also leaders of public organizations and "ordinary" ministries. One point was added to any of these positions if the candidate was a member or candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee as of election day. The positions of leaders of key union ministries or departments of the CPSU Central Committee were given five points; the position of member or candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was given six.

The calculations showed that the hypothesis about a negative reaction to rank or position in the management structure resulted mainly from the "loud" defeat of a number of prominent leaders, many of whom lost to ordinary citizens. However, such cases were by no means predominant, and on the average throughout the country the rank of the winner was 1.5 times higher than that of the loser. Of course, such a result only roughly reflects the essence of the matter, since the leaders' higher chances were also determined by the fact that they were more widely known and had greater opportunities to organize their election campaign.

The picture of the deviations the country's average 1.5-fold higher rank of the winner is instructive (Figure 5). The negative reaction to high official status was vividly demonstrated in the northern and eastern regions of the country—in the northern oblasts of the European territory of the USSR, in the Urals, in Siberia, and in the Far East. The picture is radically different in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, where the rank superiority of the winners proved to be so strong and general that this instinctively suggests the thought of excessive "over-organization" of the elections.

Contrary to widespread opinion, the hypothesis on the unfavorable attitude of voters toward "chiefs" in the Baltic region was not confirmed—possibly due to the fact that the calculations were done only by TIO's, the number of which there is relatively small. In the rest of the parts of the country an orderly geographic picture was not observed, but here too there were considerable deviations from the average in both directions. The reasons for these deviations can be explained only in the next stage of the analysis, with a more detailed study of specific situations.




Figure 5. Correlation of "ranks" of winners and losers in elections to the Congress of People's Deputies by TIO on average by regions:

Key:

- 1 More than 2;
- 2 1.5-2.0;
- 3 1.2-1.5;
- 4 1.0-1.2;
- 5 Less than 1;
- 6 Information not available

The regional average rank of the winner by TIO is correlated statistically reliably with the average percentage of districts with a single candidate (it is known that many leaders became deputies in precisely this manner). Even more noteworthy is the high coefficient of correlation (0.63) with the same variable of average rank of the losing candidate. Voters in many districts rejected the practice of nominating a candidate with no alternative; it reminded them too much of recent times and ran contrary to the policy of democratization of public life. The negative correlations of the average rank of the loser with the percentage of urban population and average number of candidates per mandate are also quite high (0.41-0.50). Prominent leaders lost more often in cities with their overheated election campaign.

Special importance in the results of voting for candidates with a high official position was attached to speeches at meetings of first secretaries of CPSU kraykoms and obkoms, who virtually everywhere advanced their own candidacy. The results of voting for them make it possible, if not to measure, at least to assess qualitatively the sociopolitical, economic, and ecological tension in the region. They may object to us that this involves the voters' subjective assessment of the business and human qualities of specific people. But that is not the only thing. It is not likely that many voters are able to assess the

personality of first secretaries, since the majority of them only recently took up this key post. It seems that the first secretary most often personified for the voters the entire management structure, bearing the burden of responsibility for the general state of affairs in the region.

The distribution of regions according to the percentage of votes cast for first secretaries reveals an interesting phenomenon (Figure 6). In the West, such distributions usually have the appearance of a "hat" with a low brim and a two-humped crown in the middle, with us it is a "kepi with a pompon." The observed cases are distributed fairly evenly, increasing from 0 to 100 percent at one rather unexpected local maximum, accounting for the level of 50-60 percent. It is curious to note that only one first secretary collected from 45 to 50 percent of the votes, just missing the minimum necessary for victory; the results of eight secretaries fell in the adjacent range of 50-55 percent (a small excess).

A geographic analysis of the voting for oblast party leaders indicates an extreme compactness and fusion of the areas of "victories" and defeats (Figure 7). Whereas the former are practically all situated below 55 degrees, in areas of old development, the latter encompass the vast and predominantly sparsely populated spaces of the Northwest and North of the European territory of the USSR, Siberia, and the Far East. Besides the pronounced




Figure 6. Distribution of electoral districts in which party leaders were on the ballot, by frequency of percentage of votes cast for them.

zonal factor in voting for first secretaries, an azonal factor was also clearly apparent: Voters of many large industrial, scientific, and cultural centers, including most capitals, did not express trust in the first secretaries of gorkoms and mayors (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Alma-Ata, Kishinev...). Why? Was it due to the special sharpness of the gap between development of the production and social sphere, or due to the higher

social activeness of the population and the greater dissatisfaction with the pace of perestroika and its results in the economy? A special analysis is needed to find the answer.

As a rule, many collectives in various rayons of a kray or oblast nominated party leaders for deputies. What districts elected the leaders? In Figure 8, the districts in which first secretaries were on the ballot are divided into three groups: those in the oblast (kray, republic) center; those relatively near it; and those on its distant periphery. The points corresponding to districts of the first group fall in the inner ring in the diagram; districts of the second group fall in the boundaries of the second ring; and districts of the third group fall in the outer ring. The curved spiral line, dividing the middle and outer ring into two parts, shows the correlation of urban and rural population of a district. The percentage of urban population (only oblast-subordinate cities were counted) is reflected by the shaded area. The inner circle, naturally, is shaded entirely, since all the population of the corresponding districts is urban.

As can be seen from Figure 8 and Table 5, the majority of first secretaries clearly preferred the outlying and rural



Figure 7. Results of voting for first secretaries of CPSU kray and oblast committees and central committees of union republic communist parties, 26 March 1989. Percentage of votes cast for party leader:

Key:

1. Over 90 percent (passed with enthusiasm);
2. 80.0-90.0 percent;
3. 60.0-79.9 percent;
4. 50.0-59.9 percent;
5. Won, but precise information not available;
6. Less than 50 percent (did not win);
7. First secretary did not advance his own candidacy.




Figure 8. "Spatial tactics" of first secretaries of CPSU kraykoms and obkoms, and central committees of communist parties of union republics not divided into oblasts.

Key:

1. Urban population;
2. Rural population;
3. Wins;
4. Losses;
5. Uncontested;
6. Contested;
7. percentage of urban population;
- I. Center;
- II. Near periphery;
- III. Distant periphery.

districts to the urban districts, especially in oblast centers. It can hardly be considered a coincidence that about 90 percent of the winning leaders were uncontested, while more than 80 percent of those who lost struggled

with other candidates. An oblast leader running for office in an outlying district with predominantly rural population in the absence of an alternative candidate had virtually a 100 percent guarantee of success.

Table 5. Types of Territorial Districts in Which First Secretaries of CPSU Kraykoms and Obkoms and Communist Party Central Committees of Union Republics Ran for Office*

Types of Districts	Party Leader Not Elected		Party Leader Elected		Total
	Contested	Uncontested	Contested	Uncontested	
Oblast Center	3	1	2	6	12
Near Periphery					68
Predominantly urban population	7	1	2	9	19
Predominantly rural population	6	1	2	40	49
Distant Periphery					58
Predominantly urban population	1	1	-	5	7
Predominantly rural population	6	1	3	41	51
Total	23	5	9	101	138
	28		110		

*138 electoral districts, in which first secretaries ran for office, out of 177 were examined.

Conclusion. Geography can and should offer society, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, soviets of various ranks, and other social structures a number of constructive theses and developments. The most important and urgent is, obviously, a radical revision of the division of districts on the threshold of elections to soviets of various levels. We should reject attempts to cram electoral districts into a Procrustean bed of administrative-territorial division on the oblast, rayon, and probably in many cases, republic level. This will make it possible not only to implement in deed the fundamental principle of "one person—one vote" but also to intensify the integration processes in society outside the framework of today's territorial-command structures.

It is absolutely essential to immediately begin gathering socio-cultural and economic statistics for electoral districts. We should, apparently, develop a district passport and organize this work on a national scale, publish necessary information in a timely manner, and continually update it.

The first thing that should be published right now is detailed information on the course and results of the elections in all their phases, beginning with the nomination of candidates and district meetings to all voting by districts and, possibly, groups of precincts. We also should eliminate all other, besides divisions of districts, possibilities of failure to observe territorial fairness during the course of elections (in large cities, for example, during the district meetings people working on the territory of the district but not residing there weeded out candidates, but it is the exclusive prerogative of those whom the candidates represent to vote for them, that is, those residing in the district).

As regards the "internal" interests of geography, expanding work on electoral geography should, apparently, proceed along the path of moving from a formal-statistical analysis to a qualitative analysis, from a general description to an explanation, to a full-fledged political-geographic regionalization. Organizing the appropriate term papers and graduation theses in geography departments of the country's universities and pedagogical institutes can provide invaluable assistance in gathering detailed information in the local press, by means of polls, and so forth. All this information should be incorporated. We should strive to create a nationwide data bank and publish a fundamental, continually updated reference book like the ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS. We have to hope that in our country, as in others, a special periodical will be published that sheds light on the activities of the Soviet parliament, with detailed minutes by which one will be able to judge the political behavior of the elected officials and the results of roll-call voting.

We are at the source of a new, important direction in domestic geography. It can become prestigious and influential, but much depends on how thoroughly and considerably geographers judge the political process, how

substantive and useful their conclusions and recommendations are, how large a group of enthusiasts will be able to become involved in research on this subject, and how successfully they are able to coordinate it.

Footnotes

1. In the last 10-12 years, electoral geography in foreign materials has also developed successfully in our country, which is reflected in a number of publications and also in defense of dissertations.

2. It was established long ago and reliably that the dominant social group exerts much influence on the entire territorial community. As a result of this, many representatives of other groups vote the same in elections, thereby predetermining the considerable differences between the actual voting results and the expected results based on a study of the social structure of the voters. In recent years, British geographers and sociologists, based on materials of their own country, have been able to disclose rather convincingly the essence of this unique political function of locality (see, for example, [1, 5]).

3. We will note that in the United States, after a number of lawsuits resulting from protests against the unfair division of territory into electoral districts, in the mid-1960s the Supreme Court established that the number of voters in the districts should not deviate more than 1 percent.

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Leningrad Party Organization Draft Program

90UN0026A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Sep 89 p 2

["Offered for Discussion: The Draft Program of Actions of the Leningrad Party Organization for Deepening Perestroika in Contemporary Conditions"]

[Text] The CPSU began perestroika under the influence of deepening contradictions in social life: in conditions of increasing crisis phenomena in the socio-economic and political spheres, culture and morals; and in the party itself. The party has proclaimed a policy of renewal of socialism, imparting to it a humanistic and democratic content. Radical economic and political reforms, expansion of glasnost, and activization of social and cultural life have become the practical realization of the CPSU's strategic line.

The path of perestroika has turned out to be a great deal harder than it was originally supposed. In spite of obvious positive achievements in socio-political life, which have received the support of the people, no tangible results have been achieved in the socio-economic sphere. The crisis has not only not been surmounted, it continues to worsen. Changes are being made slowly and inconsistently; quite often incompetent, erroneous decisions are taken. The break-up of the administrative-command system is not being accompanied by an increase in economic independence and the creation of effective forms of self-administration in manufacturing and in social life. The standard of living of the populace is declining; law and order is not being reliably maintained; executive and labor discipline have gotten worse; and problems of inter-ethnic relations, the ecology and culture have become acute. Dissatisfaction and fear for the fate of the country and socialism have begun to dominate the public consciousness. All these processes are also present in Leningrad and in the Oblast.

The complex economic and domestic political situation has damaged the prestige of the CPSU. Its leading role and its ability to overcome the difficulties of the transitional period are in doubt. The lack of a purposeful, scientific conception of party renewal and a program of actions which would correspond to contemporary conditions and the work of all its links and electoral organs are holding back perestroika. The processes of social political development insistently demand developing new CPSU Charter and a new CPSU Program.

On the basis of proposals expressed at gatherings of the party aktiv, at many primary organizations, and in letters from Communists and non-party workers, a joint plenum of the Leningrad Oblast and City CPSU Committees has decided it is necessary to submit for public discussion the draft Program of Actions of the Leningrad Party Organization for Deepening Perestroika in Contemporary Conditions.

In the Area of Politics and Ideology

1. IN PRACTICAL work, to proceed from the fact that the CPSU, being in its class essence and ideology the party of the working class, shall work out on a democratic basis a strategy for developing the country, and put it into effect through its members; shall express and defend the fundamental interests of the entire Soviet people; and shall be the consolidating factor of the progressive forces of society on a socialist basis.

At the present time there are no objective prerequisites which require that Soviet society develops along multi-party lines. The CPSU possess sufficient potential to work out and conduct policies in the interests of the absolute majority of the Soviet people. Under these conditions, attempts to establish new political parties are false in nature and do not promote the consolidation of society.

The party's ideological platform is constructed on the basis of creative interpretation and elaboration of Marxism-Leninism, which support the ideological and organizational unity of the communists.

2. TO CARRY OUT further, uninterrupted development and enrichment of the concept of socialism, taking into consideration at-home and international experience of socialist construction—placing at the basis such principles as freedom from exploitation of man by man and continual perfection of socialist productive relationships; guaranteeing all-round development of the individual as the condition of free development of all of society; equality, fraternity and friendship among the nations of the USSR; the guarantee of the rights and liberties of the citizens, and social justice; and strengthening Soviet power, and a law-governed socialist state.

3. TO SUPPORT the activity of various social organizations and movements of the workers, standing on the platform of perestroika and renewal of socialism; as partners in social self-administration, Communists working in social organizations and within the movements must make use of their prestige and influence to enlist them for cooperation with the CPSU in carrying out economic and political reforms, in the formation of Soviets of People's Deputies, and in giving a decisive rebuff to extremist, antisocialist elements. They bear party responsibility for conducting party policy in these social organizations and movements.

4. TO CONSIDER the Komsomol a youth organization which stands on the same political platform as the CPSU. And to build relations with the Komsomol on the basis of close practical interaction, without petty interference in the internal affairs of Komsomol organizations. And, to speak out decisively against any attempts to isolate the Komsomol from the party, and support by every means the political prestige of the Komsomol among the young people.

5. WHILE IMPLEMENTING its policy with respect to trade unions, to proceed from the fact that this social

organization has been summoned, along with the soviets of labor collectives, to defend the interests of the workers and forestall possible conflicts in production, and not to permit group egoism and solving the problems of some categories of workers at the expense of others. This policy shall be conducted through the Communists, and above all—those elected to the trade union organs, by means of rendering them every assistance in working out strategies and tactics for their actions.

6. PROVIDE extensive information to the public on the most acute problems, and above all on questions of production and distribution of material goods, social justice, the ecology and housing construction, and the struggle with crime; in order that the citizens of Leningrad might know which problems can be solved today and which in the future; who is responsible for solving them, and who is hindering their solution.

Projects which touch upon the interests of all the citizens of Leningrad should be accepted only after expert social analysis is conducted; and, when the situation requires—referenda. It is recommended that communist-deputies of the Leningrad Oblast and City Soviets speak out as the initiators of the adoption of the Statute on Referenda in Leningrad and in the Oblast.

Party committees are obligated to systematically study public opinion and take it into consideration when working out and implementing their policy.

7. IN RELATIONS with the mass information media, refrain from nit-picking and issuing orders. At the same time make mass information media, party committees and journalists increasingly responsible for objectivity, adherence to principle, and constructiveness in illuminating the processes of social life. Communist-journalists should be strictly guided by party principles and communist ideology, and systematically putting into effect the policies of the party organizations.

Re-examine the structure of the mass information media in Leningrad and in the Oblast; do this in accordance with socio-political needs, and strengthen the cadre staff. Increase the role of the public in the work of the editorial boards, and expand the practice of journalist meetings with the working collectives.

Support the efforts to resume publication of the magazine LENINGRAD, to develop the cable television system, and open new newspapers for regions, creative societies, and trade units, and to publish a VESTNIK OF THE OBLAST CPSU COMMITTEE, VESTNIK OF THE LENINGRAD SOVIET, and VESTNIK OF THE LENINGRAD OBLAST SOVIET.

8. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING the right of every individual to freedom of conscience, and rejecting administrative suppression of dissidence, wage an uncompromising ideological struggle with anti-communism, propaganda of war and oppression, nationalism and chauvinism, and with other anti-human views.

Intensify the propagation of the ideals of Soviet patriotism and internationalism, and strengthening the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Inculcate respect for the State flag and other symbols of the USSR and union republics, and for the interests and spiritual needs of the various nationalities and nations. Establish national cultural centers, and organize the publishing of the corresponding periodical publications and literature.

Establish politology centers for party committees on the facilities of the CPSU Obkom Political Education Building, the Leningrad Party History Institute, and the political education offices of the CPSU gorkoms and raykoms.

9. CATEGORICALLY reject attempts to falsify the historical significance of the Great October Revolution, and tendentious revelations of the life and activities of V.I. Lenin. Make the propagation of the ideas of V.I. Lenin, the study of his theoretical legacy, and the struggle with opportunistic and revisionistic interpretations of Leninism your most important tasks.

Restructure the work of the museums of V.I. Lenin and the Great October Socialist Revolution in propagating Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary traditions of the Soviet people, and set up political clubs connected with them.

10. SPEAK OUT against attempts to insert bourgeois political and moral ideas into the minds of Soviet youth under the guise of de-ideologizing public education. Display constant concern and attention toward the process of training cadres of teachers and instructors. Focus attention on the all-round development of the young people's creative initiative; on enriching their spiritual life; on inculcating patriotism and love for the Motherland and work; on restoring the traditions of collectivism, mutual assistance, feelings of compassion, and pride in their city. It is considered wise to introduce optional courses on the history of Leningrad and local lore at academic institutions. Public opinion should be oriented toward increasing the responsibility of families for the education of their children, and on rendering every assistance to children's homes. Develop a Childhood Program.

11. PARTY PROPAGANDA and ideological-educational work shall be directed toward the revival and expansion of revolutionary, labor, civic and patriotic traditions, and toward raising the intellectual level of the citizens of Leningrad. Rely extensively on the creative intelligentsia in this noble cause, and support their initiatives in every way.

Ensure the personal participation of communists, social organizations, amateur associations, and the entire population in restoration of the historical objects of Leningrad and the oblast. Support public initiatives on establishing a special fund for these purposes in connection with the preparations to celebrate the 300th anniversary of our city.

12. **DIRECT** the efforts of communists working in the court, procuracy, militia, justice, soviets of working collectives, people's control, trade-union and Komsomol organizations toward changing and stabilizing the operational situation in Leningrad and in the oblast. Render every assistance to the temporary committees for struggle with crime and embezzlement in the state and cooperative sectors of trade and the services sphere.

Render genuine assistance to internal affairs authorities in solving social problems, in technical supply, and in strengthening their cadres.

13. **WHILE AGREEING** with the political line of the CPSU Central Committee to provide for the national defense at a level of wise sufficiency, and acknowledging in this connection the necessity for fundamentally restructuring the army—wholesale and unfounded besmirchment of the army and belittlement of its service to the socialist Fatherland is considered impermissible. Ties of mentorship with military units and subunits shall be strengthened; their capabilities for patriotic civic education of the young people and preparing them for military service shall be employed more extensively, while displaying concrete concern for the housing and living conditions of the servicemen, veterans of the army and navy, and internationalist troops, supporting their public defense, and preserving the heroic traditions of the nation.

14. **FOR FURTHER** democratization of the political system, it is deemed wise to:

- update the clauses of the USSR Constitution which define the status of political and social organizations, to include the CPSU itself;

- speed up the adoption, after nationwide discussion, of the laws on the status of people's deputies, the press, young people, trade unions and social organizations;

- introduce changes to the Law on Election of People's Deputies of the USSR, which exclude the elections from social organizations and the conduct of district pre-election meetings; and,

- bring Soviet legislation into line with the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Man.

In the Area of Democratization of Intra-Party Life

1. **RESTORE** a Leninist understanding of the principles of democratic centralism and ensure complete freedom of discussion and unity of action after adoption of resolutions. Take minority opinion into consideration as they submit joint reports on this or that problem, and alternative draft resolutions. A communist has the right to publicly defend his point of view, even when it does not coincide with a resolution adopted by the majority, providing it does not contradict the CPSU Program and Charter. At the same time, carrying out party decisions remains his primary obligation.

2. **WHILE ATTRIBUTING** a more democratic character to the interaction of party and economic organs, and relying upon methods of persuasion and party discipline, the right of control by party organizations of the actions of the administration shall be considered an additional responsibility of the communists working in administrative and economic positions, for carrying out the party line in the collectives.

3. **MAKE IT THE PRACTICE** to hold annual bureau reports at party committee plenums, as well as for members of elected party organizations at the meetings of party organizations to which they belong, where if necessary the question may be raised to remove them from membership in the higher party committee.

4. **PARTY** organizations shall examine in a principled manner the attitude of communists toward carrying out the provisions of the CPSU Charter and Program, and remove from their ranks people who lack moral scruples or who have compromised themselves.

5. **ABOLISH** the nomenklatura approach to solving cadre questions. It is considered pointless for elected secretaries to be approved by higher party organs, which bring pressure to bear on the solution of cadre problems by indirect participation in the electoral process.

6. **ALL FORMS** of financial and material support for relieved members of elected party organs and their staff shall be carried out by decision of party conferences, plenums and meetings, with strict oversight by inspection commissions, and keeping the communists informed.

7. **PROCEEDING** from the conception that the division of functions of the party and the state is the basis for strengthening the political prestige of the CPSU in society, the principal task of the party organizations is to carry out the political line through the communists working on the staff of the Soviets of People's Deputies, reserving to the party committees the right to criticize the resolutions taken by the state organs.

The question of combining the posts of party committee first secretary and chairman of a Soviet at all levels shall be resolved in accordance with the concrete conditions which obtain.

8. Communists shall consider preparations for coming elections to republic and local Soviets of People's Deputies a **PRINCIPAL** task. Support the nomination to Soviets of communists who enjoy the confidence of the public, who uncompromisingly defend socialist values.

9. **ELIMINATE** parallelism and duplication in the work of oblast and Leningrad city party committees after examining proposals submitted, including proposals for their amalgamation, combining the positions of first secretary, and making the CPSU gorkom directly subordinate to the CPSU Central Committee.

10. **WHILE SUPPORTING** the creation of an RSFSR republic party organization and holding its inaugural

congress, the idea of turning the CPSU into a confederation of union republic parties is rejected. The CPSU must remain a single party with a single Program and Charter.

11. INTRODUCE the practice of reports by Leningrad communists—CPSU Central Committee members and People's Deputies of the USSR—on their work in these organs at meetings, plenums, and conferences of party organizations, and in the mass information media.

12. FOR THE PURPOSE OF strengthening the processes of democratization in intra-party life, it is deemed necessary to introduce the following changes to the CPSU Charter:

-At meetings and conferences, at the same time that collective organs of leadership are elected, conduct direct elections on an alternative basis of party committee and bureau secretaries at all levels, and also delegates to conferences and congresses. A communist may not be simultaneously a member of two elected party organs;

-Party organizations and their supervisory organs shall independently define their structure, and the periodicity of holding meetings, plenums and conferences;

-Primary party organizations shall retain up to 50 percent of the amount of the dues of the communists for use in their own budget;

-City and rayon party organizations shall independently establish and utilize their own budget, including deciding questions on the number of party officials relieved and their salaries; and shall establish, in accordance with the norms, the deductions for higher party organs, and redistribution of a part of the funds for party organizations with few members.

-Selection for the party shall be conducted in consideration of the opinion of the working collective, without limitation on age and social composition of the party replacements. Young people up to 25 years of age may enter the ranks of the CPSU on an equal basis; at the same time the provision may be applied, that the recommendations of the elected Komsomol organ and the recommendation of a single CPSU member are equal;

-Primary party organizations shall make the final decision on accepting candidate CPSU members, and on examining their individual cases. Party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms shall examine them only in case of appeal or upon their own initiative. Subjecting persons to party liability who have committed crimes not punishable under criminal law shall be carried out after the court's verdict is delivered;

-A communist may leave the party on the basis of personal declaration, or by decision of the primary party organization, examined by the CPSU gorkom and raykom;

-CPSU gorkoms and raykoms, with mediation by primary party organizations shall, in individual cases

(advanced age or chronic illness), on the basis of the personal declaration of party members, take a decision on relieving them from the payment of membership dues and mandatory attendance of party meetings.

13. APPEAL to the CPSU Central Committee with the following proposals:

-On suspension of the existing instructions on intra-party questions and working out temporary rules to remain in effect until the adoption of a new Charter by the 28th Party Congress, by which the party organizations will be guided;

-On holding a CPSU Central Committee plenum this year for discussing questions of intra-party life, and the procedure for formulating a draft Charter and Program of the CPSU for their subsequent examination at the 28th Party Congress, bearing in mind the possibility of its being held earlier; and also for publishing the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the congress, not later than six months prior to its opening.

In the Area of Socio-Economic Policy

1. Every communist shall consider his most important obligation the realization of the party's socio-economic policy on the basis of further improvement of the economic mechanism, introduction of progressive economic relations, increasing responsibility for the results of labor, strengthening discipline and organization, and forming a sense of participation in the cause of perestroika for every worker.

Increase the role of moral stimuli for inculcating an honest, conscientious attitude toward labor, and strive to convince everyone that he cannot live better than he works.

2. **INTRODUCE** for discussion of Leningradites in October 1989 the conception of the transition of the Leningrad national-economic complex to regional cost-accounting, self-administration and self-financing, which stipulates that the solution of social questions is a priority, as well as further development of the multifaceted forms of social property, and acceleration of scientific-technical progress. Work out a comprehensive program for converting the defense sectors of industry.

3. **WORK OUT**, utilizing the creative potential of Leningrad scientists, well-founded proposals on fundamental questions of the party and government's socio-economic party at the contemporary stage of perestroika. Formulate a conception of stabilizing the financial situation in the country, the strategy and tactics of the struggle with inflationary processes, and perfection of the pricing mechanism.

Submit these proposals for public discussion.

4. In order to improve services to the populace, **DECENTRALIZE** the administration of housing and municipal services, trade, public catering, health-care, education and other spheres of the social infrastructure, by means

of expanding the economic independence of administrative regions, and transferring to them a number of the functions of the Leningrad oblast and city executive committees. At the same time re-examine the existing structure of their party organizations, as well as the system for forming the budget and the material-financial basis of city and rayon organizations. As an experiment, transfer as early as 1990 a number of the rayons of the city and oblast to economic independence and self-financing.

5. Within the framework of the conversion underway, organize at defense-industry and machine-building enterprises, a complex of additional manufactures of equipment for Leningrad enterprises of the food, light and medical industry, and agriculture. Ensure increased output of foodstuffs, consumer goods and services for the populace, at the same time paying special attention to articles in the children's assortment, as well as products for poor citizens, pensioners, invalids and veterans of war and labor.

6. WORK OUT and introduce for the discussion of Leningradites additional measures to support fulfillment of the Housing-2000 Program. Establish the necessary benefits for enterprises and organizations in carrying out construction and repair of apartment houses and subsequent occupation of the spaces constructed or repaired. Implement further improvements to the technology and organization of the construction industry; in particular, radical improvement in the volume of poured-cement housing construction, the development of housing complexes, creation of joint enterprises, and so on. Make use of all available capabilities to enlist the assets of enterprises, private citizens and foreign firms for housing construction and repair.

7. TAKE extraordinary measures to improve sanitation and public utilities in the city and the oblast, improving the citizens' standard of conduct, and restoring Leningrad traditions in this matter. Develop a mechanism of economic, administrative and social influence on the responsible officials and citizens of the city who permit violation of the utilities rules and the norms of sanitary conditions.

Organize the constant supervision of Soviet, party and social organizations over the observance of these requirements.

8. CONSIDER the real improvement of the standard of living of all strata of the populace a task of paramount importance.

Every initiative of working collectives, social organizations and formations and private citizens to offer real financial and other assistance to the poor strata of the populace, until the USSR Supreme Soviet adopts the appropriate legislative acts, merits the all-round support and attention of the communists.

Render support to the creation of social funds for help and assistance to veterans of the party, to the survivors

of the Leningrad blockade, to invalids, and to poor families. Work out special programs to solve the housing and social problems of the blockade veterans, and the labor and living conditions of women, and aged and widowed people.

9. SUPPLY cooperatives and state enterprises on an equal basis. Prior to the introduction of changes by the USSR Supreme Soviet to the USSR Law on Cooperation, local organs of Soviet power shall implement measures to regulate the cooperative movement. Carry out their re-registration. Close the cooperatives, the activity of which is based on receiving unearned income, increasing speculation, aggravating the socio-economic situation, and destabilizing the financial situation. In the struggle with corruption, establish strict social control and the required legal liability for specific responsible individuals for the soundness of their decisions on registration or refusal to register new cooperatives. Regulate the work of Scientific Youth Creativity Centers and cost-accounting enterprises set up by Komsomol organs, while at the same time forbidding those types of mediation activity which are not connected with their immediate purpose.

10. ESTABLISH a network of small shops and manufactures in every administrative rayon of the oblast for processing meat, dairy and vegetable products, and for baking bread and biscuits, for the purpose of satisfying the estimated needs of the urban citizens and especially the rural populated places for these products.

Ensure that in the course of the year, desks are established at practically every enterprise for ordering food and extremely scarce manufactured goods, cookeries, and a well-developed network of domestic services.

11. WORK OUT an economically-sound regional program for stimulating agricultural production. In order to improve the supply of food to the population of Leningrad and the Oblast, taking into consideration the real state of the Leningrad agro-industrial complex, collectives of industrial enterprises, construction, transport, scientific and planning organizations, academic institutions and cooperatives must take a concrete role in carrying out the Food Program, and continue to render effective sponsorship aid to the workers of the countryside.

At the same time, take the greatest advantage of progressive experience in mutual relationships which have taken shape with the state farms of the oblast and the Baltic Steamship Lines, the Leninets Scientific-Production Association, and a number of enterprises and organizations of Vasileostrovskiy Rayon.

Increase the supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods to the populace of the oblast up to the level of Leningrad.

12. WORK OUT, with the assistance of Leningrad scientists and specialists, proposals for a unified conception of health-care in the country and the Leningrad

region; discuss them with the public; and expand the struggle for a healthy way of life.

Place all medical institutions on an equal footing, regardless of their departmental subordination; make use of diagnostic and other medical technology concentrated in the medical centers and institutes, for the needs of the broad strata of the populace.

13. CHANGE the evolved approaches to the solution of ecological problems. At the same time pay more attention to public opinion. This very year, ensure the establishment of a unified scientific ecological conception for the use of the natural environment in the region; and planning organs are to consider its condition when working out tasks for the 13th Five Year Plan.

Enterprises and agencies shall take the necessary measures to improve the state of health of the environment, to introduce waste-free technology, eliminate ecologically-harmful manufactures, and rapidly construct purification facilities. Do not permit construction of new projects by any department, if environmental protection measures are not carried out at its existing enterprises. Putting new industrial capacities into production is unacceptable if they form sanitary-protection zones, which require the evacuation of existing houses and the relocation of schools and children's institutions. Establish a system of priority financing of environmental protection and environmental restoration measures.

Both economic administrators and specialists, and the public at large shall consider all-round improvement of ecological standards a most important factor, which determines the rate of restoration of the natural environment.

14. In order to strengthen the socio-economic situation of the Leningrad region, introduce the following proposals to the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets:

- On approving the concept of switching the Leningrad region to cost accounting;

- On granting the Leningrad region the rights of a union republic with respect to resolving economic and social problems;

- On re-examination and revocation of a number of previously-adopted resolutions on the siting and construction of industrial projects in Leningrad and in the Oblast, with the exception of enterprises which produce consumer goods, and direct the capital investment and capacities of the construction organizations thus freed, to the solution of the most acute problems in the socio-cultural sphere; and,

- On the reconstruction of the historic center of Leningrad.

THE PRESENT draft is submitted for public discussion for the purpose of offering an opportunity to all the citizens of Leningrad to take an active part in drawing up the program of actions of Leningrad Communists at the

stage of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, and also preparations for the elections of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and local Soviets.

New Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice Appointed

90UN0359A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 p 1

[Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the appointment of V.G. Tikhinya as Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice, 27 October 1989]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees that Comrade Valeriy Guryevich Tikhinya is appointed minister of justice of the Belorussian SSR.

Comrade V.G. Tikhinya: born 1940, Belorussian; CPSU member since 1969; higher education: doctor of jurisprudence, professor.

He began his course of labor in 1956 as a clerk at the people's court of Vasilevichskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast.

In 1963, after graduating from the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin, comrade V.G. Tikhinya worked as a scientific associate at the Belorussian SSR scientific research institute of legal expertise; as head of the Belorussian State University criminology laboratory, as assistant procurator for Leninskiy Rayon, Minsk; then as assistant procurator for the city of Minsk; since 1972, as procurator for Leninskiy Rayon, Minsk. He has been engaged in teaching activity at the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin since 1974. In April 1983, he was elected dean of the law faculty, and in 1986, he was appointed prorector for academic studies.

He has state awards: the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, a medal "For Valiant Labor," "In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of V.I. Lenin," and a certificate of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Belorussian SSR Appoints New Publishing Chief

90UN0359B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 p 2

[Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the appointment of I.P. Makalovich as chairman of the the Belorussian State Committee for the Press, 27 October 1989]

[Text] Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the ratification of the Belorussian SSR Presidium Ukase "On the Appointment of Comrade I.P. Makalovich as Chairman of the Belorussian State Committee for the Press."

The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet decrees:

To ratify the 24 August 1989 Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase on the appointment of Comrade

Ivan Petrovich Makalovich as chairman of the Belorussian SSR State Committee for the Press.

Belorussian SSR Appoints New Chief Arbiter

90UN0359C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 p 2

[Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the appointment of V.V. Boyko as chief state arbiter of the Belorussian SSR, 27 October 1989]

[Text] Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the ratification of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Ukase on the Belorussian SSR chief state arbiter.

The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet decrees:

To ratify the Ukases of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium:

Of 24 August 1989 on the release of Comrade Vladimir Nikolayevich Isaychev from the position of Belorussian SSR chief state arbiter in view of his transfer to other work;

Of 6 October 1989 on the appointment of Comrade Vladimir Vasilyevich Boyko as Belorussian SSR chief state arbiter.

Georgian Buro Names New Cadres Chief

18300858

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA reports on November 11 that the Georgian Central Committee Buro confirmed Nugzar Razhdenovich Sadzhaya as chief of the Organizational Party Work and Cadres Department. Sadzhaya is a deputy to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and a candidate member of the Georgian Central Committee Buro.

Latvian SSR People's Control Committee Role During Election Period

90UN0150A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 1 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with Latvian SSR People's Control Committee Chairman, Z. Aushkap: "Improving the Public Arm of People's Control" by a LATINFORM correspondent]

[Text] Perestroika is underway in the people's control organs, just as it is in other segments of society. Organizational and procedural questions which received too little attention earlier now have acquired an important significance now.

The restructuring process requires a broadening of democracy, abandonment of formalism, and strict observance of the law. How these aims will be achieved during the election campaign is the subject of a LATINFORM

correspondent's discussion with Z. Aushkap, chairman of the Latvian SSR People's Control Committee.

[Correspondent] What are the provisions for conducting election campaigns in the people's control committees, groups and offices and how do they differ from election campaigns in party and public organizations?

[Aushkap] As everyone knows, people's control committees, groups and offices in enterprises, institutions and organizations and on collective farms are the country's public arm of people's control. According to the law "On People's Control in the USSR", committees, groups and offices are elected for a period of two or three years. The last elections in these organs were held in 1986. In view of the expiration of the term of office of these committees, groups and offices, the Central Committee of the CP of Latvia supported the proposal of the Latvian SSR People's Control Committee to hold these elections from October to December of this year. City and rayon party committees and primary party organizations have been ordered to take an active part in this important campaign, ensuring that the election of these local arms of the people's control system are conducted on a genuinely democratic basis everywhere, in an environment of widespread openness and fundamental analysis of work which has been done, and determination of specific measures to increase the effectiveness of people's control in resolving the problems of perestroika in every labor collective.

In party, trade union, komsomol and other public organizations, the leadership organs report and are elected only at meetings of the communists and trade union and komsomol members.

People's control committees and groups are the elective organs of labor collectives and enterprises, collective farms, and institutions and organizations. They are elected only at labor collective meetings or, whenever general meetings cannot be called because of production considerations, at conferences of labor collective representatives or, on collective farms, at meetings of authorized representatives.

It is presumed that all public organizations, labor collective councils and economic managers will take an official interest in the organization of labor collective meetings and conferences and in the discussion and resolution there of questions about people's control activities.

[Correspondent] Toward what should the goals of the present election campaigns of the people's control committees, groups and offices be directed? What kind of tasks should be set?

[Aushkap] First of all, toward detailed, self-critical analysis of what has actually been done by the committees, groups and offices with regard to how effective their control activities have been under new control and management conditions.

Secondly, for the forthcoming period, these meetings and conferences must define for the people's control organs specific tasks which derive from the state of affairs in enterprises, institutions and organizations and on collective farms, from the resolutions of the 19th All-union CPSU Conference, from the Latvian CP Program of Action "On the Path to Latvian Sovereignty", and from the law "On the Economic Independence of the Latvian SSR". In doing this, the recommendations and critical observations expressed by the workers must be taken into consideration and carried out.

The elections should promote renewal of the work of the people's control organs and development of the initiative of the people's controllers to combat loss and waste, breaches of labor and technological discipline, and displays of bureaucracy, preferential treatment and the consigning of state interests to oblivion. The efforts of the people's controllers must be directed toward resolution of the problems of setting the economy of the republic on a path to economic independence, introducing new economic management methods and cost accountability, accelerating scientific and technical progress and resolving those pressing social issues which worry people, especially protection of the environment, construction of housing and other social projects, and improvement of workers' medical, commercial and everyday services.

A critical examination at these meetings and conferences of the style, form and method of work of the committees, groups and offices is important, keeping in mind that they must act more quickly and systematically to eliminate shortfalls and improve the competency of the people's controllers to carry out economic analysis and take control of agro-industrial activities. An important objective of all arms of people's control is to react sympathetically to the recommendations and observations of workers and regularly to inform the labor collectives about their work.

Finally, the election campaign should serve to strengthen the people's control committees, groups and offices in the future through the election of more principled, competent and active workers, collective farm workers and specialists.

[Correspondent] Have there been any kind of new recommendations on organizational improvement of the local farms of the people's control organs such as their structure, number, and the like?

[Aushkap] Yes, there have been. For instance, the CPSU Central Committee regards favorably the recommendation of the USSR KNK to consolidate public control in enterprises, institutions and organizations and on collective farms into a unified organ—the people's control committee (or group), if party, trade-union, komsomol and other public organizations agree. This means that, instead of numerous control formations such as the control committees and groups of party and trade union

organizations and the "Komsomol Searchlight", a unified control organ will be created and include representatives of public organizations. An experiment to create such an organ in enterprises and on collective farms in the republic has been underway since February of last year. At the present time, there are more than 60 such people's control committees and groups in the republic. It should be noted that they have presented themselves favorably. I can mention here the people's control committees and groups of the "Rigas Tekstils" production association, the everyday services combine of the Bauskiy rayon, the "Draudzib" collective farm, the "Uzvar" fishery collective, and others.

Further, labor collectives, with due regard to certain conditions, have the opportunity to determine for themselves the structure of the people's control organs and how many there will be in the production subdivisions of enterprises, collective farms, institutions and organizations. The collective itself decides whether or not groups are needed in a shop or offices in a district, on a farm, in a department, and so on.

Cities have a new opportunity to create at the initiative of their citizens territorial people's control groups under the housing operations and housing microrayon organs to control the status of communal, commercial, medical and everyday services and the work of cultural and educational establishments on the issues of organizing public services and amenities and the ecology.

With the agreement of agricultural labor collectives, in the territories of rural Councils of People's Deputies where there is one collective or state farm, unified control organs may be formed under the rural Soviets which would execute control with due regard to the interests of both labor collectives and all citizens living within the territory of these Soviets.

Practically, this means that a meeting of a state or collective farm labor collective, having heard the report of the people's control group, must decide whether to re-elect the farm group or transfer its functions to the people's control group of the rural council. In the latter case, it is advisable to simultaneously decide the issue of the slate of candidates for the unified group under the rural council, the composition of which will be organized by a session of the rural council immediately after elections to the local councils.

[Correspondent] In conclusion, is there anything else to which you would like to call our attention?

[Aushkap] With the broadening of democracy and independence for the enterprises, collective farms and organizations, the initiative of the labor collectives has risen sharply in all areas of public, political and economic activities, including improving control. Restructuring of the activities of party organizations is underway and their methods of direct interference in economic matters are outdated. The functions of trade unions are being revised and the frank opinion has been expressed that they should be freed from the direct organizational work

connected with economic problems. Under these conditions, the role of the people's control organs in enterprises, as forms of public control envisioned by the constitution of the Latvian SSR, should increase sharply. They will work in close co-operation with labor collective councils [STK] on an equal footing to solve general problems of both social and economic development. It is expedient to recommend that the head of the people's control committee or group be a member of the STK.

With the aim of improving their control over and the organization of continuous and effective work for the unified control organs which they establish, many collectives are finding ways to provide full-time chiefs for the control organs and to pay him additional wages. This pays for itself.

Lately, the practice of electing the leadership from all ranks on an alternative basis has become widespread. We also recommend that experienced organizers in positions of authority and competent and principled workers, both communist and non-communist, knowledgeable about the requirements of restructuring in new ways to direct control affairs, be elected on an alternative basis everywhere as representatives of committees and groups and heads of offices.

The elections of the public arm of people's control now coincide with the election campaigns in party and komsomol organs and with the preparation and conduct of elections to the local Councils of People's Deputies. This naturally causes certain difficulties. For this reason, labor collectives and their party and other public organizations need to plan in detail the conduct of this measure over time in order to abandon formalism and guarantee a business-like atmosphere at the meetings and conferences.

Besides this, I appeal to all labor collectives and their public organizations, and rayon and city KNK organizations to conduct the elections of people's control committees, groups and offices in an organized manner, and to ensure widespread openness in the conduct of these campaigns. They should take specific measures to ensure that there is no delay in including our elective organs in work to exercise practical control, to strengthen state, industry and labor discipline and to eradicate all violations or breaches of this discipline. Training for people's controllers in the forms and methods of control work in an environment of economic independence and cost accountability should be organized right away.

LPF Congress Attendees Share Post-Congress Impressions

90UN0259 Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 11 Oct 89 pp 1, 3

[Interviews with LPF congress delegates and guests: "To Make Friends"]

[Text] Valdis Shteyns (Latvian Social-Democratic Workers Party).

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Valdis, how do you evaluate the current LPF [Latvian People's Front] congress? What was special about it?

[Shteyns] This congress went much more quietly and evenly than the first one. I think the reason for this is that it was delayed somewhat—by about 3 months. Today, we are simply setting our course for independence.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Yet on the eve of the congress, there was talk about lines being drawn in the LPF...

[Shteyns] Yes, the liberal communist wing of the People's Front continues to maintain the leading position in the Front. But we must not be in opposition to each other, since both the Movement for [Latvian] National Independence [DNNL], and the LSDRP [Latvian Social-Democratic Workers Party], and the "Helsinki-86" group are also components of the LPF. All of us together—this is the People's Front. The LPF cannot be a party; this is a movement, this is a "roof" for all democratic parties and organizations. And no one can forbid us our participation in this movement; no one has the right to judge whether or not I am suitable for participation in the People's Front.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] The LPF today is indeed heterogeneous, but the discussions take place relatively calmly, without excess emotion...

[Shteyns] All the heat fell on the discussion during the preparation of the draft program documents. This time, in the editorial group for developing the drafts there were representatives of almost all trends in the LPF. And then we were able to find compromise decisions, so that we achieved what is ours.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] The LPF's first steps after this congress?

[Shteyns] I think that we must define the algorithm for forward movement, think through a tactic for executing our decisions step by step. This is the cause of the Front's committees.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] What do you see as the task of the Social-Democrats in the LPF?

[Shteyns] A normal politicizing of society has taken place over the past year; people have understood where they should be, who is who. One came to the social-democrats, another to the "greens," and yet another to the Workers Union. We filled the niche for social-democratic ideas in the LPF which had been empty up to now, and we will continue our political activity in this direction. Moreover, the People's Front somehow forgot about youth, so we undertook the organization of youth, and mending relations with the Workers Union...

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Valdis, what do you see as the future of the Latvian People's Front?

[Shteyns] We nevertheless wish for the LPF to be set up on the level of a parliamentary structure. From general totalitarian thought to discussions and parliamentary struggle. If the LPF wants to survive and develop, then such a path is the only one.

Tatyana Zhdanok (International Front of Latvian SSR Workers)[Interfront].

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Tatyana, at this congress you represent the print organ of IF [International Front of Latvian SSR Workers]—the newspaper YED-INSTVO. Your personal impressions of the LPF congress?

[Zhdanok] It should hardly be expected that any principle questions be resolved at the congress—the draft of the new LPF program bore a purely declarative stamp (as those speaking at the congress confirmed). I would like to hear some constructive proposals, particularly from the economists; I myself was dissatisfied with the LPF economists' speeches; many questions remain. Thus the impression is that this congress was more for resolving some organizational issues, issues of personal ambitions, and divvying up portfolios.

There is no argument that the congress delegate had one goal—the course for an independent Latvia. Yet it remains finally unclear, what do they understand this to mean and how do they intend to reach this goal? To a certain degree, Interfront has the same goal: the republic's independence, sovereignty, and freedom. These same goals are also written in the party's recent documents. So it seems to me that today it is very important to find good economists who could work out a program of Latvian independence on the level of the republic government, regardless of how the portfolios are divided in public political organizations...

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] At the congress, as a representative of IF, you found yourself at the center of the delegates' attention, you had great deal of extended contact with the members of all possible organizations. What did you discover that was new for you?

[Zhdanok] New? I was simply convinced once again that we must all search for a dialog. And we may come to a dialog only through personal human contacts. In "one on one" conversation, all the features given us by the mass information media are removed, the stamps, the images of enemies... At this congress, I understood once again that despite the labels stuck on IF members, during conversation with the LPF members we were able to find a common language. The most important thing is the desire to understand one another and to find points of contact.

Eynars Repshe (Movement for Latvian National Independence)

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Eynars, what is your opinion of the speech of Daynis Ivans?

[Repshe] In my view, Ivans faithfully expounded the path covered by the People's Front, and assessed the possibility of achieving our goal—the renewal of democratic, independent Latvia. He paused primarily on the third version, which he himself considers the best—changes in the structure of power, the structure of the state at all levels—not only in Latvia. I also think that democratization in Latvia is linked to this process in other regions of the Soviet Union as well, so encouraging democracy in all regions of the country may give us many like-minded people, who in turn, at a certain point, will support our aspirations as well. Our common enemy is the structure which has in 70 years brought Russia, and in 40 years, Latvia to the point of ruin.

I fully approve of the aspiration of Ivans for unity within the Latvian People's Front. It is always more correct to make friends than enemies. A schism in Latvia's democratic movement on the principle of being more radical or less radical may damage the common cause. The aspirations of the radicals and the centrists in the LPF are hardly mutually exclusive. We have a very serious common base: democracy, independence, human rights... This is a platform for consolidation.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Whom would you like to see in the Front's leadership?

[Repshe] I feel that the Front chairman is a symbolic figure, which must reflect the mood of the front. The main thing is that the figure be elected by the working LPF Duma.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] On the street alongside the building in which the congress is taking place, there are picketers. Some of them are holding signs with demands for purging the LPF Duma, the entire movement, of communists. What do you think of such demands?

[Repshe] The thing is that communists have smothered society for a fairly long time; they have planted enough of their ideology, therefore, a portion of the people are justifiably fearful that it will be the same way in the People's front. That is possible even today, since we do not live in a democratic society, and forced pressure of the Communist Party upon the LPF is quite possible. People are afraid that this will make Latvia a second Albania or Romania. But I believe in the irreversibility of the process of democratization, I believe in common sense, and therefore I cannot agree with such slogans.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] the Movement for Latvian National Independence [DNNL] "drove" the People's Front to the idea of independence. What role will the DNNL play in the Latvian People's Front in the new year?

[Repshe] The role of constructive opposition to the LPF, the role of a constructive partner. The time for slogans has passed. Our task is to find constructive solutions as to how to extricate the republic from the crisis. The very intense work of competent people must begin. I, for

example, am afraid that my political, economic, and legal competence today are insufficient for resolving the serious problems. I myself must grow; all members of the movement must grow; they must understand that no matter how loud we shout, nothing will change. A scream is not enough. We must seek independent economists, legal scholars, and other specialists.

We must seek new friends, supporters of independent Latvia. And convince the residents of all nationalities living in the republic that independence is necessary for everyone. We will persuade them through science. And give precise guarantees for the future...

Mavrik Vulfson (LPF Duma member)

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] In your view, why was the congress gathered? The main issue it was called upon to resolve?

[Vulfson] The congress was conditioned by the same reasons which forced the review of the LPF program. First of all, this is the growth of the influence of the People's front and at the same time, the complications which came to exist within it. The LPF is an extremely heterogeneous organization. The influence of the radical wing has grown markedly of late. Secondly, we came up against a fairly complicated reaction on the part of the center. For myself personally, I can say that I felt the desire of the center, first and foremost, of Mikhail Sergeyevich himself, with whom I have the opportunity to converse from time to time, to understand our problems. In the Baltic republics, Gorbachev sees the support for his progressive aspirations. Yet in my eyes, even these aspirations are not always simple. This is probably explained by the fact that he is all the same forced to take into consideration certain circles in our country, and that he cannot overcome some sort of barrier within himself. On the other hand, steps such as the CPSU Central Committee Declaration on the Situation in the Baltics put the People's Front on the alert, and force one to think about how the situation could go when the forces against the Baltics' further movement toward political and economic independence gain the upper hand. Even though Mikhail Sergeyevich told me that a common line had to be drawn, and that his speech at the Central Committee plenum should be viewed as his basic position. But this is in personal conversation that a common line may be drawn, and the Declaration has all the same sown its seed. So we have alarm and skepticism toward how the center is going to regard our further aspirations. All of this has required of the People's Front that its positions be defined.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] To which wing or grouping do you belong?

[Vulfson] I would not assign myself to any definite group. I am in general a person who thinks more realistically than many of his colleagues. But all the same, in all conversations, both here and in Moscow, on all levels, I emphasize that I invest in the concept of a nation's

self-determination the nation's right and practical exercise of this right to separation. So in this matter I do not distinguish myself from the radicals. But in the practical sense, I favor a search for sensible compromises.

Peteris Lakis (LPF Duma member)

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Do you see in the future the formation of the LPF into a party?

[Lakis] I do not think so. The political spectrum is nevertheless broad. It is in general difficult to speak of the creation of a political party under our conditions. We do not know at all how political parties function. In fact, we have had no experience since 1934. I think that the People's Front must be preserved since today this is the only real opposition to the existing system.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] If the disagreement between the center and the radicals deepens, is it possible that need will arise for lines to be drawn?

[Lakis] In my view, even today there are in the LPF members who have overstepped all bounds of the permissible. Let us say, Yanson, who, at the Freedom monument called for all communists to be hanged. Or Vidinsh, who declared that the LPF is an organization whose creation was inspired by the Central Committee and the Cheka. Then I have a question: Why would a man certain that the LPF is inspired by the Central Committee and the Cheka still be sitting, and agree to sit in this organization's Duma? But you see, this is a normal process. There are things like this in any organization. It is another matter to evaluate all this in time.

Let us take what is happening in Moscow. Here we have one Yanson at the monument, and there "Memorial" openly screams at a 3-hour rally about Jews and Latvians and everyone who should be hanged right then and there.

The congress completed its work at 7:00 on 9 October. The Duma and chairman elections, the refinement of the program and the adoption of the resolution lasted all night. Naturally, the television broadcast was shut down. The commission counted votes all night. They had to verify 140,000 names. An open microphone was set up in the auditorium at this time. The discussion continued. The counting commission's report was given on the radio in the morning. Daynis Ivans became the chairman of the LPF Duma; Ivars Godmanis became deputy chairman. The membership of the new Duma will be published in the next issue of ATMODA. The newly-elected Duma members held a press conference at 11:00. We offer the reader fragments from it.

The newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA: There exist three concepts for achieving independence. The LPF concept: outside of the USSR through a transition period. The DNNL—by tomorrow. The Latvian Communist Party: sovereignty within a framework of federation. Some concepts must lose in the elections. Who would you like to see lose?

Daynis Ivans: The question's accent seems incorrectly positioned. We do not speak of who is winning or losing in our relations with the DNNL. I do not see any antagonistic contradictions in our positions regarding the concept of independence. And the Communist Party of Latvia has a concept of limited sovereignty. This is not independence, although it is already a great step forward in the program lines of the Latvian CP. True, these lines do not meet with understanding in Moscow. But how to resolve this issue is already an internal party affair.

Yuris Dobelis: The DNNL proclaimed in the first days of its existence that it sees the future of the peoples of Latvia only in an independent state outside the borders of the USSR, but maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other countries. But this does not mean independence tomorrow. We are talking about methods to achieve it.

The magazine RODINA: What kind of Latvia are you in favor of, an internationally recognized Latvian Republic or a new state founded upon the status quo?

Daynis Ivans: As came about in Lithuania, our Supreme Soviet must recognize Latvia's entry into the USSR as illegal. But we must construct a principally new state. The old cannot be taken and mechanically restored. The construction of a new, free, democratic Latvian society is in our program.

The newspaper NEFORMAL (Grodno): How do you plan to build relations with the people's fronts and democratic movements in the country?

Ints Tsalitis: We have established contacts and exchange of information with many movements. We cannot cover our path alone on the scale of Latvia. We must rally all democratic forces. Only thus can such an abnormal formation as the forced empire be disassembled. And that process has already begun, thanks to the informals movement.

The newspaper YEDINSTVO: A question for Daynis Ivans. Do you consider CPSU membership status to be compatible with being in an organization which is declaring the restoration of a bourgeois republic?

Daynis Ivans: I do not know of a single country in the world today which could be called bourgeois. In that sense, the world has gone further than Marx and Engels supposed. It is also time for us to reject the ideological dilemma: capitalism—socialism. We are building a new state conscious of the fact that we have had our own statehood.

Thus, the second LPF congress adopted a new program. It affirms a course toward the restoration of Latvian state independence. The LPF presents the future Latvia as an independent, democratic, parliamentary state. The path to achieving independence has been defined—without force, parliamentary, and democratic. A new

situation has been fixed in the program—a period of transition to a new independent state.

Ukrainian CP CC Plenum Speeches Published

90UN0332A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
20 Oct 89 pp 2-3

[Speeches at the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum held 18 October 1989: "To Profoundly Analyze the Situation and Creatively and Successively Carry Out Party Nationality Policy"]

[20 October 1989, pp 2-3]

[Excerpts] As was already announced, on 18 October a Plenum of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee was held. It examined the question of convening the next 28th Congress of the Ukrainian CP, the tasks of the republic party organizations in carrying out the decisions of the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum as well as the organizational question.

Reporting on the first and second questions was the First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee V.A. Ivashko.

Participating in the discussion of the debate were 16 persons. Their speeches are given below.

Ya.P. Pogrebnyak, first secretary of the Lvov Party Obkom:

At present, our plenum is examining very important questions of fundamental significance for the republic's future. The CPSU Platform and party nationality policy under present-day conditions are, as we see it, a sort of breakthrough in analyzing the theory and practice of nationality relations and they establish a reliable foundation for further creative search. These questions were set out constructively in the report given by V.A. Ivashko.

Among the range of problems of an interethnic nature, the core one which brings together all others is the problem of the development of our nation, the rebirth of a federation of a multinational state, the providing of a new economic and political content for it, and the extending to the republics of all rights corresponding to their status as sovereign socialist states. Here it is essential to decisively eliminate the deformations in interethnic relations.

Let us take our western region and the city of Lvov. For a whole series of questions it has its own historical, political and economic features and does not resemble the specific features of the other regions of our republic. Individual problems here have arisen and built up over decades. At present, these have been complicated by the perestroika processes and it would be a major error not to consider this by us and by the Union, the republic party and state bodies.

With all the positive changes which have occurred in the Western lands over the 50 years, it still must be said that the rush and distortions in carrying out collectivization, the unjustified repressions and deportation of people at the end of the 1930s and in the 1940s, including the intelligentsia, the party and state aktiv, and the violating of personnel policy even now make themselves felt in the Western Ukrainian lands and this must be constantly considered. These and other painful, tragic events are being played up by individual leaders and figures in the informal organizations and by separate destructive, extremist forces. They are endeavoring to revise the Soviet federation and promote the idea of confederation. Voices are heard about the national separateness of the Ukraine and the rehabilitation of the OUN [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists] Movement.

The party oblast organization condemns such actions. Recently the plenum of the party obkom called on all the communists in our oblast to consolidate their forces, to deal a decisive rebuff to such manifestations, to conduct extensive explanatory work among the public and win and reinforce our socialist positions. Although, to tell the truth, all of this is not going easily in the course of the complicated and diverse perestroika processes being carried out in our country.

In this context I would like to recall at present the timely words by the inspired thinker Ivan Franko who over a hundred years ago in the article "On Socialism" wrote that "the idea of socialism leads, ultimately, to the closest fraternity (federation) of humans with other humans and peoples with other peoples as the free with the free and the equal with the equal." These words of our compatriot are applicable to the present.

It must be said that perestroika in all spheres of social life and the new political thinking have brought about an unprecedented rise in national awareness and—this we cannot help but notice—heightens the interest in the history of one's region and republic and in the development of the culture, language, folk traditions and customs. Here I would like to emphasize that in the Western oblasts these are particularly touchy questions.

In the minds of the people a reassessment and reevaluation are occurring for the complicated, life-affirming and often tragic past of the Western oblasts of the Ukraine. This is particularly tangible now, during the year of the 50th anniversary of the annexation of the Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR as part of the USSR. The unforgettable historical event became a decisive step in the unification and consolidation of the Ukrainian people and it is of great political importance for all the workers of the nation. I would like to turn to the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee with a proposal that this holiday must be celebrated not only in the Western oblasts. This is a holiday of our entire republic. I feel that in addition to those measures which we should carry out in our Western oblasts, this should also be made a holiday on the republic level. The 40th anniversary of the annexation was celebrated by the

entire republic and the entire nation. The ideological and political feedback from this was extremely great. Of course, at present it is a more complicated period but still the jubilee must be celebrated widely and this was discussed at a recent plenum of our oblast party committee.

The nationality question has always been acute and sensitive, particularly in our oblast as well as certain other oblasts. An objective assessment of the deformations of socialism, the rehabilitation of the unjustifiably repressed and the restoring of needlessly forgotten names will make it possible to separate the nationalistic attitudes, however small these may be, and the political adventurism in interethnic relations from a real, true national rebirth.

In implementing the party platform on nationality policy, in our republic we must practically solve specific questions which actively influence nationality conscience, internationalist feelings and the political life of the Ukraine. These are the problems of a truthful assessment of national symbols, the recognition of the Ukrainian language, the status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and collaboration with the NRU [People's Movement of the Ukraine]. These have moved to the forefront in political work in the Western oblasts of the Ukraine.

I know all the republic oblasts and have worked in different regions. I would like to say that the difficult questions which presently exist in the Western oblasts are not to be found in the other ones, although there, of course, are problems as well. These require greater militancy, activeness and a thoughtful, constructive attitude on the part of the social scientists and everyone who should work to stabilize the situation.

It must be said that the lack of clarity of the positions and ultimately the not always thought-out approaches both by the oblast party committee as well as the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee have slowed the stabilizing of the ideological situation. There should be a solution to these problems or at least clarity. There can no longer be a delay.

Granting the Ukrainian language the status of an official one and broadening the sphere of its official use in the practice of the party and state bodies are an immediate task for today and this would eliminate a whole series of acute problems, in particular, for our region.

Here we have already spoken about the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The general lack of clarity over what should be done with this church has caused the faithful to be nervous and at present there are many of them, this influences the interethnic relations and injects tension in the religious milieu which is largely in support of perestroika. Clarity must be provided on this question in order to eliminate the tension.

We are maintaining the necessary dialogue with an absolute majority of the informal associations. This is

essential under present-day conditions. In addition, we must maintain relations with the progressively inclined figures working in the People's Movement.

For the UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Alliance], its leaders are moving to outright confrontation with the party and soviet bodies, they are instigating others to carry out antisocialist, anti-Soviet actions and are calling for political strikes in the aim of destabilizing the situation. And this, of course, demands decisive actions from us and from the Central Committee and the party committees.

We are doing little to study and propagandize drawing on the new ideas and the history of the Ukraine. From the republic social scientists, the broad public is expecting well-supported, balanced studies and materials on Kievan Rus, from the age of Bogdan Khmelnytskyi, the history of the KPZU [Communist Party of the Western Ukraine] and on certain other questions. This will provide an opportunity to prevent speculation over little-studied questions of history.

It is also essential to review publishing in the Ukraine so that the publishing houses and specialized journals—of course, in giving due to Russian—contribute to the dissemination of the Ukrainian language. We must organize the mass output in the mother tongue of literature which is in increased demand, the classics of the world's peoples and books on art. I feel there is a need to set up an Ukrainian nationality publishing house for the representatives of the non-Ukrainian nationalities living in the republic and increase the publishing of books in their languages.

I would also like to support the opinion that we must open up a network of Ukrainian consulates abroad and above all where compact groups of Ukrainians live and establish cultural, economic contacts with them.

The process of the establishing of national awareness acutely raises the problem of a national cultural rebirth. A good initiative in this area has been started by the ideological department of our Central Committee. Correspondingly the Lvov oblast party committee is carrying out an oblast Culture Program and is presently working out a regional national rebirth program from socialist positions. Positive steps have already been taken in this direction. Recently, museums have been opened for progressive figures such as Krushelnitskaya, Manastyrskiy and others, a children's choir school and a whole series of other institutions. We are establishing contact with our creative intelligentsia which in its majority defends socialist positions.

In speaking about a national cultural rebirth, we also have in mind the problems of satisfying the cultural and linguistic needs of all nationalities residing in the Lvov area. It must be said that a national rebirth is inconceivable without relying on a sound economic base. We realize this and are doing everything possible so that neither the manifestations of the specific political situation in the Lvov area nor the difficulties of the transitional period become an obstacle for socioeconomic

change. An important component part in the style of party work is comprehensiveness and the ability to see each problem simultaneously in the political, ideological, economic and social aspects. A program has been worked out for the integrated socioeconomic development of the oblast for 1989-1995. It considers the natural resources, the demographic and ecological situation, nationality, ethnic and historical conditions.

Such an approach has made it possible to halt the negative trends of previous years, to overfulfill the quotas of the five-year plan and meet the quotas of the republic and Union programs. Here the share of allocations for social purposes has now risen from 18 to 35 percent in the total capital investments.

We are presently working on a program for regional cost accounting. Work is being carried out also in this area in the republic but there should be more initiative. All those bodies which have raw materials have now set up Union concerns for fuel and for metal. Why can't we, in having a great raw material base, establish our own republic concerns which would operate for the benefit of the republic economy?

We recently proposed establishing an energy-producing construction association. This has not been received with understanding and an Union association has now been organized. We should raise the authority of our republic in these questions.

We would also like to point out the importance of the Carpathians Program. The rebirth of the Carpathians—this pearl of the Ukraine—we see in establishing a national reserve, a republic park, a place where people can come together from different areas of the Ukraine.

At present, it is important to return to the Leninist attitude toward nationality cadres. In the oblast we have provided the necessary representation of the main nationalities in the elective bodies, their staffs and among the economic leaders. Here the party committees and the primary party organizations pay primary attention to the qualities of the individual and his political maturity.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee must decisively revise cadre work and provide representation of all the republic regions in the republic bodies. This is very important, since the CPSU Central Committee is now doing this.

I feel that it is essential to refocus the work of the republic superior party schools to training professionals in party work and the emphasis must be put on a profound study of political economy, sociology, psychology, history and, possibly, even speaking skills. The party workers often lose out now at meetings not being able to provide information on the positive things we are doing.

I feel that to a certain degree we must change the work style of the personnel of the Ukrainian CP Central

Committee. In our view, there still is much office work. The Central Committee secretaries and workers should support the oblasts with their knowledge, experience and vital contacts and do their share in the difficult situation.

We must certainly publish a VESTNIK TsK KOMPARTII UKRAINY and establish sociological services under the higher party schools and in the regions.

A solution to these and other questions which at present are being seriously discussed at our plenum will help in better resolving the interethnic questions and the questions of the rebirth of the Ukraine and all the Ukrainian people. This is very essential now during this complex perestroika period.

M.A. Orlik, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers:

I share the position and support the acuteness with which V.A. Ivashko in the report posed questions which must be resolved by the republic party organization in preparing for the next 28th Ukrainian CP Congress in the socioeconomic development and restructuring of the spiritual sphere of the republic. In my speech I would like to take up certain questions of cultural development. Certainly without an increase in spiritual culture of the people, it is impossible at present to resolve the complex nexus of national economic, social, ideological, nationality and interethnic problems which were emphasized at the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The development of this sphere to a significant degree depends upon the long-range vision of all its aspects by us.

For these purposes and for eliminating the deformations in the cultural area, for ensuring a further rise in the cultural level of the public, for overcoming the bottlenecks in this area, at present a special commission is working out an overall plan and comprehensive program for the development of Ukrainian culture for the period up to the year 2005. This program will widely represent the interests of not only the Ukrainians, but also persons of all other nationalities residing in Ukrainian territory as well as our compatriots outside of it. It will include an integrated range of tasks and measures directed at preserving and adding to cultural potential and strengthening its material base.

In recent years, the republic has witnessed the rebirth of the sources of Ukrainian national culture and the sphere of the use of Ukrainian has broadened. There has been this as well as the creating of conditions for studying the mother tongue in schools and other institutions of learning, restoring the status of the Ukrainian theaters, increased TV and radio programs, the publishing of books in Ukrainian, the preserving of the Ukrainian national heritage and other positive shifts.

Against this background, there is a contrasting situation in the national cinematography which was correctly described in the report at the present plenum. The Union of Ukrainian Cinematographers, together with the

leaders of the rental organizations of many oblasts without suitable economic grounds has become involved in working out various models and new structures while the questions of the ideological and artistic level of the films and their spectator interest remain virtually disregarded. The Ministry of Culture and the Union of Ukrainian Cinematographers ultimately must find a platform for further joint work in this important area of art.

There is serious concern over the flippant and often irresponsible approach by individual leaders of state and public organizations to the use of video arcades the basic repertoire of which is foreign films with the outright propagandizing of cruelty, violence, pornography and racism which are alien to our society. Regardless of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers which prohibits the cooperatives from renting and showing movie and video products, many of them, hiding behind all sorts of names and sponsors, continue to show video films the nature of which can be seen from their very titles: "Fist of Cruelty," "Creature of the Swamps," "The Illusion of Murder," "Bloody Beach," "Death Machine," "Fatal Hunt" and others which cause irreparable harm to the upbringing of the young, coming generation.

We also cannot remain indifferent to the organizing of various mass amusement measures and concert performances by touring actors and which have a clearly expressed commercial nature. Recently in the Ukraine, a cruise on the Dnieper was conducted by the Temple Theater of the RSFSR Union of Theater Workers with the noble goal of collecting money for the Charity Fund. According to the data of the republic Ministry of Finances, of the almost 800,000 rubles collected from the tickets, the Charity Fund received only 126,000, while the remainder went basically to the performers, the impresario and other organizers of this cruise.

For putting proper order in this question and for bringing paid concert activities into conformity with the legislation, the republic Council of Ministers in June of the current year adopted a special decree. But, unfortunately, this document has not encountered proper understanding and support from many professional and Komsomol organizations. We are counting that the party committees will provide practical aid to the soviet bodies on the spot in this important matter.

In the area of the rebirth of the national culture of the peoples of the Ukraine, there has been noticeable development of independent folk art. This has been aided by the traditional republic holidays of folk creativity held over the last 4 years in Ternopol, Poltava, Lvov and Khmelnytskyi Oblasts and during which they opened Singer Fields as well as the republic festivals of school folk art in Chernovtsy, Poltava and Kirovograd Oblasts. In the Chernovtsy and Cherkassy areas they have held republic holidays with kobza [a guitar-like instrument] playing. In Kiev Oblast, for the first time they have begun operating two children's schools for kobza playing and in the Lvov area there is a children's choir school.

Such forms for the rebirth of the national sources of Ukrainian culture will also be developed in the future. And there is no doubt that the Chervona Ruta [Red Rue] Holiday of Ukrainian Song and Popular Music held in September of this year in Chernovtsy will become traditional. Unfortunately, it was turned virtually into an extremist and nationalistic debauch. For this reason, the organizers of this festival—the Komsomol Central Committee, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, the Ukrainian Music Society as well as the republic organizing committee which I lead to hold the Third All-Union Festival of Folk Creativity within which this holiday occurred are critically and self-critically assessing the results of this festival and the first stage of it and are drawing proper conclusions.

V.A. Ivashko: Please excuse me. Both you and the Ministry of Culture, as became known from the press, completely surrendered this festival into the hands of others. Neither you, the minister of culture nor his deputies were there. And so this level of artistic creativity, level of artisticness, this level, if you wish, of politicalness was just as you made it, both the government and the Ministry of Culture. As it was organized, so it turned out. If things go on that way, then our Ukrainian art will disappear.

M.A. Orlik: I, Vladimir Antonovich [Ivashko], agree completely with your assessment. We actually did turn it over completely to those persons who should have been concerned with this and now we are reaping the consequences. For this reason, we are now doing everything so that this does not happen again in the future. For this reason we should help the people and particularly the youth in understanding where the boundary lies between the growth of national self-awareness and nationalism.

The platform of our party's Central Committee on the nationality question emphasizes the need for fundamental changes in the very work methods of developing an internationalist awareness. On this level we should note the holding of the Literature and Art Days of the fraternal republics. In recent years, Ukrainian Days have been held in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and days of these republics in the Ukraine. The last friendship holiday in Kazakhstan in September of this year went far beyond the limits of the literary and artistic program. Professional contacts were made making it possible to establish direct ties between the oblasts, rayons, cities, enterprises and kolkhozes. Contracts were signed for collaboration between Dnepropetrovsk and Dzhzhkazgan Oblasts, Kanev and Abayskiy Rayons in Semipalatinsk Oblast, the home of Abay Kunanbayev and between our republic's Ministry of Culture and the Kazakh State Committee for Culture. Ways were outlined for resolving economic, cultural and scientific-technical questions between Ternopol and Chimkent Oblasts and other oblasts with their confreres in Kazakhstan. All of this shows the need for the further strengthening of interrepublic ties and for holding not only literature and art days but also measures making it possible to represent republic life in a broader aspect.

They help to strengthen the friendship of peoples of our Soviet Federation and this we must be constantly and steadfastly concerned with.

One other thing. In speaking about urgent problems in the development of spiritual culture, I cannot help but mention the strengthening of its physical plant. Regardless of the residual principle and the direct prohibition against building cultural institutions which existed in the not distant past, the republic still did something on this question even during that difficult period.

However, the state of the physical plant and the equipping of cultural facilities still do not correspond to the increased demands of our workers both in the city and in the countryside. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the capital investments allocated for this sphere have been constantly underutilized. Let me give just a few figures. Over the 3 years of the current five-year plan, the republic construction organizations have not utilized 82 million rubles for all financing sources. And this means that we have lost around 40 rayon cultural clubs. At present, according to the statistical reporting some 43 of our rayon cultural clubs are in a disastrous state. And they could have been repaired.

And in conclusion, on the provisions of the republic draft laws on elections. I support the proposals stated at the plenum on the inadvisability of holding a congress of people's deputies and direct elections of a republic president as well as the electing of people's deputies from public organizations. And as the chairperson of the republic Women's Council I can tell you that the women equally with the men in the forthcoming elections will fight boldly and actively for deputy mandates to the Ukrainian Parliament and the local soviets.

[21 Oct 89, pp 1-4]

[Excerpts] **A.Ya. Vinnik**, first secretary of the Donetsk Party Obkom:

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a platform on the questions of nationality policy, it concretized the theoretical questions of Marxism-Leninism in terms of the practices of perestroika and designated for the party organizations clear political guidelines aimed at the restoring of Leninist principles on this question.

The plenum materials create a real basis for seeking out political solutions and for eliminating tension in interethnic relations. But, in soberly assessing the situation, we can only speak now about potentials. For the practical implementing of the ideas proposed by the party it is essential to have not only their profound understanding but also good will, a sincere desire and an interest on the part of all groups and strata of our society, all the party, state and social bodies and organizations. At present, the time has come, on the basis of the party platform, to begin to improve our legislation governing interethnic relations and rectify the errors made in carrying out nationality policy.

Considering historical experience and modern conditions, it clearly makes sense to study the question of the formation of the nationality areas and rural soviets and, possibly, the autonomous areas within our republic. It is a question electively of establishing associations and granting opportunities if there is a desire for this on the part of the minority peoples. For example, over 85,000 Greeks live altogether in Donetsk Oblast. At present, they not only do not support the idea of creating any nationality territorial administrative units but in their majority are sharply against this. We feel that it is important to settle the question in principle and work out a democratic way for implementing such a right. It is important to set out measures for the fullest satisfying of the sociocultural and legal interests of the nationalities living outside their state-territorial formations or not having such.

We feel that it is extremely important that in overcoming stereotypes in the minds of people, in breaking up established patterns and in improving the legal, economic and cultural aspects of nationality policy, not to allow rash decisions which could produce the reverse effect. It is a question, in particular, on the draft Language Law in the Ukraine. This document has caused concern among the residents of the oblast. Harsh statements were often made in the discussion. The representatives of the strike committees in the Donbass and the voter clubs of a number of cities in the oblast adopted a special resolution which favored the introduction in the Ukraine of two official languages—Ukrainian and Russian. Possibly this sounds somewhat categorical but this is the opinion of people. In any event, here it is essential to outline more clearly in the Law the role and functions of Russian—if not as an official language then at least as a language of an interethnic communication. This would make it possible to achieve a reasonable compromise and avoid the errors of the past.

The peoples who live in our oblast (over 120 nationalities) have experienced the deviations from Lenin's nationality policy. In the 1920s, on the territory of Stalinsk District, there were Russian, Greek and German rural soviets, and schools taught in Russian, Ukrainian, Greek, Tatar, Armenian and Jewish. Newspapers were published in Tatar and Greek languages and there were Greek theaters and publishing houses. However, at the end of the 1930s, everything was closed down, broken up and eliminated.

An analysis of public opinion at present shows the presence of nationality problems in the sphere of education, culture, the development of languages and folk traditions.

At present, the oblast is taking the first steps to meet the cultural needs of peoples of different nationalities. Each year, reviews of folk creativity are held, and the folklore holidays of the Greeks of the Azov Area are becoming traditional. The proportional amount of TV broadcasts in Ukrainian has risen. In the areas where the Greek population is concentrated, there are broadcasts in

Greco-Hellene and Greco-Tatar languages and elective courses have appeared for studying modern Greek. For the first time over the postwar years, the number of schools teaching in Ukrainian has risen. In the school institutions they have begun working on developing in the children the skills of Ukrainian conversational speech. The public understands and affirmatively responds to this.

But our efforts and possibilities are not sufficient. There must be nationality cadres, teachers, journalists, proof-readers and actors, and great material outlays are required.

It is essential to have a solution on the governmental level, a reasonable solution which would provide an opportunity of a democratic approach to the urgent problems and one considering the particular features of the regions. Here there must be no rush, confusion, administrative response or the imposing of ideas and approaches. Unfortunately, this does happen. For instance, it is hard to explain what the republic Ministry of Culture was being guided by in ordering that the Oblast Theater imeni Artem be converted to the Ukrainian language as of 1 September of the current year. Donetsk with its more than a million population is basically a Russian-speaking city. In accord with the population census, over 75 percent of the people in the oblast consider Russian their mother tongue. In the Theater imeni Artem, one-half of the performances is in Ukrainian. Why force events? It is time to realize that by employing decrees it is impossible to recreate what existed in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. Conditions have changed and the people themselves have changed. There is one way out and that is we must have painstaking explanatory work and the consistent establishing of democracy in everything concerning interethnic relations.

It must be said that consistent democracy is lacking in many leaders of the new social formations established along national lines. In working for the development of the national self-awareness of "their own" nation and in arguing for its rights, they, as a rule, intentionally or unintentionally endeavor to subject to themselves the representatives of other peoples living in the territory of the republic as a minority.

This is clearly seen in the speeches of a number of delegates from the congress of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka, in the program documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Alliance and certain other groups. Such approaches, we must state directly, alarm others, create conflict situations, introduce a split and ultimately harm perestroyka. As paradoxical as it may seem, in this instance we encounter the followers of the administrative-bureaucratic system. This applies particularly to the leaders of the extremist groups. At a time when people are engaged for a search for compromises and seeking a way out of the difficult situation, they ignore the law and provoke clashes between the peoples. What nationality interests can there be if in the course of

disorders the blood of innocent victims is shed. In depriving others of the right to housing, to peaceful labor and the sacred right to life, the leaders of extremism are pushing interethnic relations, let us state it directly, back to the times of savagery. Analogies arise with the most obscurantist forces which operated in our history. "All the plans of the Black Hundreds were aimed at putting the interests of different nations into opposition and at poisoning the minds of the ignorant and downtrodden masses," said V.I. Lenin in 1914. "The persecution of 'foreigners,' the fanning of reciprocal hostility between the Russian peasantry, the Russian petty bourgeois, the Russian artisan and the Jewish, Finnish, Polish, Georgian or Ukrainian peasant, petty bourgeois or artisan—this is the bread which feeds the entire Black Hundred band." Yes, this was said under different conditions and in different times. But is this not the path being followed by the extremists in Sumgait and Fergana, is this not their plan in Lvov and other localities where there have been attempts to provoke clashes on a nationality basis? It is not nationality interests which are being pursued here but rather antinationality ones and they are not concerned with the well-being of others but rather their own selfish aims.

Delayed action mines are being laid for future generations. For if the difficulties in the economy and social sphere are forgotten by the people relatively quickly after their overcoming, the outbursts of nationality conflicts remain in their social memory for a long time to come. More than one generation is doomed to mutual hostility, suspicion and enmity. For this reason, it is very important to work out principles on the basis of which it would be possible to solve the problems on the spot, proceeding from the actual conditions.

Consideration of the interests of all nationalities and a recognition of the existing realities are the main thing that all the forces favoring perestroika must now rely on. For this, in our view, it would be advisable to establish special deputy formations in the soviets of all levels and structural subdivisions in the executive committees of the soviets, the trade union and Komsomol bodies.

There is the well-known Marxist-Leninist tenet that the nationality question is a component part of social changes. At present, this is a component part of the entire perestroika process, including the restructuring of the economy. Without a normalization of interethnic relations, we not only will not make headway along the path of economic development but can be thrown back. Even now, we are suffering major losses. The deepening of nationality conflicts in Moldavia, Azerbaijan and Armenia has led to a situation where the losses of just the Donetsk Railroad were over 11 million rubles, 140,000 railway cars were not received or almost 10 million tons of freight were not dispatched. This means in practical terms that the Donetsk Railroad did not operate for 10 days.

The overall losses in the economy for these and other reasons are much greater. At present, when we are

moving toward the 28th Party Congress and to the congress of the Ukrainian CP, it is exceptionally important to understand what is going on in the party organizations, to change the forms and methods of our activities and abandon everything that does not conform to the dialectics of the coming events.

I cannot help but say a word about the following problem. The main territorial administrations have been eliminated, including Glavdonetskugol [Main Donetsk Coal Administration]. This means that numerous enterprises and associations are directly subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry. With such a system, I will be so bold as to state at the Central Committee Plenum that the situation in the Donbass coal industry not only is not improving, not only is it not stabilizing, but will deteriorate in the future. And not only in the production sphere but also in the social one. Moreover, in the opinion of the councils of the labor collectives of the associations, the strikers and the leaders of the coal industry associations what is being done by the republic state bodies is not enough.

The Donetsk and Voroshilovgrad Party Obkoms have submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers (to Comrades N.I. Ryzhkov and L.I. Abalkin) proposals to establish organizational structures for the management of industry in the regions and these have been supported by the STK [Labor Collective Council] and the strike committees. We must move faster in solving this question.

What has the miner's strike meant in the oblast? During the first half of the current year, the plan was fulfilled for the production of virtually all types of industrial products, and the plan indicators were overfulfilled for commodity turnover, the production of consumer goods, paid services and labor productivity. But for the 9-month results, the outcome has been negative. Since the start of the year, we have been short almost 400,000 tons of coal and in comparison with the previous year the mining volume has declined by almost 5 million tons. Profits in the first 6 months equaled 17 million rubles but now there are losses of 18 million. For these reasons the plan for all stages of ferrous metallurgy was not fulfilled.

In this context there is the following question. It is an issue of a decree of the Council of Ministers which would regulate relations between the strike committees and the Council of Ministers in resolving the questions raised during the strike. At present, it is essential to quickly settle the problem of supervision by the republic bodies over the carrying out of these demands and provide regular information to the mass information media. For this question is the reason that the strike committees have survived on the spot up to the complete resolution of these problems.

The strike committees have been joined by formations of a varying negative social and political sort. And here the question is no longer of an economic struggle but a political one. A delay on this question will constantly

create difficult preconditions for another problem. Moreover, on this basis far from innocent associations are being established in the Donbass. It is a question above all of a regional alliance of the strike committees of the Donbass. There is the matter of creating a "Worker Union" with its own bylaws and its own program.

A tense situation has arisen in capital construction and particularly in the building of housing, sociodomestic and utility facilities. The criticism of the "construction" situation in the oblast is valid in the report. The state of capital construction, in my view, requires an immediate review on the republic level.

Quite naturally, the conclusion arises that the development of democracy, glasnost, the growth of social activeness and the nationality self-awareness of persons have nothing in common with anarchy, with the abandonment of socialism or the disruption of the Soviet federation. At present, it is essential to strengthen discipline and organization and raise the responsibility of each and every one of us for the fate of the plans for transforming our society. Only national unity, organization and discipline, only a decisive rebuff to the various anti-Soviet, antisocial phenomena will allow us to successfully resolve the economic, political and educational tasks and move forward along the path of socialist development.

F.M. Rudich, director of the Party History Institute under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee:

In my speech I would like to draw the attention of the Central Committee Plenum participants to certain questions which are brought up by its agenda.

In the first place. Of the many touchy theoretical and political problems which are now being actively debated, I would like to emphasize one: is it essential to reorganize the party along federative lines in order to be in the vanguard of society?

When at present one reads and hears various sorts of arguments in favor of the federalization of the party (such a debate has been actively underway in the party organizations of the Baltic Republics), inevitably it comes to mind that all of this has already existed in our history. And although the "federalists" were never an influential force in the KP(b)U [Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], they did, however, create quite a stir.

The Ukrainian Bolsheviks did not establish a republic party organization that was separate from the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], when for a certain time a state frontier ran between Russia and the Ukraine under the conditions of foreign intervention. The realization was victorious that the party should be united and that it should resolve all its questions, including nationality ones, from an internationalist standpoint.

At present, we are profoundly convinced that a "nationality" tint will not make the Union republic communist

parties stronger and more influential. The limits of the united CPSU provide sufficient expanse for resolving both the national as well as the republic and regional tasks.

However, I would like to emphasize that in line with preparations for the next 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian CP [Communist Party] Congress and the working out of the CPSU Bylaws, there is an urgent need to work out a new overall concept of democratic centralism which is the guiding principle for the organization and activities of the party. The overcoming of the deformations to which this principle was subjected during the years of the cult of personality and stagnation is one of the urgent tasks.

It is completely obvious that the status of a republic party organization requires a definite revision and clarification. The Ukrainian CP, as the political vanguard of the Ukrainian people and the expresser of their interests, aspirations and desires should provide, aside from all else, the satisfying of their specific social, economic and nationality demands. For this reason, its status should be distinct from the status of the oblast or kray party organizations.

There is an urgent need to clarify the competence of the CPSU Central Committee and the central committees of the Union republic communist parties. The latter must be delegated the right to resolve a majority of the organizational, structural, staff, financial and other questions.

It would be advisable, in particular, in following the example of the CPSU Central Committee, to publish an IZVESTIYA TsK KOMPARTII UKRAINY. This publication could more widely than is presently done take up the activities of the Politburo, the Secretariat, the commissions and departments of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. It would be possible to ensure the publishing of the verbatim reports of the congresses, conferences and plenums of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the corresponding materials from the KPZU. I would point out that in 1921-1930, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee had such a publication. It was published in Ukrainian and Russian.

Clearly, these and other problems should be reflected in the program of actions of the Ukrainian CP and the need for working out such a program was raised in the report of V.A. Ivashko.

The second question. A rather eloquent historical parallel: the gap in time between the general party forums—the 12th RKP(b) Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference which specifically examined interethnic relations as 65 years. And it was not merely a matter of an unique jubilee. This very fact symbolizes significantly more. Precisely in this complex period, and particularly in Stalin's times, there was the abandoning of a Leninist nationality policy, its serious deformation and at the same time there was a growing awareness of the vital

need to restore Leninist principles and renew party nationality policy as a whole.

The decision of the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum to convene the next 28th Party Congress and the platform adopted by it embody the unbroken, organic inner linkage between socialism and perestroika, the spirit of revolutionary innovative boldness in solving those complex, often dramatic problems of interethnic relations which reality poses for us.

As was pointed out in the report and comments by comrades, in our republic an intense and far from simple process is going on of analyzing our interethnic relations. In this context we cannot help but be concerned by the fact that those who would play on nationalistic feelings and fan nationality passions are endeavoring to take as allies not only the unstated heritage of many scholars and literary figures of previous decades but also Lenin's works.

As is known, Lenin showed an attentive and sensitive attitude toward the Ukraine. Thousands of his works and documents are devoted to various aspects of the history, revolutionary struggle, culture and language. However, at present they are arbitrarily taking only those points and quotes from Lenin's works which, so to speak, work exclusively in favor of the "national minority." Although it is well known that Lenin always defended a dialectical combination of the national and international. Why then are not the lessons given by him not taken up? Moreover, many have endeavored to put the very concept of "internationalism in quotes and place it in doubt.

The Party History Institute along with Politizdat are planning on an ongoing basis to publish the documentary and scientific research "V.I. Lenin i resheniye natsionalnogo voprosa na Ukraine" [V.I. Lenin and the Solution to the Nationality Question in the Ukraine]. The timeliness of such publications has been rising in line with the approaching 120th anniversary of the leader's birthday.

At present, the question also arises as to whether it is sufficient to define the essence and causes of modern nationalism merely as vestiges in the mind and conduct of individuals? It is perfectly apparent that in sinking its roots into the distant past, modern nationalism as an ideology, policy and philosophy has its own modern nature and specific features. Here I would like to emphasize that it is a major error to have an unique "distribution" in assessing the actions of our political opponents regardless of whether they derive from among the UKhS or the People's Movement. Certainly words are one thing and actions are something quite different.

Is it quite harmless to have the desires of certain circles to establish the image of the Ukrainian people "as the most sacrificed, the most without rights of all peoples in the world"? This quotation was taken from one of the speeches at the constituent congress of the Movement and published on the pages of LITERATURNAYA UKRAINA. Involuntarily you wonder: Is this to some

degree the toying with emotions? If the leaders of the Movement, the Soviet writer and a respected newspaper are not aware of this measure, then someone should halt the bacchanalia of forcing national hardships, humiliations and insults which ultimately lead to openly extremist and nationalistic actions.

As is known, presently the opponents of perestroika are the conservative forces as well as the supporters of the leftist liberal trend. Political extremism of the nationalistic stripe endeavors to bring all together. We must not underestimate this circumstance. Unfortunately, far from all the party committees and mass information bodies have drawn the proper conclusions from this.

And in conclusion. The Party History Institute is a scientific institution of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. We are clearly aware not only of its role but also the increased responsibility for the theoretical soundness of a restructuring of ideological work in the republic party organization. Timely theoretical problems of party renewal and an analysis of the modern concept of socialism about which M.S. Gorbachev spoke at the previous Plenum of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee are presently at the center of attention of our co-workers.

We are preparing and in the near future will publish works on history and modern times. A number of publications is being published directly for the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress. Among these are the reference "Kopartiya Ukrainy: syezdy i konferentsii" [The Ukrainian CP: Congresses and Conferences]. Here for the first time in a condensed form are given the course of work and the decisions of the superior forums of the republic party organization, information on the personnel of the leading bodies and brief biographic essays on all 14 of the first secretaries of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. By that time, we will also have published the minutes of the Second Congress of the KP(b)U and the works of N.A. Skripnik have been assembled.

However, the organization of scientific research on the history, theory and practice of international relations, the analysis of the perestroika processes in the activities of the party organizations and the publishing of documents on the history of the Ukrainian CP are being held up by financial and personnel barriers.

The institute is in acute need of modern technical support. We have submitted the corresponding proposals on these questions to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. We will not be able to resolve these questions without substantial aid from the Central Committee and the Central Committee departments.

A.S. Matviyenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee:

At present among the youth, as in society as a whole, an unusual political and socioeconomic situation is arising. In turn, such a situation has given rise to new problems

and heightened the existing ones in the spiritual sphere. A sharp politicizing of a significant portion of the youth can be noticed. Our unpreparedness within the Komsomol, as it turned out, to respond to such activeness has led to the growth of the nontraditional, independent formations. There is a real pluralism of youth formations. A portion of them, to our great regret, holds ideological platforms which oppose the communist ones and is involved in acute conflicts with political overtones.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the Komsomol itself is going through a critical moment. An acute need for fundamental reform has arisen. The legal and economic status of the Komsomol does not permit it to express actively the interests of the youth, or take an active part in the leadership of the state and society. In the near future, if the ways to organizational and financial independence are not found, we will be forced to narrow significantly the sphere of our activities. And this must not be permitted. This would mean to weaken the influence of the communist ideology. This is the reality and it cannot be overlooked or described by a self-serving word. It is impossible to escape from it or avoid it.

In my speech I do not want to limit myself to merely youth problems. Primarily because I consider that they are the consequence of something more important. I would like to speak about this frankly, as a party member. I am convinced that future perestroika and the path of improving the situation will depend upon party authority.

As was pointed out in the report, at present, in preparing for the party congresses, each communist must ask himself: Are we really fighting for political authority and is there no threat of losing what was acquired over many years? Let me mention one thing, the principle of truth. Undoubtedly, this cannot exist in different degrees and please everyone. We must not delay with this. But the attempts to make it such, to our great regret, have not been united. No matter how painful it is to admit and whose ambitions might be involved here, there is no escaping the bitterness that our actual actions often violate the political authority of the party and sometimes cause greater harm than the actions of the alternative forces.

From the viewpoint of certain comfort, it would be more suitable for me to remain silent about this, but such attitudes do exist among the youth and among Komsomol comrades. And for this reason I feel it my duty to inform the Central Committee members of them. What may be the source of problems here? Let me give an example. Seemingly the elections of the USSR People's Deputies and the First Congress became a very serious lesson which should have been considered in preparing the draft laws concerning elections in our republic and avoid individual provisions which were unpopular among the people and provoked alternative variations. The session of the Supreme Soviet, of course,

will settle their fate. But will not our uncritical attitude toward this fact again mean mistrust for many candidates who are supported by the party and Komsomol organizations on the spot. I feel that this will turn out to be the case.

Or the following. I want to support Comrades Pogrebnyak, Ostrozhinskiy and Stezhko. Have the tactics toward the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika proven effective and does this take everything into consideration? Has not our delayed approach shaken the sympathies of a large number of persons to the opposite side of the proclaimed positions not to mention those with alternative attitudes? Has not such an approach provided an opportunity for the appearance now of various sorts of publications in our newspapers including those of Comrade Derevyanko, the editor of *VECHERNYAYA ODESSA*? The speculation which he is propagandizing develops only confusion and mistrust in a young person. The same reflections arise over the problems related to the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Clearly this should not be the case and we do not have the right not to take into account the fact that in the main mind at present, as never before, there is a stereotype of the views concerning the source of unpopular decisions. If we endeavor to make headway, such decisions are simply inadmissible. And the persons responsible for them should feel responsibility to the entire party. I say this because each day convinces us what complex and contradictory moments and alarming processes are occurring involving primarily young people. And how important it is in solving them to have a prompt, precise and clear offensive position by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. And if the youth are indifferent to the absence of a sincere position yesterday, at present it expects a different approach and is ready to support this.

Secondly, as for the Komsomol itself, we are confronted with the necessity of its major renewal and ensuring its activities with its own economic infrastructure and legal basis. We have begun to solve this. The first work results will be made at the extraordinary congresses. We are preparing to submit to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet a package of proposals aimed at improving the public self-esteem of the youth. The youth should feel that their fate does make a difference to the Komsomol, the party and the republic government.

Life demands that the Komsomol intervene evermore actively in policy. No matter how paradoxical it may seem, we have realized that not each person sees a political force in the Komsomol. At times, the Komsomol committees are noticeably isolated from participating jointly with the party organizations in stabilizing the political situation. Undoubtedly, it would be better now to send the entire Komsomol raykom to work, as is now being done in Shevchenkovskiy Rayon, Kharkov Oblast as *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* is written.

Unfortunately, the Komsomol often is not involved in joint work not only on the spot but also on the republic level. Often our actions focus on secondary matters. Thus, only recently has work intensified on preparing the republic Youth Program and the hope has appeared of completing this. It took an entire year for the Council of Ministers to support our initiative for developing in the republic the construction of youth housing complexes. And, unfortunately, the list of such examples could be extended.

And lastly, on the questions of interethnic relations. In actuality, the situation in the republic requires a maximum of tact and restraint in order that no one be limited in his legitimate civil rights. And such concern does exist. This was often brought up at the Komsomol meetings. This was stormily debated at the last plenum of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee, in particular about the draft law about languages in the Ukraine. We are in favor of a differentiated approach in realizing the planned goals. Let us not hope that the law is to remain just an intention or a desire. Since significant material outlays are needed for implementing its provisions, it will clearly be impossible to do this without a special program. In our view, such a program should also be widely discussed and these two documents should be approved in an inseparable unity.

At the same time, it is wrongly hoped that the law and the program will settle all problems. Certainly one of the largest threats is the low manner in which national feelings are manifested. Here directives will not be of any help. We see a need for the active involvement of all the public organizations, and particularly the creative unions leading the artistic forces in the work of educating national dignity. Here any deviation can lead to the unpredictable. We acutely felt this during the first republic Chervona Ruta Festival of Ukrainian Modern Song and Popular Music. We accept all the valid criticism we have heard today and are drawing the necessary conclusions. But I cannot agree with the view of M.A. Orlik that this festival was unbridled anti-Sovietism and nationalistic propaganda. That is far from the truth. In actuality, there were such instances but to give an across-the-board evaluation would at the same time insult a majority of those who worked honestly and those who put in a great deal of heart and soul to carry it out and for its generally good conclusion.

Probably it would be more valid now to pose the question thus: has not the Komsomol Central Committee become an unique hostage of the old orientation, of indifference to the youth by a series of republic departments which should be equally interested in the festival? I feel that it would be wrong on the part of all our partners in organizing the festival to view this question at present as a rhetorical one.

The Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee understands the complexity of the moment, its role and the need for active actions by each Komsomol committee.

We have done and are doing far from everything possible. This is also true. We clearly realize our task as a communist organization working with the same ideological platform as the party. The Komsomol will not abandon these positions.

G.K. Kryuchkov, first secretary of the Odessa Party Obkom:

The representatives of the Odessa party organization who are attending the Central Committee Plenum support the proposals made in the report of the Central Committee Politburo on all fundamental questions. Very important, in our opinion, is the fact that the Central Committee Politburo is focusing the party organizations primarily on the need for their organizational and political strengthening and increased militancy, on renewing party practices, strengthening all work related to carrying out the most important economic and social tasks, as well as improving all levels of discipline, order and organization. The oblast party organization sees their primary duty chiefly in this.

Preparations for the party congresses and the current very crucial stage of profound changes occurring in our society raise an important task for the agenda, that is, to completely define ourselves on the major questions over which the acute political struggle has developed. It is no secret that in our society social differentiation is deepening. There is a growing stratum of those who have not made an adequate effort, who are enriching themselves and who have already concentrated in their hands, according to the data of certain publications, a capital of around 150 billion rubles. At the same time, scores of millions of people are in deep poverty and are living worse and worse.

What should be the response of a socialist—and I emphasize—socialist state to these processes? Certainly they are growing and the social, political consequences of this are hard to anticipate.

At present, on the pages of rather authoritative publications and from the rostrum of the USSR Supreme Soviet there resound slogans to restore private property of the means of production, abolish the kolkhozes and immediately distribute land between the peasantry. Here they do not ask the agreement of the peasants themselves or the people. They try to convince society that this is a good. Supposedly, we will not have "such" private property. This actually would be a major change. But leading to where? Certain specific consequences of such a change are mentioned frankly: the resumption of the practice of hiring a labor force, the legalization of the so-called "shadow" economy, and the creation of unlimited expanse for further unearned enrichment for its sharks. Rackets and not only rackets is what we have returned to our reality.

Possibly this would mean a purging of the deformations from socialism? Have we not begun to forget too early why precisely the Great October Socialist Revolution occurred? Is socialism with an economy based on the

enrichment of some and the impoverishment of others not reminiscent of the well-known bride who is all well and good with only one "small shortcoming," she is a little pregnant.

Why have I taken up today at our plenum these seemingly strictly theoretical questions? And there are many such questions. In the first place, because this is a question not only of theory, it is a question of our very life. Secondly, I feel that the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and our republic party organization with its intellectual, theoretical potential on such questions should hold a more active, militant position and firmly defend a principled Marxist-Leninist line.

I also feel that our deputy corps in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the Congress of People's Deputies should work more actively.

In fully sharing the view set forth in the report on the various informal groupings, including the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika, I would like to say the following. Our mass information media have demonstrated clearly in what atmosphere the so-called "constituent congress of the Movement" was held and what its participants are calling for. But the amazing thing is the following. Almost 3 weeks have passed when the program documents of the Movement were published. It is high time to have our say on their content and political direction.

It can be said that supposedly the official documents of the Movement in their smoothness and their "tolerance" contrast to the extremist statements at the congress. In actuality, a majority of the provisions in the Movement's program are in sympathy with the party documents. I do not speak about the tone of the documents which is conceited, preachy and accusing. One might also ignore the fact that as demands of the Movement the program formulates certain proposals which have already been made or resolved upon the initiative of our party. More important, fundamental questions are raised. Here are just a few of them. And they lie on the surface. The Movement clearly does not recognize the integrating, leading role of the CPSU. The Ukrainian CP does not exist at all for it. The preamble of the "Movement" Program lists various events in the life of the Ukrainian people in the 20th Century and recalls the formation of the "Ukrainian People's Republic" and the "Western Ukrainian People's Republic." Space has not been found even for such an "insignificant" event in the history of mankind and our nation as the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The Ukrainian economy is defined as "imperfect, with a characteristic structure for colonies." The document asserts that the Ukraine up to now has had a Stalinist model of socialism. To disassemble this, in the opinion of the ideologues of the Movement means, as is seen from the program, to denationalize the means of production and restore private property. This is why for many

members of the Movement, the Great October Socialist Revolution sticks in their throat.

Is it not valid to ask the question: Why do the leaders of the Movement not renounce the calls of the extremists for the Ukraine to withdraw from the USSR, to rehabilitate the Banderov followers or the imposing of nationalistic symbols?

I feel that the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and its ideological services and above all the social scientists as well as the mass information media must voice an opinion on this matter. Certainly it is a question of fundamental, principled, if you wish, fatal questions.

One other thing. The Movement Program is indisputably not an ordinary document. But all the more essential are the practical actions. These facts show that on the part of those who run the Movement, and particularly the members of the UKhS, not the slightest desire can be seen to collaborate on specific matters. Our aim, we were told by the Movement members in Odessa, in referring to the directives of their "center," is to win decisive positions in the deputy corps, that is, seize power. For the sake of this they will not stop short of slander, provocations all the more as this is to the liking of those who support them.

One last question. The realizing of the CPSU platform on the questions of nationality policy for our party organization is a very crucial and difficult matter. Odessa Oblast, where more than 2.6 million persons live, is perhaps the most multinational of all the republic oblasts. Around 55 percent of its population is Ukrainians and 27.2 percent is Russians. Living in the oblast are almost 70 percent of the Bulgarians living in the Ukraine (approximately 170,000), around one-half of the Moldavians (almost 150,000), a majority of the Gagauz (27,800), 70,200 Jews (10 years ago, according to the census data there were 92,000) and representatives of other nations and nationalities (around 120,000). They all live peaceably and work together at multinational labor collectives. Until recently, we have not had any major questions on nationality grounds.

But this does not mean that there are no problems in this sphere. We realize that here there are questions which we must solve. But when it is a matter of publishing supplements to newspapers in the nationality languages, writing textbooks, training teacher personnel, and strengthening the physical plant and personnel for television and the radio, then I would like to see a more active position on the part of the republic departments as well as the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

It is possible to discuss the possibility of organizing newspapers for the national minorities. One of these—in Bulgarian—could be published in Odessa.

One of our important tasks is to significantly broaden the sphere of the use of the Ukrainian language. Historically it has developed that for a majority of the oblast's population, Russian is the mother tongue. In Odessa, for

example, during the 1979 census, less than 300,000 out of the more than 1 million residents called Ukrainian their mother tongue. And in daily life it is used significantly less.

Also difficult is the situation in rayons and population points (we have 88 of them), where Bulgarians, Moldavians, Gagauz and Albanians reside in large numbers.

I am obliged to report to the Plenum: events based on the language problem in the adjacent republic and the publishing of our draft law on languages have caused concern among a certain portion of this population. Certain insufficiently clear provisions of the draft law, insufficient consideration of specific conditions in certain regions, the noisy campaign in the mass information media accentuating the establishing of special conditions for one language, the pretentious demand of the Movement's program "for different ethnic groups inhabiting the Ukraine" to realize that "the Ukrainian nation has in the republic the status of the historical dominant group" (while the others are thus latecomers) as well as the rash, straightforward actions of individual departments are perceived by a portion of the citizens as a manifestation of a policy of forced ukrainianization of the non-Ukrainian population. No one has yet proven and, I feel, one could scarcely prove that forced ukrainianization is better than forced russification or any other "fication." There has been an intensification of autonomous moves inspired by emissaries from the neighboring and other republics among the Bulgarian, Moldavian and Gagauz population. There are also manifestations of concern among the Russian-speaking population. We, comrades, feel all of this acutely.

The resourceful Odessians who can do business in any situation have responded to the developing one in an original manner, that is, by publishing in the evening newspaper announcements of the following content: "State courses of foreign languages are organizing the studying of Ukrainian. Payment in cash or by money transfer." Any commentary here, as they say, would be superfluous.

Unfortunately, the organizations of the Ukrainian Language Society do not have any time to propagandize the mother tongue or aid in studying it. They are involved in the struggle for power in the soviets and this struggle they are waging together with extremists from the Movement.

The alarming thing is that the problems are arising where they previously did not exist. And in politics there has never yet been any success from attempts to solve some problems by creating other ones.

The nationality problems are closely linked to the socioeconomic ones. Under our conditions, these are exacerbated by the presence of a portion of an unemployed population in certain rayons and these are chiefly Bulgarians, Gagauz and Moldavians. Moreover, on the socioeconomic level our oblast has lagged seriously behind the others. In terms of the supply of housing, in-patient medical aid, central gas supply, power and

water supply, in terms of the state of road construction and the availability of building materials, it holds last place in the republic. Transport, utility and ecological problems have become very acute in the city.

All of this has had a negative effect on the political situation in the oblast. We are unable to explain to the public the reason why in the development of our agriculture, we invest 3-fold less state funds than in neighboring Moldavia which has approximately the same amount of agricultural land and similar soil and climatic conditions as we do. For this reason it is not surprising that the crops are better in Moldavia, livestock productivity is higher and the villages are being transformed significantly faster.

Our appeal to consider the very acute problems of the oblast in working out the plans for 1990 and the future five-year plan have been received with understanding by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, in the republic government and in many republic bodies. We are hoping on business-like support in all departments although we realize that the work is up to us to do and no one is obliged to do it for us.

The report has correctly emphasized that one of the most important tasks at present is to consolidate all the forces in favor of perestroika. Understandably, it is a question not of consolidation at any price but rather the rallying of forces precisely on the grounds of socialist principles.

N.V. Bagrov, first secretary of the Crimean Party Obkom:

The results of the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in our oblast are being discussed with great interest. Characteristically, its decisions on the convening of the next 28th Party Congress and the ways for improving nationality policy under modern conditions are being examined not in isolation from one another. This, in our view, is no accident. For at present more and more people are realizing that the effectiveness of the perestroika processes will depend not only upon the successes of the economic and political reforms but also upon whether or not the party, as before, will be able to fulfill the role of the political vanguard in society, and whether we will be able to establish in our multinational home peace and mutual understanding which will allow the consolidating of all forces to carry out the pending tasks.

Allow me to voice certain general considerations on these questions as they apply to our oblast. With all the pluralism of opinions, it must be recognized that in the last period the party also was unable to avoid certain deformations. Without siding with extreme positions on this matter, I would like merely to emphasize that we cannot help but point out that a whole series of ossified structures has come into being in the party and they to some degree have become permanent. In understanding that only a renewed party can actually affect the processes occurring in our society, at present, as never before, we must have a profound and sober self-analysis of how it is possible to regain the authority and trust in

the party committees. I am convinced that this must be done primarily by improving the forms and methods of work. The times demand that we take a new look at many of them which have become almost classic for us and answer the question of whether they are all flawless?

As an illustration, let me give just one example. Let us give some thought to how we conduct plenums. The scheme is well known. A report for an hour or a bit more, 15-20 speakers and the adopting of a document. But does it not seem to you, comrades, that the accents have shifted in this scheme? Certainly, we must discuss not the report but rather the decision which, in essence, should be a practical program of actions on one or another question. If you agree with this, then clearly the report should be something different providing information and explaining the basic provisions of the document which is to be adopted.

Understandably, in this instance in the nature of the debate it is essential for one person to be able to merely make specific proposals while another must argue for his position. The essence of the given proposal is not to alter the procedure for holding a plenum. The main thing is something else. With such an approach we will collectively work out the plenum decisions and hence there will be a collective sense of responsibility for implementing this document and which we now lack.

I propose that how rapidly we are able to fundamentally change the forms of our work, starting with the party Central Committee and ending with the party organizations, will determine the attitude of the masses toward the party and toward the party committees. This is now particularly important because on the spot we often encounter a situation where the public links literally all questions, even those the solution to which does not depend upon us, to the activities of the party committees. Just take the situation with the construction of the Crimean Nuclear Power Plant. The inhabitants of the oblast accuse the party obkom of insufficiently energetic actions aimed against its erection. The paradoxical nature of the situation is that, having posed these questions literally on all levels of national leadership, we still are unable to give a reply to the public.

Of course, it is difficult to recognize an error, particularly when it comes so dearly. Nevertheless, it is essential to do everything so that reason wins out. The Crimea is not a place for the construction of nuclear power plants. For this reason, I am forced from this rostrum, on the one hand, to thank the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the republic government for the support and, on the other, to request they make additional efforts to accelerate a solution to this problem.

The party platform adopted at the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the nationality question has particular significance for the Crimeans. For it confronts them with the task of moving the solution to the problem of the Crimean Tatars toward a practical solution. The reality is such that we must, in rectifying

those errors which were committed as a result of the Stalinist notion of "responsibility" of entire peoples for the deeds of individuals during the years of the Great Patriotic War, in the first place, relocate the Crimean Tatars, and secondly, define the future status of the Crimea considering this. Over the last 2 years, the number of Crimean Tatars in the oblast has risen by almost 4.5-fold and is presently around 55,000. Up to now, this process has gone on spontaneously. And this, considering the actions of the extremistically inclined portion of the Crimean Tatars, creates great difficulties and at times even leads to conflict situations on an interethnic basis.

We feel that this question can be settled only in a relatively calm situation and we must adopt a state program for the organized and gradual—and I want to emphasize—precisely organized and gradual solution to the problem of resettling the Crimean Tatars. Certainly we must relocate on the order of 200,000 persons and they will need housing, jobs, nurseries and schools as well as the establishing of conditions for the development of culture in the broadest sense. We would hope that the commission of the Supreme Soviet and the national government would adopt a document which would state clearly what we must do and what real aid we can expect from whom and how. Here, of course, we must unswervingly observe one condition: all of this must be done without the slightest encroachment on the interests of those almost 2.5 million persons who already live in the Crimea. Here there can be no other approach.

Of course, we realize that it would be wrong to rely solely on a state program. Certain countersteps are also needed. We feel we must follow the path of establishing new farms in the steppe region of the Crimea. The experience of the Agrarnyy Sovkhoz shows the benefit of this and here in practice we have set up the first nationality rural soviet.

One of the possible variations for solving the resettlement problem could be the building of individual housing at one's own expense. The feasibility of this path will be determined by whether we can supply the building materials. In this regard we would request the republic government to review the question of transporting building materials out of the Crimea and provide us with additional help here.

Now about the status of the Crimea. There are presently two viewpoints. Some propose giving it the status of a national resort while others are in favor of autonomy. If one is guided by the proposed changes in the demographic structure of the population as well as by the general situation stemming from the CPSU platform approved by the plenum on the nationality question, then the autonomy of the Crimea is in essence a problem of time. Clearly the question is merely how it should be reborn, what it will be like and subordinate to what body. The position of the bureau of the party obkom which is supported by the Crimean population is that, in the first place, it is premature to speak about this. Secondly, the

claims of a certain portion of the Crimean Tatars to national autonomy is neither historically nor politically sound.

In the future, when life poses the question of the rebirth of the Crimean ASSR, we should be clearly aware that here it will be a question of a special form of autonomy which is international-territorial. Our opponents say that this is a precedent. Yes, to a certain degree this is so. But it is possible to ask if we, of course, are not being dogmatic, why, along with national autonomy, there cannot exist an international-territorial autonomy? Possibly this is a new stage in the dialectical process of the evolution of autonomy as a form of a community of humans. Due to the fact that the practice of nationality relations has already raised this question, it should be additionally studied and worked out by specialist theorists.

As to where the future Crimean ASSR will be located, here there can be only one reply and that is as part of the Ukrainian SSR. First of all because the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized: the redrawing of frontiers can have far-reaching and basically fatal consequences for our country. And this certainly is the main thing for the Crimea, in terms of its situation and national economic ties, is an inseparable part of the Ukraine and it would be simply unreasonable to wrench it from the republic.

However, in order to legally reinforce such a possible variation in the future, the corresponding correction must be incorporated in the republic Constitution. At present, it would be to-the-point to say that the very question of where possible Crimean autonomy may be incorporated arose after the publishing of the draft law on languages in the Ukraine. In our oblast over the last decade, much has been done to attract the population to the rich Ukrainian culture and language. At the same time, we are profoundly convinced that in resolving such a problem as giving the Ukrainian language the status of an official one, in our oblast an approach cannot be made with the common republic criteria.

Russians predominate among the population of the Crimea. This language is the language of international intercourse for all of those who arrive for vacations and for those who serve on the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. We do not need to recall that there has already been an attempt to introduce the Ukrainian language by force into the Crimea and we know to what this led. For this reason, in agreeing in principle that the Ukrainian language must be given the status of the official one, we feel that in the Crimea, Russian and Ukrainian should function on equal grounds as the official ones.

For the sake of the priority of Ukrainian, we must not upset the current linguistic situation in the Crimea which arose historically. People will simply not tolerate this. If we maintain the existing situation, then we will be able to strengthen work on the further development of Ukrainian language and culture.

In conclusion, at the request of the Crimeans attending this Plenum, I would like to support the proposal to hold the 28th Congress of the Republic Party Organization. There is no doubt that this will provide a good impetus for uniting all Ukrainian communists on a platform of perestroika and will make it possible to better understand the distance traveled and outline the tasks for the future.

G.M. Mushtetik, first secretary of the Board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union:

The life-giving rains of perestroika have washed our land, they have filled it with moisture and our souls with hope. They have also sprinkled the bridges which Pavlo Tychina called the "arching" bridges for the crossing of some peoples of our nation to others. The dust of the years has been washed from them, in some places also the varnish, and they now present themselves in their true form.

Certainly as a writer, I have chiefly in mind the artistic, literary bridges. They were erected by our leading lights and in particular in Ukrainian literature by M. Rylskiy and M. Bazhan, and at present entire detachments of writers are crossing them. From the fraternal springs we gain labor experience, we more profoundly understand the historical experience of the peoples and use this for ourselves. Much has been done, in particular, by the Ukrainian writers. These are the 50 volumes of "Rodniki druzhby" [The Springs of Friendship], the numerous anthologies of the literatures of the Soviet peoples, the international clubs, personal contacts, ten days and days of literature and so forth. In the future, we must reinforce and erect bridges of friendship. They are our great accomplishment.

But at the same time, we cannot help but state that the roads to these bridges have been extremely neglected, destroyed and now they must be leveled out. They have forgotten this behind the eloquent declarations and have ended up on a line beyond which lies national decline and possibly a national abyss. This is no exaggeration. This is particularly noticeable in language which is the basis of existence, an inseparable part of a nation and ensures the development of its culture and its very future. In being concerned for the people and the nation, we are also concerned for common human values, the development of world civilization and the bringing of the Ukrainian people into the historical arena. In a difficult struggle this people has defended its own land, it was the first among the Eastern Slavs to raise its culture to a high level, it established its own academy, schools of versification and so forth.

At present, we all speak about the narrowing of the sphere of use of the Ukrainian language. It would be more accurate to say that entire strata have been bled white. The precise sciences and engineering, sports, Komsomol work and the workers have been completely or almost completely excluded from the nationality sphere.

While prior to the revolution the Ukrainian population was some 37 million persons, according to the 1979 census, some 35 million considered themselves Ukrainians.

Our situation is such that a majority of the students do not study in Ukrainian. In the 14 major cities of the Ukraine, there are only 66 Ukrainian schools and 1,037 Russian ones. The Ukrainian language has been almost completely driven out of the VUZes, technical schools and theaters. Just 7 percent of our films is shown in Ukrainian. Even dissertations on the questions of the development of the Ukrainian language, its grammatical structure and lexicology are defended in Russian.

At present, there must be a broad and thorough analysis by scientists and sociologists of the entire situation so as to begin the rebirth of the national minority institutions and raise national minority awareness for only a citizen who can properly represent himself, his people and his republic can talk as equals and become friends with his neighbors.

It is not a question of any "ukrainianization" which frightens some people. It is merely the return to the "natural" situation. This is simultaneously a return to Leninism. Lenin said: "We have, for example, in the Commissariat of Education or near it communists who say that there should be a unified school because you will then not dare teach in any other language but Russian! In my opinion such a communist is a great-Russian chauvinist. He resides in many of us and we must fight against him."

Yes, Vladimir Ilich [Lenin] was against an official language whatsoever. And no matter how they may distort the very content now, this is the essence of this Leninist thesis. In the republics which are real, viable states, and he saw them only as such, the status of an official language was not required. People could communicate in any language but without a knowledge of the nation's language, they would experience great inconveniences.

We have been forced to protect the Ukrainian language against its demise by creating a state system. The Russian language is widely developed and does not require protection. We all respect it and employ it widely. It is the means of international communication.

I will admit that I find incomprehensible those strikes which have occurred and are still occurring, for example, in Moldavia as well as certain letters received from certain of our cities, particularly in our south, addressed to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on the matter of the draft to grant Ukrainian the status of an official language. Well, why do I, for example, do not hear at least from the white-haired representative of a so-called non-indigenous nationality: "Comrades, yes, an injustice was made. We realize this. I, for instance, at my age would find it difficult to learn Moldavian, possibly my children could and my grandchildren would. And we, remaining Russian or Ukrainian patriots, will show an interest in

your culture and history and will respect them." Immediately all the confusion would disappear.

The representatives of a great nation should take a step to meeting the demands, they should reflect and understand the situation in the nation, set an example and thereby eliminate the tension, while the representatives of the so-called indigenous population in the republics should abandon statements such as "this land is only for one such nationality." We live under one common roof and we should be concerned that everyone living under it be comfortable and at home. Certainly, our strength finds integration in its unity.

Also to blame for exacerbating the existing situation is the distorted agitation and propaganda where they have cultivated a disrespect for anything which smacks of a national minority, of a mother tongue, advice from fathers and customs. We are all to blame for this and Comrade Kryuchkov, I would say, is seeking in vain for failings by the Ukrainian Language Society which even now is so poor that it does not have even a single room while he would heap the responsibility on it. We should ask ourselves: What have we done and what are we doing?

Everything that I have said applies not only to the Ukrainian language in the republic. Just imagine, in 1935, there were 238 Polish schools in the Ukraine, 627 German ones, 168 Moldavian, 468 Jewish, 54 Bulgarian and 23 Greek; there were Armenian, Latvian, Turkmen, Belorussian, Tatar and other schools. And this in no way impeded the development of Ukrainian and Russian school science. So we must restore the situation in this sphere. We must also take an interest and show attention in our compatriots living outside our republic.

Yes, we must consider the actual situation in the republic but also take into account that the situation must be rectified and a work carried out on a planned basis, purposefully, calmly, persuasively and over an extended time. For a law will be of no aid to us if we do not do this. It is essential to act without exacerbation and trouble. Some things are already being done, but this is very, very little. And the work must be done not only in the linguistic sphere. We must write a history of our people, as we know nothing about it. But there is nowhere to read this. Prior to the revolution such works were prohibited. The works of Soviet historians on the Ukraine are so docked and distorted that it would be better if they did not exist at all. "Cossacks," "Zaporozhye" and "Sech"—these were words scarcely adequate to nationalism. They said following Marx that this was the world's first democratic republic and here they sought thousands of shortcomings in it.

Now the first swallow has appeared with the publishing of "Litopis ruskiy" [Russian Chronicle] translated into Ukrainian and long published throughout the civilized nations of the world. We plan to publish a series of other literary monuments. The people will recover scientific

works, literary works of the classics not previously published, as well as artistic works by rehabilitated writers. But we bring up the tail in book publishing. While in the nation in terms of the total per capita run there are nine published books, in the Ukraine the figure is three. Half is in Russian and half in Ukrainian. Considering the deliveries of books from the central publishing houses, the linguistic balance would be as follows: 5.5 books in Russian and 1.5 in Ukrainian. The indicator for the publishing of books per 1 million of our population is also nearly in the last place in the world. For example, the figure for Hungary is 885, 448 for Czechoslovakia with an average indicator of 303 for the USSR and 54 for the Ukraine.

Without expanding publishing facilities, we cannot take a single step, and waiting their turn to be published are numerous Ukrainian textbooks, teaching aides, dictionaries, the works of world minds on philosophy, sociology and history, a majority of which has not been translated and never published in our country. Without this there cannot be a strong national pulse.

The possibility for the broad analysis of the nationality question which is closely related to the economic and ecological and which, incidentally, is also very complicated for us and we are well aware of this, is provided for us by perestroika, glasnost and the last decisions of our party. To analyze and rectify, being profoundly aware that precisely to us, the simple and the mortal, with pains and concerns for our daily bread, history has entrusted this unbelievably responsible task and that we are all responsible for this to history, to the future and to our own conscience.

A.T. Zonenko, editor of the newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY:

Balance and the truthfulness of materials concerning the various aspects of our social life at present are the main thing for the mass information media. It is particularly unpleasant when colleagues forget this. I have in mind certain publications of Lvov Oblast which do not provide completely accurate information for the reader on the position of the republic newspaper and the local party committees. I would like the Plenum participants to know what is at issue here.

The newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY on 4 October published an article "A Cobblestone for Democracy?" with the subtitle: "Hooliganistic Elements Under Yellow-Blue Banners Tried to Organize Mass Disorders on the Streets of Lvov." Comrades, please note: "Hooliganistic Elements Under Yellow-Blue Banners...." The very subtitle says everything. The text of this article described who these elements were. They were the representatives of the lamentably well-known Ukrainian Helsinki Alliance which at present is so frequently mentioned, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the "Lion Society" and the so-called Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), a completely definite group of informal organizations.

PRAVDA UKRAINY has called and will call nationalists wherever they be, in Lvov or in Kiev. We firmly adhere to the party line that a constructive dialogue must be conducted with the informal associations which stand on a platform of socialism and perestroika, collaboration must be broadened, but not with those who openly pursue the goal of destroying the USSR and restoring capitalist orders.

The Lvov center of nationalistic, antiperestroika forces is marked clearly by aggressiveness. It has also endeavored to destabilize the situation in other republic oblasts. PRAVDA UKRAINY has already provided information on the raids of the UKhS from Lvov to Poltava, Kiev, Ivano-Frankovsk, Odessa and Chernovtsy. They have also made their way to Donetsk and other cities.

All of this is the truth and the communists and all the healthy forces in the republic should know about it. Our people should know the true make-up of the UKhS and the anticommunist groups close to them which are supported by the anti-Soviet Radio Liberty and the foreign OUN organizations.

PRAVDA UKRAINY has written repeatedly about this and this is very much to the dislike of the foreign benefactors and for this they rebuke the newspaper virtually in every broadcast. But this will not stop the journalists from writing truthfully about everything and calling things by their real names. We know that honest people think differently.

Here is what the Second Secretary of the Chernigov Party Gorkom, A.N. Skokov, had to say: "Your paper is marked by a clear party position on many modern problems, it does not vacillate, it does not play up to the informal groups and has a principled view of their positions. We recommend that the communists subscribe to PRAVDA UKRAINY. And the day before yesterday at a meeting of the party raykom secretaries at the Kiev VPSH [Higher Party School] (there were 200 persons in attendance), I received the following note: "Thank you for the fact that the newspaper firmly stands on party positions and adheres to a pluralism of opinions. Ugnivenko, Kiev Oblast."

These have been not isolated responses. They inspire us, the journalists, they give us strength in our work of treating the difficult question of perestroika and our complex, contradictory life.

Giving the concluding speech at the Plenum was V.A. Ivashko. He said:

Respected Comrades! The course of discussing the report of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, in my view, has shown that all its theses are supported by the Plenum. From the plenum rostrum there has resounded the firm conviction that the Ukrainian CP has unswervingly followed the path of renewal and the republic communists—primarily by their personal example—will in the future lead the people along the path of perestroika.

The Plenum participants voiced many critical comments and they all will be taken on advice.

Again, I would like to emphasize: the existing state of affairs and the existing difficulties and tasks which we must carry out in their character and scope are such that there must be a true about-face in the work of all the elements of the national economy and in all spheres of social life. In order to bring this about, it is essential to have major changes in all areas of party work and specific deeds with positive end results. The Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat fully realize what important and difficult work must be carried out in the precongress year.

Results which the people would feel—be this in the area of social construction or on the store shelves or in the sphere of education or culture, will come only due to the creative labor of all the party organizations and all the people. And each person, as they say, should pull up not a "bedsheet," but rather take on a job, not a pen, putting off their duties on someone else. Comrade A.Ya. Vinnik, speaking from this rostrum complained that in the republic coal industry (although this was said not very accurately since the coal industry now is not subordinate to the republic government), it is very difficult to solve problems due to the fact that they have recently eliminated the corresponding territorial administrations. But who eliminated them? The Central Committee of the Council of Ministers? You yourselves disbanded them and did not consult with anyone in the republic. The decision was taken at the miner meetings during the strikes and now you are searching for an extreme way in one manner or another to restore them, for if all 850 enterprises are directly subordinate to Moscow, it will be difficult to resolve the questions arising in the miner collectives. Consequently, we must organize either concerns of some associations. Comrade V.I. Masol and I appealed to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers that the Commission on Economic Reform would come to the Donbass, where we together, considering all the complications, would find the most suitable way out of the situation. Here you can see how a decision taken "in emotion" has given rise to a new and very complicated problem. And there are as many such cases in the republic as you may like. For this reason, it is essential to act reasonably and without fail anticipate the consequences.

Here it has been said with concern that the countryside this year has received less material resources, including building materials. At the same time, facts were given, in particular, on the building of luxury dachas near Nikolayev. But is it not the people of Kiev who have built them here! And the local bodies themselves have provided their own bricks and cement for their construction. I am not against dachas as people grow vegetables and fruits there, children grow strong and they become involved in labor. But if one compares the resources of the retail trade in building materials and the amount of work "in kind," then immediately one realizes that the two- or three-story "garden huts" have consumed a large

portion of the resources which could have been allocated for individual housing construction. And here the question must not be posed that supposedly "this was done by someone from the center." In this as on other questions, order must be imposed primarily on the spot.

I would like to take up one other problem. As you can see, at present a fierce political struggle is underway. This is being carried out over economic problems. The "theorists," including those in our republic, under all sorts of guises have already decided to "introduce" private ownership. But just note this: everyone is saying private ownership and...that is it. But ownership of what? Ownership of the means of production? Then this will be outright capitalism. And if we are to resort to private ownership of the means of production, to capitalism, then we must sell off our industry and our national economy. But some of these "theorists" (yesterday, Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov posed such a question at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and at present I am merely repeating him) might ask our people whether they want to serve a capitalist? This question has never been asked of the people. But the answer is known. Just take a look, they have organized cooperatives. But what is their production volume? It is peanuts! And what enormous dissatisfaction in the people. And just what would happen if we began to sell off the state-owned means of production such as factories and plants to the capitalists? What would the people say to us? But this will not happen for us, it will never be as long as there are Bolsheviks in the world. In order to purchase the means of production, it is essential to have money. Who of you has a million rubles? (Stir in the auditorium.) Is this to say that what our parents and we ourselves during our lifetimes have created in the national economy we are now to hand over to the wheeler-dealers in the shadow economy? No we will not. And this must be said everywhere at full voice (applause).

At our Plenum, exceptionally great attention was given to the questions of implementing the CPSU nationality platform. We have all seen how complex and delicate are the problems which we must resolve here. For this time, patience and effort will be required. But here it is essential to emphasize that we will not follow the path of extremes as they lead to what we have already seen in Moldavia, Estonia and the other republics. This must be stated without fail to the people. Here Comrade G.M. Mushketik spoke about the so-called "ukrainianization" of the Ukraine. And it is with good reason, comrades, that this terminology has been "bandied about" by some. But this actually is nonsense. We—peoples of different nationalities—live in the Ukraine. A majority of us is Ukrainians. How can there be any "ukrainianization" of the Ukrainian state? But also the thesis that the Russian language or, for instance, Moldavian, Polish, Greek or any other does not require attention, this thesis is incorrect and, I would say, as harmful as is the thesis of "ukrainianization." Generally speaking, we should now do everything to strengthen the friendship of the peoples living in the Ukraine.

In conclusion, I would like again to emphasize, comrades, that we will be successful if we will act reasonably and energetically, with initiative and boldness.

On the questions discussed, the Plenum approved decrees which have been published in the press.

Then the organizational question was reviewed. On behalf of the Commission for the Questions of Party Organizational and Cadre Work of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, the First Secretary of the Zaporozhye Party Obkom G.P. Kharchenko spoke. He stated that the Central Committee Commission at its session on the eve of the Plenum reviewed the question of the candidacy for the post of second secretary and member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Here they considered the opinions voiced by the members and candidate members of the Central Committee, by the members of the Auditing Commission of the Ukrainian CP at meetings conducted with the delegations from the oblast and the Kiev city party organizations. Everyone agreed on the candidacy of Comrade Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko, secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

During the discussion the comrades commented on the good theoretical and practical training of Comrade S.I. Gurenko, his erudition, boldness and great exactingness. He combines a knowledge of party, soviet and economic work. He has proven himself to be a political fighter during the elections of the USSR people's deputies. He holds an active, principled position in a superior body of the nation's state authority. At the same time, the comrades said that at times he can be excessively categorical in his judgments.

At the previous Plenum, the candidacy of Comrade S.I. Gurenko was proposed during the elections of the first secretary of the Central Committee. We feel that the very logic of events now makes his candidacy most acceptable.

Alternative candidates were not named at the commission session. Probably they considered that he had already undergone such a testing. The commission has proposed placing the candidacy of Comrade S.I. Gurenko on the list for secret balloting in the elections of the second secretary and the members of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Of course, this does not exclude that the Central Committee members could propose other candidates.

Participating in the discussion of the candidacy for the position of second secretary and members of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee were the Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom A.A. Mironenko, the Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences V.I. Trefilov, and the members of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Ye.A. Matsegora and Yu.P. Ivanov. They all supported the proposal made to elect S.I. Gurenko to this position and voiced specific requests of him.

A secret ballot was taken. S.I. Gurenko was elected the Politburo member and second secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

The Commission on the Questions of Party Organizational and Cadre Work, G.P. Kharchenko, went on to state, also examine the question of who could be put up for the post of secretary and candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo. We supported the opinion of the Politburo that at present work in the ideological areas has become very complex and it would be difficult for a single Central Committee secretary to handle all of this. For this reason, it would be correct to have one other secretary who would assume a portion of this work. As for a candidate, the commission members were unanimous: most suited for this position would be Comrade Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk who works presently as the head of the Central Committee's Ideological Department.

In proposing the candidacy of Comrade L.M. Kravchuk for this position, the commission proceeded from the fact that he is a well-known worker in the republic and he is a true and not a formal ideologue and a principled party member. The communists have commented on his wide viewpoint, the ability to lead a discussion and defend our ideological positions.

The commission proposed including the candidacy of Comrade L.M. Kravchuk on the list for a secret ballot in the elections of the secretary and candidate member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Understandably, the Central Committee members could also name other candidates.

The proposal made was supported in speeches by the Director of the Party History Institute under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee F.M. Rudich and the First Secretary of the Ternopol Party Obkom V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy.

By secret ballot L.M. Kravchuk was elected candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

As has already been announced, the Plenum elected the First Secretary of the Kiev Party Gorkom A.I. Korniyenko as a member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the First Secretary of the Kiev Party Obkom G.I. Revenko as a candidate member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

The Plenum released I.A. Gerasimov from the duties of member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and K.I. Masik from the duties of candidate member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee at their request.

The Plenum confirmed S.I. Gurenko as the chairman of the Central Committee Commission on the Questions of Party Organizational and Cadre Work, Yu.N. Yelchenko, as the chairman of the newly organized Central Committee Commission on the Questions of

Interethnic Relations and L.M. Kravchuk as the chairman of the Ideological Commission of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Changes were also made in the membership of certain Central Committee commissions.

Uzbek First Secretary Karimov on Solving Republic Problems

90US0139A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS

UZBEKISTANA in Russian 28 Sep 89 pp 1-2

[Islam Abduganinevich Karimov, Uzbek CP CC first secretary, interviewed by PRAVDA VOSTOKA and SOVET UZBEKISTONI: "Milestones of Renewal"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Reporter] Islam Abduganievich! You took part in the work of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum which considered the problems of inter-ethnic relations, and which approved the party platform on the national question. Could you not briefly share your impressions of the work of the Plenum?

[Karimov] First of all, I'd like to stress that the Plenum's resolutions have given new impetus to all our work on improving inter-ethnic relations. Gorbachev's report, the discussions held, and the party platform adopted on national policy in contemporary conditions forced all of us to ponder more deeply the complex and contradictory processes taking place in society and more clearly recognize the vast amount of responsibility of each and every one for the fate of perestroika, the integral nature of our multi-national state, and the historic perspective of socialism.

Of the various aspects raised at the Plenum, I would like to single out one key feature which has direct bearing on our conversation. Both the report and the speeches stressed that the state of inter-ethnic relations is the result of the influences of many factors: socio-economic, spiritual-moral, demographic, ecological, and others. And only in aggregate do they define the moral-political climate, the mood and interrelations of the people—inter-ethnic relations included—in every republic and in every region.

As pointed out in Gorbachev's report and in speeches at the Plenum, the key to the solution of all these problems lies in consolidation of all the healthy forces of our society, strengthening order and discipline, and increasing everyone's responsibility for the matter entrusted to them. Greater initiative and independence must be displayed in solving any problems and difficulties which spring up; entering political discussion more boldly, resolving the specific questions of concern to the people through the common efforts of the party and the people. Only under these conditions will perestroika become real.

Speaking of inter-ethnic relations in our republic, it must be pointed out that in point of fact there are no unsolvable problems. Naturally, what is required in this very

delicate matter is—mutual respect, mutual understanding, and patience. As concerns the situation of the Crimean Tatars, the Meskhet-Turks and the Kurds who were at one time deported to Uzbekistan, it was firmly declared from the high rostrum of the Plenum that this historic injustice must be corrected as soon as possible.

[Reporter] How do you assess, through the prism of the Plenum's resolutions, the situation which has taken shape in the republic?

[Karimov] It's a very complex situation. And here's why. While they have no doubts about perestroika itself, the people are dissatisfied with its results, and rightly so. They are tired of waiting. Under these conditions, various forces have become active which are taking advantage of the accumulated difficulties and dissatisfaction and are trying to turn the people against the party, Soviet and economic organs. I think it's clear what this entails.

I would like to reiterate that the acuteness of the social and inter-ethnic and, in the final analysis, the socio-political tensions as well, is conditioned first of all by the fact that every family and every person living in the republic, regardless of nationality—and especially in the countryside—senses inwardly that with every passing year, and every day, it is becoming harder and harder to live and supply oneself with everything one needs to live a normal life.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the very basis, the foundation, and above all the social and the economic base in the republic has significantly lagged behind the average national indicators, and continues to do so: both in terms of per capita national income, and in terms of having enough of the basics—food and shelter; educational, health-care, household and trade facilities; and so on.

Everything that we build and produce barely covers population growth (which is about 600-650,000 people a year), and certain per capita growth indicators or, in other words, the living standard, are hardly growing at all, or if they are improving then insignificantly. Hence the increasing dissatisfaction and discontent among the populace, which has already grown weary of our general discussions, and the various programs and plans which have been drawn up, but which in fact are not realized.

And what do the people see with their own eyes: discipline is coming apart and failing; the authorities are losing prestige (including respect for one's elders); prices are climbing, and the goods which the public needs are becoming scarcer. This is quite often accompanied by social injustice in income distribution (As they say, life has its ups and downs), and there are large discrepancies in the development of cooperatives, where serious abuses and unearned income are permitted.

And against this background there is a significant number of needy persons; above all families with lots of children, pensioners and the disabled.

If one adds to this the incompetence, inability to organize work, rampant indifference and bureaucratism which takes place at all levels of administration, a general picture of the increased tensions in our interrelations emerges.

The increasing number of resolutions giving empty promises is seriously undermining the authority of the administrative organs. I am convinced that the major portion of the documents coming into the offices never reaches those responsible for acting on them, or they are accepted without consultation with them. If no one is interested in these documents, and if no one is controlling them, why on earth adopt these decisions and resolutions?

I have to tell you frankly, that whatever limits of confidence we the leaders have enjoyed has been exceeded, because of our neglect.

[Reporter] You've recently become the leader of the republic party organization. What, in your opinion, must be done first in order to normalize the situation in Uzbekistan?

[Karimov] The main thing required of us today, is a sober, real and critical analysis of the state of affairs in the localities: We must have the courage to acknowledge our mistakes and our neglect, and where appropriate, our bankruptcy in working with the cadres and in leadership of socio-economic construction; and, relying on the aktiv, we must seek avenues of escape from the situation we find ourselves in. In short, we must do everything to restore and strengthen, through practical deeds, the prestige of party and Soviet organs. Only if we acknowledge the true situation and the actual state of affairs—our blunders and our mistakes—can we do anything concrete to improve our lives.

In this matter it is very important to restore justice in the eyes of the people, wherever it has been trampled.

After all, nothing happens without any traces; everything leaves its trace. Today we can see the kind of reaction caused among the people by the indiscriminate, thoughtless approach and the serious mistakes and excesses committed during examination of the so-called "cotton cases;" where often still-capable people were groundlessly dismissed from active employment—and the kind of scars all this left on the fortunes of many people and their families; what a negative influence on their frame of mind and what sufferings were brought on by attempts which took place both in the central city and in the localities to discredit and abolish centuries-old folk traditions such as, for example, the Narvuz Festival in the Spring and to foist off far-fetched rituals and forms of dress in their stead, etc., under the guise of struggle with vestiges of the past.

Those who have not yet acknowledged this must understand, that any imprudent attempt to rehash things, to do things over in one's own way, or to forbid, offering nothing in return, those national traditions which

evolved over the centuries (Take for example the funeral rites for close relatives), can bring about only one thing—the just and proper reaction of all age groups (which quite often crosses the line to aggressive action) to defend, preserve and renew their own traditional culture. I would like to stress that every nation and nationality, no matter what its size and situation, demands maximum respect and attention to its traditions, language and culture. And if we consider ourselves intelligent people, we should have understood this before.

Therefore, everyone who really wants to speedily correct the distortions of the past and take concrete, practical steps to alleviate the people's situation, should first of all refrain from lodging complaints against one another, but rather join in cooperation, not only in the economic and social, but also the ideological and the cultural fronts. We simply have no other way.

Why should certain representatives of the public, placing themselves in the position of the opposition, direct all their efforts and energy at criticizing everyone and everything (That is not criticism, but carping), trying to accuse us of the fact, that we ourselves had long realized and understood? After all, the republic's leading cadres are not being replaced just because someone desired it—but rather, to put an end to empty talk and carping over the past, and to quickly get down to business, the results of which should affect every collective and every family even today and tomorrow; in order that every person would understand, and be able to tell who is simply babbling and stirring up the people, and who is engaged in activity useful to the nation.

It should be clear to everyone that today we ought not to be shaking and rocking the boat we all sit in, but giving it a proper and firm course. It is my deep conviction that only firm discipline and responsibility can save the situation.

Along the lines of such an approach, today I would like to describe the practical matters which are being implemented in our republic. I will stipulate in advance that I am talking primarily about the rural area, where all the disproportions and shortfalls in our progress are especially felt, and where the overwhelming majority of our populace lives.

The first question on which we should dwell is the question of allocating plots of land for private use. In the republic, where the populace is growing by leaps and bounds, and there is a surplus of labor resources—let's call a spade a spade: unemployment; where there are more large families than anywhere else (six to seven dependents in every worker's family); where per-capita income is not on the rise, and is even on the decline in some places—the question of allocating plots of land for the populace has long-since matured. And, if you will, everyone has known and understood, that this problem must be solved; but—few were found to take it up seriously, and take responsibility for it. Now such a decision has been adopted, and is already being put into

effect. In the last month alone, since the adoption of the decision, more than 60,000 families have been allocated plots of land.

I would like to restate the purposes for which this task is being set and carried out: first of all, in order to resolve the Food Program, in order to feed the people. The entire history of the people bears witness to the fact that the local populace is able to, and loves to, work its own land—and produces great yields on it. The yield from a single hectare of land in private use (and there are about 200,000 hectares of such land in the republic today, or 5.0 percent of the total cultivated area), amounts to over 12,000 rubles—which exceeds the yield from the public sector by more than a factor of three.

I am convinced that if we bring the program which we commenced to its fruition—and we are obliged to do so: that is, before 1991 we shall transfer 200-250,000 hectares of land to private subsidiary farms—we shall be able to feed every family and shall achieve a sharp decline in market prices. In order to carry out this program we shall have to resolve two problems:

First, to overcome bureaucratism, and in places, opposition and instances of extortion on the part of the middle link—on the part of representatives of certain rayon and village Soviets and farm administrators, and absence of control and indifference of oblast administrators.

Second, to do everything possible to not permit losses, and to resolve questions associated with timely procurement, delivery, sale and processing of everything the populace wishes to sell from their plots.

I would like to assure and at the same time warn everyone: let no one think that these questions will not be monitored. The Uzbek CP Central Committee has sufficient power to successfully complete this work.

Without transferring plots for individual construction we shall be unable to resolve the housing program before the year 2000. Even today the proportion of individual construction amounts to over 60 percent of the total volume. However, we consider it our duty to resolve the question not only of allocating land, but also furnishing the builders the necessary privileges, loans, and above all—building materials.

The recent examination of bank accounts at the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro is only the first reminder of who is still standing on the sidelines; and, moreover, who is discrediting the importance of individual construction in the republic. We know how many officials, including leading officials, are still making a fortune on the difficulties connected with this. The public itself, along with the law-enforcement organs, must also expose them and put them in their place.

The fact that by transferring land to the populace we are establishing the conditions for employing people, and

above all mothers with many children, and are protecting their social security, is also becoming enormously important. This has already been mentioned, but it is very important to change the manner of thinking of those upon whom the fate of the future rests, not only that of the new generation, but also that of their mothers. The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Social Security must play a positive role in the question of restoring their rights.

The next serious direction for employing the able-bodied populace, is setting up small shops and manufactures right in the rayon centers and in the kishlaks for manufacturing labor-intensive but non-material-intensive and non-energy-intensive articles and consumer goods. Direct contacts with major associations and plants for implementing this program have already been defined. Only our Council of Ministers has to take up coordination of these things once and for all, and take the completion of these tasks into their own hands.

Today, taking advantage of the opportunity, I would like to express my gratitude to our veterans and elders for the great things they are doing in helping us to resolve these knotty problems, and especially for educating the young people. However, I must acknowledge that we do not give sufficient respect to the many, many people on the kishlak, aul and makhall committees. Lately we have somehow forgotten that those respect people, the elders, have had and continue to have important influence on the way of life, on the behavior and on the mood of the people; namely the elders who, as a rule, are elected to the kishlak and makhall committees. Those who were brought up in the conditions of the makhall know from their own experience the value to every person and every family of the respect of one's neighbors and the makhall society as a whole.

If a young man himself, his parents and forefathers have spent many years building up the authority of the family, brick by brick; I know of no self-respecting person who would not fight to preserve this authority in the eyes of the people. For many people, to lose it is like losing one's life. We must continue to build up the strength, and support the role and the importance of the kishlak and makhall committees. In the next few days the republic Council of Ministers will adopt a resolution establishing the wages of the chairmen and secretaries of Makhall committees (To this day they receive no wages): 170-130 and 150-110 rubles, respectively. Ten million rubles in all are allocated from local budgets for these purposes.

[Reporter] The next big problem area is associated with the so-called mono-cultural cotton crop. One can say without exaggeration that it has everyone worried—both the old and the young.

[Karimov] Yes, actually an exceptionally tense situation has come to pass in the republic, brought on primarily by the high level of cotton farming on our irrigated lands, which has reached 85 percent in certain regions. A great deal has been said about the reasons for this, about why

we have taken up such a life, and the fateful consequences to which this has led. It came about primarily because the peasant cotton farmer himself, the brigade leaders and farm managers have never been closely involved in drawing up the plans: little attention was paid to them. And all the consequences of the inflated reports and the damage wrought by the enormous wealth certain people have accumulated at the people's expense, was on the whole laid on their shoulders, and has had unfortunate consequences on the fate and the situation of many families.

This we must never forget. A real plan, which comes from the producers—the farms themselves—must be made the basis for the plan of the republic as a whole: This is the principled position, to which everyone to whom the matter has been entrusted must adhere.

Hence, we have been able to support our argument and convince the Union government to establish the plan for the Uzbek SSR for 1990 and the following years for production of cotton fibre in the amount of 1,500,000 tons—or 215,000 tons less than what was reported for 1988. Translated into terms of raw cotton, this is about 600-700 tons less. Now, every oblast and rayon will be given a task in terms of cotton fibre. And the farms themselves will decide what to plant, how much to plant, how to distribute their own cropland.

Estimates indicate that at the same time cotton-growing on certain farms is decreasing by 56-63 percent. With sensible distribution of the established task a normative base will be created for introducing scientifically-based crop rotation in practically all oblasts and rayons in the republic. At the same time every farm, rayon and oblast administrator must ponder on these things and take responsibility for ensuring that kolkhoz and sovkhov income does not fall, but rather that it shows steady growth.

Unfortunately, one finds administrators, even on the oblast level, who somehow are not concerned about this question. They prefer to count the money in someone else's pocket, in the pockets of the peasants. There are attempts to explain and justify the reduction in income in the public sector (kolkhozes and sovkhovs), by the increased income of the people to whom land has been transferred for private subsidiary farms and the sale of products connected with this, from one's own garden, at the market. It must be made perfectly clear to these comrades, that increased income in the public sector is their primary task, and it is not proper to connect it with any other questions and sectors. A worker must at all costs not lose interest in the public sector, no matter what income he receives, once again through his own labor, from his subsidiary farm. This is a principled question. Those who labor honestly should receive full value from their labor.

There is not a single person in the republic who is not concerned about the question of the price for cotton. Everything, literally everything, is associated with the

price for cotton: both just wages for hard labor and the welfare of the millions of people employed at raising this crop; the development of the social sphere, and above all in the countryside; questions of preserving fertility and improving the condition of the land itself; and the financial and economic condition of those enterprises connected with services to the cotton industry: in a word, there is not a single sector that would not be touched by the solution of this problem.

An increase in the price of cotton is long overdue; this question has been raised many times by the cotton farmers. However, it must be acknowledged that the organs concerned has not taken any serious, well-thought-out steps to resolve this problem. This can be explained by the fact that to this day there has not been one single well-developed and well-grounded proposal on how much prices must be increased, and why. It has long been known that parity (a fair correlation) between prices for agricultural production and the prices for industrial goods supplied to the rural area has not been achieved. To a certain extent, this also explains the situation in the rural area as a whole, where the procurement price for many kinds of products (and not only cotton) is unjustifiably low.

For example, in our conditions the procurement price for potatoes is 23 kopecks, while the average production cost is 32 kopecks; for melon crops (watermelons), the corresponding figures are 6 and 8 kopecks; for grapes, 30 and 32 kopecks; for corn, 11 and 13 kopecks; and the procurement price for tomatoes is only 18 kopecks. Therefore, price reform on the whole for many kinds of agricultural products, including cocoons, rice, grain, fruit and vegetable products, animal products and others, is long overdue—and the necessary materials, estimates and proposals have been prepared on it.

Initial examination of this question has shown that its solution requires very large sums, of which, we must honestly admit, there are not enough in the country, and the press writes about this openly. Questions of tying procurement prices for raw materials produced in the countryside to the manufactured products received in return, and many others, have not been resolved. And we must not permit increased procurement prices to affect the market prices, or the public will suffer.

In this connection, a resolution has been adopted to examine questions of price reform along with the plans for the coming five-year-plan in 1991: this means, throughout the country. However, having taken cognizance of the poverty situation which has come to pass in the cotton-producing republics, and above all in Uzbekistan, the nation's leadership has managed to locate additional funds and sources to supplement the present prices for raw cotton, for this year and for 1990. Total assets directed to these ends in our republic for this period amount to nearly 1.2 billion rubles. This year, (medium fiber) raw cotton, grades I and II will receive supplements of 90 rubles, and 60 rubles for grade III;

while in 1990, grades I and II will receive 210-ruble and grade III, 120-ruble supplements.

The average price for raw cotton for the republic as a whole, counting the supplement, amounts to 900 rubles. Next year the price will be 1,016 rubles, as opposed to 806 rubles for the current fiscal year. Prices will also be increased for fine-fiber cotton, although in lesser amounts, it is true.

I would like to give notice once again, that although funds have been allocated for price supports, price reform is to come in 1991. We have every reason to hope that the average price per ton of cotton will amount to no less than 1,500 rubles. At the same time we must remember that increasing income from sale of cotton is tied first of all to improving the quality of the raw cotton raised. It is especially important that the maturing of the raw cotton this year has significantly lagged behind that of last year owing to weather conditions.

[Reporter] The CPSU Central Committee Plenum adopted a resolution to hold the 28th Party Congress next year. And since we are talking about the tasks of the rural area today, what will have to be done on that sector?

[Karimov] The Plenum adopted a resolution on the approaching periods for convening the party congress, and it will define a clear-cut program for our further progress. And not a single person in Uzbekistan should be indifferent to how the republic approaches the congress in the economic, cultural and social spheres.

All of us, all the leaders, are paying close attention to the forthcoming elections to local Soviets and to the republic Supreme Soviet. We have too little time to shake things up and define a firm position. Our concrete affairs, our concrete concern for the people—this is the best agitation and propaganda for the election campaign. And this time no one will put up with empty promises and lofty words. Everyone should understand this.

Today the main question which occupies us all is the question of strengthening the party ranks and increasing its role and prestige in restructuring all aspects of our lives. We must acknowledge that as the politicization and self-awareness of the masses is increasing, we quite often place in the category of unofficial groups extraordinarily thoughtful people, who boldly and openly express their thoughts. In my view this is a stereotypical, banal and superficial approach; in other words, we are still thinking in the old way. Uzbekistan needs an influx of fresh forces, and above all the talented young people who are coming up—true fighters for justice and for progress; who place the interests of the people and the regions in which they live, the republic, and the whole country, ahead of their own or group interests.

I am convinced that the aspirations of these people do not fundamentally clash with the interests of our party; and if our tasks and ultimate goals are the same, that is, the welfare and the future of the people, then it turns out that we are simply wasting our efforts and are staking out

positions which place us in opposition to one another. The entire cause is the loser in this situation, and people are the ones who suffer.

A few words about the tasks for today: they should be decided on the land, in the literal sense of the word. The agricultural year has turned out to be a very difficult one and not only for cotton farming. Heavy downpours, frosts lasting right up until May, caused enormous damage. According to preliminary figures, losses of wheat and grapes amounted to 200,000 tons; vegetables and melon crops, 350 tons; and cotton, 200-250,000 tons. In monetary terms this is nearly 800 million rubles. Despite sleepless labor, the native wit and the heroic efforts of our peasants preserved and restored the young cotton plants, but they too were slow to develop. Intensive harvesting began late, and in some places the harvest is still being gathered.

I do not need to speak about the particulars of the technology, the time for defoliation, and the readiness of the equipment in the established conditions—our specialists and our peasants know full well what they must do, and they understand their responsibility for the success of the harvest. We need only show concern for organizing a smooth-running harvest sequence, and for the best possible conditions for effective work and proper rest. In the intensive harvest period it is important to deepen and strengthen leasing relationships and cost accounting in the harvest sequence. Here we must not yet overcome inertia. But we shall wage a determined struggle with it, encouraging in every way independence and a creative approach to the matter. After all, many of our peasants are enterprising, work-loving, thoughtful people! I know many; I have seen such genuine work-innovators. And I have faith that the same people will set the example during the harvest, with responsibility and industriousness, of solicitously achieving the end result. And other people need to follow their example.

The harvest must be saved. And we are counting on the intelligence of the city-dwellers, students and workers of industrial enterprises, on their feelings of solidarity with the peasants. And finally, we are counting on the profound understanding of the truth, that unlike the rural area is rich, the city can never be so. It goes without saying that all of this must be without coercion, but must be voluntary, based only on economic self-interest.

But the intensive harvest period is only part, although an exceptionally important part, of the final stage of the agricultural year. At the same time, the foundation must be laid for the harvest in the last year of the five-year plan. Here too, I will not be making economic recommendations. I would only express my confidence that this work also will be carried out with consideration of the cost-accounting and leasing principles which have already proven themselves in the rural area, and in consideration of the economic incentives for which there are real opportunities with the introduction of price supports for cotton.

Other areas of agricultural production have the very same task, and these areas must not be treated coldly or considered of secondary importance. We must finish the harvest and the procurement of feeds, fruits, vegetables and potatoes, and grain; and we must get the farms and pastures ready for wintering the cattle.

And all party committees, soviet and economic organs, and working collectives must follow a policy of strengthening order and discipline, and carrying out all agricultural work on a timely basis. We must rapidly restructure and skillfully and efficiently resolve the numerous problems in the agro-industrial complex.

Everyone must honestly and conscientiously perform at his workplace to accomplish the matters entrusted to him—this must become an internal requirement for everyone who has a feeling of involvement in perestroika and in the renewal of society begun by the party.

Uzbek SSR Development Seen in Light of Population Projections

90US0133A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 Oct 89 p 1

[UzTAG report: "Uzbek CP Central Committee Conference"]

[Text] The need to increase the role and place of the higher educational institutions, their leadership, Party organizations, pedagogues, and all their Party activists in stabilizing the republic's political and economic situation was stressed at an Uzbek CP Central Committee conference. The rectors, secretaries of Party committees, and other leaders of the republic's higher educational institutions participated in this conference.

I. A. Karimov, the Uzbek CP Central Committee first secretary, spoke at the conference.

It was noted that the country and the republic are currently undergoing a crucial stage. And how quickly the crises will be overcome depends on all of us and our work. We must devote more attention to moving forward and to finding constructive solutions to pressing problems in order to overcome these crises.

Today, Uzbekistan is below the average standard of living indices for all republics. The solution to this problem depends on a whole complex of measures. But, first of all, we must pay heed to the fact that all economic phenomena and prospects should, first and foremost, be viewed in the light of demographic problems. Currently, there are 20 million people living in the republic. In 2005-2010, the population will be about 33 million, and in the entire Central Asian region, it will exceed 55-60 million.

In this connection, the problems of providing such an increase in population with everything required for normal life will become increasingly acute. We must admit that we do not yet have clear-cut solutions to these problems. In the past, transporting water from Siberia to

Central Asia was considered and the solution to these problems was linked to that. This is above all our fault—the fault of the republic's leaders, who thought little about the future and about realistic ways out of a difficult situation and lived only for the present.

Some have suggested resettling people. But it is clear that we cannot force this on the people and tear them away from their native roots. The need for family planning has been discussed. Hotheads have used vulgar methods to this end. But this also has been categorically removed from the agenda. On the whole, the question may be one of raising the culture and living standards of the people, and through all of this—of solving the problems of the demographic and national plan.

Even now, the rapidly growing requirements of the republic's population are being met with very great strain. The annual population increase in Uzbekistan is 600-700 thousand people. And all the problems arising in this connection cannot be separated from this overall global problem.

It is very important to have one's own clear-cut positions in this very difficult situation. One cannot remain aloof, and this applies first and foremost to pedagogues and educators of young people. But a large portion of them are people, who are deeply upset over the republic's fate and are searching for means to solve the complex problems.

Of no small importance is the question, how perestroika is going in the universities, in what is it manifested and what is interfering with it? There has been a great deal of discussion about a transition to self-government and a further democratization of education. In reality, there have been few changes for the present.

It is clear that the higher educational institutions are experiencing very great difficulties. They have poor training facilities. The lecture halls are overcrowded and there are not enough laboratory facilities. All necessary steps are being taken to solve these problems. Apparently, it is no coincidence that the question of the need to reestablish the Ministry of Higher Education has been raised.

And, nevertheless, the primary question remains, why are there a lack of spirituality, a negative attitude toward socialist values, and political infantilism growing among a portion of the students and instructors? Why is there a devaluation of knowledge taking place? Is the attitude toward one's elders and toward work changing? And this is happening, beginning with primary school. Incidents of displays of nationalism are on the rise. These are serious symptoms. And the ideologists, pedagogues, and educators of young people must not allow these poisonous seeds to sprout in the youthful souls of our children.

We are gravely worried by the fact that many instructors do not have a clear-cut and distinct position regarding

the students' participation in political rallies, demonstrations, and meetings of various kinds. We cannot condone the fact that this does not lend itself to a principled appraisal. Moreover, certain comrades have taken a duplicitous stand. It is high time that all of us find our positions regarding the questions of principle, which living poses. People, especially young people, respect first and foremost those who have convictions and steadfast positions.

To enhance exactingness, to strengthen discipline and order, to seize the initiative, to unite all the healthy forces behind the principles of perestroika, and to set the example of ideological conviction in word and deed—this is what is currently required of communists and all university instructors.

The problems of the cotton single-crop system are often raised at present-day political rallies. And, in fact, we had and continue to have a single-crop system, preventing the resolution of the food problem. But at the same time, we must sensibly approach the estimation of raw cotton's importance to our republic. It is time to understand that for the present cotton is feeding Uzbekistan. It is another matter to reduce the sowing of cotton to reasonable, scientifically substantiated limits and to obtain increased market prices. Work is being conducted along this line and there have already been definite results. We have achieved the condition that a target on the scale of one and a half million tons of fiber has been established for 1990. Expressed in terms of raw cotton, this is approximately 4 million 600 thousand tons. These quotas will not change until 1995. But beginning next year we are shifting to a new system of planning—in fiber. The import of this lies in the fact that the freedom in crop distribution is granted to the farms themselves and they will be given the right to sow crops selected by them and in those quantities, which will allow them to manage their own land without reducing the aggregate income of the farm. We will be able to free up about 300 thousand hectares because of these measures. Other concrete measures are also being taken. But people, who are utterly incompetent in such issues, discuss these problems at political rallies.

Let us take the timely question of cotton prices. Calculations have been made and methods have been defined. And despite the fact that the country is in very severe financial straits, we received price increases for raw cotton. In 1989-1990, the sum total of the price increases will be about 1 billion 200 million rubles. The profit received by the republic from agriculture should double because of this alone. In perspective, agricultural prices in general will be reviewed in 1991. But now it boils down to the fact that there are people who are saying: we should not seek an increase in cotton prices, it will become profitable for farms to grow it and we will return to a single-crop system again. In my opinion, these are untenable arguments.

The second issue, which is being actively discussed today is language. The question of making Uzbek the official language is being decided favorably. A large number of people are participating in the discussion of the draft

legislation and the more people participating, the more just the adopted law will be. But at the same time there must be a rational approach to the problem as a whole. Making Uzbek the official language should by no means infringe upon any other language used in the republic's territory, least of all—the Russian language.

According to experts' calculations, the conversion to Uzbek as the official language will optimally cost almost one and a half billion rubles. It is necessary to find these resources. We must admit, the study of Uzbek has found itself in such a state that currently, except for linguists, there are not very many people, who really know Uzbek literary language. The mistakes of the past must be corrected, we must create conditions for the study of the Uzbek language and set aside an appointed time for it. We also have to study Arabic script. After all, this is our history and a part of our culture. But we must do all of this from reasonable positions. Above all, we should approach the solution to this problem from the state's positions and our actions should not separate, but, on the contrary, should unite all people living in the territory of Uzbekistan. Today, as never before, the consolidation of all forces and constructive resolution of the tasks set before us are required.

Sh. A. Alimov, rector of Tashkent State University, S. I. Ibadullayev, prorector of the Institute for Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanization Engineers, A. N. Nasyrov, first secretary of the Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee, A. S. Saliyev, rector of the Samarkand Cooperative Institute, Eh. T. Shaykhov, rector of Tashkent Agricultural Institute, S. P. Pulatov, rector of the Road Transport Institute, U. Nigmatdzhonov, dean of the economic department at the Order of the Red Banner for Labor Tashkent Institute for Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanization Engineers, M. A. Zaidov, the republic's Minister of Education, and K. Yusupov, rector of Tashkent Pedagogical Institute spoke at the conference.

The speakers emphasized the need to increase the responsibility of university leaders, Party organizations, and the Party activists for organizational and propagandistic work among the students. A proposal was made to create political centers attached to the universities, of which the best teachers and students from the Party activists would be members. They should be well-informed in the issues of language, interethnic relations, and the economic and social tasks, which have been set by perestroika. Students and anyone who so desires should have the opportunity to come into these centers and receives answers to any questions that are troubling them. It was noted that the relations between teachers and students should be built on mutual trust and respect.

D. Khamidov, secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, M. M. Mirkasymov, first secretary of the Tashkent Party obkom, A. I. Fazylbekov, first secretary of the Tashkent Party gorkom, Sh. R. Mirsaidov, deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan, and R. Gulamov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, took part in the conference.

'Bureaucratic' Concept of 'Center' Seen as Fostering Inequality*90US0196A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
19 Oct 89 p 3*

[Article by Grigoriy Baganyan: "Nationality Policy: Of the Party or of the Center?"]

[Text] Recently, the term "center" is frequently encountered on the pages of the press, in the speeches of state figures, and people's deputies. It is applied to the largest republic, the RSFSR and to the Russian people (which in the political sphere not infrequently leads to flaming anti-Russian moods), to the country's leadership (Moscow-Kremlin), and to the central departments.

So what should this word be taken to mean?

A GENUINELY EXISTING BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISM, PENETRATING ALL FORMS OF THE APPARATUS AT ALL LEVELS OF POWER, PURSUING ITS OWN, "EGOTISTICAL" GOALS, AND HAVING AS ITS SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATIVE-COMMAND SYSTEM—considers the author of this article. It is to the center that we are "indebted" for the stagnation, the perversions of socialism, and other misfortunes. The article makes an attempt to show the Center's "activity" in the area of interethnic relations. Many of the article's positions are controversial, and thus we invite their discussion.

As we know, the emergence of the Center in Soviet society was conditioned by concrete historical conditions. However, it should not be considered that this phenomenon is characteristic only of our country and our society. Bureaucratic centers have always existed in one form or another in various societies and in various epochs; they represented the interests of certain groups of people (and of even one person). A study of such bureaucratic organisms (which have existed for millennia in other states) proves that they have always developed first and foremost in accordance with particular interests and requirements which, as a rule, do not coincide with the interests and needs of the society that generated them.

Today, the party has come to a simple conclusion about the need to eliminate the command-administrative system hampering society's development, and, consequently, a serious limitation of the power of the bureaucracy (for the time being, we may only dream of its elimination), including the area of nationality policy so important for our country. In light of this, it is necessary to examine in detail the position that "without a strong Union there are no strong republics; without strong republics, there is no strong Union," fixed in the CPSU Central Committee platform, "The CPSU Nationality Policy in Current Conditions."

In principle, it is a deeply true and logical position, but the problem is that until now, in fact and in society's life practice, it has been substituted (and there is the danger that it will be substituted in the future) by the thesis that

"a strong Center is strong republics." The concept of the Union is thus castrated and reduced to the theoretical grounds for the necessity of preserving the so-called strong Center. Correspondingly, the "strong republic" is already mechanically reborn as a section of the main Center in the provinces (the local center). But the Soviet republics are an historical, socioeconomic, and political formation, and the Center is only an organ formed by these republics. The republic is the base, and the Union (in its current meaning of Center) is the superstructure, not the other way around.

There exist two principles of firm and voluntary unification of independent elements (read sovereign republics) into a system of a higher order. First of all, if each of the elements will have in the new system the opportunity to fulfill the interests and needs of its people to a greater extent than if it were not in the system. Secondly, under the condition that the development of the level of fulfillment of interests and needs of one element (the people) not take place at the expense of reducing the level of fulfillment of another people (that is, of another element—the republics).

How are these principles realized in our reality, in the USSR as an integrated system. In order to convince that the given principles are not being realized, and are moreover being ignored, and that the more they are ignored, the more contradictions emerge between the Center and the republics and the needs of the Center with the interests and needs of the peoples (and republics), somewhat later we will cite some official data from the material of party meetings and the USSR State Committee for Statistics.

However, before pausing on them, the author feels it necessary to remind the reader of the following canon, to which, objectively, any "egotistical" Center adheres for its survival: In order to preserve its influence, the Center always displays and substantiates its significance, periodically allowing the development of certain negative processes, and in some places, even stimulating them to underscore its necessity, demonstrating and imitating the artificial unity and coincidence of the interests of society and the interests of the Center. This is on the one hand; on the other hand, in order to conceal the existence of contradictions, it is not to the Center's advantage to "study" society's interests and needs (in actuality, the Center does study them, but does not inform the entire society of this). As we have become convinced, contradictions may be concealed only up to a certain moment in historical time and level of development, after which they will all the same be revealed. But the main thing is that in order to exist, realize, and fulfill its interests, the Center must rely upon someone within the system governing it; it must receive someone's support. By what means? By allowing and introducing into the system certain disproportions in the levels of allocating and fulfilling the needs and interests of various groups of society. Naturally, the Center needs to rely on the strongest, largest element. Of course, the RSFSR is and has been such an element in the USSR.

The given republic is a large and complex system in and of itself, consisting of autonomous republics, oblasts, and krais (elements), which in their functions and significance do not "yield" to the elements composing the USSR. The strongest element in the RSFSR is the Russian people, the most numerous in the USSR (almost 52 percent of the country's entire population).

Obviously, in order to understand how the Center's reliance the strong part has manifested itself, it is necessary to link into a single chain the following arguments:

a) in its majority, the Center must consist of people of a single nationality;

b) the more representatives of the given nationality there are, the more simply functions the mechanism of selecting "worthy" individuals with appropriate qualities for the natural replacement of those departing (primarily due to age-related unsuitability) from the center on pension;

c) it may replace its "unsuitable" members (or individuals who got through by chance) easily and painlessly. And almost no one will pay any attention to this, let us say, replacing Petrov with Ivanov, or Bondarchuk with Ivanchuk. How much more pointed the replacements of Asymbayev with Petrov or Karapetyan with Petriashvili would look.

Graphic examples of this are the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, or the Supreme Soviet Presidium, or the central ministries and departments, from the viewpoint of their national composition. We note that the first cabinets of the Sovnarkom [soviet of people's commissariats] under the leadership of V.I. Lenin and the Baku commune under S.G. Shaumyan were not at all like this.

Most interesting are the results of an analysis of the nationality composition of the delegates to the party congresses, where the number of delegates of Russian nationality sometimes approached only 54 percent (6th Congress, 1917), and 57.4 percent (15th Congress, 1930). Further on, the share of Russians in the body of the delegates grows, and they become even more numerous among the candidate members to the CPSU Central Committee.

An analogous picture can also be observed in the dynamics of the nationality composition of the party. The proportion of CPSU members of Russian nationality is increasing. However, the increase in the share of party members of Russian nationality is in contradiction to the demographic processes within the USSR. After all, the growth rate of the number of Russians is lower than the growth rate of the entire USSR population; and here, too, incidentally, a tendency toward even greater reduction is noted. Is this a reflection of the political party or of the Center? Let the reader draw conclusions on his own.

Let us examine another example. The share of non-Russian individuals in the ruling organs of the RSFSR differs significantly (to the lesser side) from the share of Russian leaders in other republics.

It is also an interesting fact that this is under conditions where as many non-Russians live in the RSFSR as Russians live in the Union outside of the RSFSR.

Thus, there exists an obvious "subjectivity" in the cadre nationality policy of the Center, the generator and organizers of this policy. This is not the result of errors; this is the result of the Center's policy, and it specifically is one of the reasons for the decline in the party's authority.

Now it is not difficult for the reader to surmise why, until recently, the RSFSR has not had its own more or less independent center. The thing is, that is not advantageous for the main Center to "maintain" an intermediary between it and the strong republic. This is both troublesome, and in the final analysis, could lead to the small center's "exit" from subordination, and to the redistribution of "benefits" in the area of power. An analysis of the structure of the Central Committee apparatus also presents a practical interest (and not only for the specialists in party building, of whom, incidentally, the country has extraordinarily few; they are practically non-existent in some republics). In examining the structure before and after the formation of the USSR, you notice one very important contradiction. Changes in the structure as a whole touched upon only one subdivision. An glaring error (was it an error?) in the organizational structure of the apparatus, which did not take into consideration the fact of state unification of sovereign republics, has gravely reflected upon the evolution of nationality relations.

Let us now examine certain socioeconomic indicators which confirm the author's thesis that it was to the Center's advantage to support inequality in the system's development, and create the semblance of more favorable development conditions for a certain element of the system.

1. **The index of growth in city development** (as an indicator of the development of productivity, industry, the expansion of state territories, the strengthening of state power, the development of the state apparatus, etc.).

In the USSR in 1950, there were 11 cities with a population of over 500,000 (2 of them with a population of over 1,000,000). But by 1 January 1987, in the USSR there were 55 such cities (31 in the RSFSR), including 23 cities with a population of over 1,000,000 (13 in the RSFSR).

2. **The composition and structure of the republics' urban population.** In 1913, within the territory of the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, and Estonia, the share (percent) of the urban population in the overall population figure was higher than that of the RSFSR. In 1989, this index in the republics became lower than in

the RSFSR, where the urban population already comprises 74 percent (in Armenia, 68 percent, in the USSR, 66 percent). The increase in the growth rate of the RSFSR urban population was accompanied by a 26 percent decline in the rural population figure. This figure is the lowest of all the republics. Within the boundaries of the USSR territory in 1913, the population was 18 percent urban and 82 percent rural, and in the RSFSR in particular, 17 and 83 percent respectively; in Armenia, 10 percent and 90 percent.

3. The average life expectancy. The following tendencies may be noted from 1969 to 1986. In the USSR, this index falls from 69.3 to 69. In 1969, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia still surpassed the RSFSR; in 1986, they already fell behind. Other than in the RSFSR, an increase in average life expectancy is observed only in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Lithuania.

4. The average monthly wages of workers and employees in the USSR in 1940 was R195.6, and in the RSFSR, R207.8 (in Armenia, R184.5). In 1940, the average monthly wages of workers and employees in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Turkmenia was higher than in the RSFSR. But in 1986, only in Estonia has the salary remained higher than in the RSFSR. The average monthly wages of kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers in the RSFSR is higher than the USSR average. The rates of real per capita income growth for the USSR population (1970=100 percent) for 1980, 1985, and 1986 were 146, 162, and 167 percent respectively and in the RSFSR, 151, 168, and 173 percent, and in Armenia, 145, 159, and 164 percent.

While the 1986 USSR average per capita investment in savings banks was R882, in the RSFSR, it was R946 (R853 in Armenia).

5. Capital investment in housing construction in compared costs (millions of rubles) in the RSFSR from 1971 to 1975 was 62.0 percent of the USSR total, and from 1981-1985, 62.3 percent. Over this period, capital investment in the RSFSR in relative units grew by 44 percent (in Armenia, 20.3 percent).

In 1986, in comparison to 1980, the urban housing fund (millions of square meters of space) grew by 19.2 percent in the RSFSR, and by 17.4 percent in Armenia.

In 1980, the USSR average per capita population housing provision (square meters of space) was 13.4; in the RSFSR, 13.4, and in Armenia, 12.8; by 1986 these figures were USSR, 14.9; RSFSR, 15.2, and in Armenia, 13.7 respectively. Does this mean, however, that the RSFSR is always in the winning position, and that the Center has always conducted a policy aimed at raising the standard of living of a given republic? Hardly. We all know perfectly well that the real standard of living of those residing in the Russian Federation is lower than, say, that of those residing in the Baltics or the Transcaucasus. And this happens because in a large system (such as the RSFSR), the disproportion in levels of accumulation, allocation, consumption, and fulfillment of interest

and needs is more easily hidden. In the majority of cases, the bureaucratic Center, even a mononational one, is absolutely indifferent to the interests and needs of its people. At the same time, when claims arise or could arise against the Center, it immediately "remembers," and exploits the circumstance of its primary affiliation to the Russian people, which indeed, more than anyone else, suffers from this same bureaucracy, settled in the Center.

Under the conditions examined, in the provinces (the republics) for many years it was relatively easy for the hands of those promoted by the Center to conduct a policy of "Russification" of schools, book publishing, newspaper and magazine production. Thus, for example, while in the USSR in 1986, 83,472 books, brochures, and printed item titles were issued; in the RSFSR alone, there were 51,323 (with 46,584 of those in Russian).

In Armenia, respectively, there were 1,146 books and brochures (791 in Armenian), 91 magazines (55 in Armenian), and 92 newspapers (81 in Armenian). Incidentally, almost as many Armenian-language newspapers are published abroad. From 1970 to 1986, the publication of books, brochures, and printed items in the native language declined in the Ukraine (from 3,105 to 1,826); in Belorussia (from 428 to 381); as well as in Moldavia, Latvia, and Kirghizia. Publication of magazines declined in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Estonia.

What does the bureaucratic Center fear most today? Of course, a loss of power, which is ensured by the current USSR state structure. That is why it is a change in the structure of the USSR, specifically, a recutting of borders, which is the most dangerous thing for the Center. But this recutting is inevitable in the face of objective conformity to natural laws (this is evidenced by the entire history of the development of mankind and its state formations); our state can exist no other way but on the basis of a voluntary union of sovereign, self-standing, independent, and free national-state formations—the republics.

The formation of new republics is to be expected, this is a natural process, and obviously, it will begin first and foremost with the RSFSR. The first to divide will either be Russia itself; or a number of autonomous republics or krays will form into a republic, or leave the body of the RSFSR, and join with one of the already existing republics.

Whether the Center wants it or not, the de-structuring of the RSFSR is inevitable. The only thing that the Center can do is to retard this process. This is why the center has no interest in an early resolution of the problem of NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. It does not want to create a precedent. As a result, there appear in the country acts of so-called aggravation of interethnic relations.

After all, today's "aggravation of interethnic relations" is nothing other than the result of the lack of a mechanism

for the realization of the Leninist principle of democratic self-determination of nations and nationalities, the open-ended [bestupikovyy] surmounting of conflict situations. The egotistical Center had not needed such a mechanism. Take a look at the countries of Europe. Dozens of disparate (above all, along national lines), developed states, yet we are observing the process of their economic, cultural, military, and even political integration.

Of course, our unification in the twenties was dictated by political considerations and a real military threat. But now, under the conditions of new thinking, the principles of unification must be changed. The function of the genuine Center, its role and tasks must be changed as well.

In the process of renewal, it is above all necessary to implement the renewal of the party itself, its apparatus. The artificial restraint of democratization in the party; the practices of direct, democratic, competitive elections of party leaders—this is a serious blow to the party's authority. After all, to the bureaucracy and to the Center as it changes its tactics, it is all the same whether they rule with the assistance of the party or the assistance of the body of deputies. For a successful struggle for the weakening of the egotistical Center, the author proposes:

- That congresses of people's deputies be held in the republics; forums of representatives of republic congresses of people's deputies should be convened.
- That the country's leadership be implemented by the forces of the representatives of all republics (or elected by the all the country's people).
- That the apparatus of leadership be formed by the leadership itself.
- That cadre policy be conducted under the control of the republic congresses. The leadership needs to be made younger both in the Center and in the provinces.
- That the party preserve its priority in the regulation of political relations. It is being genuinely transformed and is becoming a party of the workers of all the country. Admission into the party should be severely limited, and admission requirements should be tightened. All compromised individuals should be released from the party.
- If the party is becoming a party of the workers, then the decision on nominating a person to the party and for vacated party work must be made by a labor collective. Labor collectives should also be given the right to petition the exclusion from party ranks of one or another party member, and the review of the party work he has relinquished.
- That all national groups, nationalities, and formations must have Leagues in the party. For example, the League of Georgian, Armenian Communists, etc.

—That a Communist Party of the Russian Federation be organized. It is unnatural that of all the union republics, only the RSFSR does not have its own Communist Party. There is not yet a practical differentiation between the rights and tasks of the republic central committees and the RSFSR oblast party committees; the status of the republics' central committees has not been defined.

It is a paradox, but the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium has the position of deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but the first secretary of a republic Communist Party Central Committee does not even have the right to vote at CPSU Central Committee Politburo or Secretariat meetings. A distorted principle of the majority is being realized in the party to this day. The author proposes another variant for combining interests.

If the republics are indeed sovereign and independent, then in the Union each of them must have the right to "one vote," regardless of the size of the population. And the same way in the republic itself. But this means an end to the bureaucratic "Center."

Swiss Federalism, Language Policy Examined

90UN019A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 40,
2-8 Oct 89 p 13

[Article by TASS correspondents B. Shabayev and V. Vykhodtsev, Geneva-Bern: "On a Consensus Basis"]

[Text] What Is It Like There?

The Soviet people resoundingly support the party's program which is aimed at the concept of filling the Soviet Federation with real content. And how do things stand with federalism in other countries, for example Switzerland?

S. Kuznetsov, Zelenograd.

Switzerland is among those countries where the inhabitants coexist peacefully while speaking four languages—German, French, Italian, and Romansch—and possessing different cultural traditions connected with the national cultures of the adjacent countries, both Catholics and Protestants. Finally, the high mountains, by making it difficult to come into contact with people, have given rise to many immediately apparent differences in the way of life and customs even among the inhabitants of different regions of the same canton, to say nothing of neighboring ones.

But the main thing is that, with all their differences and idiosyncrasies, the Swiss are one people, and Switzerland is a well-tempered, unified state. What forms the foundation of this commonality, which is the subject of national pride?

About the basic democratic institutions of Switzerland—the direct democracy, the resolution of most problems through referendums—much has already been written and said. But far less frequently is attention drawn to the

democratic nature of the solution to the language problem. Every Swiss citizen is free to express himself in any of the four languages of his country, among which three—German, French, and Italian—are official languages: all government documents and decrees are published in them. The country's legislation makes no provisions for any sort of limitations or obligations on citizens with regard to language use, with just one exception: according to Article 107 of the Union Constitution, all three of the official languages must be represented in the composition of the federal court, confirmed by parliament.

The state system of Switzerland is structured as follows: the president is elected annually from among the members of the government in order of succession for a parliamentary term of one year, without the right to reelection in the following calendar year. All resolutions of the government are passed only on the basis of consensus—that is, universal agreement.

It should be kept in mind that Switzerland is a union of 26 cantons and semi-cantons, each of which has its own constitution, government, and parliament. In order better to understand the operation of the Swiss state mechanism, it is useful to take a look at the constitution of a country which is so laconic and precise that there is no room for false or variant readings.

The federation's goal, according to Article 2 of the Union Constitution, is "to secure the external independence of the fatherland, maintain peace and order within the country, preserve the freedom and rights of members of the union, and increase their common wellbeing." The following article defines the limits of sovereignty of the cantons: "Cantons are sovereign to the extent that their sovereignty is not limited by the Union Constitution, and as such they enjoy all rights which are not given over to union authority." The federation guarantees the cantons inviolability of their territory, sovereignty within the limits established by Article 3 of the Union Constitution, and the freedom and constitutional rights of their citizens. The canton constitutions must be "guaranteed"—in other words, recognized by the federation. The chief criterion for this guarantee, according to Article 6, is that the canton's constitution must not "contain anything which is contradictory to the decrees of the Union Constitution." In this demarcation of the competence of the federation and the cantons, the following principle is embodied: everything is permitted which does not harm the other members of the united federal family.

However, the cantons are forbidden to conclude "separate alliances and agreements of a political nature" among themselves, with the exception of agreements "on questions of legislation, courts, or administration." But the force of these agreements may be overruled by union authority, if they contain "anything which opposes the union or the rights of the other cantons."

All foreign relations are the exclusive prerogative of the federal organs. In this area, the cantons possess only the right to conclude agreements with other countries concerning questions which relate to their individual competence, for example, transport and border communications, and police activity, but always under the condition that these agreements do not encroach upon the interests of the Swiss Federation and its individual members.

At the present time, a fairly well-structured system has been built up for dividing the competence of union power and of the cantons into the social-economic field and administration. Swiss jurists consider that the exclusive right of legislative activity of the federation extends to customs affairs, finances, the post office, telegraph and telephone communications, railroads, and shipping. The legislative activity of the cantons embraces spheres such as organizing the police, relief for people who are without means of support, construction of housing for indigent citizens, and religious-legal questions. There are fields where the right of making laws belongs to the union, while their practical realization and enactment is the prerogative of the cantons. These are transport, military organization, labor, civil, and criminal legislation, and social security. And, finally, questions such as taxes, railroad construction, and questions of education and upbringing can be regulated by both union and canton legislation.

The juridical reference books on the state structure of Switzerland emphasize repeatedly that under the country's present state law the sovereignty of cantons should be understood not in the literal sense of this term, but as the autonomy of union members having equal rights. It is important to note that this tendency toward more precise definition of, and a certain limitation of, the cantons' competence in favor of the federation, reflects Swiss society's deep consciousness of objective reality, namely the necessity to react appropriately to the activation of integrational processes in the world, especially in Europe, where plans now call for voluntarily turning over a part of national sovereignty to supranational organs. Furthermore, all limitation of the cantons' sovereignty, in essence, is in the form of self-limitation. The federal constitution and amendments to it are passed by all the cantons together, and are dictated by a single aspiration—to prevent any manifestations of regionalistic egotism which are dangerous to the union.

For all the harmonious nature of Swiss federalism, nevertheless not infrequently sharp questions and problems of interethnic relations arise, and various interests clash. In such cases, the mechanism of conciliation conferences goes into action, with the participation of fully-empowered representatives of the cantons and of federal authority. Such conferences finish up, as a rule, by working out a consensus. Many problems are also resolved by means of referendums.

Party Organs Faulted for Poor Relations with Informal Groups

90UN0090A Moscow SOVetskaya Kultura in Russian 17 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by V. Bobkov, Ph.D. in history, professor, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Belorussian SSR: "In Search of Dialogue: On the Relationship Between Party Committees and Public Initiative Movements"]

[Text] (Minsk.) First of all, I have no desire to separate social forces, social movements into formal and informal categories, and not only because we have no purely formal movements. Rather it is because, in the language of our administrative-command system, the word "informal" has come to be synonymous with the formerly notorious concept of "oppositional."

The child of perestroika, active, independent social movement is still young. In it participate the most diverse public and social forces, and it reflects their diverse views, moods, aspirations, desires, and even contradictions. But, of course, the goal of almost all its participants is the same: the desire to help perestroika, to guarantee its success, be it in the political, or the economic, or the cultural-historical, the ecological, or any other sphere. This is why it is important to point out opportunely the positive principles in the activity of these active formations. At the 19th All-Union Party Conference a resolution was passed: "On the democratization of Soviet society and the reform of the political system." Thus, what we should expect is not the curtailment of independent groups but the appearance of new movements among the people. It is like a widening, mounting flood. Although for now party and political leaders prefer not to notice or simply ignore this perfectly normal phenomenon. On the other hand, we are hearing voices increasing frequency from official tribunes about how "meeting" democracy has dragged on too long. But after all, the meeting is just as essential a part of public-political life of a law-governed state as glasnost, free elections, control from below over the level of political leadership. To shun all this would be unseemly.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference, while discussing such faults in the activity of public organizations as overorganization, formalism, the undermining of independent principles, also recommended "making every effort so that public organizations could conceive of their place in society in a new way and utilize their creative potential even more energetically to the process of renewal, in order that the general patriotic movement in support of perestroika might develop further."

Unfortunately, in practice the relations between the majority of the republic's party committees and independent movements have been marked by skirmishes, confrontations, and envy toward concrete manifestations of the latter's independence.

On the one hand, both the leaders and the apparatus of the party committees willingly cite M.S. Gorbachev, speaking about the rightfulness of disagreement and about how the party does not to pretend to a monopoly on the truth.

On the other, they oppose this process under the pretense of defending "principles" which they cannot permit to be violated.

What is the reason for this discrepancy?

In the recent times of stagnation and political comfort for party and all other leaders, a type of thinking took shape based on the submissiveness and defenselessness of the boss's subordinate, on the unconditionality of the command-order methods of leadership, the inadmissibility of multiple opinions. This type of thinking lives on in the heads of many holding power: "Think like I do; I've given you an order—you carry it out."

This thinking, in which stereotypes and cliches are embedded as if in concrete, does not accept the changes that have occurred in the reality of life in the course of perestroika and tries to ignore them, to cast them aside. That is why it adamantly opposes any different point of view, regardless of the mood of the popular movement. Take as an example a nonpolitical movement like the ecology movement and just try to name any powers-that-be that would actively support it. You don't have to look far for a similar example. And not only in Belorussia.

Events in many regions of the country show supremely convincingly that even a powerful, even a bloody "shake up" in this somnolent thinking is not always capable of turning it around. Even before Georgia there was Alma-Ata, Nagorny Karabakh, Sumgait, Erevan, Baku. Then Fergana, Novyi Uzen, Lvov. By no means am I condoning the initiators of these events, but one cannot condone either the party committees, their leaders, who are going about rather strangely the matter of executing the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the most recent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee (CC).

According to the classical Leninist formula, political methods of party leadership in state and public organizations, independent movements, require first of all helping them in working out their tasks, establishing the closest of ties with them, personal meetings, bringing party influence to bear. Political methods mean working with people, understanding people, their moods, empathizing with people's joys and sorrows. Political methods mean observing tact, the ethics of relationships. But many of our party workers in critical situations for some reasons do not seek political methods of exerting influence, do not seek people out for explanations, but instead, practice their old habit of pushing a button to issue orders to the MVD, the KGB, the army. And so the confrontation starts.

In what way, by means of what political methods, is it possible to render the most effective party influence on a public movement? Until now we have known that the only answer is direct participation of Communists in their work. Unfortunately, with the exception of individuals who have done this at their own risk and peril, Communists have kept to the sidelines. Moreover, other party committees and organizations forbid Communists to participate in such associations. All "informals," regardless of their orientation, are for some reason considered antisocialist elements.

In the pre-October history of our party, undeniably one of its greatest services was Bolsheviks' participation in various trade unions, in the State Duma, in the conclusion of compromises with other parties. Out of inertia, supporters of the easy path of prohibition are following the Stalin-Suslov-Brezhnev interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. I refer those who object to Lenin's "The Childish Disease of 'Leftness' in Communism," written in 1920.

Groundlessly prohibiting Communists' participation in independent action associations, they cite the CPSU Charter. But the charter's first section talks about the need for the Communist to participate actively in the political life of the country and in the administration of state and public affairs, about the need to take active measures to facilitate the ver fuller realization of the people's socialist self-administration. The Charter does not stipulate Communists' participation in democratic formations, but it contains no prohibitive fetters. It occurs to me that this prohibition dooms party committees and organizations to clear failure, to alienation from large groups of actively involved people. After all, reason and logic themselves should tell them: if there does exist an opinion other than yours, seek out the chance to challenge it, to convince yourself of your own or to reject it, having armed yourself with the opinion of your opponent.

The resolution "On the democratization of Soviet society and the reform of the political system" contains a conclusion that is relevant to our assessments: "Given the one-party system that has formed historically in our country, the presence of a permanently active mechanism for free dialogue, criticism, and self-criticism, self-control and self-assessment in the party and society is a matter of vital significance."

It is not difficult to see that the directives of the June plenum of the Belorussian Communist Party's Central Committee will scarcely be able to facilitate effectively the increasingly profound democratization of public and intraparty life. They will scarcely even serve the very essential perestroika, the issue that affects us all of consolidating all social forces.

In official Belorussian offices, in the mass information media, angry voices ring out with and without reason against Vasili Bykov, Alesi Adamovich, leaders of independent associations, in an attempt to catch them up

more forcefully, to tag them with political labels. This has already led many people into an impasse.

True, promising assessments do ring out as a counterweight. For example, I would like to support the opinion expressed in print by the secretary of the Pervomaiskiy rayon party committee in Minsk, T. Puzhevich. "In the first place," he writes, "there is a range of questions which the party has already raised; here the 'informals' have not contributed anything new. Secondly, there are questions which have to be discussed with them on a professional level. And, finally, we come across among the 'informals' moments with which I as a Communist, as a party leader, cannot agree. What task do I envision for myself in this situation? To work with them wherever possible, to discuss whenever necessary, but definitely not to accept anything that contradicts the course of the party. In doing all of this it is essential to show respect for one's opponent" (Zvyazda, 21 September 1989). Also published was a self-critical, promising article by the second secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, N. Igrunov, "The Burden of Leadership, or, One More Look at Perestroika in Belorussia" (Pravda, 1 August 1989). The Central Committee secretary gives party committees and organizations the only correct advice: convince the party activists, all Communists, that with the help of the creative and scientific intelligentsia we will realize more quickly the very necessary revolutionary change in the public consciousness and psychology.

The current upsurge in political action among the masses and the heated conflicts of opinions in the party require true fighters able and ready to stand up for its line, its ideals.

Unfortunately, often at meetings of independent associations, party organizations do not even have their own speakers. It is alarming that the words of Communists, especially Communist ideologists, are not heard when the time comes to repress manifestations of national egoism or chauvinism.

In extreme situations they frequently occupy defensive positions, waiting as before for commands and instructions from above. The majority are simply unprepared to conduct a direct, candid dialogue with people. That is why many leaders do not go to meetings themselves but send rank-and-file workers in the apparatus or invited figures. Then, later, they call them out on the carpet and rebuke them for real and imagined lapses.

Observing the current acute consequences of the prohibition syndrome among leading cadres, and above all among them party cadres, one has to notice that the basis for prohibition, as a rule, is professional incompetence in issues of the spiritual life of society, low political culture, an inability to foresee the long-term consequences of actions undertaken. Take a good look at those leaders and you will almost invariably discover that they are primarily merely specialists in industrial and agricultural production.

Suffice it to say that in the Belorussian republic party organization, economic specialists comprise 95.6 percent of the first secretaries of the party's city and rayon committees and 75.2 percent of the second secretaries. These figures reflect approximately the situation in other regions as well. At the same time few party workers have any party political education. Among Belorussian CP gorkom and raykom secretaries they are 46.5 percent, among department heads 20.9 percent, and among the instructors of those party committees only 8.2 percent, among Belorussian CP obkom instructors 31.4 percent, and among Central Committee instructors 45.7 percent.

Until now, many party leaders were not concerned about their own theoretical growth. These industrial-agricultural specialists wouldn't have given a plug nickel for specialists with a humanitarian education. I remember with horror their assessments, expressed frankly, without a trace of embarrassment, at the faculty of continuing education for party, Soviet, and ideological cadres in the Minsk Higher Party School. They were accustomed to carrying on a dialogue in an administrative-command tone.

How can we resurrect the intellectual potential of the CPSU, of its leaders in the center and in places, and what awaits us if we don't? We do have some guidelines. K. Marx called those who counted on getting a leading post and successfully coping with their responsibilities without the essential scholarly preparation, without studying theoretical questions, simpletons. V.I. Lenin warned that emphasis solely on practice would turn the party worker into nothing but a craftsman.

Herein, I think, lies the answer to the question, by the way, although each party committee, and its leaders, each Communist preferably should seek the answer independently: How are we to explain the fact that independent action movements struggling for perestroika, for democracy, for our culture and ecology, are achieving their goal solely on their own powers, frequently in spite of party committees, and not in conjunction with them, not under their leadership?

Youth Paper Promotes Dialog Among Armenian Informal Groups

Dialog Proposal

90US0120A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The 'Dialog' Movement. Is It Possible? In Our Opinion, It Is Necessary!"]

[Text] No, there is no such movement. In any case, not yet. It is, if you wish, a sign of our position, based on a firm conviction of the need for a dialog precisely now, while different public organizations and groups realize the final goals of their political aspirations. At the same time, it expresses our readiness to become intermediaries in such

a dialog, for which we willingly offer the pages of KOMSOMOLETS and invite all who wish to participate in it.

Informal is a fashionable word... Once, at the very start of restructuring (although, who would claim that even now is not still just a start?), the numerous formations of different persuasions and directions which appeared seemed to us almost a sign of the democratic changes and guarantees of states' loyalty regarding dissidents. We were delighted, but a bit envious because it seemed like the wave of universal awakening had bypassed Armenia. Even the Metalists, Punks, and Lyubertsy who managed to set people's teeth on edge remained a distant exoticism for us. Strictly speaking, the carelessness with which various groups of "informals" took up society's defense attested to the lack of sociopolitical experience, rather than to the truly democratic nature of the new social formations. Today, it is no accident that ever more concerned voices are being heard throughout the country, warning about the intolerance of many informal organizations toward each other, and in addition to everything else, about their lack of political and moral scruples...

Does this danger threaten our informal groups and associations, many of which are for youth, or the Artsakh movement, which really served as the impetus for their appearance and united hundreds of thousands of people under the banner of a just idea? Is there enough protection from all manners of delusion? The question is hardly premature, since the casting and tossing about, undeniably inherent in that most unstable and mobile part of society which is youth, is still generated by reality. Yet, reality remains extraordinarily alarming, against the background of the as yet disunited positions of the several dozen groups and movements striving to actively participate in the Armenian nation-wide movement and even aspiring to leadership in it. In any event, a truly world-outlook pluralism, with its readiness for cooperation, has not yet been achieved.

Today we present a number of the social formations which have made themselves known most loudly. We assume that some of their programs and political orientations may spark keen disagreement and even rejection. Nonetheless, we believe that the time for "ostrich politics," which let us fail to observe obvious processes and phenomena, has passed. Otherwise, we are in store for an unenviable and unconstructive path of exhausting opposition.

'Mashtots' Group Profiled

90US0120B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by Professor Rafael Ishkhanyan: "Mashtots"]

[Text] Rafael Ishkhanyan, linguist, professor at Yerevan State University, doctor of philosophical sciences, and one of the founders of the "Mashtots" Association, represents this organization:

Our organization, founded last year in April, sees its task as coordinating efforts aimed at establishing the priority of the native language in the republic, primarily in the national educational system. Many years of squandering our national traditions and language have led, perhaps unexpectedly even for us, to the truly disastrous situation in which we have already started rejecting our native tongue voluntarily. According to the most modest estimates, 80,000 Armenian families in Yerevan do not speak their native language and 50,000 Armenian children attend Russian-language schools. Moreover, 98 percent of all business documentation was done in Russian in 1988, thereby acting against Article 72 of the Armenian SSR Constitution, by which the state language of the republic is Armenian... This is reality, which cannot be avoided, although the situation is beginning to change for the better today.

We must quickly pass a Law on Language, not as a tribute to fashion, but as a real requirement of the times. For we must not forget that all assimilation begins with the loss of one's native language and, as a consequence, of linguistic, and later, of ethnic thought. Every civilized nation is primarily concerned about providing its growing generation with an opportunity to study in its native language. If we also strive for the right to be called a civilized nation, should we not remember, for a start, the thousands of our children who attend kindergartens and schools with Russian-language instruction and study their own language as supplementary? After all, physiopsychologists have already shown that the formation of speech centers in the brain and consequently, of linguistic thought, occurs up to age 12, not by heredity, depending directly only on what language people speak with and teach to the child. Thus, an Armenian child attending a Russian school will, accordingly, have Russian-language thought, and later converting this into ethnic thought is an almost impossible task of unbelievable complexity.

The representatives of the "Mashtots" Association are working to implement a concept of ethnic education which would include, besides native language instruction, an entire system of subjects that develop ethnic thought: Grabar, the ancient Armenian language, the history of the Armenian people in the broadest view, and the history of the Armenian church and religion. The latter is important precisely because, in our atheistic zeal, making everything relating to religion anathema, we somehow managed to forget that precisely religion helped our people to survive, to get up on their feet and preserve the true face of our nation. Really, can ignorance serve as a source for belief? Only a consummate ignoramus could think so, feathering his cap with the nation's antiquity, yet not even knowing how to substantiate his own ambitions.

Incidentally, another extreme degree of ignorance is displayed when we, people who are concerned with preserving linguistic traditions, are accused of Russophobia. Let it be known that there are no "Mashtots" Association members who are opposed to the Russian

culture and language or, by the way, to those of other ethnic cultures. I personally bow down before the great Russian writers: Lev Tolstoy is my idol. However, along with this, I consider it disastrous for the Armenian people that many children, and indeed not just the children, are starting to consider Russian their native language.

It is still too early for now to speak of the first specific results of the activity of our association, which numbers about 200 members today: our biography is too short. I will say only that with our cooperation or, if you wish, interference (many of us left no stone unturned at the republic Minnarobraz, various rayon organizations for public education, and schools, and many talks were held with teachers and students...), Armenian classes were opened in a number of Russian-language schools in Yerevan. Several rayon Russian schools are also switching to Armenian-language instruction in Vardenis and Masis... Right now we are faced with trips to Rostov, Abkhaziya, and other places of large settlement of so-called internal spyurka [not further identified]. They need Armenian-language textbooks, teaching aids and literature for their schools. They need support.

Unfortunately, we do not have so many possibilities for the time being, due to the state's failure to recognize us. We support ourselves through the participants' enthusiasm and selfless devotion in work to unite people. Of course, this creates additional difficulties, not only of a material nature. Finally, it is time to realize that the defense of the existing state language is a state matter.

'Goyapaykar' Official on Goals

90US0120C Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with Tigran Paskevichyan, central council member of the "Goyapaykar" organization: "Goyapaykar"]

[Text] Translated literally from the Armenian, the name of this organization means the struggle for survival, for existence. Properly, its programmatic formulation lies in protecting the ecological environment. Our interlocutor is Tigran Paskevichyan, a central council member of the "Goyapaykar" organization.

[Correspondent] It seems, we should start with the time when the "Greens" movement began in our republic...

[Paskevichyan] We consider October 1987 to be the organization's birthday, when members of the "Goyapakhpanutyun" youth organization met for the first time at Yerevan State University. Soon new members joined our ranks. Since February 1988, the newly christened "Goyapaykar" has been acting as an individual, independent link of the Armenian nation-wide movement.

[Correspondent] So the "Greens" movement is not limited only to the circle of ecological questions?

[Paskevichyan] Scarcely anyone can limit himself to solving one, albeit important, problem. At the beginning of our movement, we viewed the ecological problem only in the context of preserving the surrounding environment. However, with time, having encountered difficulties and often running up against bureaucratic barriers, we realized that ecological problems will be hard to solve in isolation, separate from other realities of our life, realities of a social nature. The construction of a nuclear power plant and the spread of chemical enterprises in the small territory of Armenia are no longer mistakes and oversights, but a definite policy implemented not only here in our republic, but throughout the country as well. We see the complete sovereignty of Armenia as the way out of this situation.

[Correspondent] A great scientist once said: "One of two things: Either man will make the air less polluted, or pollution will make fewer people on earth." What do you think of this statement?

[Paskevichyan] It was stated such that nothing need be added. It is an axiom. Of course, we are not against man's triumph in mastering nature. Whether we want it or not, mankind should develop. However, this is the question: In what manner and at whose expense? For example, after stopping the Armenian nuclear power plant blocks, the expansion of the Razdan GRES was planned. Of course, the republic needs electrical energy, and a great deal. However, if this is to be achieved by destroying the Tsakhkadzor and Razdan resort areas, spare us! Indeed, for many years already, many scientists have been suggesting using the wind and sun energy with which Armenia is so rich.

Or let us consider Yerevan. True, we do not yet need respirators and we do not wear dosimeters on our jacket pockets, but the air that we breathe already does enormous damage to our health.

There is an example for every case. Everything can be improved. One need only want to understand the threat of ecological catastrophe.

[Correspondent] People have been talking and writing about this threat for a long time. However, alas, relatively little is being done. How are your relations with official authorities, society and scientists taking shape?

[Paskevichyan] What can I say! Let me begin with the good. We are in close contact with many scientists. After all, our organization basically consists of young people, students, not ecological specialists. Our task is to draw attention and shape public opinion with regard to one or another problem, not to solve it. Unfortunately, we lack the strength for this. Also, we would be unable to do without consulting specialists. As far as society is concerned, it is hard to find a person who does not sympathize with our aspirations.

Now, let me turn to more difficult problems. In May of 1989, we asked the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet for approval of our organization as independent. However,

we were denied. Or more correctly, we merely received a formal reply. This is incomprehensible. The "Greens" movement is finding support throughout the world, throughout the entire country, not only from the people, but also from the authorities, but for some reason not here. We need official recognition in order to act as a legal entity, to create our own funds and dispose of them, to have a bank account. A press organ could be the agitator for our ideas (right now we have only a samizdat "tribune"). However, unfortunately, they "cannot," or rather, do not want to recognize us.

[Correspondent] However, in my opinion, Goskomproda ought to welcome you!

[Paskevichyan] That is in your opinion, but in theirs: "Since we exist, what do we need you for!" In general, what can the State Committee for Preservation of Nature do, being subordinate to the republic Council of Ministers!

[Correspondent] By the way, Tigran, about public organizations. We have many of these in the republic, and almost all consider ecological problems in their programs. Does the existence of an organization such as yours make sense?

[Paskevichyan] Undoubtedly, I would say unquestionably. After all, the majority of organizations that include ecological problems in their programs nonetheless have a different orientation. Of course, they are in no state to devote themselves completely to problems of preserving the surrounding environment. In my opinion, each should work on its own business. Not much will be achieved, separating into parts.

[Correspondent] I would like to find out about specific results of your work and, of course, about the "Nairit" NPO, the question of whose fate worries everyone.

[Paskevichyan] I was starting to be surprised that you had not asked about this yet.

The struggle to fulfill the republic Supreme Soviet resolution of 23 June on the "Nairit" problem is currently our main task. Apparently, there are still people who do not care much for the decision made by the republic parliament. Our goal is to defeat these people, to force them to realize that the future of our children is more important than a comfortable job, more important than the "interests" of the state. Yet, as far as specific results are concerned, probably, they are expressed in the fact that people are starting to think about ecological problems. Part of our work, albeit a small part, lies in this. We have managed to achieve the re-profiling of the Abovyan Biochemical Compounds Plant. Yet, how many times have we spoken out for closing the nuclear plant? The "Nairit" NPO resolution is also to our credit. Unfortunately, for now there are more defeats than victories. Really, this is inevitable. After all, ecological ills are among the most neglected in our society.

Indeed, we should not be surprised. After all, work safety in dangerous fields of work is often violated, and it is no secret that in many of our enterprises working people are deprived of basic social and everyday cultural benefits. They often simply use workers as manpower, unconsciously manipulating and undermining their health. "Goyapaykar" is struggling against this as well. After all, in order for a person to live normally, not only his ecological, but also his social, cultural and ethnic spheres of life should be healthy.

Furthermore, our program includes points on eliminating blank spots in history, raising the prestige of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and protecting and developing our language. However, I repeat, "Goyapaykar's" main task is and will be the struggle for the republic's ecological cleanliness. If we do not win the struggle for survival, if we do not avoid ecological catastrophe, all political, economic and social reforms will be useless.

[Correspondent] Tigran, what would you wish to tell the readers?

[Paskevichyan] I have many wishes. However, I will voice only one. Whatever views you may hold, whatever organizations and societies you may belong to, remember: to live in the future, the world must be green. There is no other way. Otherwise...

Armenian Students Union Viewed

90US0120D Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Armenian Students Union"]

[Text] This organization could be briefly characterized as follows: It seeks broad popularity, capably presents its projects and ideas as already-developed programs, and strives in its activity to "comprehend the incomprehensible."

The first article on it appeared in our newspaper when it, essentially, had just been formed. The official birthday of the SAS [Armenian Student Union] is considered to be November 1988, but there were student sit-in demonstrations before this in May-July of the same year, organized with the most active participation by leaders of the future union.

"The Armenian Student Union is a social organization, called on to unite Armenian youth, to protect its interests and to participate in developing the national and democratic movement. (From the SAS program)

In the words of the organization's leaders, the prerequisites for creating the SAS were contained in the traditions of the past national freedom struggle of the Armenian people, of revolutionary democratic movements, for which youth has always been a vanguard force. Strictly speaking, in its organizers' plans, the SAS was also called on to unite and coordinate youth potential, to not let it "be lost" in the fairly chaotic process of the start of the Armenian nation-wide movement. Today, many

different student groups have already joined the union. The SAS does not consider itself an alternative to the Komsomol or any other sociopolitical youth organization, although it stands up for its right to criticize them. Incidentally, not only Komsomol members, but members of any other organization (not mandatorily students, although they are the basis of the organization) which support the SAS program and are ready to cooperate in implementing it, can also join its ranks. Interrelations with the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee, taking shape with difficulty from the start, do not prevent the Student Union from declaring its own readiness to hold a dialogue and even cooperate with the Komsomol—but only on equal footing. For the time being, it is hard to say how this is working out in practice...

The SAS supports close ties with many progressive youth movements and organizations in the Baltic, Georgia, and other union republics and with societies and unions of spyurka [not further identified], both internal as well as external. The basis of this cooperation was made in Leningrad, during meetings held there among representatives from the country's VUZs and from informal student organizations.

The SAS intends to hold a congress of Armenian students in Yerevan which will definitively determine the union's goals and tasks. It is assumed that Armenian students from all ends of the globe, representing the most diverse parties and youth organizations, be they political or religious, will participate in it.

"The SAS acts from the position of defending the rights of man and the rights of nations to self-determination. The union, having chosen a constitutional way of struggle, rejects any kind of violence. The primary tasks are to expand the sovereign rights of Armenia and to protect the rights and interests of youth and students. (From the SAS program)

Meanwhile, being unaffiliated with any of the influential "adult" organizations and, moreover, aspiring to official state recognition as independent, the SAS sets its goal as the implementation of tasks which are also in the programs of other movements and groups. In particular, this includes the struggle to expand the sovereign rights of the republic, its economic and cultural independence, and recognition of its rights to all natural resources as national property; passing a Law on Citizenship in the Armenian SSR, giving a definite status to all Armenians regardless of their place of residence; passing a Law on Military Service by Armenians only in the republic territory; and passing the Law on Language. In short, the SAS supports the policy of struggling for the freedom of the Armenian people to solve their problems themselves, without pressure and interference from outside, considering sovereignty possible only when the priority of the union republic before the Union, as a whole, has been clearly established.

As far as social problems are concerned, which includes protecting the rights and interests of students, the organization is faced with a great deal of work. For, having been converted over long years of routine and stagnation into an extremely, as SAS leaders believe, inert mass, it is now hard for the student body to discover its own "face." Indeed, the range of problems, which, by the way, concerns not only students, is too broad.

The SAS activists are applying many efforts in a rather unexpected direction: organizing a scout movement for schoolchildren. Time will show how successful and expedient the attempt to create this in the republic will be... By the way, the same relates to the question of the viability of the union itself. For now, it is fairly active and has its own press organ (alas, samizdat) and far-reaching plans, which its representatives would prefer to talk about in good time...

'National Self-Determination' Association Program

90US0120E Yerevan KOMSOMOLETEs in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Martin Dzhermakyan, council member of the "National Self-Determination" Association: "The 'National Self-Determination' Association"]

[Text] The National Self-Determination Association [ONS] was established in September 1987 through the efforts of Paruyr Ayrikyan and other leaders of the Armenian national freedom struggle for the purpose of restoring the state independence of Armenia. It was founded on the basis of the "National United Party" [NOP], which has existed since 1966 and had experienced for itself the entire might of totalitarianism.

It should be noted that until 1974 the NOP's activity was deeply anti-communist and anti-Soviet in nature, and the idea of independence was then considered more a means of opposing Soviet activity. However, thanks to the efforts of P. Ayrikyan, A. Navasardyan, R. Markosyan, A. Azatyan and others, the ideological basis of the NOP survived the tempestuous stage of evolution and was brought into conformity with the Soviet Constitution and international legal standards. It goes without saying, at a definite stage all of this was to a certain extent stipulated by the instinct for self-preservation.

The ONS is an organization formed on voluntary principles, entrance to which is open to all who share its views. As its primary task, the ONS promotes the need for the most rapid restoration of Armenia's independence, as a result of which the solution of the problems of territorial unification, national revival and prevention of ecological genocide will become possible. As opposed to several other Armenian social organizations, the ONS is convinced that our national problems can be solved only after achieving independence.

We see the principle of self-determination of nations and peoples, proclaimed by the United Nations Statutes, the

Helsinki Human Rights Pacts, and a number of United Nations resolutions and declarations as the basis for achieving this. We do not intend to foist our aspirations on others. Currently, the ONS is trying to create the prerequisites for the people's free will, of course, to offer feasible agitation assistance for them in work to realize the need for restoring our own independence. The point is that we are unable to advance as long as we have not achieved the necessary determination for most of our people. By way of illustration, let me note that, although the Komsomol movement had started and continued over the decades, real steps were successfully made only when the Armenian people of Artsakh clearly and decisively expressed their will, having declared the Nagorno-Karabakh independent union territory. In this regard, we take the appearance of prerequisites for an upsurge in national freedom movements is stipulated not by the historically historical phenomena of a restructuring of society, but by the level of national self-awareness at a given stage of a nation's development.

Returning to the ONS, let me add that the structure of its internal statutes of our organization, as well as its interrelations, are entirely democratic. In its relations with organization relations, we proceed from the principle of respect for human rights. We have no system of control whatsoever and the work done is the only principle of moving along the organizational hierarchy. We believe that our work should be creative in nature. From this viewpoint, we struggle not "against," but "for" change. Our goal is not to overthrow Soviet power in Armenia, but to create an independent Armenia.

As already stated, we are proceeding from the principle of self-determination of nations, but not from the fact that because this conforms to international legal standards, so much as because we believe this principle is just in a moral aspect. We are guided not by the interests of a certain nation or phenomenon, but by the principle of personal national dignity and the need to create guarantees for the survival both of our ethnic group and the whole, as well as its culture.

Opponents see a weakness in the ONS position in this assertion. Making assumptions, they claim that if Armenia were independent, it would rapidly be isolated. Digressing from the violation of elemental tact in this regard, let me say that such statements, in the first place, insult our national dignity, reduce us to a helpless crowd. It should be noted that the precedent is insufficient grounds for this kind of argument. For example, as everyone knows, England and France only ceased being enemies in our century, for instance, other European states which were at one time against each other coexist excellently today. It should be noted that "there are no permanent enemies, there are permanent interests" (in international politics).

Talk of Armenia's economic non-viability is completely groundless. Let us recall that in 1918-1920

of Armenia was far worse than it is now. However, only a year after achieving independence, Armenia had coped not only with mass epidemics and hunger, but had also created the most powerful army in the Near East, had founded a university, and had achieved enormous success in diplomacy and trade, exporting cotton, salt and other products to the international market.

Even today, some economists claim that with proper economic organization Armenia could feed a population of over 10 million. Like dozens of other free organizations in Armenia, the ONS is joining the "Armenian National Pre-Parliament," which was created for the purpose of organizing the free election of a National Independent Parliament (temporary). Finally, let me add that the ONS, as an organization which does not acknowledge the existing power in Armenia, does not participate in elections to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet. The ONS believes it can recognize the Supreme Soviet only when the Supreme Soviet truly becomes free.

'Miatsum' Society Profiled

90US0120F Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by "Miatsum" leader I. Muradyan, prepared by N. Kazaryan, S. Makaryan, G. Rubinyan, and R. Ter-Gazaryan: "Miatsum"]

[Text] The Miatsum fellowship declares its program of actions, proceeding from what is, in its firm conviction, the chief task of our national movement for the present day: reuniting Artsakh with Armenia. Firmly adhering to an "accomplished fact" policy, Miatsum has focused all its efforts on consistently reinforcing and expanding political, economic and cultural ties between the Armenian SSR and the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], seeing this as an integral way to genuine reunification. In practice, Miatsum does not digress into the discussion of ecological, social, linguistic and other "popular" problems, believing that this scatters the movement's forces. Furthermore, the leaders of the Miatsum fellowship are distinguished by a keenly critical attitude toward... Well, one of the organization leaders, I. Muradyan, can better speak of this:

For a year and a half at noisy meetings in Yerevan, Stepanakert, and other cities and settlements in Armenia, a number of slogans have appeared—"Miatsum," "Andzhatum," "Ankakhutyun" and others. Of course, these are not so much slogans, as ideas that have entered the social consciousness of the Armenian people to varying depths. In the political arena, different organizations and leaders have appeared with their own concepts of national development and are thus, in general, distinguished from each other. Apparently, the authors of each of these concepts is guided by a single goal: determining the most rational path of national development which will enable the solution of vitally important problems. One can say with certainty that, as opposed to the goal of reuniting Artsakh with the Armenian SSR, which is the primary national task of the

Armenian people, any other goals and sub-goals, even in their formal interpretations, are highly vague in nature at the present time. Although the leading informal (now already formal) organizations have not proposed a mechanism for the constructive discussion of different ideas, for now they are holding a monopoly on the promotion of ideas.

Firstly, however, an idea ought to be meaningful and should have the ability to be implemented under existing real conditions. Secondly, the methods for achieving a goal should correspond to the essence of the phenomenon, especially in the national liberation struggle. I would like to talk about the correspondence of the Karabakh movement's methods to its essence, since one can judge a movement's maturity by its methods, as well judge people's capacity to wage a struggle to the end, to be guided by such an important political category as national justice, increasingly receiving the right to citizenship.

At the start of the Karabakh movement (September 1985—February 1988), its activists and participants thoroughly knew and understood one thing: our homeland, our people are divided and we are losing not land, but a homeland (as Zoriy Gaykovich Balayan said), and our generation, despite God and the Devil, is fated to reunite our national home. However, in the labyrinth, thrust on us, of blather, demagogic subterfuges, and categorical, crude statements by the then officials, the idea of the so-called "democratization" of the Karabakh movement forcibly appeared. Along this path, the Karabakh movement shattered many myths, gave a tremendous impetus to raising the social consciousness of the people, and accumulated priceless political experience. However, did it solve the problem?

How should the democratization of a national liberation movement or its democratic methods be interpreted? Any national liberation movement, if it is such, has a high manifestation of democracy, since all social strata participate in it. Rather, democracy or a democratic way applies to the methods that its leaders and activists use in local areas. Since June 1988, the basic achievement and the result of all actions and measures was the passing of definite decisions about Artsakh's fate by an Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet session and the session's appeal to Moscow with a request to provide a political solution to the NKAO problem. Such a mechanism would have been remarkable, if the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the NKAO Oblast Soviet resolution had been implemented regardless of decisions by other authorities, excluding any kind of appeal whatsoever. Breaking this vicious circle of false democracy and learning to implement one's own decisions in one's own land with the help of one's own people: this is self-determination.

Toward what are we striving? Toward democracy for the sake of democracy, or democracy for the sake of achieving a goal? Today, this is also a question which many people are asking themselves, when they see with their own eyes that the Karabakh movement has been

turned into a branch of the cosmopolitan democratic organizations of the "Tsentr" [Center]. It has been turned into a branch of the forces that would like to see the Karabakh movement only as an institution for democratization, not as a people's struggle to reunite a homeland. Our people do not need the self-assertion of several leaders in an area of several hundred square meters or in premises where various sessions are held. Our people need the self-determination of the Armenians of Artsakh in a territory of 5,000 square kilometers, giving our people a chance to survive.

Competing groups, essentially, deny support for their own forces, deny the principal of sovereignty as the only path to self-determination. Thus, the Karabakh movement is deprived of its basic method. To what has this led? Enormous masses of Armenian people were deprived of the opportunity to actively participate in the process of asserting the sovereignty of the Armenian people in Artsakh. Here, the meaninglessness and facelessness of the slogans, which were recited so loudly and for so long that they were devalued, is displayed with all clarity.

What is sovereignty? Every people has only those rights which it has secured. The rights of a people are restricted the moment it begins to ask for them. The struggle of the Armenian people for Artsakh is no Irredento movement, but a movement for the political liberation of a part of the nation. Armenians have been living in Artsakh for more than 2,000 years. Artsakh was joined to Russia 184 years ago and has been part of the Soviet State for 69 years. It is absurd and destructive to expect recognition of rights to self-determination. In Artsakh there is a local parliament, the body of which was illegally dissolved on 12 January 1989. The Parliament of Artsakh, having committed a number of unprecedented acts, is characterized by political maturity, national dignity and courage. Should one expect permission to create a parliament? The activity of the oblast soviet in its former structure, its session, which will proclaim the creation of a Committee for National Salvation, the decisions of which would be mandatory for all economic, soviet, party, cultural, and public organizations of the oblast, far more conforms to the slogan of self-determination advanced by the people of Artsakh. It is also necessary to create a joint session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the NKAO Oblast Soviet, which will proclaim the creation of a similar committee with similar powers for all of Armenia, including Artsakh.

Passing the Law on Citizenship in the Armenian SSR and granting the rights of Armenian citizenship to the population of Artsakh, the election of deputies from Artsakh to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, declaration of the land, natural resources, waters and forests of the Armenian SSR and of Artsakh as the property of the Armenian people—all of this would create conditions for implementing the "Miatsum" slogan.

"Miatsum" is impossible without carrying out an active demographic policy, resettling up to 40-60,000 Armenian refugees in Artsakh, forced to abandon the homeland in previous years, providing them with housing and jobs. In order to do this, we must build 300,000 to 400,000 square meters of housing space and repair 4,000-6,000 rural homes, create about 30,000-40,000 jobs, increase food production in the oblast by 20-25 percent, form a charitable fund of 30,000 million rubles, and open dozens of new polyclinics, hospitals, schools, kindergartens, clubs, discotheques, etc., using these funds. "Miatsum" is impossible without constructing 2-3 safe highways connecting Artsakh to the Armenian SSR, a modern airport with a capacity of 300 passengers per hour, the installation of electrical transmission lines connecting the kray to the Armenian power system, the construction of a road system across Artsakh, and the creation of significant reserves of fuel, food, fodder and construction materials.

"Miatsum" is impossible without the administrative subordination of Artsakh enterprises to Armenian SSR ministries and associations, including the agroprom, with creating 20-25 branches of enterprises from Yerevan, Kirovakan, Razdan, Charentsavan, and Abovyan in the cities, settlements and large villages of the oblast. "Miatsum" is impossible without the manifestation of numerous cadres of leaders in Artsakh, capable of carefully disposing of resources.

Raising the role of the technical structure in the Armenian national movement is especially important if one considers the hypertrophied influence within it of the VUZ and creative intelligentsia with bohemian attitudes.

FROM THE EDITORS:

Consciously or no, almost all of our interlocutors representing sociopolitical formations avoided open statements and, even more so, assessments concerning their interrelations with other groups and organizations. Therefore, there was no discussion of a search for common points of contact, of which, in our opinion, there are quite a few. A pity! After all, if we do not have enough wisdom today, the situation might lead to open confrontation tomorrow. This can only be avoided if equilibrium and stability is maintained in the interrelations of political forces operating in society and if a clear-cut balance of their actions on the basis of common interests is preserved.

Would a "Dialog" movement be possible under conditions of strengthening world-outlook and political disagreements and even confrontations? In our opinion, it is necessary!

Let the discussion continue!

'KOMMUNIST' Editorial Cites Blockade as Proof of NKAO-ArSSR Link*90US0123A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 1*

[Unsigned editorial: "The Blockade"]

[Text] In recent days the load on the inter-city telephone exchange has increased many times over. It seems that the entire country is rushing to express its sympathy with the blockade of Armenia. When we go to the telephone once again and hear the voices of friends, acquaintances and perfect strangers uttering words of sympathy and support, we catch ourselves thinking that in that place, thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia or the Baltics, in the non-black earth belt of Russia or the Far East, that in some hidden place they, too, do not believe that such a thing is possible; people refuse to understand that at this time our great Union has people who are trying to achieve far-reaching political goals by means of an economic blockade.

One can understand the feelings of our subscribers at the other end of the line, for we ourselves would never have believed that in a country in which, as our anthem says, "the friendship of peoples is a secure bulwark," one Union republic would lay economic siege to another. We would never have believed it if we ourselves had not experienced all the hardships of blockade life. Canned goods, flour, other cereal products and matches have disappeared from almost all the stores. Given the existing shortages of a whole range of products, the blockade has made the situation even worse. Interruptions in the sale of bread products have started; sometimes it is impossible to find essential goods and medicines in the stores. Such is the real state of affairs in the republic today.

If one rummages around in every possible dictionary and encyclopedia, one finds out that an economic blockade is the economic isolation of the country being blockaded for the purpose of undermining its economy. Numerous examples are cited from world history. But one cannot find in a single publication even a hint of the possibility of an economic blockade within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That is, in essence, we have become witnesses to events for which there is no analogy in the history of our multi-nationality country.

The policy of perestroika, glasnost and the democratization of all aspects of our life is founded on realism, on the desire to bring to our society fundamental revolutionary transformations. Having armed itself with this new policy, which applies as well to inter-nationality relations, the party is doing a great deal not simply to stabilize the situation in the country, but also to achieve serious tangible results. Naturally, no new, genuinely revolutionary cause reaches fruition without mistakes, distortions and doubts. Moreover, the situation is frequently destabilized by anti-perestroika forces, who see

in the new processes the danger of losing their predominance; they do everything possible to hold up perestroika, to channel it into a direction convenient for them.

It is in precisely this context that one must examine the situation which has developed around Nagornyy Karabakh, whose people began a movement for reunification with the motherland—Soviet Armenia. This expression of the will of the Karabakh people was taken by some forces in Azerbaijan as virtually an infringement on the republic's sovereignty. In this regard the choice made by the population of an autonomous oblast and established by a session of the highest organ of power in an autonomous republic has not simply been passed over, but ignored in every possible way. Punitive measures have followed one after another in a chain of events which has included the genocide of Armenians in Sumgait; mass eviction and at times the beating of Armenians in Baku, Kirovobad and Shusha; as well as confrontations provoked for inter-nationality reasons in many other regions of Azerbaijan. That is why the blockade of Nagornyy Karabakh, and the subsequent blockade of all Armenia must be viewed, first of all, as a political act, as a form of political pressure on Armenia and NKAO, as well as on the center, for the purpose of steering the development of events into the direction necessary for themselves.

It is a feature of our times that we are expanding the horizons of our worldview: a black-and-white understanding of the world is giving way to a colored palette, saturated with various shades and hues. In essence, we are learning to think and live in a new way. However, at the same time, unfortunately, we are learning those things which no one would like to know. We have undergone the ordeal of Chernobyl. We have survived the horror of Sumgait and Fergana, and speaking honestly, as bitter as it is for us to know this, neither we nor a great poet today can foretell what the coming day holds for us. For now it holds an economic blockade.

Our newspaper recently carried a report by Armenian Goskomstat which contained dozens of figures which show convincingly how much the blockade is costing our republic and the entire economy of the country. Yes, how much it is costing the entire national economy, for Armenia is linked by thousands of ties to the entire country and to the entire national economic complex of the USSR. Today, sitting idle on our railway sidings are cars loaded with machinery and equipment, building materials and economically-useful minerals, the fruits of the labor of hundreds of thousands of Armenian working people. Twenty-eight thousand freight cars have failed to arrive; the losses of industrial output due to the blockade have amounted to more than 150 million rubles. The republic failed to deliver to the all-Union fund 2,860 tons of fruits; 2,500 tons of grapes and 3,600 tons of vegetables. This means that production is being affected and soon will stop in related enterprises in the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, Belorussia and Uzbekistan; the echo of this blockade reverberates in virtually every

corner of our multi-nationality country, every working person in the USSR will feel its influence to one degree or another.

At the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and in numerous newspaper and broadcast interviews which followed, many deputies from Azerbaijan expressed in one form or another the idea that in Armenia people have gone so far as to forget such sacred concepts as "internationalism," "friendship," and "fraternity." Yes, it is true that we use these words significantly less often because experience shows that frequently they are not backed up by anything concrete. It is now becoming completely clear that behind the numerous verbal reassurances of friendship and fraternity there lies a desire to create a kind of screen around the events in Nagorno Karabakh, to force us to forget about the bloody pogroms in Sumgait and other instances of lawlessness.

Today it is simply essential to pass a political judgement on the economic blockade; today it is simply essential to talk about the moral-psychological factor which has been aroused by it. The forces which stand behind those who leave foodstuffs to spoil on railway lines, add water to cement and dilute gasoline with water must clearly be aware that they are political criminals who are trying to inflame inter-nationality differences, for after this how can the republic's workers believe any talk about the desire to further develop friendship and to strengthen economic and cultural ties with Armenia? What response can there be in Armenia to the statement by one of the leaders of the Azerbaijan Railway, who reassures us that everything is going fine, that there is no blockade, that the conflict which has developed is little more than an everyday occurrence at a time when even baby food has disappeared from republic's stores? After all this, can these people look a newborn in the eye? Can they look in the eye the hundreds of thousands of people in Spitak and Leninakan who suffered from the devastating earthquake, who lost tens of thousands of relatives and friends and were left homeless? Many of them had hoped that before the onset of winter they would get a house or an apartment, that they would walk into bright new classrooms and that they could use new hospital buildings. Alas, now they will have to wait more long months because, in fact, the work in the devastated area has been curtailed; layoffs of construction workers from the fraternal republics have begun, and foreign builders are leaving.

The entire country and many states of the world are helping Armenia to heal the wounds inflicted by the terrible disaster. Georgians and Russians, Uzbeks and Belorussians, Estonians and Ukrainians have answered the heart's cry for assistance to our people. What they have done for our republic will remain forever in the people's memory. Now, many of them are without work, the cranes and cement mixers have fallen silent, motor vehicles are without fuel. It is possible that by blockading the republic and NKAO someone was trying to arouse the dissatisfaction of these people. However, as the many letters, calls and telegrams to the editor and reports from

our own KOMMUNIST correspondents in the affected area show, the builders have understood correctly who the real villains are in this situation and they are demanding not just an immediate end to the blockade of the republic but also strict, criminal punishment for the guilty parties.

One must not ignore the fact that along with the economic blockade an information blockade of the republic has been organized as well. Until very recently the overwhelming majority of the mass information media were concealing the fact of the blockade. And even today they are trying to present the matter as if it were only an insignificant episode which has already been resolved. However, the development of events convinces us that the blockade is in fact continuing; it has simply taken on somewhat different forms. For example, almost no fuel is arriving on the Azerbaijan Railway. If we consider that the railways are the country's arteries, then fuel is its blood, and an attempt to drain the blood of an entire republic means an attempt to paralyze the entire national economic mechanism, while heaping the blame for the situation on Armenia. Such attempts are extremely dangerous for the simple reason that a significant amount of Armenian territory borders on NATO Turkey, which has never hidden its special interest in our region.

We must state with complete obviousness that the political goals being pursued by the organizers of the blockade have failed completely. In the first place, the very fact of the blockade of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia testifies to the actual recognition of the re-unification of Karabakh with the mother-homeland. The attempts to destabilize our society and to introduce disunity into it have had the opposite effect. The extraordinary session of the republic's Supreme Soviet at which full support was expressed for the speech by the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, S.G. Arutyunyan, at the September plenum of the CPSU Central Committee provides evidence that the positions of various groups in society have moved significantly closer together, and a good basis for the consolidation of all reasonable forces has emerged.

Karabakh Committee's Kazaryan on Blockade, NKAO Issue

90US0123B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
4 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Rafael Avetisovich Kazaryan, corresponding member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences and deputy of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, by V. Sarkisyan, at the Polytechnical Institute in Yerevan, date not specified: "You Cannot Cross an Abyss in Two Jumps: A Meeting by Readers' Request"]

[Text] This is one of those occasions on which there is no particular need to introduce the person with whom I am talking. The name of Rafael Avetisovich Kazaryan is well known in our republic.

Our conversation, which took place in one of the auditoriums of the Polytechnical Institute, lasted for more than one hour. At the same time the political commentator of the magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV, Yu. Kaleshchuk, also interviewed R. Kazaryan, corresponding member of the republic's Academy of Sciences and deputy of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. The conversation published here is only part of this long dialogue. We have given preference to the key aspects of the realities of the current moment.

[Sarkisyan] And so, the blockade. In my view, it is economic in form and political in content.

[Kazaryan] Indeed, it is necessary to start with the fact that the NKAO blockade had been going on for a year and a half while for the last two months, in essence, our entire republic has proved to be in its grip. First—with regard to those who initiated these actions. It is my deep conviction that neither the year-and-a-half-long blockade of Artsakh nor the two-month blockade of an entire people in a peaceful federative country is an initiative undertaken only by the figures in the neighboring republic.

I do not want to flatter them, and I do not think this is the result of their senseless courage. It is typical that last year when a Stepanakert plant failed to supply a certain batch of capacitors for television sets, all the information media raised a hue and cry and portrayed the matter as if the country were facing an economic failure due to the non-delivery of these tiny parts. Right now, however, an entire republic is in a forced position, and this hardly troubles or disturbs anyone. For what purpose and with whose silent agreement is such an act being carried out?

We know that in the course of the year and a half they have attempted in every possible way to force the Armenian people to retreat from their national liberation movement, using the most diverse and mainly dishonorable methods. The latter include: falsification and labeling by all the mass information media; Sumgait as an act of intimidation, an organized action about which much has already been said, I will not repeat it; an unceasing, protracted genocide, consisting of persecution, pogroms, murder and violence aimed at Armenians in Azerbaijan. We know how emigration from there is being carried out; it is really deportation.

[Sarkisyan] The republic's enterprises and organizations have been receiving telegrams from all parts of the country urgently demanding that they ship needed products and fulfill their inter-nationality obligation. It turns out that many people in the country again are in a state of ignorance as to where and who is being blockaded and how this is being carried out. The central press, despite the efforts of its own correspondents in the republic, continues to be guided by the notorious "parity."

[Kazaryan] I judge the blockade to be the last attempt to stifle our movement. To force the people of Karabakh to retract their just demand and to force us to retract our support. This is the last act.

[Sarkisyan] Excuse me, but are you not optimistic in talking firmly about the "last act?"

[Kazaryan] But beyond that is open war. For this reason I consider it to be the last act under current, relatively peaceful conditions. Note that our democratic methods of struggle for the restoration of historical justice have frightened some people more than, say, the vandalism in Sumgait, Kirovobad and Baku. The blockade is in pursuit of one of two goals; I cannot say exactly which one, it is possible that either of them suits its organizers. And they are: to retreat and cease the struggle under pressure of economic crisis, or to break loose and take violent actions in response (this goal was also pursued after Sumgait or the cases of mass poisoning).

Answering actions are being provoked to make it easy to present the situation as a squabble between two "wild" peoples. The calculation is very simple: the Armenians' patience must break some time.

[Sarkisyan] I know that you have recently returned from Moscow. Share with us, please, your impressions.

[Kazaryan] To our great regret even the progressive deputies who knew or guessed the truth and supported us morally have now somewhat unexpectedly changed their position. The inter-regional group was obligated to declare its attitude toward the blockade. However, they had become convinced that it would be better if the informal organizations of Azerbaijan and Armenia themselves came to an agreement on lifting the blockade. Under the informal groups of Azerbaijan they have in mind the People's Front (PF), which is actively organizing the blockade and all the violent actions. The intermediaries agreed on a meeting between the Karabakh Committee and the PF. I categorically rejected this meeting and I will explain why. Their proposal was the following: "We (i.e., the PF) lift the blockade, you give up Karabakh." There you have the fable about the notorious fox guarding the hen house.

[Sarkisyan] Were emissaries from the PF present in Moscow?

[Kazaryan] Yes. They came up especially for this.

[Sarkisyan] One gets the impression that the inter-regional group of deputies viewed their step as the only alternative in this situation.

[Kazaryan] Or rather as one of the most desirable ways to get out of a dead-end. The reason for their behavior is that otherwise the authorities may resort to calling on military units for help. The deputies from certain regions of the country very much fear such an action because an escalation, they assume, in the future may result in the suppression of their movements as well. For this reason they suggested that we should make certain moral compromises.

In our sad history we have seen much more terrifying ordeals, and despite everything, we shall continue to demand justice. Armenians will not be broken. All the

parties are now coming to grips with this reality. And this means that no matter how they try to get out of it, public discussion of the question cannot be avoided.

Why do we call this action monstrously immoral? Everyone knows that in the disaster zone half a million people are living in tents and fighting rats, the coming cold and hunger. On the one hand, the whole country and the entire world have responded, and on the other, they are being deprived of the opportunity to give us effective aid. For two months the republic has not received building materials. The building crews which have come to Armenia from all ends of the country may be dispersed because of the boundary. This shameful phenomenon is becoming obvious to the entire world. And it is a disgrace. A disgrace for a country which declares democratization. The "scenario" which was handed down has resulted in this: the informal organizations have gotten themselves into this mess, let them get themselves out of it. We will not give this opportunity to anyone.

[Sarkisyan] It seems to me that all the deadlines have expired and all the moral criteria which force us to sit down at the negotiating table have been exhausted. And, indeed, what kind of negotiations can one talk about if one side has chosen a peaceful constitutional path for achieving historical justice and the other side has chosen vandalism.

[Kazaryan] Undoubtedly, we are in a state of unilateral war. The blockade is a military action, which is being carried out in a unilateral manner by Azerbaijan. How can we come to an agreement with them if the PF states that it controls the situation in the republic and not the government. That means the action is organized by them; moreover, they have reminded us of other threats. We cannot proceed with any withdrawal of the Karabakh question, if only because it has been raised by the Karabakh people; this is their highest, sacred right to self-determination. And Artsakh stated this in the most constitutional manner in February of last year.

For a year and a half they have maliciously presented the situation as if Karabakh were the "bone of contention" between two peoples. I talked about this at the last session of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and I will not repeat myself. This kind of "bone of contention" tactic is advantageous for those who are trying to drive the question into a dead-end. If our fictitious constitution does not allow us to resolve the problem, then it is necessary to turn to international practice, in which self-determination is the highest right of a people.

[Sarkisyan] I think that many people continue to be struck by the lack of factors for predicting possible consequences in the Karabakh situation. It is precisely for this reason that the problem has been driven literally into a dead-end.

[Kazaryan] I agree with you. It seems to me that no one expected such persistence on our side. There were no precedents. For this reason I will say, with reference to

the idea I mentioned above, that the country's Supreme Soviet does not have to discuss the question raised by the Karabakh residents; it only has to recognize the act of self-determination. Only recognize it. We have always declared our disapproval of violent actions; we will continue to be against them if we are not led to the point where they are necessary for us.

[Sarkisyan] The situation is now more than critical; however, our people remain at the height of their historical spirit.

[Kazaryan] The people are demonstrating once again a very high degree of restraint; otherwise, we will become a blind tool and a cheap card in the dirty hands of some players. They are waiting for us to break down, they are waiting for retaliatory violence. We will not give this opportunity to those who are planning it. The PF figures have hinted to the intermediaries about possible consequences.

On the subject of the intermediaries. These are decent people, who sincerely understand all the complexity of the situation and wish to help in some way. They were "asked to convey" that we should give some thought to the fate of our fellow-countrymen because the people sending the message cannot guarantee they will be able to restrain their own people (Azerbaijanis—V.S.) from violent actions. One would think that up to now they had restrained them. Thank God that in recent days a truthful article has finally appeared in PRAVDA concerning the vandalism in Agdam in relation to the Russian investigators. And here, too, reference was made to the Azerbaijan PF, as an active organizer of this action. I have already told the intermediaries that they, without recognizing it, highly offend us by repeating the year-and-a-half-old refrain: "If you would think about your fellow countrymen..." which Borovik formulated more clearly: "Sumgait will be forever..."

Fifteen to twenty thousand of our brothers remain in Baku and Kirovobad. They are mainly old men, who are being dealt with "heroically." They guard personal property while their younger generation there tries to make a go of it. I sent a telegram about one of these "heroic" actions to the party plenum. A 67-year old Baku man (Avetisyan Arutyun Andranikovich), who was moving his things, was set on fire with his property. They did not return his body to his 90-year old parents; the latter were themselves beaten until they were half-dead. That is the kind of "heroism" they manage to achieve. Yes, and I conveyed that our patience is not eternal... After all, we are tired of these constant threats.

[Sarkisyan] As far as I know, the Karabakh Committee in its time agreed to sit down at the negotiating table.

[Kazaryan] Yes, we proposed that as long ago as last year. The PF figures conveyed to the inter-regional group that they had proposed this more than once and even specified a time period—February of this year. It is a lie: in February it was difficult for us to meet with them—in Butyrki they did not give us an opportunity for that.

[Sarkisyan] Excuse me, I would like to talk about the mythical raising of the blockade because sand, broken rock and rotten foodstuffs are arriving...

[Kazaryan] This is an action unprecedented in the entire history of our country, and of any federative state of the world. I remember the blockade of Leningrad. In the war I myself participated in raising one of the blockades in the south. But a blockade in peace time? The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet posed the question of lifting it as a whole. After all, in Karabakh there is an external as well as an internal blockade. The roads were built there in such a way that in order to go from one rayon to another it is necessary to go into Azerbaijan. That is, there are no direct motorways between rayons there.

I think that the damage inflicted on our republic must be calculated to the kopeck and a suit for compensation must be pressed against the Azerbaijan republic. The deputies from Armenia must raise this question in the country's Supreme Soviet. This will be one more step on the path toward establishing a law-based state, if we have serious intentions at all on this score.

[Sarkisyan] Rafael Avetisovich, it seems to me that if there were sceptics before, none remained after the appearance by S.G. Arutyunyan at the plenum on the nationality questions. Now no one doubts the firmness of the position of either the leader or the republic's party organization. I am at the same time pleased and frightened by the phenomenon of the informal organizations which have sprung up like mushrooms after the rain. Will this not lead to chaos in the movement? The consolidation which we talked about so much is now necessary in fact.

[Kazaryan] In any case, in any state, in a situation close to war all forces are mobilized on a voluntary or legal basis. I see one of the positive factors of the current moment in the consolidation of forces between the people and the leadership and, in particular, the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, S. Arutyunyan. His position cannot fail to make one rejoice. His speech at the plenum left nothing to be desired. We hope that this brilliant speech will be followed by sufficiently firm actions. The Armenian national movement is prepared to cooperate in every possible way with the leadership in eliminating the crisis state in the republic. I cannot say that the entire leadership in general has this spirit, but conversations with those whom I had the occasion to meet during the session convinced me that this is already a common anguish.

As for the informal organizations, I am also distressed by a certain lack of agreement between individual informal groups. But you know, this is probably a natural "disease" of the transition period. At the very least, the Armenian national movement is making every effort to unite the efforts of all the parties. I have talked about those questions which are significant for the fate of our

nation, questions on which no conflicts are observed. In essence, we are already working jointly on these questions.

[Sarkisyan] It would seem that we need forums at which not only tactical questions of the current moment but also questions of strategic significance for the future would be worked out. The discussion concerns the development of an Armenian-wide program.

[Kazaryan] This work is being carried out in several directions. I cannot say what is being done at the governmental level, but our movement is preparing a conference at the end of October. We will invite representatives from the state organs and from all the informal organizations to talk about uniting our efforts and about working out a concept for the survival of our people. Yes, alas, today—in the period of perestroika—we have been placed in such conditions that we must think about the concept of survival...

Issue of German Plant Director in Latvia Examined

90UN0067A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11, 12 Oct 89

[Two-part article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent A. Afanasyev: "The Dissenter Bossert: Who is he: A migrant or a citizen with full rights—'A Russian-speaker' director doing everything in his power to assist the well-being of the republic?"]

[11 October 89, pp 1, 2]

[Text] My purpose is rather modest—to return together with my readers to the Riga Automobile Factory (RAF), to Vladimir Davydovich Bossert, and to see what has happened during the past two and a half years to the first elected director in the USSR.

Our angle of view is as follows: The first elected director—a result of the recent USSR-wide surge of restructuring—at the crossroads of the popular democratic revolution.

Let us make clear at once that we will find many inconsistencies here. Without qualification, Bossert wants a better republic, but he shares the positions of the leaders of the national movement in far from everything. And he does not hide this, but talks calmly about it. Under today's conditions, Bossert is a dissenter.

And there is another side to the matter.

Bossert is a German, and for this reason he is considered in the republic today to fall in the vague category of the "Russian-speaking population." Bossert was not born and did not grow up in Latvia, his ancestors did not even live in the Lettish lands before 1940, but rather in the villages and countryside of Omsk. Only and exclusively by virtue of this, within the framework of the regulations which exist today in the region, the first director elected in the USSR, do what he may, simply physically cannot

belong to the first ranks of those who are working for perestroika within the republic.

Bossert would hardly have guessed in 1987 that in 1989 he would be deprived of his passive voting right (able to vote but until expiration of a five-year "trial" period of living in the republic, unable to be elected a deputy). Moreover, a question still under discussion is how much longer the first elected director in the USSR must live in the republic that elected him in order to become a citizen of this republic. Some say ten. Others: Go higher, fifteen.

Some may object, and with justification: And what, is it absolutely necessary that he be a deputy? No, it absolutely is not required. This is not a question of an individual, but of the situation in which not only Bossert but a whole strata, in which many thousands of "Russian-speakers" are being placed—entirely irrespective of the kind of civic "benefits" they are bringing to the republic.

The criterion of citizenship is length of residence. The standard is that it is best if you or our ancestors lived in Latvia before 1940, that is before the moment when Latvia became Soviet... Usually they say that the longer a person has been living on this land the better the chances are that he will understand its cares and pains. But, for one, a year is sufficient to be included in the civil restructuring of society, while another can live his entire life on the land as an Oblomov—which of these will be a citizen in terms of his passport and which in terms of substance? Bossert, for example, developed bustling housing constructing in the city of Yelgava (and now there are those who want to change over to work in the RAF micro-rayon, although formerly they avoided it like the devil avoids frankincense). Bossert organized sales of goods that are in short supply directly at the plant (small-scale, of course, but out of an average plant wage of 250 rubles—and this in a time of inflation!—approximately 200 are being spent right at the plant); along with this, a store selling imported goods is now being built at the RAF. Bossert, and this the main thing, is devoting colossal effort to derive the maximum cash from the sale of vehicles (and, incidentally, is producing an increase in the share of profits that are being assigned not to the all-union but to the republic budget).

Is all this tipping the scales in Bossert's favor?

Bossert is striving to escape from slavish dependence upon the ministry, is increasing the plant's contribution to the republic budget, and is close to signing a contract with Chrysler (he thinks that a civilized republic cannot get along without a developed automotive industry.).

No. And one feels that events are unfolding against the laws of logic: The harder a person tries, the more this produces arguments that are not to his advantage... Either this is absurd, or other, deeper laws are at work.

The unique circumstances of the Baltics (as neighbors of Europe, the time of their entry into the Soviet Union, the higher level of development of the productive forces

than in many regions of the USSR, their culture) cannot but bring them into conflict with an ossified system earlier than other republics. This did not happen yesterday and not today. The process, regularly and rudely interrupted, has developed tortuously, without publicity, and consequently has acquired not so much a sociopolitical coloration as a sharply ethnic one. Many are inclined to connect this with the events of 1939. And indeed it is. But this is not the entire truth. If the level of the Baltic countries were considerably lower than the Soviet level, if this developed region had not ended up in the role of an ordinary province of a Stalinist power, is it possible that the view of this period in time would not be such a painful one?

But what happened, has happened. There were also crude repressions later on, and "purges" of personnel. When residents of the Baltic countries say, in a conciliatory way, that "it was the same with us," this argument seldom holds together. Inasmuch as the cradle of the revolution was, after all, not in the Baltic region. And Soviet Power came to the Baltics dressed in a Stalinist military greatcoat.

It would be hypocritical to accuse a person of nationalism while remaining silent about the fact that nationalism is a syndrome of rejection [ottorzheniye], albeit distorted, but nevertheless a reaction to a totalitarian system. All these "isms", disturbing in themselves, become more understandable when you can see their subsurface connections with other "isms."

It is even more important to understand as well the mechanism of modern rejection.

Earlier its basis was a self-protective reaction. Now, it seems to me, rejection does not offer protection, from hardly anybody; rejection unites and supports a social consciousness (which developed and hardened during the 1940's and 1950's) in its former "sporting" [sportivnoy] form.

And it is precisely here that Bossert and others like Bossert turn out to be in an ambiguous position. Although he is a progressive person who is striving for renewal and who is objectively doing a good deal for the republic, Bossert is, in the eyes of many indigenous inhabitants, a typical migrant. And, as has been known for 50 years, these are the source of "all evil." This stereotype has grown even stronger today: If you are a migrant, which means a candidate for citizenship, and if you do not wish to be considered a candidate (that is as a "second-class" citizen), this means that, by the same token, you are standing in the way of ethnic policy and you reveal your true essence; consequently you are a Stalinist and stagnant. It is not important what you carry inside yourself. The important thing is what kind of badge you carry.

What happens with such a scheme: Don't do good and won't get hurt? You build homes at an accelerated rates—does this mean you are "bringing in migrants?" You have been concerned about the establishment of a city theater—are you "infringing on culture?" You want

to take upon your own shoulders the republic's football team, which has fallen into difficulties—did you "threaten sports?" With a foreign firm, you establish a joint enterprise using modern, ecological technologies—are you nevertheless "heading things toward intensive methods and are you planting a new ecological bomb?"

The myths current in the modern USSR will perhaps be recognized more readily than the myths of ancient Greece. This one, for example. They introduced a limit on the number of enterprises in the republic in order to limit mechanistic [mekhanicheskii] migration; for two and a half years, Bossert not only has not reached the "ceiling" but he has implemented many reductions; however, it has been seldom that he has not been roundly reproached on the grounds that, supposedly right up to the present time, the RAF has been "inflating" its staff. Very recently, the city executive committee proposed a new limit for him. If it is approved, it will be necessary to cut several hundred living people. No, Bossert did not rebel, although it was not easy not to rebel: Politics is politics, but where to put the people, out on the streets?! Bossert ... expressed a readiness to reduce—the plant still has such possibilities—but, in such a case, let the city fathers themselves find jobs for these people...

As we see, there is rejection. But what is its basis? It basis is a very strong attraction for the happy days before the war.

The informational bulletin of the People's Front of Latvia, "Atmoda" ("Incentive") reports that on 10 May 1920, back during the struggle for independence, the Latvian Constitutional Assembly's commission for agrarian affairs, having begun its work, noted: "The arable land of Latvia is our only gold fields." And, in fact, as we learn further from the bulletin, arable fields have increasingly been used industriously and wisely. If in 1909/1911 the per hectare crop yield came to 12.4 poods of wheat, to 9.3 poods of rice, to 9.1 poods of barley corn, and to 80.3 poods of potatoes, in 1988 these figures were 13.6, 13.2, 12.8, and 127.0, respectively. On the eve of the 1940's the Latvian republic held second place in Europe in terms of cattle per capita. In terms of living standards—16th-18th place among the 60 member countries of the League of Nations. In terms of meat exports—4th place in Europe and 6th place in the world. Agricultural production comprised from 33.8 to 50.4 (!) percent of total exports. In any case, this is what the bulletin writes.

Leningrad State University (LGY) professor Oyars Potreki, whose ideas we will discuss in more detail a little later on, writing in the newspaper RIGAS VALSS, noting that 65 percent of USSR exports consist of oil, gas, and coal and came to the following conclusion: "... specifically, overcoming the ideologized (ideologizirovannii) idea about some sort of economic advantages of socialism is one of the problems whose solution could eliminate the lack of understanding on the part of a relatively broad segment of the population of the essence of what is occurring and, as a consequence of this, change

its view of economic self-reliance of the republic as being something unnatural. The problem is we have to start up on our own, and not eat up the natural resources of Russia."

We note in passing that this introduces a certain amount of clarity to the question of "who is indebted to whom and for what." But it is not at all this that interests us at the moment. What we are interested in right now is the very strong mechanism of "ideologized ideas," which is devouring the lion's share of the energy of the professionals, who would like to and should work without losing their way on account of venerable myths and while focusing on simple common sense and the well-being of man.

If we picture it schematically, then there are two mechanisms of ideologization, or in essence mythologization, of the economy that are at work in the republic. One is the one which Professor Potreki mentioned. The second is not yet in departmental-monopoly use but is still in the use of the nationalities.

I cannot be a judge, but I am somewhat more sympathetic to the positions of the side that is not attracted by the ideals of "equality in poverty," the side that places human well-being, prosperity, the well-known bread and butter, higher than essays that don't tell you how to grow this bread but how best to take it away from somebody close to you... The only trouble is that this healthy desire to raise "bread" is to, a great extent, being weighed down by an ideological slab.

Having such figures as were published in the bulletin, any school child will say that the corner stone of prosperity at that time (indeed, up to half of total exports!) was butter, meat and milk. From this thesis, the same school child can easily draw a conclusion: and agriculture must become the basis for present development of the nation!

Good, the school child does not know the situation of the present (to say nothing of the pre-war) foreign market. But those who are now formulating the official and the "informal" concepts for Latvia's economic development, who are pushing the priority of agriculture to the forefront, cannot but know; if, before the war, there was a great demand in Europe, and also throughout the world, for meat, butter and milk, then now, for example, our neighbor Sweden has a persistent over-production of food products of 30(!) percent. The Common Market, when accepting new countries as members, is now imposing the condition that they reduce production volumes. The reason is the same—a surplus and nowhere to put it; the goal—somehow to reduce, to bring down the wave of food goods that has built up.

And, under these conditions, to orientate the national economy toward the "priority of bacon"? Is this not disastrous?

"Policy!"—people have enigmatically explained this maneuver to me, raising a finger.

It is completely clear that this is policy. It is even clear that these policies have been dictated. But still it is obviously not entirely normal when policy and its tool, concentrated ideologization, prevail—how many times have they done so—over reality and fly away with economics? Even though the policy is a rather clear one: to maintain in the public consciousness the priorities of the "good old times," and also at the same time to reduce the social and economic base of the migrants...

However, the ideological "battle" against large industry has by no means excluded the possibility that at some stage (for example, when the migrants flood back or move into a third-class role) such industry will be declared necessary. But this will happen when it happens! And is it wise to pursue a conscious weakening of the economy today, when the republic is making a transition to economic accountability, to the principles of mutually beneficial trade with its neighbors. And how do these principles square with all the naivete with which they propose, for example, "to reduce the relative weight" of light industry, to "stabilize" the share of its production which is being supplied to "other republics," while at the same time fully recognizing that an increase of electric power consumption is unavoidable (to a large degree covered by the "other" republics)? And, in the aims of ensuring growth of deliveries of natural gas from our neighbors, under no circumstances to envisage an increase in the mass of commodity goods for equivalent exchange with our neighbors, and... "the development of gas main networks"? What are they thinking to exchange for their electric power and gas for? Milk and cottage cheese? These are very good, but are they sufficient for us to settle our accounts—and at the very lowest world prices.

And with all respect for the past, one question remains fundamental: Where, in the final analysis, are we going to get the hard currency we need today in order to ensure the independence we want tomorrow?

Professor Oyars Potreki from the faculty of political economy at the Latvian State University has his own weighty ideas as to where the republic should get this hard currency. "The first place: ports! Create, for example, a stock company based on shares. A part of the shares will be for the republic. A second part—for the Union. Still another—for the local population. And the last—for foreign capital... The second place—the RAF plant..." "You are citing the RAF as an example?", I repeated my question. "No," the professor corrected. "Not as an example. RAF, in my view, holds second place in republic as a source of hard currency..."—"And what about other, large enterprises? Let us say, the Riga State Elektrotechnical Plant imeni V.I. Lenin (VEF)."

Here, the professor explained it all to me: In the production of radio equipment and microelectronics, we have, unfortunately, fallen so far behind that to think there is a hard currency lever for the republic in this area means to be deeply deluded. At least this is not a lever today, nor will it be tomorrow, and hard currency from RAF

even now is capable of substantially strengthening the bases of republic economic accountability (*khozraschet*)... The next step, following Potreki's idea, lies in the establishment of a free economic zone. He considers that the idea of the republic creating its own currency, a customs institution, etc.—under conditions of the self-integration of Europe—to be no more than childish willfulness. A free economic zone is another matter. Here there is a basis for removing ourselves from conflict and for a substantial rise in our standard of living—indeed, within the framework of this zone, everyone would receive equal chances to realize their capabilities—both the indigenous residents of the republic and those who have come to it in various years...

I knew that not long before our meeting Oyars Dmitriyevich had addressed a plenum of the Latvian CP Central Committee. Judging from the comments, this address, full of figures and facts, produced a deep impression. Indeed, if naked enthusiasm is going to infect anyone today, this will only be in the event that statistics remain silent. However, the best thing is for me to do is cite two extracts which show how things are in the republic now. And what it is necessary to have. The first quotation: "The proposed draft plans (for economic development of the republic—A.A.) do not take into consideration either the recommendations of Soviet scholars or of twenty-five Nobel Prize laureates in the field of economic research. Instead of comparative multi-factor analysis, at least up until now, everything is being built 'by eye,' on the basis of emotions."

The second quote: "West Germany, ... per capita, annually exports goods that are worth more than 5000 dollars and Singapore, with a population of 2.6 million (barely less than the population of Latvia—A.A.), has an annual commodity turnover of 60 million dollars, exporting 15,000 dollars in goods per capita. This is what somebody needs to consider. We will try to calculate how things are with us. It turns out that, per capita, we sell 1600 rubles in goods to the Soviet Union; abroad, we sell 130 rubles worth via the Soviet Union and 15 rubles worth directly ourselves. With these figures, there is nothing for us to do out in the world. All the more so as exports of products to the Soviet Union and to the rest of the world is simply miserly. The total annual value of our milk products on the present world market is less than 110 million dollars. This exactly corresponds to the value of 12,000 autobuses out of the 160,000 which the RAF would like to produce ... in cooperation with Chrysler. Thus, the value of 25 days of production in Viegava corresponds to the value of the republic's ~~same~~ annual milk production. We need to have a highly effective, competitive industry with an export potential by the year 2000 of at least 10 million dollars. Otherwise that which we call success will remain only a dream." (extract is mine—A.A.).

They told me afterwards that the tough assessments by the professor may receive a painful reception in the republic. This is possible: The treasured belief that the path to success lies through the dairy farms has, so it

seems, been placed in doubt. But, indeed, in this there is also a bitter paradox: What are being painfully received are the proposals not of an extraneous person, a romantic poet, or of some kind of ideological dilettante, but of a professional economist, who most of all and more competently than many is concerning himself with the success of the republic's economy, who, scientifically rather than on the basis of myths, is providing substantiation for a reliable path, the shortest possible one, to the realization of a national dream!.. Is this not a paradox?

I recall what Bossert said to me. "The plant is looking all over the world for partners," he said in a tired voice. "The plant concludes an agreement in order to achieve one main goal—hard currency, hard currency for the republic! And they explain to me with a calm smile: Don't waste energy Viktor Davydovich. It's all the same, nobody needs your "Rafikis." In keeping with agricultural priority, your plant in the foreseeable future will start to produce ... plows."

Yes, dissenters do not have an easy time: to stand with both feet on solid ground, to call on common sense, but, looking around, to find out that you are considered as someone abnormal... This, I note, albeit on a miniature scale, reminds one of the situation with academician A.D. Sakharov. The academician stands at a podium and, in a quiet voice, tries to make simple things comprehensible to human understanding. Well, it has turned out we might be smarter: Do not kill, avoid lasciviousness in thought and deed...

But obviously the laws of mass consciousness are by no means founded on Biblical commandments. Some kind of blow, a crisis, is needed for a new, more vital and solid idea to take hold of the masses, to become a "material force."

So, it seems to me that there are certain signs of approaching changes. First, a small but entirely symptomatic observation by a person who came from here the West. In the opinion of I. Gerol, chief of the international information department at the Canadian newspaper THE CITIZEN, who visited Riga during a vacation, "the principle worry of the leaders of the nationalist movement in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (but particularly in Latvia) is a product of the fact that they are losing the battle for public opinion in the West and in other regions of the USSR and, perhaps, even among the Latvian intelligentsia" (extracted by me—A.A.). About public opinion in the West, a little later, but now—about the last remark.

The general situation, and, it seems, rather successfully, has been formulated by a Latvian journalist: What people earlier whispered about in the kitchen, they are now shouting about in the square; but, on the other hand, they are now talking about something else in the kitchen... Everything here, obviously, is true. With a single correction: The situation is changing so swiftly that already they are also talking about the "something

else" not in the kitchen, but are sometimes even writing about it in the papers: "Analysis of the situation forces the thought that, in the event of achieving ... independence, the chances of living under democracy in the near future are rather insignificant. The chances are much better of getting ourselves a 'leader' who is very far removed from democracy,—indeed it is theoretically possible for us to crawl out of the swamp of economic chaos if we take the path followed by South Korea. I do not think that the residents of the republic are ready for such a turn." (O. Potreki).

In the final analysis, waves—faced with the gigantic reef of the world economic level, a reef which they cannot surmount in a single leap (and this has now become distinctly evident),—these waves either get deeper, or ... The latter alternative is obviously putting people in the West on edge to a certain degree. The Soviet press has already published a number of rather sharp statements by western journalists and political and public figures—from Sweden and Canada, Belgium and the FRG, the USA and Great Britain. The solid English newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES assessed prospects with extreme clarity: "No matter how much the West has admired the Baltic peoples and with what sympathy it has regarded them, it will not start a third world war for the sake of ensuring their freedom, and to encourage them to nourish any kind of hopes on this account would be a bad illusion."

The less than cheerful prospects of the third world or the chance at the end of the 20th century of "getting a 'leader' who is very far removed from democracy" in the center of Europe also do not bring joy to people whom it would be extremely difficult to suspect of sympathies toward Moscow. I quote from an article by Nil Muyzhnieks entitled "The National Question. The View of Western Sovietologists," which appeared in an informational bulletin of the People's Front of Latvia: "In the West as a whole they view with anxiety the fact that the peoples in the Soviet Union have begun to stir. They recall the two world wars, in the outbreak of which national arrogance also played a definite role. The bloodletting in several regions of the Soviet Union (for example, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict) is not evoking sympathies toward these peoples and a desire to support them, but rather an aversion toward the offenders and a sympathy with the victims. If the Baltic peoples need the support and respect of the West, they should maintain peace-loving and parliamentary methods of struggle." (extracted by me—A.A.) As is obvious from another article in the bulletin that cites an American professor invited (it is necessary to remember, certainly not by Moscow) to an international conference in Riga, V. Khatt [phon.], who, in answer to the remark that "many of those who have come are living here illegally," was "forced to note correctly that man cannot be looked upon as a thing. This kind of judgement cannot contribute to support on the part of the western democracies..."

And so, western sovietologists advise us to operate by civilized means. And if we nonetheless operate otherwise? What then? The same Nil Muyzhnieks points out: "To a certain degree, democratic and national tendencies are in competition in the Baltics—one is advancing the rights of man to the forefront, the other—corporative belonging and the rights of the nation." Which tendency will turn out to be the more viable? Muyzhnieks gives his answer: "In the future, the democratic strivings of the Baltic peoples will be judged on the basis of how they attract representatives of other nationalities to their movements." Professor V. Khatt, the participant in the conference in Riga, in essence, seconds him. The bulletin writes: "He called upon us to attract into our movement as many inhabitants of Latvia as possible." Another participant, and also a professor (at the University of California), R. Tagepper [phon], "expressed the hope that citizenship in the Latvian republic will be afforded to all the people who are living in Latvia..."

And, indeed, if this thought is purged of a certain political coloration, it offers real approaches to consensus, to national agreement, to that unity which can move the republic (and the country as a whole) toward true democracy. Just as, without it, there can be no talk of this...

But this is the opinion of the West and of the East. And what of the Baltic republics themselves?

It is also possible that there will be an uncorking, and opening up a public consciousness that has been designed for a protracted Stalinist winter; it is not excluded that this will evolve toward "a democratic trend in human rights."

If this does occur, then a movement of moderates, of "centrists" will develop in a natural way—breaking away from the "fronts." Obviously, this is not the same thing as in today's Latvian CP (where it is still unclear whether members of the party have left to join the fronts and are carrying out the party line there or whether radical activists, while formally remaining members of the party, are carrying out the line of their fronts within it). Legitimization of the moderates will provide an opportunity of acquiring a political face to the hundreds of thousands who shun extremists (on either side) and for whom political stability is attractive. Their involvement in politics will create the prerequisites for creation of a so-called middle class—of an untrampled nucleus and support for democratic society...

If we are talking about today, then I think that the problem is not whether one or another Baltic republic will "leave" (which cannot be prevented if this is the will of the entire people of the republic—and this is its constitutional right). Most likely, they will not "leave" so long as they have not grown strong, have not developed their own economic and political "biceps." The fact that the power over minds is in the hands of extreme radicals, whether they are on the left or right, is unimportant. And, under such circumstances, without stabilizers (as

the history of the 20th century has showed more than once), it is easy to slide back and, again, it is not so important whether this to the left or right. The problem is that the present "centrism" lacks initiative, that its policies are policies of conciliation, of smoothing things out, that this is primarily a responsive reaction on two fronts, that such "centrism" does not have a content of its own which stays ahead of developing events, a strong alternative of its own that can pass the test of public opinion, a position of its own that can be and needs to be criticized, but cannot be subjected to obstruction, either dependent or cumulative [kompilyativniy].

[12 Oct 89, p 2]

[Text] What I said in the final paragraphs of my previous letter, of course, is only a prognosis for the foreseeable future, and I will not exaggerate its importance. The general atmosphere is rather heated. But the talk in the kitchen, and also in rare publications is about something else.

Question: Is a second echelon of public opinion taking shape in the "kitchen"?

Generally there is confusion: Actions may be the chief argument, inasmuch as actions are more prescient than people.

At the Svet kolkhoz in Yelgava Rayon they told me about one very radically inclined kolkhoz worker ("almost not even a member of Helsinki-86"), who travelled especially to Yelgava in the spring to take part in the election campaign: In the most active way, he came out against the election of the director of RAF as a USSR people's deputy. When, however, the leadership of the Svet kolkhoz raised the question of either continuing to hopelessly bow and scrape to the agro-industrial committee or, having signed a contract on cooperation with RAF and supported by its foreign currency, to take the lead, this same radically inclined kolkhoz worker voted, like the others, for cooperation.

I am not overrating a given fact: A radical simply does not extend politics to his own pocket.

Politics is politics and money is money. In principle, nothing more is needed for a person to convince himself: The arithmetic substitution of one ideology for another—without the development of the economy itself—will not leave enough money in your purse or in the purse of the nation.

We will also not "ideologize" the motives which led the chairman of the Svet kolkhoz, Yan Yanovich Poch, to the idea of collaborating with the RAF. Yan Yanovich has even not concealed them—he is counting on hard currency.

Oh, the kind of conversations that started then! The kolkhoz is getting out of the RAPO? The indigenous Yan Yanovich is getting together with the migrant Bossert?

Yan Yanovich then retreated. But he didn't become confused and he kept a cool head. Dissent—this is not the only sign but is a rather important one that a person, in fact, knows how to think.

Very tall, impetuous, with a happy, inspiring face, he now explains: This was a tactical move—you know, too much politics, too much feverish activity, and that is why we agreed, as a first stage, to sell the RAF above-plan products. And now? Oh, now! Now, Jesus Maria, is a different time—and we are going to sign an agreement with the RAF about creating an association or a stock company. So be it: we are not a subsidiary farm; we are independent. And co-owners with the RAF. Of course, in 1940, they took us by force, but to rehash this again and again; neither East nor West resorts to this. Radicals? It stands to reason they are necessary, to untwist the democratic machinery, but what, listen only to them? It is necessary to look ahead! I think it will take about ten years to shake things down, but don't get excited, order will come to the country, and we will come to have a different attitude toward the RAF; there is a prosperous future in store for the RAF, for such plants, Jesus Maria, you don't find them all around the country!

This is the kind of passionate ally the RAF has. Moreover, that this union has—and realizes it!—a practical, pragmatic basis, and what is bad about this? Yes, perhaps chairman Poch has somewhat overrated the potentials of the RAF and underrates the significance of the multi-faceted activities of local radicals (confusing them to a certain degree with western radicals, with their strictly outlined place in that same stable, "detached" Sweden), but he fully appreciates his own interest—and how many more such wise Yan Yanovich's there must be...

In principle, such a view—not from the offices of Moscow or Riga, but from within, from the land, from work—clarifies where those who are oriented toward the priority of agriculture and in whose name, properly speaking, republic-side goals are being set, are headed.

Priorities, of course are not a bad thing—but, frequently, the individual (private?) person, tired from all and all kinds of campaigns, while focusing as the moment demands on the birds in the bush, completely sensibly tries at the same time to hold on to the bird in hand... Thus it is at the Svet kolkhoz. The situation is similar at the Yelgava non-standard equipment plant. When they refused this small plant its own numerical limit (that is, practically denied it the right to exist and proposed that it "join ranks" with the agroprom, the factory workers refused to abandon their ideals and priorities and, in a friendly way, voted (of 60, two or three didn't vote) to "join ranks" with ... the RAF. They wrote an application to Bossert. And they signed their names. I spoke with them. With the chairman of the labor collective's council, with the chief engineer, and the workers. Among them were Latvians, Russians, and people of other nationalities. The question was clear for all: if earnings will not drop (and they will sooner rise), if technology

there will be improved and "ecologized" (and this is the very first priority—for Bossert as well), then ... what kind of agroprom can compare?

Picture the following: At the moment when a snow-white ship, not the largest one but, to make up for it for this, temptingly loaded down with all kinds of things to eat, sails past a drifting, unseaworthy sloop, full of people—that, at this moment, these people are told: Don't hurry, be patient, an ocean liner will soon come by and then we'll all transfer over together! What do you think? How would the people react at this moment?

However, the main point is not only a pragmatic one. From a human viewpoint, it's easy to understand people's desire to live well right away, but, indeed, ideals also have their place.

"Do you know what?," said the manager of the Yelgava all-city territorial trust, V.I. Liepinsh. "I didn't learn my history out of books, but first-hand, from the stories of my parents, my grandfathers and grandmothers. And what we have now is a nostalgia for the past. Back then, they had highly developed agriculture (now it is much lower). But they also had the Riga state electrotechnical plant imeni Lenin, and production of automobiles—why forget about that?! We were somewhere on the level of Finland. A second consideration in favor of agriculture is that we don't have our own resources. But... We would not be able to go out into the West now. And, there, they also have enough of their own food. Fill our shops with products—yes, sell them to the Soviet Union—sure, but count on agriculture alone? This does not offer the republic prospects... It is necessary to do everything on order to achieve convertibility; perhaps we should even introduce our own monetary system. But, in any case, we must first of all support such enterprises as the RAF. Bossert is doing a great deal for the future of Latvia. He does not talk about this, but in fact he is providing the base on which convertibility can actually be achieved..."

One ancient Greek philosopher said that the state perishes when it loses the ability to distinguish "good" citizens from "bad ones."

This is how they think in the "lower levels" [v nizakh] about the interrelationship of ideals and interests. Perceiving a direct and very close dependence: The most just ideal, obviously, is one that is based on the interests of people of today, and not of people from the day before yesterday. ...

However, the unshakability of priorities or authorities is frequently explained not only by traditions or by the intensity of ideologies, but also by intellectual inertia. In the case of agriculture, the state purchases of the 1940's and 1950's are clearly making themselves heard: "Do everything as in the past." Evidently, it is the same thing with the residency requirement as well—judging by everything, this is the fruit of an epoch of ideological irreconcilability, when all (or almost all) non-Latvians, non-Lithuanians, and non-Estonians were considered (and to a large extent were!) bearers of Stalinist ways of

thinking. In such times, it was entirely natural to dream of somehow being able to cut yourself off from totalitarianism, to stand apart. But times change—the thaw, the opposition of dissenters, finally even perestroika; the public consciousness of an enormous country has decisively evolved—but state purchases and their purposes have remained as before?..

And there is also another side. Would that the Russian left radicals and the liberal intelligentsia had known, for example, to what, to put it mildly, peculiar results their efforts would lead, the efforts of many, many generations of people who fought against a lack of freedom. Would that the patriotic intellectuals and the right radicals of the Weimar republic had known what kind of wood would grow on the national soil that they also abundantly fertilized. "In moments that are difficult for the people, to be together with them; in all times, it is the higher destiny of the intelligentsia to lead the people, while serving their interests." The obviousness of these truths borders on the commonplace, but think of the kinds of diabolic upside-down turns that have been manufactured by most recent history, with its many immutable truths! And from this comes a series of torturous questions for any real representative of the intelligentsia: To serve—how? Whose interests? Have you correctly come to understand this interest?.. There have been moments in history when the people have not known or even have not wanted to know who has correctly grasped and expressed his very deepest interest. And, on the contrary, when they have cordially greeted a momentary "ruler of men's minds," as has become clear later, as their destroyer... Where should the member of the intelligentsia be at such moments? Mixing with the crowd, dissolving into the "body of the people"? Or, taking a risk of bringing down upon himself the abuse and glory of a renegade who speaks fervent truths?.. It is characteristic that, for example, to A.I. Solzhenitsyn, intelligence is the ability to think non-imitatively, to think contrarily.

We are all in a similar situation, the Latvians and the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Armenians—the Stalinist steamroller ran over us all alike. Of course, it would be intellectual cunning to draw a conclusion from this that the situation is supposedly the same in all ways. For a small people, it is more difficult to preserve its uniqueness, its culture, its language. A large people in the process of renewal should be farsighted, cautious, yes, and even simply decent in its treatment of its neighbors. Don't harm them! But... The scales are various, though the moral laws are the same (it would be absurd, surely, to think otherwise). This "don't harm them" is universal for all, whether you are large or small. Mentally put yourself in the place of the other person before you make a decision concerning his destiny. Expecting to be respected, you yourself respect the things that are sacred to them—or at least be able to think a step or two ahead, keeping in mind what a lack of respect for another will turn into for you. When thinking about the problems of your own people and about the shortcomings of another,

don't flatter yourself that no shortcomings are your own, at least don't demonstrate ill-bredness by assiduously not noticing the pain of another.

Let's not be idealists. I, for example, do not say we will fix things now by a repetition of the "eternal friendship", about "internationalism" that our mouths are sore from saying. However, be sure that people who are well-bred (or at least this) should assimilate the interethnic rules of conduct. No matter how nice you may be, if you live in a communal apartment, get used, nevertheless, to living with each other.

Is it possible to "break away"? The probability (earlier) is not great. But if this suddenly happens, this will be a blow both to the "breakers" and to the Union. It is difficult to imagine any world in which people would support a break-up. The course would objectively lead to its disintegration. The next steps are almost arithmetic: a change in the course... But if, nevertheless, a change should occur—this (for the republic) would be like a person who can't swim (and who is a life preserver) falling into the ocean... Debates about "separation" are another matter. They are equal to those advocating separation and for the sake of the course, the thinking of people who have been accustomed to their country being "big" may be the very probability of a break-up. But as long as these are debates and not reality, they may depress but should serve as a stimulus for preventive reforms. The probability of a break-up grows less the greater the speed and depth of the reforms in the Soviet Union, the greater the probability that the USSR itself will emerge from that odious situation in which we have hobbled ourselves.

I thought about this, about everything as I was on my way to Riga for a meeting with the president of the Society of Jurists, Valdis Valdemarovich.

Valdis Valdemarovich began our conversation with my remark that they say the "not entirely" support the idea of a residence permit, he did not agree. Think, said the president, countries in the past have had a strict migration policy and thanks to this they have solved their problems. Have you now achieved a good deal—but how do you compare Latvia with their situation? And with the FRG!—Valdis Valdemarovich called the situation. There are a great many Turks living in the republic is now taking harsh action—it is necessary for the reunification of their families!

And I recall another example. They told me how in one municipality they conducted a referendum to deprive immigrants of the right to vote. The Kingdom was up in arms: A democratic principle was being violated and, besides (and it is still more important), the nation's reputation was being damaged. I recall even another one: the commun-

newspaper regarding decisions already made in the Baltic republics. I don't recall it literally, only the sense of the comment: yes, in Sicily there is also a residency qualification, but it is necessary to take into account that this is happening in Sicily!

In a word, it is possible to be guided by that experience which seems the more convincing. And, in general, it is also possible not to be guided by either East or West, or even by international law (such a point of view also occurs; for example, the authors of the bulletin of the Latvian People's Front, rebuking the West for political timidity in its relations with the USSR when deciding the fate of the Baltic states, noted that: "Considering the experience of the past 45 years, it makes sense to think awhile about whether it is worth staking the future of the Baltic peoples on any kind of international legal norms at all.")

Although, of course, this is already from a "different opera," and my president-conversation partner, a man of civilized standards, certainly backs this, in particular, and our dialogue was a valuable and interesting one. All the more so because we were able to argue without causing the other to lose his dignity or to retreat without losing, take note, our own dignity. I was convinced by Valdis Valdemarovich that it is not our business to take as a model only the result of experience; it is necessary to examine it in the context of time, contradictions and development and then create ... our own that will not be similar to any other. I could not agree that it is almost impossible to arrive at something outstanding without experience and mistakes. I hope also that Valdis Valdemarovich did not miss my reasons: Yes, it is obviously also possible to look upon the activities of the committees for registration of citizens of the Latvian (that is, the prewar) republic as a purely sociological experience (it is nevertheless interesting how many of them there are!), but in the course of intensive political struggle, sociology also, willingly or unwillingly, becomes a very strong political tool. (Indeed, this exclusively academic interest frequently produces serious psychological consequences among "non-Latvians" ... However, there were also places where we came together without argument. You will understand, the professor said, that there are several points here. First, the rapid reaction of people to a painful subject—the sharpest, but not the most real one. One person thinks a while and will say: "The Russians are equal." Another thinks and will say: "In the words of the Latvians there is a portion of truth." Then, indeed this is like a family squabble, many understand already that it is necessary to take the first step. But they are afraid. Won't they consider this to be weakness? Finally, we have achieved a certain degree of openness, but the mechanism of glasnost is working, is pushing us forward. It is difficult to say new things. Backwards—they misconstrue this. And what we need is, as we talked about, to change our minds today... Really, don't you agree with this? Or here is another. Although Valdis Valdemarovich is also a proponent of the residency requirement, conforming to the present situation, he however is inclined

to the recognition of all present residents of Latvia (by a general declaration) as its citizens.

"You cannot take away from people what they already have: People will become aggressive. Moreover, it should not be necessary to sign an oath when accepting citizenship. Permanent registration and an indication of a steady source of income will be sufficient. And for those who come later, introduce a requirement—10 years!"

"Consequently, what? Has the Duma of the People's Front, in your view, gone too fast, been too hasty?"

"Possibly," the president did not start to argue but amplified substantially: "You know my present opinion. However, if the Duma does not change its position and stands on the one it has, I will submit to the general decision—most of all, what is making itself heard here is my habit of party discipline" (Valdis Valdemarovich smiled at this—in my opinion, sadly).

Perhaps this amplification contained everything that, basically, I came here for... (Here I recalled Bossert, who has contrived the whole time to do "the wrong thing." Yes, I thought, to think and live differently is not one of the easiest jobs.)

Therefore, I cited the following example to President Birkas. Having read the well-known declaration concerning the situation in the Baltics I travelled to Latvia, prepared to encounter a situation far worse than I found. Yes, my impressions matched in many ways. But there were also differences. For example, it would have been supposed that desecration of monuments and hooliganism had become almost daily phenomena. But this, fortunately, is not so. There were individual instances. Not a phenomenon. And in general the tension (it exists) is manifested not in physical but, first of all, in political actions... I said all this to Valdis Valdemarovich. And then I added: I personally see a certain difference between what is supposed and what is to be seen. But following your logic, I would be able to say: If, indeed this text bears the signature of the Party Central Committee (and the Party did start perestroika). If, indeed, Mikhail Sergeyevich as well (and M.S. Gorbachev is the leader of perestroika) has a relationship to this text. Then it automatically follows from all this that I should gather up my impressions, frugally conceal them in my pocket, and be in complete solidarity with the published text... Right?

Valdis Valdemarovich began to laugh. I also began to laugh. At that moment we, it seemed, understood one another much better.

UzSSR: Almalyk 'Defense of Perestroika' Informal Group Activities Reviewed

90US0156A KOMSOMOLET'S UZBEKISTANA in
Russian 22 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Larisa Petrova: "Informals Organize Public Debate"]

[Text] When they speak of informals in Uzbekistan, they are usually referring to Tashkent informal groups, while the groups which act in the oblast and rayon centers, as a rule, are called "branches" of the capital groups. In this sense, the Almalyk initiative group "Zashchita perestroyki" [Defense of perestroyka] is an independent organization which has quite actively included itself into the public life of the city literally from the very first days of its creation.

One of the major actions of the "ZP" was its participation in the electoral campaign on presentation of candidates for USSR people's deputies. It is still remembered in the city. Some remember it with hope for the victory of the democratic forces, and some with ridicule—"so, they wanted to get involved in the well-ordered mechanism of the elections", and some with concern—we cannot create "opposition to the gorkom"... One way or the other, the initiative group in Almalyk is operating and commands respect by its concern for problems of society and its desire to personally participate in their fastest possible resolution.

A quite recent measure by the "ZP" members was the public debate (which was, by the way, officially coordinated with the authorities) on the topic of "Bilingualism: Reality and Prospects". Those wishing to discuss the draft of the Law on Languages gathered in a small park. These were informal group members of various currents, and city residents who had simply come to the park to rest joined in with them.

There are many discussions of the draft currently going on in the republic, the reader might exclaim. Why have we decided to tell about this one?

Why, it is because as a result of the almost two-hour debate, Almalyk residents learned two lessons. First: Nothing terrible will happen from the fact that the authorities are agreeing to contact with the informal groups. Rather, on the contrary, stable mutual respect is emerging. Secondly: We must prepare thoroughly for such measures, so as not to lower the prestige of the organization which we are representing. Yet there were not only informals present at the debate, but also Komsomol leaders.

Then again, it would probably be incorrect to call this a real debate, since it was more reminiscent of a battle of words between the organizers and the first secretary of the Almalyk party gorkom, A. Abduvasikov, who for some reason had decided to turn the debate of the informal groups into a meeting with... himself. In any case, unfortunately he exercised quite actively his "right" to interrupt the speakers and to unceremoniously foist his own opinions upon them. In doing so, he understandably evoked the disfavor of a large part of the public. After all, we have all grown deathly tired of this "style" of management.

Thus, a well planned endeavor—the participation of the city's ideologists in an informal discussion with the

people on a question of interest to all turned out to be a mutual misunderstanding and irritation for the parties involved.

Nevertheless, despite the nervousness, the debate, I believe, did take place. The initiative group "Zashchita perestroyki" is planning to pass on the basic proposals to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet commission for developing the draft of the law on languages. The general conclusion of the debate was as follows: The project is rough, unfinished, and encourages the disunification of people by national indicator. The discussion participants believe that it contains no legal guarantees for the development of other languages (aside from Uzbek) in the republic, and only a program on development of languages specially developed by the government can give these guarantees.

"The Law cannot be adopted without a discussion of its material- technical and financial justification", the speakers rightly affirmed. It is a pity that Comrade Abduvasikov did not want to speak frankly with them or explain the parts that were unclear. And by the way, Comrade Abduvasikov is a member of that very same commission which is working on developing the draft law.

Uzbek SSR: Yusupov Analyzes Causes, Unfolding of Fergana Tragedy

90US0102A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
6 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by Eh. Yusupov, USSR people's deputy: "The Roots of the Fergana Tragedy, A Word to the USSR Soviet of People's Deputies"]

[Text] I am in full agreement with the Uzbek CP Central Committee commission's report concerning the tragic events in Fergana Oblast and the responsibility of the Party, Soviet, and law enforcement organs, because I am one of the members of that commission.

These reflections were evoked only by the fact that part of the issues was not addressed in the text of the report and they require concrete definition.

The tragic events which occurred in Fergana Oblast at the end of May and beginning of June 1989 have caused anguish and alarm in the heart of every resident of our republic and of the whole country. What happened is incompatible with the political and moral qualities and with the historical ideals of the Uzbek nation and all Soviet people. The Uzbek people have always been notable for integrity, diligence, hospitality, and a respectful attitude toward all people regardless of their national or racial affiliation. The principles of internationalism were and continue to be inalienable traits of the nation's spiritual makeup, a fact that is confirmed by its rich history. It was this way during the years of the struggle for the consolidation and cementing of Soviet rule, during the famine in Povolzhye, during the hard times of the Great Patriotic War, when the Uzbek nation

lavished care and kindness on thousands and thousands of evacuees, including orphaned children. They found here a dwelling, comfort, care, and kindness and many found a second homeland.

The Crimean Tatars, the Meskhetinskiy Turks, and others, who were forcibly driven from their native lands by Stalin's genocide, were received with kindness. With the assistance and support of the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, and other nationalities, they retained their own national originality, took an active part in public and industrial activities, and made a significant contribution to the development of the republic's economy, social sphere, and culture. For 45 years there was not a single serious interethnic conflict among the Meskhetinskiy Turks, the Crimean Tatars, and the local inhabitants. The closeness of the languages, customs and culture, and moral traits and psychology made them similar to the indigenous nationalities and genuinely fraternal and friendly relations and consanguinity appeared. So much the more painful and bitter to acknowledge the whole tragedy of what has occurred.

The tragedy flared up while the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was in session, at a time when the elected representatives of the people were discussing prospects for the country's development. It is very possible that independent forces, who wanted to focus attention of the members of the Congress on the rapid resolution of the question of returning the Meskhetinskiy Turks to Georgia, aggravated the events in Fergana.

During those days that were sorrowful for all of us, I, as a USSR People's Deputy, had an opportunity to visit Fergana, Namangan, and Tashkent oblasts and Chimkent Oblast in the Kazakh SSR, and to meet with individual representatives from the Meskhetinskiy Turks, who were also exacerbating the existing situation by their unreasoned actions. Influenced by rumors, panic, and at times direct threats, many Meskhetinskiy Turks gave up their houses, sold their livestock and belongings literally for a song, and abandoning their homes, departed for different areas of the country.

I also had an opportunity to see something else: the concern, sympathy, and compassion exhibited by the majority of the republic's inhabitants toward the Meskhetinskiy Turks. It was impossible to look indifferently upon the parting of neighbors, who had lived side by side for decades and had become close friends. In Namangan, I saw Uzbeks who were guarding blocks where Turks lived and women who were spending the night with Turkish women, calming them and protecting the peace of their children.

As people say—every family has its black sheep. Among Uzbeks there were many nationalistically inclined good-for-nothings, criminals, and religious fanatics, who, after trampling the nation's honor and dignity, resorted to murderous deeds. The Uzbek nation cursed these renegades and riffraff.

All nations of the Soviet Union and the Uzbek nation, first and foremost, are interested in an impartial and objective analysis of the causes of the tragic events in Fergana Oblast. After the unjustifiably shameful labels of the type "Uzbek affair" and "Uzbek mafia", we must not allow new labels of the type—nation of nationalists and nation of pogromists and insurgents—to be pinned on the nation of toilers.

The Fergana tragedy began from the events in Kuvasay, which, in my opinion, were touched off not by interethnic friction, but by conflicts between groups of the criminal world. A lack of culture in interethnic relations, ethnocentrism, egoism, and arrogance also played their role. For a short period of time, intergroup antagonism drew the ideologically immature portion of our young people into its maelstrom and was transformed into interethnic dissension. It should be noted that the events in Kuvasay were only the occasion for the explosion of a situation, which had been heating up for years in Fergana Oblast. Various extremists, anti-Soviet elements, criminals, militant religious fanatics, and others skilfully took advantage of these events. Purposeful and provocative fabrications and rumors, which were propagated among the inhabitants, drew residents of other rayons and cities in the oblast into the conflict. During the disorders, the criminal elements consciously resorted to brutality and vandalism: violence and arson was accompanied everywhere by massive looting of residences, stores, warehouses, etc. According to information released by the central press, on the eve of the Fergana tragedy ringleaders of the criminal world from every corner of the country gathered there. And this is understandable. In the history of our country, the criminal world has never felt as invulnerable as they do now.

The law enforcement agencies, having concentrated their efforts on the exposure of corruption, bribe takers, and plunderers of state property, have lessened their struggle against criminal offenders and the mafia. Many Party and Soviet leaders in the oblast and republic also proved to be unprepared to function in the conditions of glasnost and democracy. Signals of the impending performances by criminal, extremist, and nationalistic groups were perceived with distrust and the necessary political conclusions were not made in time. Therefore effective preventive measures were not taken.

The intensity of emotions and passions in the course of the development of events promoted, to a certain extent, their growing into a movement, which was directed against the Party and Soviet bodies and their leaders. Naturally, the question arises: Was it possible to foresee and stave off the events. Of course it was. An investigation is currently under way. There can be no doubt that the perpetrators of the tragedy, which brought suffering not only to the Meskhetinskiy Turks, but to the members of other nationalities as well, will receive the punishment that they deserve. At the same time, normal living and working conditions will be created for members of all peoples and nationalities living in Fergana and other oblasts in the republic.

The origins of the tragic events in the Fergana Valley possess socio-economic, ideological, and political roots and they bear a rather subjective nature. All of them are interrelated and interdependent, therefore one has to study them specifically and impartially.

First of all, one must take into account the economic difficulties of the oblast and the republic. Although tremendous historical changes have taken place during the years of Soviet rule, deformation still remains in the structure, development, and distribution of the forces of production. For example, the structure of the economy in Fergana Oblast remains basically agrarian. Over the course of the last 30 years, the rate of industrial growth has invariably lagged behind the average rate for all republics. Furthermore, the proportion of the oblast's industrial output has decreased from 17.4 percent (1970) to 14.8 percent (1988). The primary emphasis on development has been in the chemical industry. The subsidiary branches of the collective farms, which under the circumstances in Fergana could have a much greater economic and social impact, are poorly developed. In 1988, per capita production of foodstuffs equalled 217 rubles, which is 22 percent lower than the average index for all republics.

Cotton growing comprises almost 65 percent of the oblast's agricultural production, which is higher than the average for all republics. The single crop system and the scantiness of land resources have gradually decreased the share of crop rotation and sowing of food crops, which has affected the satisfaction of the population's requirements for foodstuffs and the villagers' overall standard of living. The rural population has the shortest life expectancy and highest infant mortality rate in the country. The collective farmer's and state farm worker's monthly salary is 30-60 rubles. The extensive use of manual labor has hampered the intensification and improvement of agricultural efficiency. Since the majority of the Uzbek population lives in rural areas, these difficulties gradually began to acquire a national tinge. The growth of the population's national consciousness little by little influenced the minds of the young people. This promoted the emergence of discontent with the existing situation.

Health care, education, preschool institutions, etc. are in an extremely neglected state in the rural areas. The ecological situation has worsened as a result of unreasoned construction and distribution of industrial enterprises, especially in Fergana, Kokand, and Margilan. The principal polluters of the air and water are the enterprises subordinate to the Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry, the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production, the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry, and others. The sewage from these factories contain harmful substances, which are ten times greater than the maximum permissible standards. In Tashlakskiy Rayon the water in all wells became undrinkable because of contamination by petroleum products. The intensive use of defoliants and herbicides

pesticides has decreased the fertility of all the oblast's arable land under irrigation.

The demographic processes have also become strained. The natural population growth occurs primarily because of rural inhabitants. The traditional foundations of their life inhibit the migratory processes. The population density in the oblast is great. This creates considerable complications in job placement and employment of the population. To employ new hands on the collective and state farms is becoming increasingly more difficult. In Fergana Oblast more than 70 thousand people are out of work. Graduates of secondary school and young men after their military service are not being accepted by the labor collectives because of the lack of, or weakness of their professional training. All of this also complicates the social situation and removes unemployed young people from the sphere of ideological and political influence.

Serious blunders and errors have been made in ideological and educational work. It has failed miserably to keep pace with the social processes which are taking place. Numerous resolutions and decisions of the Party and soviet bodies have not been supported by daily political work among the masses. A lack of proof and dogmatism still prevail in them.

There are grave shortcomings in international and patriotic education, in which window dressing and triteness are prevalent. The specific socio-economic, ideological, and moral roots of interethnic conflicts have not been analyzed. The fostering of the feeling of a respectful attitude toward the language, history, culture, traditions, and customs of the nations inhabiting our republic has been poorly organized and the cultural and social needs and interests of the small nations have been poorly manifested. There are no scientifically grounded plans for satisfying national and public interests. Up-to-date information concerning the inhabitants' specific socio-economic problems, which ones are being solved today and which ones are being projected for the future, has not been created. It was exactly this lack of information that stirred up the people's emotions and discontent.

The not always justified forms of the struggle against the perpetrators of gross errors and dereliction during the stagnant period had a negative influence on public opinion. During the last 4-5 years, criminal proceedings have been instituted against more than 25 thousand people in the republic. Among them are many people who have proven to be only executors of the directives and instructions of higher bodies and certain leaders. Quite often a regional and national tinge has been attached to negative phenomena in the past without considering their unionwide socio-economic roots.

One also must not overlook faults in the personnel policy. There can be no doubt that the CPSU Central Committee had good reasons for sending Party and soviet workers to the republic to help overcome the negative phenomena in the past and to help accelerate

the socio-economic development of Uzbekistan. The overwhelming majority of these workers worked and continue to work honestly and conscientiously, while displaying profound tact, professionalism, and ideological and political maturity. But, unfortunately, among them were found those who displayed tactlessness, arrogance, and a sense of omnipotence and impunity. They did not exhibit a respectful attitude toward the language, culture, and national peculiarities of the indigenous population and committed unreasoned voluntaristic acts. Some of them, after committing an offense, left the republic without being punished (the Minister of Trade, the Uzbek SSR Assistant Prosecutor, the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, etc.). In Fergana Oblast they still discuss with indignation the activities of A.I. Barulin, the former second secretary of the Party obkom; V.V. Galkin, the oblast assistant prosecutor, and others. Various antiperestroyka forces have exploited these cases when giving a one-sided and distorted interpretation of the nature of the Party's social and national policy.

Perestroyka has restored truly Leninist norms and approaches to freedom of conscience and to people's religious feelings and beliefs and has renounced the irrational forms of antireligious propaganda and administrative meddling in the affairs of religious organizations. But the atheistic propaganda had no sooner started to abate, when certain extremist members of the clergy took advantage of the opportunity by advancing reactionary political ideas. Cases of forcing young people to observe religious customs and rude treatment of those wearing European clothing were reported. Moslem organizations, whose political goals are still far from being realized, sprang up. The members of these organization force the young people to perform religious ceremonies and oblige them to engage in such sports as unarmed self-defense, karate, and others.

The principles of glasnost and democracy are incompatible with liberalism and indifference toward the actions of various extremists, who under the guise of national interests advanced antisoviet and nationalistic slogans. Certain representatives of the informal organizations and the intelligentsia exhibited particular zeal. In their speeches they committed manifestations of national egoism and ethnocentrism and threw a distorted light on the CPSU national policy and on the Russian people's role in the historical fortunes of the nations of our country. Disinformation, to the effect that the persecution of the Turks allegedly began after those who were at the call of the Uzbeks did not confront the Russians, also played a provocative role in the Fergana tragedy. This false information was echoed on the pages of *IZVESTIYA* and *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*, which undoubtedly promoted further aggravation of nationalistic and chauvinistic passions. And today, some time after the tragedy, the journal *OGONYOK* appeared with an extensive article "Zatmeniye", which seriously distorted the events and made a number of unfounded accusations against Party, soviet, and public bodies.

It is difficult to establish relations with the various informal organizations having influence on the workers, and particularly on the young people. A severe confrontation was permitted instead of a scientific and useful dialogue and contacts with the leaders of the informal organizations were ruled out. As a result, nationalistic extremists began to take root among their ranks. Therefore the relations with a certain portion of the intelligentsia and the university students were complicated.

The tragic events in Fergana Oblast distinctly revealed the unsatisfactory work of the Party, soviet, and Komsomol bodies, and the law enforcement agencies. Officials of the Party obkoms and raykoms and of the Uzbek SSR MVD and KGB, who participated in the settlement of the controversial situation in Kuvasay, did not succeed in foreseeing the development of mass disturbances. Neither the members of the operational headquarters, nor the chief of the Fergana Oblast ispolkom's department of internal affairs, nor other officials took control of the situation and the disorders spread into Margilan, Kokand, and other areas of the oblast. And it was obvious from the very beginning that criminals, who were known to the internal affairs agencies, were leading the activities of the extremists in Kokand and Margilan. However, timely measures were not taken to isolate them.

Feebleness and confusion gave rise to fear among the population, which had been left defenseless, and to certitude in impunity among the criminals. Officials from the internal affairs agencies limited themselves to self-protection and guarding the soviet and Party organs. They did not even attempt to suppress the disorders in the neighborhoods of the Meskhetinskiy Turks and others. Many of the officials, having found themselves in the thick of things, acted on their own responsibility and at their own risk.

The actions of the transportation militia employees, led by Colonel of the Militia V.B. Bandedet, the chief of the Central Asian Department of Internal Affairs for Transportation, were the only exception. The officials, in close contact with detachments of workers from the paramilitary guard of the railroad, opportunely strengthened the protection and defense of the most important transportation facilities and appropriately equipped and instructed the employees on actions in the conditions of a complex operational environment. They successfully repulsed three attempts to capture the railway line's department of internal affairs building, the passenger terminal, and the railway junction at Kokand station. Attempts to set the passenger terminal, an oil tanker freight train, and a passenger train on fire were thwarted.

The Fergana railroad department and the Kokand station railway junction were the only enterprises that maintained regular operations during that time.

Such was the background of the tragic events in Fergana Oblast. They were not some sort of accidental episodes. They happened because of those derelictions, blunders,

and negative phenomena, which piled up during the stagnant years. One must not regard these events only as a case of heightened interethnic conflict. In order to prevent similar outbursts, we must speed up the resolution of the amassed economic, social, and ecological problems, restructure the work of the Party, soviet, and Komsomol

bodies and law enforcement agencies, raise the standard of political work among the masses, radically improve the work of the ideological and law enforcement agencies and the selection and placement of personnel, place the work with the masses on a scientific base, and conduct all-around international and patriotic education.

MVD Minister Interviewed on Fight Against Crime

90UN0200A Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 20,
Oct 89 pp 17-21

[Interview with USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin: "Against Crime with Total Resolve"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The state of the fight against crime and the shortcomings that exist in this area are generating concern among the working people. One can easily judge this from the mail to the editor. Taking into consideration the wishes of readers, the editor's office asked USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin a number of questions. We are publishing this conversation.

[AGITATOR] In letters coming to the editor's office, readers are expressing the opinion that the democratization of recent years has weakened public discipline and law and order. How accurate is this opinion and what data does the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs have on this?

[Bakatin] In principle, I consider the very formulation of the question of the link between democratization and the increase in violations of public discipline and law and order to be unacceptable. Socialist democracy is by no means a weakness of authority. It opens the way for the creative political action of people who are truly concerned about the country and can be realized only on the firm foundation of the law, which is obligatory for all and must be carried out by all—by authority, officials, citizens and public formations.

Democracy is organically and naturally interrelated with legality and discipline and requires high political standards and an awareness of the law and the obligations and responsibilities of citizens. In its essence, objectives and methods, democratization cannot contradict law and order, and the increase in violations of the law and crime is not occurring in connection with democratization. It has to do with the departure from the strict observance of the law, the main condition without which democracy is unthinkable. This is why the current situation make extraordinary measures necessary. The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 4 August of this year called for a decisive intensification of the fight against crime. Democracy must be able to defend itself. It is not for those who put obstacles in the way of perestroika and it is incompatible with arbitrariness, anarchic unruliness and a weakening of authority and its functions in law enforcement.

[AGITATOR] Why is crime nevertheless increasing? Why is its rate of increase so high?

[Bakatin] Crime is a complex social phenomenon with many factors. It reflects processes taking place in the society and reacts to those manifestations of stagnation that led to serious crisis situations. It also reacts to the

complexities of the transitional period that is characterized by the inevitability of disproportionate and unbalanced development in the economy and the social and moral spheres. There are strains and disproportions and problems with increasing shortages. All of these are the objective and subjective complexities of perestroika. Crime acts as a parasite on crisis occurrences and on the difficulties in overcoming them.

The agencies for law enforcement encountered a number of new and unknown occurrences in social and economic life having to do with the development of new forms of ownership. Legislation did not fully cover the developing processes. There were and are "white spaces" in legislative regulation. The impact of old laws that have yet not been repealed has diminished. All of this gave rise to overcautiousness, confusion and a fear of applying legal sanctions in the internal affairs agencies and in the law-enforcement sphere as a whole and diminished the coercive force of authority in the fight against violations of the law.

The world of crime has also become more aggressive and active. It took advantage of social and economic complexities and weaknesses in law enforcement. There are increasing manifestations of organized crime and the most dangerous forms of violent and mercenary infringements. Crime demonstrated extreme adaptability to the new conditions and will strive to become stronger, to survive and to utilize any possibilities and any mistakes in the economic, law-enforcement and ideological-moral spheres.

The abundance and newness of critical statistical information that people are not accustomed to perceiving gave rise to distorted and extreme assessments in unprepared public opinion. The unjustified opinion arose that it is impossible to resist the threatening increase in crime.

Hence the extreme opinions: Did they not carry democratization too far and do we not need the firm hand of administrative-command methods? No. We do not need either "extreme measures" nor a tightening of repression. Needed are legal stability, a greater spirit of democracy and higher political and democratic standards, obedience to the law and common standards for human interrelationships.

All of this will help to overcome the outbreak of crime and will not allow it to slow perestroika, disturb the rhythm of the country's labor, or threaten public security.

Nor must one fail to name acute occurrences in interethnic relations in connection with the problem of public security, law and order and the fight against crime. Recent events are evidence of the dangerous actions of nationalistic elements and national careerists speculating on difficulties of an economic and social nature. They have exacerbated the situation by igniting interethnic conflicts. This has already led to human victims and the appearance of refugees. In analyzing the events in

Transcaucasia, Fergana, Novyy Uzen and other "hot spots," we come to the conclusion that an urgent task is to affirm the primacy of legality. This, of course, also fully applies to the activities of law-enforcement agencies. It must be recognized that there has clearly been a decline in the use of the force of law in putting a stop to violations of national and racial equality before the law. Law-enforcement agencies are by-passing these legal norms. The law is taking no action in connection with instigators of nationalism and chauvinism and the ideological inspirers of national enmity. The impression is being created that there is no protection of the constitutional principle of national equality through real measures, including those of a penal and legal nature.

In a number of republics, dangerous extremes in the delimitation of social forces instead of their consolidation are causing concern. Such actions must be resisted firmly and decisively so that no one will attempt to replace democratic means with anarchy and violence. There must be no tolerance either of those who have taken the path of crime or of those who contribute to this. It is not a matter of "tightening the screws," of returning to repression. Such a course is hopeless. Political problems are resolved only through political means.

In concluding my response to this question, I will again stress the fundamental importance of political and democratic standards, a high consciousness of law and legality, and a stable legal order in all processes of perestroika.

At the same time, I will present data of some interest to propagandists and agitators on the level and rate of crime, that is, a generalizing indicator of the number of crimes per 100,000 people in a number of countries.

In 1988, 1,867,000 crimes were registered in our country and there were 657 crimes per 100,000 people (755 in 1985). In the United States, according to data from the Department of Justice (FBI), there were 13.9 million crimes, which corresponds to a level of more than 5,710 crimes per 100,000 people. In the FRG, there were 4.4 million crimes (7,269 per 100,000 inhabitants) and in France there were 3.2 million (5,689 per 100,000 people).

An objective assessment indicates that there is no basis for panicky conclusions. But nor should there be any self-complacency or even the slightest underestimation of the complexity of the problem. We do not want to put up with the outbreak of crime of recent years and are proceeding from the real possibility of knocking down this crime wave. We need the united and coordinated actions of state agencies and the entire law-enforcement system in close and continuous interaction with the public and working people. For this purpose, it is also essential to strengthen law-enforcement agencies and their personnel, service prestige and professionalism, and scientific and technical equipment at an up-to-date level. The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Decisive Intensification of the Fight Against Crime" and

the work of the interim committees established for these purposes are based on the necessity of the urgent resolution of all of these tasks.

[AGITATOR] In their letters, readers are expressing concern that the humanization of penal legislation will inevitably lead to an increase in crime. To what extent, in your view, is it legitimate to show humaneness toward criminals at the expense of humaneness toward other citizens? For any crime is linked with a violation of the rights and interests of the society and citizens and of their security and well-being.

[Bakatin] Humanism is not forgiveness for everything, especially for the criminal. There is not and cannot be any humanism at the expense of anyone. For the criminal, let us say, at the expense of the victim. Humanism is an effective and active moral force and its orientation is completely against crime as an antisocial and profoundly immoral phenomenon.

In the public consciousness (and in legal practice as well), unfortunately, the opinion has become too well established that it is possible to resolve many economic, social and moral problems, including the fight against crime—almost with the help of criminal law above all—through a maximum tightening of sanctions. Meanwhile, it is possible to overcome crime only on the basis of a set of measures of an economic, social and educational nature, far-reaching preventive measures, and the restoration of the social and moral health of the society. This naturally also includes the necessity of unavoidable punishment and reasonable severity but not cruelty. Such an approach will fully correspond to the formula: it must be better for honest people in a law-governed socialist state than for criminals. The principle of humanism is also expressed in this.

Effective protection is needed for any citizen, for the voluntary policeman and militiaman, and for any associate of law-enforcement agencies. The norms of criminal and administrative law provide for such protection. There are possibilities for their further improvement and the necessary proposals have already been made. But it is important that these legal norms be applied actively. The sharp reduction of convictions—half as many last year compared with 1986—for infringing on life or for resisting police or militia workers cannot be considered justified. The number of such cases, unfortunately, is not decreasing but increasing. We need not only the legal but also the most active ideological and social support of law-enforcement actions and civilian and professional activities.

The crime of recidivists and the most dangerous kinds of violent and mercenary crime, especially group and organized crime, racketeering, corruption, bribery, embezzlement and speculation, must be stopped decisively. It is necessary to foresee and prevent a possible increase in crime linked with the development of market economic

relations, the diversity of forms of ownership, the growth in the cooperation movement, new forms of taxation, etc.

It should be recognized that in this connection the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are still slow about restructuring their work and the criticism of citizens and the press is justified. At the present time, the operational investigatory services of the police—criminal investigation, fight against theft of socialist property and speculation, and scientific-technical and criminalistics subdivisions—are being strengthened. In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, they have established an independent service for fighting organized crime and our interaction with KGB offices is being strengthened. In the first half of the year, there were 2,427 identified cases of racketeering and 1,532 persons were brought to justice. Work is now being done in all offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to make the necessary adjustments to the plans for practical actions flowing out of the requirements of the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Decisive Intensification of the Fight Against Crime." The whole sense of these measures is not to allow any indulgence of dangerous criminals, organizers and active participants in criminal groups or recidivists on the basis of the strictest observance of the requirements of the Constitution of the USSR and laws of the USSR and union republics. And here we are counting on broad ideological support.

[AGITATOR] What percentage of crime is due to the actions of recidivists? Does not the society need to demand stricter measures in the fight against recidivistic crime?

[Bakatin] In 1988, 302,800 crime—one-sixth of those registered—were committed by people previously convicted. These persons account for more than 21 percent of identified criminals, 45,000 persons committed 3 or more crimes and 6,000 were found by the courts to be especially dangerous recidivists.

Recidivism is the base that reproduces crime in the form of criminal habits and criminal experience. It is therefore very important to interrupt the link between repeated crime and initial crime.

Along with the intensification of the fight against recidivistic and organized crime, it is necessary to endeavor to accomplish all kinds of punishment for crime and to increase greatly the effectiveness of the correction and reeducation of convicts. In the system of correctional labor institutions, the procedure for the serving of sentences by especially dangerous recidivists is changing in the direction of greater strictness. There is no indulgence and will be none for malicious criminals.

At the same time, as I already mentioned, the prevention of repeated crime depends to a considerable extent upon the resolution of economic and social questions and the subsequent employment and domestic services for released convicts. In a number of labor collectives, unfortunately, the one-sided selfish understanding of

cost accounting is seriously complicating the provision of jobs. Last year alone, according to by no means complete data, 37,500 convicts released from colonies remained without work.

For these purposes, state and not departmental or inter-departmental measures are needed. For the adaptation of such persons locally, an important role is being played by the social-assistance commissions that the local soviets are establishing.

I think that a special law is needed. There is such experience, for example, in the GDR and in other countries. In any case, I am convinced that these important questions must be resolved in the framework of the state program under development for the fight against crime.

[AGITATOR] There is the opinion that amnesties give rise to a new wave of violations of the law. Is this the case?

[Bakatin] The influence of the amnesties of recent years on the increase in the number of crimes has been exaggerated. The amnesty in connection with the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, for example, affected not only convicted persons but also those under judicial investigation, those who participated in battles in defense of the homeland, persons awarded orders and medals, pregnant women and those with minor children, and the disabled. Only 245,000 were completely released from punishment and 98,000 of them were freed from places of imprisonment.

The persons receiving amnesty committed 3,400 new crimes. Is this a lot or a little? The crime rates among pardoned persons are significantly below those of recidivists released "at the end of their time": up to 30 percent of such persons commit new crimes in the first year after being released from penal colonies. The absolute majority of those receiving amnesty justify the confidence put in them through their honest labor and subsequent conduct. Nevertheless, each such case attracts public attention. There are many reasons for recidivistic crime among pardoned persons, including mistakes in the application of the act of amnesty but most often, as I have already said, it is the result of diminished attention to employment and domestic services for released persons.

[AGITATOR] The press is discussing the question of abolishing the passport system and registration restrictions. Is such a measure realistic and what is the relationship between the passport system and the state of law and order and the defense of the rights and dignity of the individual?

[Bakatin] The passport system must be seen in the context of the historical, political, legal and socioeconomic conditions that brought about its establishment. On this basis, consideration is given to the movement of the population, manpower resources and reservists and questions are resolved in the provision of the population

with housing, medical services, pensions and other services. For this reason, the abolishment of the passport system requires the balanced assessment of a whole set of questions.

With the help of the passport system, more than 24,000 persons under investigation and up to 120,000 non-payers of alimony and debtors are located every year. These indicators are relatively small in the total volume of work of Ministry of Internal Affairs agencies. And it is not they, of course, who determine whether or not there should be a passport system. But it is necessary to keep in mind that our passport system resolves tasks that in other countries are handled by other registration systems.

We will be realists: the complete abolition of the passport system in its present form is obviously a matter for the future. At the same time, there is no doubt that today it is necessary to make substantial changes in it to strengthen the guarantees protecting the rights and dignity of citizens.

The rules of registration are changing. Thus, military personnel are being registered without considering the standards for housing space. Citizens absent from their place of permanent residence because of the conditions and nature of their work are guaranteed a continued right to housing and registration. A number of restrictions on travel into border zones have been removed. Proposals have been made on the removal of restrictions in the registration of convicted persons and on the repeal of the standards for abolishing the registration of a number of categories of persons in contradiction to legislation as well as on the changing of the procedure for making entries about nationality in passports and several others.

[AGITATOR] Despite the measures that have been taken, the problem of the fight against drunkenness is just as acute. The actions of the All-Union Voluntary Society for the Campaign for Sobriety, which some publicists see as another bureaucratic office, are also being subjected to criticism. I would like to know your opinion on this matter.

[Bakatin] The alcohol situation is becoming more complicated. "Drunken" crime is increasing: almost 30 percent of persons committing crimes were in a state of intoxication. Prohibitive-administrative measures cannot be decisive in overcoming alcoholism. One must fight the social reasons for drunkenness.

No effective measures for preventing drunkenness have yet been worked out. A number of places were hasty in eliminating medical treatment centers for alcoholics: 390 of them were closed within 2 years and some places have raised the issue of reopening them. The possibilities of the LTP's [expansion not given] are being utilized extremely unsatisfactorily. Many people need compulsory treatment but 50,000 places remained unfilled. The work of the LTP's justly fell under the fire of press criticism. Frequently the dispensaries gave priority to

utilization in labor rather than to medical aspects of the treatment. The housing system mechanically adopted many attributes from places of imprisonment. These and other shortcomings led to the fact that 88 group conflicts took place in LTP's in the first half of 1988 alone.

The treatment system in the LTP's is in need of revision. Placement in an LTP must be preceded by voluntary and then compulsory treatment in institutions of the Ministry of Health. Only when it is unsuccessful, in a legal procedure, can a patient violating public order be placed in an LTP, where in the first stage his stay must be subordinated exclusively to the objectives of inpatient treatment and then in the final stage to corrective labor treatment and rehabilitation measures. Regime-penitentiary restrictions in the LTP's must be changed to a considerable degree.

[AGITATOR] How do things stand with the observance of socialist legality in the work of the police? How are the ministry and political administration reacting to illegal actions of members of the police force?

[Bakatin] Unfortunately, there are cases of lawlessness, arbitrariness, corruption, bribery, the nonreporting of crimes and unjustified arrests of citizens. We consider them to be a great evil that discredits the honor and dignity of the Soviet police and undermines the confidence that people have in it.

In 1988, the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs received 2 million letters on shortcomings in the fight against crime and 24,000 letters came to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Half of the complaints about the failure to report crimes were confirmed. Each instance of the violation of legality is viewed as an extraordinary occurrence and is assessed most critically. As many as 10,000 employees who violated legality were punished during the year and 1,500 of them were held criminally responsible. I will also note the fact that in the past half year violations of legality declined by 9 percent, including 4 percent for the nonreporting and falsification of crimes and 44 percent for excessive use of force.

Departmental acts are being reviewed from the positions of their conformity to the constitution, interests protected by law and the rights of citizens. The course here is clear—everything that involves the rights of citizens must be in strict accordance with the requirements of the law and be subject to public control.

The agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, being called upon to protect law and order, must above all themselves be examples of high professional and legal standards in dealing with citizens and through all of their actions must contribute to the formation of a greater sense of justice.

A priority task is to restore confidence in the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and practically to ensure the stability of the reciprocal connection between the people and the police. We have taken the firm course away from lies and deception and toward truth, however

bitter it might be. This also applies in full to questions of glasnost in evaluating the actions of our workers who discredit the high calling of the workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Our position is unequivocal: there is no place for such people in the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or police.

Questions of international education are very important under today's conditions.

Serious conclusions were drawn from the events in Transcaucasia, Fergana and Novyy Uzen. In a number of places, we are seeing attempts by extremist elements to spread nationalistic influence to members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and police. They will be stopped resolutely. National delimitation is especially inadmissible in the work of law enforcement. Only an internationalist in his ideological convictions and in his spirit and duty can stand guard over the law. This is an immutable condition for the dependable defense of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

[AGITATOR] To what extent is the state of the country's public order affected by the work of the newly established organizations that are trying to consolidate their positions by going out on the streets and squares of the cities? How effective is our legislation in this matter? Does every city have formations specially trained for such cases and what is the legal preparation of coworkers who could stop violations of order without violating the law?

[Bakatin] Formations specially trained for such cases are not needed in every city.

More than 60,000 independent associations and clubs have been established in the country as a whole. The basic directions of their functioning reflect the interest and striving of all working people and all citizens to participate actively in the renewal of our society and the in resolution of questions in social and economic development, interethnic relations, ecology and the preservation of our cultural and historical heritage.

There were 2,600 meetings and assemblies held last year with more than 16 million people participating.

The police does not intend to restrain the social action of people when the law is respected. We see it as our task to ensure, along with other law-enforcement agencies, the dependable legal defense of the process of democratization, including in its "street" forms. But not to permit provocations and mass disorder. Some part of the forces should be diverted to this purpose.

The law stipulates the procedure for the organization and carrying out of assemblies, meetings, street processions and demonstrations and specifies the basic obligations and rights of internal forces in the maintenance of order. The question of the improvement of these legislative acts is in the field of vision of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet. Let us suppose that there are such

possibilities. Our course is that of the strictest observance of legal norms. It is from these positions that police workers are educated and trained and inculcated with feelings of fairness, self-restraint and high general and professional standards. Special attention is being paid to the ideological, psychological and physical training of coworkers for actions in complicated situations and the ability to prevent the rise and spread of conflicts.

In conclusion, I will note that we greatly appreciate the participation of the ideological aktiv in legal propaganda and the prevention of violations of the law and we hope for our further close cooperation in the common cause of strengthening law and order.

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Belorussian MVD Chief on Crime, Law Enforcement in Republic

90UN0092A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 Sep 89 p 5

[Interview with V.A. Piskarev, BSSR minister of Internal Affairs by the editors of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA: "A United Front Against Crime; BSSR Minister of Internal Affairs Answers the Editors' Questions on the State of Law and Order in the Republic"]

[Text] [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Viktor Alekseyevich, quite a few alarming reports that the situation in Belorussia is far from rosy have appeared in the press recently. People are expressing fears for their safety. Is there sufficient basis for this? How real are rumors of a crime wave sweeping over us?

[Piskarev] The crime situation is quite serious. Total crime has risen by more than one third and serious crime has increased by almost 58 percent. Crime is increasing twice as fast in the cities where it increased by half. Each day 164 crimes are recorded including one premeditated murder, 6-7 robberies, 70 thefts of state, public, or personal property, and six vehicle thefts or hijacking. But not only are the high crime growth rates alarming, the main thing is that its structure is changing. It is acquiring a more organized character and "professional" direction. Crimes are frequently committed with particular daring, cynicism, and many in groups.

In July, N. Sachek murdered a female villager with a homemade pistol during a jealous rage while drunk in the village of Dubrovo in Gluskiy Rayon. Later he commandeered a tractor at the kolkhoz's repair yard, drove to a neighboring village, and stole a car which rammed head-on into an oncoming vehicle. He offered armed resistance to militiamen while being apprehended....

Today there are many attempts to explain the outbreak of crime and it is frequently linked to perestroika, democratization, and glasnost. There are no such links

between these phenomena and these theories are born to please those who perceived democracy as permissiveness and an opportunity to ignore the law, and glasnost as permission to flout, publicly and with impunity, the existing foundations of the Soviet way of life to satisfy their ambitions. That is why a healthy process of peoples' lack of social inhibition is sometimes transformed into anarchy and massive disorders. Economic initiative turns out to be parasitism merging with a criminal environment.

The roots of such phenomena are in the interweaving of a whole series of causes and circumstances. In brief, they are economic difficulties, not satisfying the peoples' demands for goods, food, and services; it is the low educational and moral level of some of the people; and, it is a slackening of discipline and a decline in observance of the law. This list alone taken in aggregate has a large negative potential. Therefore crime fighting is also a matter for those who produce goods and commodities, for those who teach and instruct, and naturally for those who maintain law and order, that is, it is a national concern. Until recently, law enforcement agencies, if not in words then in fact, confronted crime by themselves.

Today the situation is changing, though slowly. The USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on "Decisive Strengthening of Crime Fighting" is a significant real step in this direction. An interim committee has been formed in the republic, an immediate program has been developed which is quite serious and specific, and we have begun implementing it.

In particular, effective steps are being undertaken to provide the militia with everything necessary, including transportation, reliable and stable communications systems, and various equipment—it really is no secret that criminals are now quite well technically equipped. The more we invest in the militia, the more significant the return will be.

The process of improving the internal affairs agencies themselves is energetically and persistently progressing. Percentage mania and paper shuffling are being decisively overcome. We are resolutely eradicating excessive caution and indecisiveness. There can only be one criteria of militia work—reliable law and order and the peoples' safety. Toward this end, we are concentrating our efforts to explain and convince the people to scrupulously observe order, to overcome the causes and conditions of crime, to uncompromisingly execute the laws on administrative and criminal liability.

It is a good thing that crime statistics have to begin to be published regularly. Today the people must know the actual crime situation and must see that there is a basis for alarm and concern in this area. But we do not need to panic at the large numbers. The main thing is to draw practical conclusions from them and to take appropriate steps.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Which crimes are most widespread?

[Piskarev] A trend toward growth of mercenary crime has become sharply visible. Attacks on cooperatives, on people who are drivers, and on those who have savings have become more frequent. Criminals are increasingly using weapons.

But this is one side of the matter. Let us turn to the other.

Cooperators obtained 213 million rubles at the bank over a one and a half year period and returned only 22 million. They provide only 3.1 percent of total paid services and 0.2 percent of the output of consumer goods. State enterprises associated with the cooperative workers obtained a real opportunity to transform non-cash money into cash money that later found its way into the pockets of thieves.

Of course, we are not remaining in the role of contemplators. Dozens of thefts, including a number of major ones, have been discovered in cooperatives this year. But along with this we need a scientifically based system of taxation under which any income declaration violation would lead to criminal charges. It seems that the introduction of a precise and sound tax on turnover would be quite useful. Then various types of middlemen and dealers would not have the opportunity to grow wealthy at the expense of the state.

Cooperatives are needed but only those that produce goods or provide services and that do not buy up or resell [goods] while filling their purses.

Speculation and the trade abuses associated with it have acquired a massive nature and they are stimulating a growing shortage. Today the population's unsatisfied demand totals 2.3 billion rubles and, with savings deposits at Sberbank, they total more than 14 billion.

We are continuously conducting the fight against speculation. Almost 2,000 speculators have been administratively or criminally charged this year. Hundreds of hidden thefts in trade, thousands of cases of deceiving purchasers, and violations of trade regulations are uncovered annually. More than 15,000 mercenary crimes have already been brought to light and the amount of unearned income discovered has grown to 3.7 million rubles. BKhSS [Combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation] personnel have conducted a number of successful operations that have received public reaction. Thus, a dangerous group of counterfeiters and manufactured goods speculators was exposed in Minsk, imported goods speculators in Brest, light automobile speculators in Vitebsk and Mogilev, agricultural product speculators in Gomel and Grodno, and alcohol speculators in the capital oblast. Among those who irreconcilably combat any type of machinations is Aleksandr Yermolayevich Demyanov, senior BKhSS operations agent of Orshanskiy GOVD [city internal affairs department]. Having skillfully organized operations at a local market, he exposed three dozen speculators.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] It is no secret that thefts cause people the most trouble of all...

[Piskarev] And the militia, too. Theft makes up the main portion of mercenary crimes. Theft from apartments have increased by a factor of 1.5 and almost one million rubles worth of property has been stolen from people. Every third thief has not worked and not studied as much as those among them who were previously convicted.

Our employees are trying to get to know all "ears of homes," conduct preventive work with them, and to rapidly find the guilty parties as soon as a theft is committed. Unfortunately, this does not always succeed. Theft is one of the most difficult crimes to solve. I am not saying this as justification but so that people will actively assist the militia and will not have a carefree attitude toward the security of their homes.

Ispolkoms of local soviets and housing agencies must persistently work to maintain order in entryways and to equip them with house intercoms, coded locks, and loudspeaker communications systems with access to a house management dispatcher, etc.

Thefts from rural stores which often are poorly protected concern us. During the first six months of the year, 430 rural stores have been robbed. Not all leaders of consumer unions yet share our concern and do not willing spend funds to technically strengthen facilities. I think the time has come to establish extra-departmental protection in villages which requires about 60-70,000 rubles in salaries in the rayon.

As before, automobiles remain the magnetic target of criminal aspirations. This year, more than three thousand vehicle thefts and hijackings have been committed, a seventh of all crimes handled by the department of criminal investigations.

Let us look at things realistically: Auto enthusiasts are still not provided with tires, wind shields, or spare parts. According to the Belaavtoservis Production Association, normative consumption for Zhigulis totals 39.1 million rubles this year and 10.4 million rubles (26 percent of the norm) have been allocated. Half of the order for wind shields has not been satisfied. Resources are not being provided for more than 600 parts. Naturally, stolen ones are being sold. There is a solution: We need to set up manufacture of these same wind shields in the republic at existing glass plants. I think we can also satisfy the demand for tires with such giants as Bobruyskshina at our disposal and we can resolve the issue of spare parts since we have three auto plants and one tractor plant.

We need to more quickly overcome the chronic shortage of parking lots and garages. Despite the steps taken, only a little more than a third of private use automobiles are provided with pay parking lots in the republic and we are experiencing demands for them from 61,000 automobile

enthusiasts. As soon as the state sells a man a car and there are many thousands of them, it is obliged to insure that automobile's safety.

Mercenary motives even guide criminals while committing robberies. Recently in Orsh, persons unknown entered an apartment, tied up the owner, and burned him with an iron while demanding money. Later, after taking a radio, they disappeared. The malefactors were detained and incarcerated the next day. Both had already been convicted but, as they say, they had not learned their lesson.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Comrade Minister, no matter how much crime increases, the main thing is solving them... Nothing depraves a malefactor like impunity.

[Piskarev] Unquestionably. This is the cornerstone of all militia work. The better we solve crimes and insure the inevitability of punishment, the faster crime as a whole will be reduced.

This year, almost 8,000 more crimes have been solved. Approximately 17,000 individuals who committed crimes have been exposed and more than 600,000 violators have been administratively charged. And this has led to a sharply increased workload for militia workers, especially for the department of criminal investigations and for investigators. There are an average of 35 crime complaints per operational agent of the [department of criminal] investigations and many investigators in production have 30-40 cases. People are overloaded.

But, of course the situation with case solving is not what we would like it to be and what would best meet the needs of the people. Nine thousand crimes have not been solved this year. And there is people's sorrow for each one... Believe me our workers undertake each case with a quite heavy heart and they completely understand their responsibility that not one malefactor should escape retribution.

You ask about the reasons why crimes are not being solved?

There is a lack of professionalism in a number of instances. We are striving to attain the level where each of our workers not only does his job but performs it masterfully, in the best possible manner. We are training our workers primarily using positive examples and there are an overabundance of them—there are shining examples in each department. For example, Nikolay Sergeyevich Kutasevich from Minsk, an operations agent of the department of criminal investigations, personally solved 27 crimes. Petr Petrovich Spetsian, senior district inspector of Molodechnenskiy GROVD [city internal affairs department], who established close contact with workers collectives and the public, insured that all crimes committed on the territory he served were solved. Such experience is a valuable commodity. Our task is to multiply it and place it in the inventory of the current generation of the guardians of law and order.

Furthermore, laws have still not been perfected. Take the following evidence. Throughout the world, film, photographic documents, and sound recordings serve as evidence on cases but in our country everything is the old way. Therefore we do not always succeed in charging even flagrant criminals.

Today much is being said about humanization. Of course no one should be deprived of the right to it. But there are all kinds of criminals. A humane approach is not only possible but necessary toward those people who have committed crimes for the first time through inattention or under the influence of some circumstance or other. Last year, of 33,000 criminals charged, almost 9,000—mainly women or juveniles who committed insignificant crimes, were not charged with criminal activity for precisely these reasons. They were released on bail, transferred to comrades courts, etc. But is it appropriate to talk about humanism with regard to a recidivist who has committed a very serious crime and who has spent less time free than behind bars? This is not humane treatment but speculation on humane treatment!

Last year, only one third of the 3,600 people put on trial for stealing personal property were incarcerated. Of the 745 people convicted of theft through misuse of their position, only 24 were incarcerated.

We know that persistent work is going on to prepare new legislative acts linked to the implementation of judicial and legal reform. But it is no less important to carry out those laws that are effective. I am talking about this because some of the laws of the Criminal and Administrative Codes do not work and frequently law violators are groundlessly sentenced to a punishment below the lowest limit and not always for the sake of argument. In this regard, I do not understand what guided the Mogilev Oblast Court which sentenced N. Vladimirov, chief of the finished product warehouse of Khimvolokno Production Association, to only two years of corrective labor when she turned out to be the organizer of the theft of 2,736 kg of textured textile thread valued at more than 140,000 rubles.

What else impedes crime solving? The population's passivity, a sort of stagnation of conscious, and social deafness. We have lost compassion for the misfortunes of dear ones. This is reflected in those people who did not see anything or did not hear anything while crimes were being committed. Frequently people prefer to look and even not to look, but prefer to secretly watch conflict situations through the peephole in their door.

A number of articles in the press have encouraged this. Other authors, often under the flag of criticizing negative phenomena during the cult of personality, urge [people] "not to squeal" to the militia. Let us nevertheless draw a line between squealing and reporting a crime or information about a crime. For example, in England the principle of watch your neighbor's house in his absence

and report all suspicious activity to the police is fully being carried out and it has permitted apartment thefts to a minimum. And not such surveillance to be degrading. Therefore every possible means to increase the involvement in the fight against crime. The militia permits the militia to rapidly detain criminals.

I think that we need to be concerned with witnesses and for this purpose we need to positively resolve the issue of acquiring names, not divulge their names in court in certain cases.

The population's indifference is also hampering on the activities of peoples' brigades and active in public life perform their work. They say, to do their time. The hasty call for three additional days of vacation is hampering impact and people's brigades do perform dangerous work.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] The Committee resolution adopted last October unambiguously states: Repeal of certain sales of alcohol does not signify curtailment on sobriety. However, many perceived an indulgence to drunkenness.

[Piskarev] Unfortunately. No matter how about the perniciousness of drunkenness in Krylov's fable: "And Vaska listens and drinks. Only small fines and high penalties essentially remain of the steps to combat alcohol. As a result, the production and growing. The seriousness on the "samogon whiskey" front" is not being reduced.

Under these conditions, it is not surprising that due to drunkenness have soared by one fifth crime is committed by a drunk and with them with irreversible consequences for life and health.

This year more than 1,000 people have died in accidents and once again in many cases is a drunken villain. We have current drivers who were drunk behind the wheel. Words are needed so that a man under the influence of alcohol and drunkenness are incompatible. Chief engineer of Vysokogorskiy Selezovskiy know this? And, nevertheless, having a large dose of alcohol, he sat behind the wheel and took four more people along, a friend, a wife, two children. He could not avoid an accident on a bridge which crossed a river. Having no guardrail, the truck became submerged. They all died...

In motor vehicle management, we must establish strict control over the condition of the technical condition of a vehicle setting a high level of leniency and no liberalism! For we are not talking this with the lives of people.

During the last year and a half, 540 people have died in fire. We also have not avoided the green snake [drunkenness] here. He has extracted peoples' lives as his horrible tribute from those who attempt to dull their minds by any means—442 people have died from liquids containing alcohol.

Above all, think! Just this year, 224,000 people have been charged with violating anti-alcohol laws.

The increase in everyday crime is linked to drunkenness. Every other murder or bodily harm is committed as a result of domestic disputes or arguments between relatives and dear ones. Alcohol abuse prevention training among teenagers and young people requires special, even emergency efforts. Today 4,800 teenagers are detained for drunkenness. Five thousand boys are considered to be chronic alcoholics. This is an anomaly—a child is degraded before he has begun to live! And unfortunately in our country we still "scrupulously" observe "pub" traditions.

Adults were concerned about "properly" bringing youth into the Army in the village of Sokolniki of Svislochskiy Rayon. They stored up 60 bottles of vodka and quite a bit of wine and champagne. All of the teenagers used alcohol at the party and this did not cause anyone to become outraged. As a result, after the party students Lyakh and Korbuk took part in the assault and rape of a minor and left her naked in the road. The young girl was found unconscious the next morning with frostbitten hands and feet.

This example is once again convincing evidence that drunkenness and crimes are "sisters." Last year, these "relatives" played a far from minor role in the fate of almost 5,000 teenagers who appeared before the courts.

Children of alcoholics are four times more likely to become drunkards. The consequences of fathers' decades, if not centuries, of drunkenness will be affect the crippled fates of their children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren. And today we have 180,000 of just alcoholics. For comparison: That is 20,000 more people than the population of the city of Baranovich.

Whole families are degenerating due to drunkenness and the number of defective children is growing—currently there are more than 1,500 of them in special boarding homes and the physical and psychological health of the population is declining.

In short, the situation with alcohol as before remains acute.

I am taking advantage of this opportunity to appeal to each citizen of the republic: It is time to come to one's senses and it is time to understand that a real danger threatens the nation. Understand and stop for the sake of our present and all the more so for the sake of the future, and for the sake of our children.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Unfortunately, drunkenness has sunk deep roots and has become a social calamity. What path do you see to overcome it?

[Piskarev] We need new approaches to the solution of this complex social problem. We have not achieved success through conversations on the harm of alcohol or through short-term campaigns on the fight against it. In my opinion the main approaches are those that deal with prevention of drunkenness: improving peoples' living conditions and organizing cultural leisure; educational, directed mainly at school students; advertising, operating through the mass media and oriented at the "warning symptoms" of alcoholism; and, medical, targeted at detecting individuals in the initial stage of alcoholism for each treatment of the disease. All of these activities must operate simultaneously and be directed toward the entire population and not only at individual groups. Hence, the main tactical task of the national prevention of the population's alcoholism strategy is to change the practice of using alcohol and to destroy the persistent orientation that we cannot get along without it.

When the decision was recently made to void certain groundless limitations on alcohol, many workers collectively demanded penalties for violators of the anti-alcohol laws be stiffened. The former was quickly carried out but the latter—was forgotten. And trouble with drunks has once again begun to climb upward.

In my opinion, fines for drunkenness must total not dozens but hundreds of rubles.

And have we really gotten rid of drunks in the work place? But communists frequently look the other way due to the unscrupulousness and spinelessness of enterprise administrations. It is no accident that internal affairs agencies have discovered 13,000 cases of alcoholic beverages being used at plants and workers collective societies have discovered only dozens.

For a leader to more boldly sweep drunken "rubbish" out of his own home, he must establish order under which he would not be held accountable for instances of drunkenness that he discovered at the enterprise. If this case was established by any other controlling agencies whatsoever, the leader would be punished to the fullest extent of the law.

We need to use every possible means to stop massive drinking bouts which are quite often very dramatically carried out. This is precisely what occurred last month in the village of Melivichi in Zhlobinskiy Rayon where drunken young people "initiated" a massive fight in which 40 people took part instead of conducting a wedding march. Militiamen had to use rubber truncheons and weapons to calm them down. What good is this? Legislators need to ponder punishment measures for the organizers of such "activities." A major fine for not insuring maintenance of order and furthermore, for getting teenagers and young people drunk, for whom a "dry" law has been established, seems quite logical and well-founded here.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Viktor Alekseyevich, while speaking about the problems of young people and their education, we cannot silently avoid the role of the family for the formation of a person is entrusted to it.

[Piskarev] Today this role, plainly speaking, has been significantly weakened. Frequently no one is seriously engaged with society's main cell. But can the whole be sturdy if its components are wobbly? It is no accident that every year more than 30,000 families break up. Behind this sad figure are tens of thousands of children's broken hearts. It is precisely in the family that we need to search for the initial causes that there are 15,000 teenagers and 25,000 "disadvantaged" families on the books.

For many long years when we talked about "disadvantaged" families, we placed the onus of guilt on men. Today the accent is mixed to a significant degree. Women have committed more than 3,000 crimes, every fifth one, during the last months of this year. This outstanding half year is unfortunately far from flawless from the moral point of view. Quite a few crimes, especially rape, are committed, frankly speaking, during provocative conduct by women. A complaint of a rape in the Lyakhovichskiy ROVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Department] literally arrived during the last few days. It turned out that at 12:30 a.m., the victim agreed to go for a ride in a car with two young men she did not know, that they all drank alcohol in the woods, and afterward they raped her. But was such an outcome not predetermined by the behavior of the woman herself?

Women have begun to drink liquor more frequently. During the first half of the year, 6,000 women were detained for being drunk in public and more than 1,000 of them were placed in medical sobering-up stations. Seventy percent of those who are charged with moon-shining are women.

Under such a situation, should we be surprised when a woman drowns a child in a river, or, having given birth to a child, strangles the child and burns the child in a stove...

To cultivate well, you need soil. Culture and respect for the past is the soil. Remember: That nation that does not have a history is doomed to oblivion. Therefore it is quite deplorable that now instead of instilling in young people a certainty in tomorrow and a revival of pride in the Fatherland, we endlessly talk about the depravity of nearly the entire post-revolutionary past as hard as we can and we cannot spare a black paint for this. There is a wise old saying: If you fire a pistol into the past, the future will fire a cannon at you. No history consists of black marks alone and there are eminent people in any history whose memory should be scrupulously preserved in our hearts.

We need to raise the work criteria as the highest value. I think we need to provide each teenager with the opportunity to work during after study and vacation periods, all the more so since the age for this has been reduced to 14 years. A paradox results: The heirs of the militia

become acquainted with work from their youth and this is physical work, while our children, those of workers and peasants, are twiddling their thumbs at the same age. Maybe we need to ponder the organization of pupils' cooperatives, let us say, and let them service relaxation parks, deliver mail, and sell cool drinks, candy, ice cream, etc. A teenager will have an earned ruble and will know its value.

It is no secret that some simply do not want to (or cannot) learn and let them sort themselves out at an enterprise... It is no accident that this year such aimlessness has already brought 233 teenagers to the dock. We can certainly find ways to interest enterprises, including economic [incentives], to hire juveniles and teach them a trade.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Comrade Minister, talk about organized crime has significantly increased recently. Does it exist in the Republic?

[Piskarev] First of all, let us define the concept of organized crime, or, as it is often called, the Mafia. It is a special type of crime which encompasses economic, general criminal, and group [crime]. It is characterized by stable criminal ties which permit them to successfully commit crimes, to find targets for infringement, to impede exposure of the guilty, and to assist them to avoid punishment.

The main sign of the Mafia is corruption and association of a criminal group with representative of state organs.

I do not think that we have grounds to call what has developed in Belorussia organized crime but there are elements of it [here]. And it would be surprising if they did not exist.

First of all, we know about the existence of the dark economy, about underground transactions, currency exchangers, speculators, and unscrupulous workers in the trade and sales area. We know that not everything is pure among the cooperative workers among whom are quite a few previously convicted individuals and swindlers. This, so to speak, is a feeding ground for organized crime.

Second, there are those who add to this [feeding] ground. There are 19,000 people who are formally under administrative surveillance, and 5,000 individuals lead a parasitic life style—parasites, prostitutes, and drug addicts. And there are over 300,000 citizens with antisocial tendencies on the militia's books. Currently 40 percent of those in the colonies have been condemned three or more times. These people are not nearly proponents of the earned ruble. As stated in eastern wisdom: A crooked stick does not cast a straight shadow.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] And what can you tell us about this form of organized crime called rackets?

[Piskarev] Unfortunately, this is a reality. Its appearance is mainly linked to the sharp polarization of the population's income and not always justifiably with cooperatives. We have begun to actively conduct the fight with this essentially new type of crime in our country.

Over 30 racketeers have been charged and over 50 are under investigation. The department of criminal investigations has data on 150 people involved with racketeering. Explanatory work is being conducted with them, but anyone who does not respond to the belief in the perniciousness of his conduct—let him blame himself.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Many believe that it is difficult to combat racketeering. What are these difficulties?

[Piskarev] Cooperative workers often prefer to come to an agreement with criminals and do not turn to the militia. I think the reason for this is not only a lack of faith in the militia's ability to deal with racketeering especially since the militia has become more actively involved in this direction and this is frequently reported in the press and on television. Meanwhile there are those among the cooperative workers themselves who once again avoid law enforcement agencies.

But the main thing is that current criminal law still does not provide the capability to successfully combat racketeering.

However, we are much less inclined to talk about difficulties. The law will be adopted sooner or later but we do not have the right to wait. We need to guarantee the people's safety today, right now. Our employees understand this and are doing this.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Are there indications that we will be able to successfully stabilize the crime situation? What do we need to do this?

[Piskarev] It is impossible to be optimistic in our work without confidence. All the more so under contemporary conditions when quite a bit of criticism is still being directed at the militia. Therefore, we are conducting all possible types of party, political, and educational work to engender a feeling of confidence among our workers in their abilities and a readiness to act without sparing efforts or time. And we have personnel who can deal with these difficult tasks. That is the main thing.

At regular meetings of workers collectives, people often demand that punishment be stiffened for crimes committed, seeing a guarantee of strong law and order in this. And this point of view is not without basis. Within the framework of real democracy, things should be much worse for criminal elements and things should be much better for citizens. But the essence is not only in that but in eliminating the causes and conditions that incite people toward illegal activities and which promote it. But it is impossible to seriously impact crime with some sort of one-time acts including harsh ones. It must be a subject of attention of all state and social organizations

and a complex program is required for this. In the resolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the nation's Council of Ministers was tasked with developing an all-union program to fight crime. Today we are seeing that this provision is becoming filled with real content and being strengthened with specific measures.

Work is continuing to improve the structure of internal affairs agencies. In particular, a new prevention administration has been formed which will have an impact both on the population as a whole and on specific categories of individuals.

A special apparatus is being established to fight organized crime. We intend to enlist experienced agents for this work and provide them with everything they need.

A special purpose militia detachment, manned with the best prepared and well-trained employees, has been formed to prevent the most acute manifestations of crime in Minsk. I think Minsk residents have already seen these militia workers in their special uniforms on the streets and may have possibly seen them in action. Special front-line subunits will be formed in Gomel and Brest and we are proposing their presence in Vitebsk and Mogilev.

The district militia officers inspectors service is oriented toward the closest possible trusting relationship with the population. We have tasked them with having a militia officer visit and work with each family and devote attention to those who are inclined toward scandals and the use of alcohol.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the policy toward development of democratization and consolidating law and order, legality, and discipline determines the entire content of internal affairs agency operations. And we are obliged to deal with the assigned tasks and we will be guided by Party policy everywhere and in everything, to strengthen links to the masses, and to closely coordinate service activities with other law enforcement agencies. So that our people feel that they are being truly and reliably protected.

Fight Against Organized Crime in Estonia Described

90UN0217A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Olev Laanyarv, chief of the Section for Combatting Organized Crime, conducted by correspondent L. Polyakova: "I Am Marching On You"]

[Text] "I Am Marching On You". It is specifically by these words that we can characterize the essence of Olev Laanyarv's current work. Although he himself, a colonel in the militia, does not aspire to a place next to the great Russian princes.

O. Laanyarv's service record is long. He served 24 years in the republic's internal affairs organs. He is experienced. He is highly professional. He is proper. It is specifically to

him, Olev Laanyarv, that the leadership of the new section on combatting organized crime has been entrusted.

[Correspondent] Crime in the republic existed before. Yet somehow we lived without fear. The criminals broke the law and you caught them. Yet now the number of crimes has risen so sharply that we have begun looking to the militia more and more often.

[Laanyarv] Yes, already last year, unfortunately, the crime rate has edged sharply upward. And it has not yet reached its peak. At the end of '88, groups of confidence men and racketeers streamed into the republic from Lithuania, Leningrad, Russia, and Belorussia. They felt quite comfortable here. That is because at the end of last year the RSFSR adopted the Directive on strengthening responsibility for extortion and confidence games. In our republic, however, such documents have only now been adopted. These few months were enough for the criminals to "impose a tax" on cooperative owners, people engaged in individual labor activity, and those working in the sphere of services—bars and restaurants.

[Correspondent] A local mafia has had time to formulate itself?

[Laanyarv] I would say it is mixed: Sixty percent of it is comprised of our own fellow citizens and 40—of newcomers, groupings from Perm, Lvov, Moscow, Leningrad, Novgorod and Georgia. The extortionists from other cities cause us many problems. While we know our own local potential criminals and keep them under surveillance, the newcomers, as a rule, we do not know. They are mobile. They stay for a short time to commit a specific crime, and then they quickly leave the city. Our colleagues, associates of subdivisions similar to ours in cities and republics throughout the country, help us in our struggle with them.

Not only is the crime rate in the republic growing, but its structure is also changing. New forms of crime have emerged, specifically, for example, racketeering. The Hungarians, I might add, experienced a similar peak in the 70's, when a stratum appeared in society from which something could be taken. And if today we in our republic do not organize a general rebuff to the enemy which has appeared, the dangerous tendencies which we already now observe will intensify. Let us take, for example, bearing arms for purposes of personal protection. Various types of firearms have appeared on the "black" market. The prices on them are exorbitant. However, this does not discourage the buyer. And as long as there is a demand, there will be a supply.

Both sides are arming themselves, one for protection, the other—for attack. And this means that the danger to all of us is growing. Today in Tallinn not a single night goes in which shots do not ring out. Several days ago, for example, there was a robbery in Pylva. At about one in the morning a passenger got into a private taxi. Under the muzzle of a flare gun, as it later turned out, he forced the driver and his guard who was sitting in the front seat next to him, to obey. Having taken his loot, the criminal

got out of the car and ordered the owner to lock all the doors. Walking a few meters away, he set the taxi afire with a shot into the gas tank. Both the driver and the guard suffered severe burns. The guards at the GAI [State Automobile Inspection] in Maardu were recently forced to use their weapons, since a car which they were trying to stop would not slow down. The occupants were apprehended and the car, as it later turned out, had been stolen.

My morning begins with a summary report. And in it—there was shooting on Kheyne Street: A car was chasing a motorcycle, shots were fired... Shots fired on the streets of the city are, unfortunately, becoming a commonplace occurrence. In the Finnish press they refer to Tallinn as the Chicago of the northern European countries, and not without some justification.

[Correspondent] We have lived to see the day!

[Laanyarv] The following type of extortion has emerged. A car is stolen. After 2-3 weeks the owner gets a phone call: "You can get your car at a designated place on a designated day. Bring 7,000 with you...". The price of the ransom varies. And they bring it. We know of a case when a man who bought an automobile for 20,000 on the "black" market brought another 10,000 for it a week later.

[Correspondent] That is a bit expensive!

[Laanyarv] In Kiev this type of extortion has reached a large scale. One out of every six new cars is stolen and returned for ransom. Our figures are a bit lower, but that, as they say, does not make it any easier. Before such things were done by visiting racketeers. Now they have taught our own clever fellows to do this. While before the problem of extortion concerned primarily Tallinn, today it is present even in the small cities. In Mustvee there was a raid on a cooperative bar. In Rakvereskiy rayon there was an armed raid on the "Loodna" tavern. In Pyarnu and Narva the situation is very difficult.

[Correspondent] How can this all be explained?

[Laanyarv] History tells us that in a society which is in a crisis state there have always been outbreaks of crime. We believe that today we have, if not a crisis, then a pre-crisis situation. Plus there is inflation and the deficit... We should have anticipated such a state of affairs. And we must not now fall into numbness, but we must find the strength and the means to combat crime. We must spend more money today than in the past on the law enforcement organs, including the militia. The associates of the recently created new sections on combatting organized crime, I believe, should be paid two times more, so that they can really combat those forces which oppose society. They, these forces, are no joke. This is no longer a game of cops and robbers. This is a very serious matter.

[Correspondent] Do you recall the article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA entitled "The Lion Has Jumped"? Does this mean he has landed?

[Laanyarv] Judge for yourselves. In the first 6 months of this year, the extortion of state, cooperative and private property has increased 4-fold throughout the country. There have been 2,500 such cases recorded throughout the Soviet Union. Dangerous groups were active who committed crimes with a real threat to human life. The press has already reported on the Rostov and Moscow groups of racketeers. Last year, murders comprised 14 percent of the overall number of crimes. This year—28 percent.

We do not yet have such a scope in our republic. Yet no one can guarantee that it will not appear. We cannot put on rose-colored glasses and sit and think that what is going on in the country does not concern us.

[Correspondent] You, judging by your work, are not sitting with your arms folded?

[Laanyarv] Yes, we have declared open war on organized crime. It is us or them. And we will not retreat from our positions.

When our section was being created, not only we, but also the republic government understood the gravity of the problem. It found additional funds for us. We have purchased video- and other equipment and received new cars.

Our enemy, we must say, is also not threadbare. He has quite a lot—foreign-made weapons, canisters with nerve-paralysing gas, and means of communication. In the Moscow criminal group from Lyubertsy, for example, there were 550 people, and every 2 people had a car. Our enemy is organizing and preparing for battle. And in doing so, he is making inevitable mistakes, which will ultimately lead to his ruin.

[Correspondent] Can we consider the events which have created a stir in the city—the capture of two groups of racketeers—to be your first victory?

[Laanyarv] Neither the first, nor a victory. This is just the beginning of the struggle. The purpose of such operations is to show the people that there is a force which opposes racketeering. After the telephone numbers of our service were listed in the newspapers, you would not believe how many people called us to give information, to offer help, and to thank us... For example, we received the following phone call: "I have just been released from the hospital. I cannot use my personal automobile for 6 months. I can give it to you". They called us from the Palace of Young Pioneers: "We have a bus and are ready to hand it over for you to use if necessary". But we have also had phone calls of a different sort—from bars and restaurants... We are currently installing a "confidential telephone" in our section. Everything said will be recorded on tape. The anonymity of the information is retained.

For a long time we tried to convince everyone that, in striving for a legal government, it is possible to fight crime while wearing white gloves. No, this will not work. Another thing, it is even difficult for us to psychologically understand the condition which life sets for us: We must shoot first, there is no other way. Organized crime is becoming a real deterrent to perestroika. It must be liquidated. We can no longer do anything merely with the words "intensify the struggle", or "increase the percent of crimes exposed". And all normal people understand this. We are often approached also by cooperative owners and enterprises: "What do you need? Do you need currency for buying equipment? Do you need cars? Personal computers? Say the word—we will help you". And we thank them for these offers. We need support now.

We have conditionally called the operations which we have conducted "Banket" [banquet] and "Banket-2". The first was conducted on 28 September, and the second on 6 October. In the course of the first operation we detained 22 people, and in the course of the second—14 people. The first were charged with the plunderous raid on the "Loodna" tavern. Eye-witnesses of this raid participated in our operation, and they helped to identify the criminals.

We suppressed the resistance offered by the racketeers during their arrest. We confiscated cold steel weapons and syringes used for narcotics.

The purpose of such operations is to detain the people of interest to us, including those under investigation, to confiscate cold steel weapons and firearms with which they now go to bars and restaurants as if to war, and to confiscate their drugs. We always have with us a dog trained to sniff out drugs.

[Correspondent] Who are these racketeers that you apprehend?

[Laanyarv] They range in age up to 35 years. They are the unemployed "golden" youth burning away their lives. Their "work day" begins at 5-7 o'clock in the evening and ends at 4-5 o'clock in the morning. Among such young people, as a rule, are former athletes: boxers, wrestlers, fencers... They comprise the nucleus of the grouping and use their strength and skills for criminal purposes. It is just such young people who participated in the raids on the restaurants "Kyannu-Kukk", and "Pirita" and the bars "Regatt" and "Autom". Recently 10 such raids have been recorded in Tallinn alone.

The extortionists operate according to the following scheme: First they raid the place, and then they make a specific proposal to the service personnel. "We will take your place under our protection," they will say. "You pay us a certain sum of money each month, and we will protect you against raids by other groups." Today all the cafes, bars and restaurants are distributed between the groups of racketeers. The struggle is already beginning between the groups and groupings themselves for the objects of gain.

[Correspondent] Like spiders in a jar!

[Laanyarv] Our first operation covered the "Sol'nok" cafe, a bar on Uus Street, and a self-serve bar in Rokka-al-Mar. The second operation covered the restaurants "Rackeek" and "Keyla", and the "Oaaz" bar, which is located 20 kilometers from Tallinn. The selection of objects is made based on our operative information. We do not limit ourselves to the territory of Tallinn. They can expect us in Narva, Pyarnu, and if need be—in Saaremaa as well. We have all the technical capabilities for this.

We keep a list of the local racketeers. We keep them under surveillance. We pick a time when we can catch them with the goods.

Aside from "Banket" and "Banket-2" there were also other operations. We apprehended several confidence men and confiscated 5,000 Finnish marks and 4,500 Soviet rubles from them. We apprehended vodka speculators. Often those who trade in these goods hire guards who belong to the criminal world. The criminal world itself is crowded. Let us take card sharps, for example. The problem is not even that there are some people who know that these are swindlers, and yet sit down to play with them. Rather, it is that this is a grouping, an organized gang which engages in cheating at cards. They can steal cars, and act as "kidalshchiks" [con men]...

[Correspondent] And what is a "kidalshchik"?

[Laanyarv] It is when during the purchase of, say, a car on the market someone very cleverly and skillfully hands you a stack of paper pasted with bank notes—a "dummy". Here is a recent example. Two Kiev residents came to the commission store wanting to put up for sale two personal computers which they had purchased in the FRG. They wanted to get 15,000 for each of them. They were approached by two nice-looking men who offered to buy the computers for 20,000 each. The Kiev residents agreed, thought about all the details, so as, in their words, not to be swindled. When the buyers left, the sellers found only 500 rubles instead of the 40,000. All the rest was paper.

[Correspondent] Your section is new. Who is working with you? Do the young people come to work for you?

[Laanyarv] My associates are professionals. Their average age is under 35. They are fellows, as you see, of the same generation as the racketeers, but with different views and life values. They stand on the opposite side of the barricades from them. At the present time we have created an operative response team. It includes many fellows who served in Afghanistan, in the airborne forces, and who have special training. With these fellows I would go into any battle. We have fulfilled the task which we have set in the course of the first operations.

[Correspondent] And so, it is a battle? "I am marching on you"?

[Laanyarv] Yes, it is a battle to total victory.

Ukrainian SSR Official On Combatting Organized Crime

90UN0219A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
22 Oct 89

[Article by Yu.Ya. Kondratyev, chief of the republic Criminal Investigations Section: "An End To Dirty Racketeering"]

[Text] Recently, the picture of racketeers being captured has become a customary one on the television screen. There is the swift rush by the operatives, and there stand the apprehended criminals with their hands up. I will note that most of them are young people. The outward appearance of many of them even evokes a certain sympathy. They are athletic in appearance, slender and well groomed... Yet by their moral character most of them are the dregs, ready, as a rule, to perform the most terrible crimes.

In connection with this, we may recall an incident in Zaporozhye Oblast which happened several months ago. Criminals walk up to a cooperative owner (for now I will not mention any names) and demand money. They go back into the apartment, and the threats begin... When the racketeers realize that threats will not help, fists come into play. First they beat up the cooperative owner, then they begin to "iron" him with a hot iron. Seeing that this does not help, they rape the daughter before the father's very eyes. Can you imagine how this man felt? If I were in his place, I would shoot them myself. I would not leave them on this earth after all they had done.

And do not think that we are being overly emotional. After all, these men can hardly be called people. We solved this crime. Two of them, armed with a sawed-off shotgun and a machine gun, we took in only after a shoot-out. It is obvious what a serious threat they posed to everyone around them.

Or let us take the Crimean incident, where our co-workers, working together with their colleagues from the local criminal investigation section, exposed and disarmed a group of dangerous criminals who were engaged in extortion. The racketeers, quarrelling about splitting the "profits", began to take vengeance on one another. It all began when they decided to blow up one of the participants of an opposing group in his own car. The first attack occurred when he was returning home from a restaurant. By some miracle, he survived the explosion in the garage, but was taken to the hospital. When he got better, he returned home. One night his house was shot up (we have apprehended the gunmen). After that he moved to Donetsk. His former buddies found him even there. And once again their attempt to eliminate him was unsuccessful. Now they once again tracked him down in Simferopol. Then suddenly their homemade bomb exploded in their own car, and the criminals inside were themselves killed. Fortunately, no one around was hurt.

These are only two examples which characterize the moral values of racketeers. It is understandable that many of the citizens who are being blackmailed by them are reluctant to come to us for help when they meet up with such people face to face, as they say.

You might ask, what can you do if from the moment of the threat of violence (in regard to the victim) until the scheduled meeting (for handing over the money) the criminals leave only a few hours? I will answer by presenting a specific example taken from our practical experience. One summer day, a worker from one of the local enterprises turned to the Chernovtsov Internal Affairs Administration with a request for protection against racketeers. First a stranger telephoned his house and demanded 35,000 rubles. The citizen, we will call him N., refused to negotiate. Then the anonymous extortionist began to threaten violence to members of N.'s family. However, if N. fulfilled the conditions which the extortionist had set, he was promised protection and help in formulating his exit visa.

There were only a few hours to prepare for this operation, but nevertheless it was carried out successfully. For example, at the designated meeting place there was a trolley bus which had supposedly broken down, in which there was a sniper. Not far from it, repair work was being done... by workers of the surveillance group, etc. As a result, the criminals were rendered harmless. I can cite many such examples.

The struggle against racketeers requires meticulous precision of actions. After all, when the criminals sense danger, they are ready to use their weapons at any moment. Another difficulty is that it is not we, but they who, as a rule, define the place and time of the operation. A person who turns to the militia for help in such cases is thereby entrusting his safety to us, and sometimes even his life. He depends on us, and there must not be the slightest error on our part.

In connection with this, I will admit, we at the republic Criminal Investigation Section have developed special plans of action for capturing racketeers, in which the basic details of the operations are defined in cases when hostages have been taken, as well as when the criminals are simply demanding a ransom. Everything is methodically laid out in these very important plans. And if the people do not have sufficient experience in conducting such operations, the procedure is spelled out in detail as to who should act and how in a given situation.

Yet at the same time, even the most excellent plan of action may not bring positive results if its executors are poorly trained. Therefore, we devote great attention to the special training of our personnel who are involved in these types of operations. It includes a mastery of all the skills of hand-to-hand combat, karate, sambo- wrestling, and many others. Our task is to teach the associates of the capture group not to lose their wits under any circumstances, to know how to act under any unusual situations, to have an impeccable mastery of all types of

weapons, and, of course, to know how to conduct themselves under fire, for example.

Such special training is conducted at the local sites—in oblast UVDs (Internal Affairs Administrations), as well as here at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where our republic center for hand-to-hand combat trains 25 specially selected militia associates each month. They are prepared specifically for actions in capturing [criminals].

I will note also that all these people, who are in a high professional risk group, receive the same salary as the other associates of the internal affairs organs. Thus, the salary of an operations worker at a city militia subdivision comprises 105 rubles, and in rural areas—95 rubles. Well, and plus also the payment for rank.

Alas, these fellows, like all militia workers, have no social protection. They also do not have much of the current technical equipment. For example, there are not enough bullet-proof vests, especially lightweight ones. I must note moreover that today in many countries even police dogs are provided with bullet-proof vests.

Or take for example the question of personal weapons. When pursuing criminals on a one-man motorcycle (and only on it can a militia worker keep up with many of the high-speed automobiles which racketeers have at their disposal today), he cannot use his Makarov pistol during the chase. After all, for this he must not only take the weapon out with one hand at a speed of 130-150 km per hour, but must use his other hand to place the bullet in the chamber. Such an operation at this speed would most likely cause him to fall. In this case it would be better for him to have a weapon of the "Nagant" type, which may be brought into action with one hand.

Or here is another situation. According to our current instructions, a militia worker is issued only one magazine for his automatic weapon. Yet today it often happens that such a supply of ammunition containing 30 bullets is enough for only a few minutes of real combat with a well-armed criminal.

The capture groups must have special recognition signs on their jackets and bullet-proof vests, as well as signs which say "militia". As it is, during the operation a man is racing through the streets in civilian dress. Who is he? The passers-by may get in his way, and when detained the racketeer may offer the excuse that he did not know that this was the militia [chasing him], and not some hooligans.

The shortage of high-speed automobiles is most acutely felt in large cities. After all, one will not go very fast in a little UAZ.

That is the capture group's job—not to let the racketeer get away. Now our fellows must be equipped with light-weight compact modern short-wave radio transmitters, so that they do not have to shout into the microphone for the entire street to hear. And after all, racketeers, as a rule, have very good hearing...

Ukrainian Officials Discuss Increase in Crime

90UN0202A Moscow NEDEL'YA in Russian No 42,
16-22 Oct 89 p 10

[Report of roundtable discussion with Ukrainian SSR KGB Chairman N. Golushko, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Justice V. Zaychuk, and Ukrainian SSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs V. Dudintsev by correspondent N. Baklanov: "A Shield for Perestroika"; time, place not given]

[Text] The reality of the day is that today there are plenty of dangers threatening the normal course of perestroika, and among the main ones are the growth of crime, and the legal defenselessness of Soviet people against criminal encroachment and the darkening social tension associated with this in many regions of the country. Perestroika needs a shield; that would seem clear to everyone. But all the same, what must perestroika be defended against first and foremost? Against retarding forces? Against the conservatives or the radicals? Against criminals or explosions of social activity? These are the questions with which our conversation with "roundtable" participants began.

[N. Golushko] The events of recent times have shown that the white heat of opinions and discussions, often unconstructive, and the inter-ethnic friction frequently take on an unconstitutional character, far from socialist ideas. Here and there, opposition has become dangerous; there have been victims in Tbilisi, Fergana... Such phenomena testify to the fact that we are dealing with a threat not only to legality and law and order, but to personal security. Therefore the guarantee of legal defense is a task of the first order.

[V. Dudintsev] It seems to me that the USSR Supreme Soviet gave the answer to the question posed having adopted the decree on decisive measures for combatting crime. This is an extremely necessary and timely measure. Among a significant portion of the population, the raging of crime has generated uncertainty in tomorrow, and doubt in the capability of Soviet power to ensure observance of legality and law and order.

In this area, the Ukraine is no exception. Perhaps the rate of growth is not as high as in other regions of the country, but over 8 months of this year, crime in the republic (according to criminal investigation data) grew 54 percent. Over 144,000 crimes were committed. The number of practically all types of felonies has increased. There is an obvious intensification of the mercenary tendencies of violations of the law. Three-quarters of the growth (about 40,000) is property crime, especially apartment burglaries.

It is sad but true: The criminal elements are more openly getting at weapons. This year there were 65 thefts of firearms and ammunition, 38.3 percent more than over this same period last year.

The increase in the number and particular cruelty of crimes against people—murder, rape, gang attack, robbery, extortion—causes serious concern.

[Correspondent] One frequently hears that the sharp growth in crime is associated with the democratic processes coming across the country in a complex and sometimes painful manner. Advocates of a return to the "iron fist" straightforwardly say: They let the people loose, they "rocked the boat" in which we all sit together... They say, first we had to solve the economic problems, and only then conduct democratization of society.

[V. Zaychuk] That is a simplified understanding of the problem... Of course, the growth in crime is linked to economic difficulties as well. Just take speculation or auto theft, with stripping down for parts; after all, it is clear that this is due to the lack of goods, and spare part for cars. So the most effective means of combatting them would be purely economic measures aimed at overcoming the shortage... But after all, the democratization encompassing all spheres of our society, including the economy as well, is aimed precisely at this!

[Golushko] A number of crimes falling within the competence of the organs of state security—contraband, illegal hard currency operations—also belong to the number of violations generated to a significant degree by economic conditions. This does not mean that the law enforcement organs do not have to strain themselves in these sectors of the struggle against violations of the law, calculating that in the future, as the economy recovers, such phenomena will disappear on their own. On the contrary, the Chekists are currently activating their functions in order to prevent and expose such crimes; incidentally, both in combatting extortionist-racketeers, and organized forms of crime which have an outlet abroad.

Only recently have we, together with militia associates, disabled the thugs demanding substantial sums of money from the cooperatives in Chernigov and Kirovograd. In Kiev, they tried to ransom a kidnapped proxy assistant to USSR People's Deputy V. Yavorivskiy. This attempt came to a sorry end for the lovers of easy money.

I want to support the idea expressed here that felonious crime in cases where is accompanied by corruption acquires a political nature to a certain extent. And even though it does not threaten the country's state security in a direct sense, as has been determined by the higher organ of state power, we are obligated to mount a decisive struggle against it.

[Correspondent] The creation of temporary committees to combat crime, including in the Ukraine, the participation in them of the KGB organs instills great hopes; after all, this signifies not just a purely quantitative multiplication of the law and order forces but also their qualitative alteration. Should it be supposed that the state security associates have special opportunities allowing them to render criminals harmless effectively?

[Golushko] Of course, there is a certain specificity in our actions, but if you understand "special opportunities" to mean being armed with some sort of special equipment,

then I must disappoint you. Unfortunately, not just the internal affairs organs, but the state security organs are insufficiently outfitted with the modern specialized equipment needed to combat crime.

[Dudinets] The measures indicated in the USSR Supreme Soviet decree touch upon many important issues, including strengthening the material base, and improving living conditions for our people. But naturally, we ourselves are not sitting with our hands folded. For the record I will say that last year and this year, we built 5,214 apartments, put into operation in five obispolkom [oblast executive committees] and the Kiev UVDs [Internal Affairs Administrations] hospitals, clinics, rest homes, boarding homes, and kindergartens. Work in this direction is being conducted in all UVDs today.

In addition, the resources of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] are being drawn into the formation of support points for law and order in rural localities. We now have 6,568 such points; their creation is planned in each village soviet. This is an extraordinarily important program, since in the meantime we have one district watching over six or seven villages.

Temporary committees for combatting crime help us a great deal. I would particularly like to pause on the work of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast committee. It has obligated enterprise, kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and organization managers to allocate 910 units of motor vehicle transportation for the use of the internal affairs and procuracy organs. An 2,210 person increase in the internal affairs organs is envisaged at the expense of institution and enterprise staffers.

[Correspondent] What can be said about another idea popular now, that of organizing workers' detachments to combat crime? The very title is disturbing. Do we need such a division along class lines today, when we declare the need to consolidate all the healthy forces in society?

[Dudintsev] A natural question. Workers' detachments are indeed being created in the republic to assist the militia. At present, we have 133 such formations with a total number of 3,437 people.

We feel that the work of the workers' detachments, the associations of voluntary people's detachments must include workers, engineers, technologists, shop managers, craftsmen, work superintendents, other categories of workers, and student youth. I am convinced that such public formations create conditions for the participation of wide circles of society in combatting crime.

[Zaychuk] I would add that it is impossible to achieve success in this struggle if it is conducted only with the forces of the law enforcement organs, and resorting only to repressive measures. I ask you to believe me that this is not a propagandistic cliché, but reality. In order to conquer crime, it is first and foremost necessary to eliminate the causes generating it.

For a long time, we asserted that we do not have the social conditions causing this evil. We are now spared the need to deceive ourselves. We have unemployment, and poverty, and the inequality in levels of well-being of various strata of population which provokes commission of crimes. For example, can we toss out of the equation the fact that the overwhelming number of criminals were in their day brought up in deficient families with one parent, or without any altogether? How should we regard the fact that the majority of recidivists return to their criminal ways just because they cannot get set up in work, or solve their residence permit problem? It is clear that in such cases, society itself must be cured, and this is a difficult path, requiring time and patience.

[Correspondent] Recently, we frequently hear that our judges are too liberal; they hand down light sentences, they release from court all but the most hardened criminals...

[Zaychuk] We may look at the problem from the other side as well. With a one-third increase in the number of crimes in the republic, the number of those sentenced to various punishments has dropped 12 percent. This paradox is easily explained—many crimes are not solved. In addition, in a number of cases, the investigative organs do not pursue cases thoroughly enough. I think that getting angry at the judges who remit cases for further investigation or hand down verdicts of "not guilty" is useless and senseless, for they are guided by the law.

At the same time I must frankly note that certain judges have begun to function as if fettered, under the effects of discussions of the need for humanization of punishments, under the influence of critical accusations on the part of the mass information media.

[Correspondent] Now I have a question specifically for the chairmen of the republic KGB. Nikolay Mikhaylovich, in addition to combatting felonious crime, your department has another, how to say, "profiled" direction. How are the Chekists working in the current stormy revolutionary period?

[Golushko] The situation now is indeed complicated... Evidence of this is the fact that the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified the Ukase stipulating accountability for public appeals for forcibly overthrowing or changing the existing structure, for inflaming national or racial hatred. If we return to the arguments for the need to provide "revolutionary order" and the "iron fist" which could accomplish this, then I note that people are reminiscing about this not only in the name of combatting felonious crime. Frequently it is those whose activities and duty require them to work in constant contact with people, who long for the "iron fist." It must be presumed that it would be substantially easier for them to manage under the conditions of a strict command system. It seems that such approaches are mistaken, for those invested with the trust of the people and authority—whether they are

party workers, soviet staffers, or militia associates or Chekists—must constantly be guided in their activity only by the law.

[Zaychuk] It is understandable that for many, such a style in the activity of the law enforcement organs seems unfamiliar. But with all responsibility I declare that only general and strict observance of legality is the path toward a law-governed democratic state. The fundamental guarantee of perestroika is in the realization of this principle.

Lvov Militia Clash With Citizens Detailed

90UN0079B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
4 Oct 89 p 3

[Article from Lvov by M. Mikolyshin: "A Cobblestone Thrown at Democracy? Rampageous Elements Under Yellow and Blue Banners Tried To Foment Mass Disorders on the Streets"]

[Text] How many times has everyone been reminded that anger and hatred are poor counselors in any real-life situations. And, in the extreme situations—even worse. Shortsighted people, however, decided to refute this folk wisdom. It must be said that the time and place for this dubious experiment were by no means fortuitously selected: 1 October, when Lvovians were staging their traditional celebration—City Day—and numerous events that, on this occasion, were dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of the West Ukrainian Oblasts' reunification with the Ukrainian SSR in the USSR's makeup.

"Political experts" from unofficial organizations—from the ill-famed "Ukrainian Helsinki Union" (UKhS), from the advocates of the Ukrainian Catholic Church's reestablishment (the UKTs), and representatives of the "Lion Society" and the so-called Independent Ukrainian Youth League (SNUM), etc.—presented a united front this time.

At about noon, several hundred fired-up people, headed by Derkach, one of the SNUM's leaders, gathered at the center of town, where it is proposed to erect a monument to T.G. Shevchenko. Then their "amateur theater" decided to show its art to the Lvovians in the form of "living pictures." The debuting actors set up a theatrical procession, during which some "amateurs" dressed in the 1939-style Red Army soldier's uniform, surrounded another group of youths dressed in Ukrainian national costumes and bound with skillfully applied barbed wire. This whole performance was supposed to symbolize the West Ukrainian Oblasts' "enslavement" by the Soviet Union.

Their own skill so inspired the actors that they decided, without much thought, to perform extemporaneously at the concluding concert of the 4th Republic Festival of the People's Creativity, dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of Reunification, which was taking place at "Friendship" Stadium. However, both the participants and the spectators of the festival, having already heard rumors

about the impersonators' outrageous anti-Soviet program, unanimously rejected their pretensions.

Feeling angry, the bunch of "amateurs" went back to the center of town. At that time, representatives of the UKhS, the UKTs, and the "Rukh" [not further identified], as well as other unofficial associations of kindred spirit, had set up their yellow and blue [blakitnyye] flags and other nationalistic and religious insignia there, and had begun to sing songs glorifying the "samostiynoi nenki Ukraini" [Ukrainian words: "the independent Ukrainian 'nenki' (not further identified)"].

Members of the UKhS and experts from the "Lion Society" who had united with them in this vocal and theatrical event, frolicked among yellow and blue flags at the marketplace near city hall where the city executive committee is located. Re-costumed in the uniform of [pre-1654] Ukrainian Zaporozhye Cossack harquebusiers, they bawled the songs of a purposeful repertoire, and "Freedom for the Ukraine!" was shouted loudly in the breaks to let the singers catch their breath. Some overeager people, intoxicated by the nationalistic atmosphere, tried to rip the Soviet Union and Ukrainian SSR state flags from the city soviet executive committee building. In this, it must be said, they did not succeed, and their faltering attempts received the deserved repulse.

Unsatisfied with their meager "successes" in the city-wide celebration, the extremists' leaders started provocative rumors among those present about the arrest and beating of UKhS activist M. Revt by the police [militia]. Then they led the worked-up crowd onto Mir [Peace] Street and to the city's internal affairs administration [UVD] building. The crowd blockaded the internal affairs administration building, and totally closed off one of the busiest transportation arteries in the city to traffic. Police Major A.N. Luts, an officer of the oblast internal affairs administration, tells us about the subsequent events.

"When we arrived at the city's internal affairs administration building, an enraged crowd, which demanded that we release a supposedly detained Revt, confronted us. 'Oppressors! Fascists!' roared the crowd.... Colonel A.V. Panikarskiy, the oblast internal affairs administration's deputy chief, addressed those assembled, and informed them: 'You have been misled. Citizen Revt has not been detained by police officers at all.'

"The crowd, however, egged on by extremists, began to press against the police picket line, and attempted to undertake a storming of the city's internal affairs administration building. In view of the angry insubordination of those assembled, the policemen had to use rubber nightsticks for defense purposes as a last resort.

"Some 15 to 20 minutes after the crowd's dispersal, the extremist element sent runners to their allies, who were holding a rally in the center of town at the time, for assistance. And, what do you know, the crowd, aroused by the extremists, rushed from the center of town toward

the city's internal affairs administration. Along the way, the hoodlums ripped USSR and Ukrainian SSR state flags from houses and institutions.

"At 2240, Police Colonel G.Ya. Shabayev, chief of the city internal affairs administration, addressed the aroused crowd. He called upon those present to disperse, and promised to discuss all matters of interest with their representatives on the following day. There remained the hope that it would still be possible to avoid clashes. However, the extremists did not heed the voice of reason on this occasion either. And this was, in fact, the Lvov police executives' ninth appeal to the increasingly heating up hoodlums. Inasmuch as Shabayev's appeal had not begun to have the proper effect, the measures for routine crowd dispersal were undertaken, without the use of any sort of special equipment or weapons.

"Then the incidents began to develop with the suddenness of a snow avalanche. On Kopernik [Copernicus] Street, the crowd started throwing cobblestones wrenched out of the pavement, bottles, sticks, and iron rods at a police detachment. Seven police officers received wounds of varying degrees of severity. Hoodlums from the uncontrolled crowd made an attempt to stop and overturn an official police bus, and they succeeded in damaging four patrol cars.

"Trouble was approaching the city like a snowball. Therefore, it was decided to bring additional forces into the city in order to prevent mass disorders. By 2300, the attempts to provoke mass disorders in Lvov had been neutralized, and public order had been fully restored.

"After the aforesaid incidents, 15 persons sought treatment in city medical institutions, and 1 was hospitalized. In all, 16 police officers received wounds and severe bodily injuries, and 3 are in serious condition.

"Of course, the state prosecuting establishment [procuracy] and the court will make the final judgment on these incidents. However, tracts and untrue documents, signed by 'UKhS Lvov Group No 1,' and trying to impose its

opinion on Lvovians, were posted in many places about the city as early as the next day. These are full of such expressions as: 'brutal beating of people during a peaceful demonstration' and 'the cruel act of using deadly force against the defenseless people.' As you see, the UKhS members consider themselves the entire Ukrainian people.

"And yet...to avoid any sort of misunderstanding, I wish to report the following to those with an inclination to create disorder. A few days ago, a joint meeting of the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR Ministry of Justice Collegium took place, with the participation of USSR Procurator General A.Ya. Sukharev. Among other things, the matter of the courts' application of the law on liability for an attempt upon the life, well-being, or dignity of police officers and people's volunteer keepers of public order, as well as military personnel, in their performance of duties to keep public order was examined. It was made clear that the actions of police officers, people's volunteer keepers of public order, and military personnel, which have resulted in the causing of injury to a lawbreaker during the performance of duties to keep public order in accordance with the normative laws regulating the grounds and methods for the use of force and special equipment or weapons, are justifiable, and do not entail liability. Lawbreakers are subject to liability in accordance with the law, regardless of injury caused to them.

"I am citing these clarifications for the information of future stentorian defenders of riotous crowds, those who will try to transfer liability from the guilty to the innocent by demagoguery and word-mongering. In particular, I am doing it because some among the Lvov yellow and blue people, even today, are bragging about how they threw a cobblestone, right on target, at our red banner celebration. No, Sirs [The Polish/Lithuanian term is used], you did not throw a stone at Lvov's celebration, but at democracy and perestroika, with the slogans of which you are trying to hide your intentions!"

**Armenian Journalist Analyzes Central Press
Treatment of NKAO Issue**

90US0175A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETs in Russian
12 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan: "The Splendor and Poverty of the 'Big' Press"]

[Text] From the start of perestroika we have surrendered ourselves to the fascination of hard, unvarnished information. Pulp literature has more and more noticeably ceased to be a part of the press's production. Beginning in February of last year, our passion for the mass information media has taken on an unhealthy nuance. And they, these media, recognizing very well the might of their own psychological influence, have made full use of this. The development of our mass disappointment has gone from curses addressed to the central newspapers to a realization that they are only a blind tool in the hands of some kind of mechanism which declines, which refuses point blank to take notice of all our attempts to enter into a dialogue. The age-old question of whether the people make the system or the system the people has been rephrased by us as follows: Are the newspapers misinforming the center, or is the center forcing journalists to misinform the public?

This question can be answered only indirectly, on the basis of the experience of life under the conditions of our system: A person can remain a person in almost any position, and even in the selection of unseemly roles (that of an informer, an executioner, etc.) there nevertheless is always an element of free choice.

In this article, we will examine the state of affairs at certain central weeklies and journals with regard to evaluation of events which effect Karabakh and nationality problems as a whole. This article is conceived as a survey and rejoinder in the dialogue with the central press. Our goal has been to examine only a small number of constructive opinions, leaving outside the framework of this article all situational propaganda which pursues clearly anti-Armenian goals, i.e. practically all disinformation. A special feature of the situation is the fact that the publications that I will be talking about do not belong not to the sphere of information but to the sphere of social and political journalism, not to that of facts but of evaluations.

Much has already been said about the dependence of our glasnost on the political situation. In reporting on the Karabakh problem, this dependence has been manifested in the following manner: The press organs of the center are free **not to write anything** about Karabakh and, within certain limits, are also free to write about Karabakh from the viewpoints of Baku and of official propaganda, i.e. instead of analysis to present a collection of stock phrases and somewhat provocative assertions. And here attempts to take an **objective approach** meet encounter almost insurmountable barriers.

And nevertheless, even in these conditions, in February 1989, during a difficult and sad time for us, the weekly KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE (No 8), in an article by Poel Karp entitled "Why Do We Write," printed the following lines:

"And Tolstoy, having written 'I cannot be silent', was himself an example of opposition to evil, of firm, selfless opposition by all means besides force! But we, as a people, have not found the spirit to condemn Sumgait as the kind of thing that cannot be permitted under any circumstances, no matter how complicated the conflict. If they even talk about Sumgait, then they equate it with mass meetings, demonstrations and strikes, although none of these, in any case and no matter how they are assessed, involved any violence; neither were there group assaults nor dismembered bodies of assault victims there."

This is how Citizen Poel Karp has spoken his own "I cannot be silent!" There have been so few of them, of such citizens—A. Sakharov, A. Vasilyevskiy, G. Starovoytova, G. Guseynov, V. Arslanov... There, in fact, have been and are few of them, because, if there had been more of them who, under conditions of pluralism, have now been freed of their obligation to the system, then they would have found a way to carry their own word to the public consciousness.

Poel Karp has won our trust, and we have come to pay attention to each of his publications. Gradually we have come to know well this author's style. If we were to characterize it in one word, this would be "free." Not in the sense of independence of the political situation. First place in this regard is perhaps held by the Baltic press, which has surpassed the entire Soviet press (not counting, of course, samizdat) and is on a comparable level only with newspapers of the RUSSKAYA MLYSL type.

I have in mind the unique emancipation of Poel Karp's style: he lets you argue with him and he himself argues and criticizes with the goal of saying once again what it is never out of place to remind us of. He always writes with a precise goal—to achieve an ethical assessment of one or another social event. This is a unique kind of instructive activity, one not stirred up by group passions but at the same time is passionate in its own conviction.

As a reader, I am filled with gratitude to him, a gratitude which should have been poured out in a routine letter, unpublished letter. But everything changes and now there is an opportunity for me to express my attitude in the printed word, to share with my fellow countrymen the unexpected joy of finding a like-thinker. And not in a private letter, but in the pages of the press, although, alas,—the "second rank" press, i.e. not one that expresses the position of the system, but one which is trying to shake it.

In the May issue of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE (KO), the day after the Congress of People's Deputies began, Poel Karp got into a controversy with Viktor

Arslanov regarding the meaning of liberalism and expressed the following thought:

"V. Arslanov, again justly, calls Karabakh a test of perestroika. But, indeed, at the same time, the demands of the Armenians bear a particularly liberal character. There has not even been any talk (at least, they have not yet backed themselves up against a stone wall) of withdrawing Armenia and Karabakh from the USSR, following the ancient example of Finland. They have only demanded changes within our united country. The earthquake served as a reminder of how little land the Armenians have, how poor and unreliable it is, how shockingly they were driven off their few fertile plots of land and forced into a diaspora. Anyone who has been to Armenia understood this even before the earthquake. The Armenians are not demanding anything more than to keep what has been left intact, without the return of what was earlier taken away; the only thing they have demanded in order to be satisfied is liberalism."

When I read these lines they seemed to me to be the quintessence of this important and good article. I am sure that, in various corners of the country, readers can be found for whom other thoughts of the author seem more important. Because P. Karp writes for all. But the words said about our nationality problem are so precise and profound that, as expressed by one woman reader, it is as if they were written "either by an Armenian, or by somebody from another planet"—because in these words are devoid of the calculation that is so characteristic for residents of our planet. However, there is, of course, a calculation. Both in the fact that the paragraph is placed in the middle of the article: it would seem that the article is not about this, that this is only a personal observation... And in its distant educational goal, the returns from which will be felt—who knows?—only in the future. But, God, what an ephemeral calculation this is. And I must confess that the joyful thought will not leave me that this argument with V. Arslanov was undertaken in order to say these precise words about my homeland. Because they are not arguing with one another—Poel Karp and Viktor Arslanov. They complement each other.

I am talking about an article by V. Arslanov, entitled "Two Perestroikas," which was printed in the January 1989 issue of the bulletin "The Twentieth Century and the World." [Vek XX i Mir] which mentions just as frequently in its pages as does KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE the word that has already become a password to reader attention: KARABAKH. Here, V.A. expresses his judgment that the "liberal intelligentsia,"—"has openly declared its alliance with the bureaucrat who is restructuring himself 'against the lower strata' [nizov]," that is, against spontaneously arising revolutionary-democratic movements which are trying to smash our system "from below." Read this article—excerpts from it here would take up too much space—and you, the reader, will become convinced that my two authors are arguing only about terms and that, in their final analysis of events, they are in agreement. P.K. only

objects to V.S. in the sense [that he believes] that liberalism is not the worst of evils, that the "pillars of the system" today fear liberalism like fire, and that it should not be transformed into an object of shattering criticism as, under our conditions, even liberalism, with all its inconsistency and contradiction, is objectively a positive phenomenon.

As regards V.A.'s position on the question of Karabakh, it too is clearly defined: if the liberals are "for" restructuring the apparatus and "against" the "lower strata", then Karabakh only muddles the picture for them and therefore, while not aligning themselves with those who are thundering against this movement for all to hear, they are at the same time not defending it, attempting to preserve the neutrality which is so distinctive of the liberal way of thinking. However, as a result, as V.A. notes, they are missing the "peal of history," which is proclaiming the failure of all liberal-restructuring schemes, the factual destruction of perestroika "from above," whose program again, as during the preceding 70 years, assigns to the "lower strata" the modest role of an obedient **object of perestroika** that is becoming its **subject** (opening a cooperative, for example) only in part within the framework of a speculative scheme dictated from above and subject to unquestioning fulfillment, as in the good old days of yore.

Thus, the problem of Karabakh has been viewed within the context of general historical processes that have taken place within our country. This has been a remarkable, particularly against the background of how the events in Karabakh have been dealt with in the central press. At the same time, from everything that has been said, and correctly said, by V. Arslanov about Karabakh, I have been particularly struck—and I consider it necessary to focus attention specifically on this emotional aspect of perception—by the rigoristic outcry: Why don't they—N. Shmelev, Yu. Karyakin, and other brilliant publicists of perestroika—write about Karabakh.

Then, at the beginning of the year,—there was a cry from the heart. Now, both the despair and a certainty in the strength of a friendship forged in difficult times have grown deeper. But then, after December, it was impossible not to assess these lonely phrases as a revelation, as a response of a distant friend. For the word of truth is an indispensable thing: It builds up resistance in people. It is of no importance that there are not many of them—of these truthful words; truth can also come by the drop. It does not need a crashing fanfare, a powerful preparatory bombardment. Undress a lie, remove its skin, and you will see that it is much less viable than a single word of truth.

Karabakh and perestroika... Volumes of letters, of appeals, of handwritten articles—a torrent of our Armenian samizdat has tried to clarify, to illuminate the interrelationship of these two words, to breach the citadel of glasnost. Alas, they have not been ready to recognize us as equal partners in a dialogue. And nevertheless, despite this, gradually, month by month, by

individual phrases, lost somewhere in the middle of long articles, and sometimes by bold paragraphs, like that of Poel Karp, our basic ideas, which seem so natural, simple and logical to us, almost axiomatic—have finally begun to appear in the pages of the central press. Now, at long last, USSR peoples deputies Daniil Grani and Mikhail Bocharov have devoted an important part of an interview in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA to how awful it is that "Sumgait" has not been assessed as it deserves. Gasan Guseynov has already written a second about the "Sumgait" disgrace in his article in DRUZHBA NARODOV (June 1989). This is a cause for joy, although it would have caused more a year ago. However, having put emotions aside, we will try to understand: Can we consider that at least the most fitting part of the country's public has come to know the particulars of what happened? I doubt it, if you consider that even many of my fellow countrymen do not understand the entire significance of the events of the past two years. As regards the center, then still, even if you were to collect together all the public statements that discuss "Sumgait" (I mean discuss it within the context of the Karabakh events, and not as the sum of individual hooligan acts)—these amount to only an assessment of the fact that an assessment of "Sumgait" is still lacking. It's a matter of a "small", of a legal assessment of the phenomenon itself. It would be logical for the peoples deputies who recognize the true situation to try not only to express their own attitudes toward it, but also, through some kind of real activity, to prepare the ground for an immediate hearing on the "Karabakh Affair." Alas. More statements and more silence.

It is true that the editors of DRUZHBA NARODOV, by the teaspoon full, are introducing their own mite into the discussion "surrounding it," although, in terms of the journal's profile, they would be seem to be obliged to devote a little more attention. "surrounding it." Along with the article by G. Guseynov, it has published an article by Uldis Berzinysh, in which the author writes that even if the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis are enemies, if the history of their mutual relations has developed in such a way that this enmity will not pass, then, even in this case, it is not mandatory that they destroy each other. It is also possible to respect an enemy; it is even possible to save an enemy's child... Yes, Uldis Berzinysh has touched upon a very complex point in our mutual relations; he calls on us to surmount our own enmity. Uldis Berzinysh has the right to his own personal opinion. But when I read these lines, I felt a vague disquiet rising within me: and is, suddenly, the myth about centuries-long enemy neighbors supposed to prevail eternally, to replace the true problem? This myth is of the same rank as judgments concerning bad and good religions, beautiful and ugly languages, and expressions of the type: "I like this nation, and that one I hate." Such emotional expressions have no use, either in real, everyday life or in politics: indeed, it is necessary to live, to associate, and jointly to solve problems with people we "don't like." These expressions mythologize popular consciousness and disorient people. This is the weapon

of people who find the myth that contradictions cannot be resolved, about a kind of Kantian tragic antinomy, more profitable than a precise formulation of a real problem, which indeed must nevertheless be solved! And here it is possible to put everything off by saying that there can be "neither victors nor conquered" (as after a nuclear war) because there cannot be. And that's that. And to end things here.

It is interesting to follow the "evolution" of the journal OGONEK during the period of glasnost. The spring of last year was marked by V. Chernov's reporting of the "Karabakh question," where the situation in the region was described objectively and dispassionately. This reporting was heard particularly strongly against the background of articles of the type "Emotions and...". The reporting enjoyed broad popularity; it was read and discussed in university halls in the city of Moscow. The one thing it was missing was to be published.

Not having published this reporting, V. Korotich showed that he was a man of principle and, over a period of several months—during the very hottest time—not a sound was uttered in the pages of his journal concerning our problem (I recall the impatience with we awaited the appearance of every new issue: "Well, now, this time, there will be something about us. Indeed, there can not possibly be nothing at all..."). Later, individual small statements showed up, for example, about how an old lady prayed in a church: "Lord, make it so that Karabakh is not repeated." It is of course "Sumgait" and not Karabakh that should not be repeated. We should not forget to mention the "extremely topical" interview with Azerbaijani academician and restructurer Ziya Bunyatov who, during the long years of stagnation, was slighted in his own native land by G. Aliyev and his clique. Later, there followed an interview which directly related to Karabakh and articles that analyzed interethnic conflicts as a whole, from which the conclusion followed that the Karabakh problem is the handiwork of a powerful nationalist mafia (in the person of one person of Armenian nationality—Arkadiy Manucharov, who has now been elected a deputy of the Armenian Supreme Soviet), being financed, naturally, from abroad. And, finally, in one of the most recent issues of the journal, V. Korotich, in his habitual editor's column, used the term "sumgaitshchina" [an illusion to purge trial tactics] to describe a personal insult to himself in the pages of one organ of the press.

And here we have to object: For God's sake, you journalists, leave this term in peace. Don't use it in vain, just as you did not mention it earlier in the good old days of all-round silence. Sumgait is starting to be not only a noun, but—a stock phrase taking the place of a tragic content. All of us are people of the 20th Century and there is no one among us unfamiliar with stock phrases. They are born so easily: All you have to do is not to keep an eye on them and a passing expression may degenerate into a stock phrase. And the phenomenon itself—in this instance the events in Sumgait—slips along the surface of consciousness without any deep impression. To this

day, there has been no public legal assessment of "Sumgait." Evidently, the matter is that everyone understands that a legal appraisal of "Sumgait" would mean the same thing as recognizing the justice of Karabakh's demands that it be given its independence. Such an assessment would engender a need for a real guarantee of the rights and personal safety of the Armenians who are still living within the territory of Azerbaijan. One fully implemented act by the state's legal system would so clearly lay bare the abyss between real legal action and fundamentally illegal reality that, as V. Arslanov and P. Karp have justly noted, it would be necessary to reject forever even the myth that a liberal perestroika "from above" is possible and to move on to a radical transformation in all areas. And one link in the single chain would lead to the next... Problems which they are trying to brush aside, to cover up under a flow of general talk and stock phrases would surface and become completely obvious. The problem of the pyramidal structure of the system. The problem of the party nomenklatura: does a self-governing society need this life-long bribe, this special sort of cabal which, for the price of a little larger piece of bread, buys a person with all his innards for his entire life, in return bestowing a slavish dependence upon the feeding trough, on the provision of special services, on foreign travel... Problems, problems.

We have now begun to publish "Gulag Archipelago" here in our country (true, still only in excerpts). Perhaps, after a year or two, when today's passions have cooled a bit, it will be possible to read a good deal about Karabakh in the solid central journals: not just individual statements by bold individuals. Indeed, this phenomenon of ours must "fade" a little in order to become "publishable." But let us not delude ourselves: The Karabakh problem cannot "fade", its sharpness cannot grow dull. Only a radical approach is capable of resolving it. Should a political solution be implemented, it will immediately become clear that the "Azerbaijan factor" as a whole is only the current phantom, a scarecrow of a word, a stock phrase, such they have been blackmailing with us from the center right from the beginning of our century. This cliché does not bring honor to our neighbor and we think that, in the final account, they will be able to disassociate themselves from it, that they will not want to keep on being a "factor", and moreover one that is not "human."

We are on the threshold of a cult of stock phrases. A 70-year accumulation of superfluous words could not pass without leaving a trace. They can say that the stock phrase is unavoidable, that it is born of a desire to be quickly and unambiguously understood. This is not so. The stock phrase is a more or less image-bearing word or group of words which hides the complex essence of what is being designated, when the basic goal is not to clarify but rather to impart to the recipient a false interpretation of its sense. A stock phrase—this is a metaphorical cancer. Thousands of stock phrases have already blossomed in the era of perestroika. And the most militant

ones relating to our problem include "anti-Russian attitudes," "a small group of extremists," "a restructuring—not a recarving" [perestroika—nye perekroyka], "unforeseeable circumstances,"... For many, the stock phrase turns out to be more pleasant than the thought: As distinguished from the later, it does not require internal effort.

Here is what I would like to say to Poel Karp and our other friends: Thank you, but your admonishing voice is effective enough. We no longer have the time. We are surrounded by refugees, by the homeless, and there, a little farther away, by those who are being deprived even of the right to call for help, the "internal refugees (or internal emigrants)—those how were unable to flee and now, having been locked up within the walls of their own unsteady apartments, listen to the roar of a pogrom-minded crowd. It is hardly possible for them to read your articles.

As Oleg Poptsov correctly noted in the 6 September issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, our hope today lies in the intellect of the new parliament and the new government. They must finally recognize that, by saving Karabakh, they will be saving themselves, their own country, and their own tomorrow. And if an inoculation is not given today, a plague will soon overtake us. And the bad thing is that the intellectualization of the "top" is moving much more slowly than the escalation of events "below."

It is impossible today to assess the degree to which ethnic problems are understood in our country if we use only the statements from the center concerning Karabakh as a basis. A paradoxical situation has been created, when criticism of the system as a whole is perceived as less painful than real analysis of its individual aspects. When judgments are made at the center about nationality problems in general, very frequently the situation in the Baltics (and for simplicity, I am not including anti-semitism) is taken as a model. Evidently, there are two reasons for this: The first lies in the fact that here we have been given a more "civilized," bloodless version of the conflict, which nevertheless makes certain theorizing possible. The second is simpler: One's own shirt is closer to the body. The Baltics are of greater concern to Russia and this problem is more understandable to Russian thinking than what is happening here with us. It is dangerous to touch the Transcaucasus; you might get burned. When cannibals are at work, the publicists suddenly grow silent, and it remains an open question who is the cannibal and who is his meal.

And nevertheless, this review would be incomplete if we did not briefly discuss the more substantial publications which do not touch upon Karabakh itself but which in one way or another pertain to our problem. I have in mind an article by P. Karp entitled "Metropol or Republic?", which is devoted to the problems of Russia—the RSFSR. The mastery and brilliance of the publicist's pen is shown in his ability to reveal the face of the problem behind a palisade of gradually hardening stock phrases. I

permit myself the following extensive quotation so that the essence of P. Karp's approach will become clear:

"And now they are saying that the largest people, comprising half the country's population, the Russian people, have not achieved either freedom or equality. They are saying, for example, that there is no Russian television, that there is only all-union television, although what in fact does not exist is precisely all-union, but there is only Russian. In Moscow, you can receive five stations ... and all five are—in Russian, but the main thing is that the character of transmissions everywhere is that of Moscow. And if television was all-union, then all the republics would have their own regular daily programs, even if in the Russian language, but informing the all-union viewer about Lithuania, Georgia, and Uzbekistan from the point of view of the Lithuanians, the Georgians and the Uzbeks, and not only of Moscow's correspondents in Vilnius, Tbilisi and Tashkent. This doesn't exist and our television has not yet had the right to call itself all-union. Moreover, no single republic has such a powerful, five-station broadcasting system as the Russians. And, indeed, what they are saying is precisely that there is no Russian television.

They also say that there is no Russian academy, although the important institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences are almost exclusively located in Moscow, in Leningrad, in Novosibirsk, and so on. They even say that it is necessary to have more Russian party workers, although they hold posts even in places where they do not know the language of the local residents."

I would like to quote the entire article, but please don't take it amiss, reader, read it yourself! And the best evaluation of it was given, in my opinion, by that one of us who expressed his view in one of the recent issues of *KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE* in approximately the following terms: Earlier, I respected you, Poel Karp, despite certain slips on your part, but now, when you have gone into an open attack on Russia, I have understood what kind of person you are... This is what you are."

In this article, P. Karp touched upon what is probably our most painful problem: the problem of national ambitions. There are few publicists in the center, even among the very most left "restructurers," who, while boldly speaking about a speck in somebody else's eye, are bold enough to take notice of the log that is in their own. Poel Karp is one of these few. And this precept is the basis of his civic position.

It seems that this same position is maintained by Marietta Chudakova, the well-known literary critic and author of the brilliant "Biography of Mikhail Bulgakov." In a program interview in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* on 20 September, she deeply and accurately evaluates the relations between the Russian and other peoples. Having grown tired of the great diversity of the stock phrases of perestroika, the reader is impressed by the integrity of Chudakova's positions, by her linguistic assessment, by her short characterization of the state of

the Russian language, by the fact that she names A. Solzhenitsyn as the central figure in the rebirth of the Russian language and literature, and by the fact that she cites samples of atrocious style taken from the CPSU Central Committee Appeal to the Peoples of the Baltic. In the interview, M. Chudakova demonstrates her erudition and breadth of reader interests, her thoughtfulness and precision of thought, frequently refined to aphorism, the unity of the entire structure of the writer's text—from content to form, from thought to statistics. We are no longer accustomed to such wealth of expression of publicistic thought. The capacity of Chudakova's style is reminiscent of the social and political writing of Leonid Leonov, of that same A. Solzhenitsyn and, from among the Armenian writers, of Grant Matevosyan (see, for example, his interview in the November 1988 issue of *LITERATURA ARMENII*). One must agree with Chudakova's statement about the reasons of the conflict between monolingual Russian thinking and the bilingual thinking of the country's other peoples. And it is only at the very end of the article that a dark sense arises that M. Chudakova, like many other Russian writers, is trying to find the reason for our country's problems not in today's sad realities, but in a history that supposedly has been imposed on the Russian people from outside, by foreigners. However, this is a subject for a different article.

And on this we will interrupt our review. If the reader likes our beginning, it will be continued. In the future, we plan to pause on problems of the comparison between the newly appeared "slavophiles" and the "westernists" of the center, on the reflection of ethnic and other problems in the youth press, on the creativity of A. Solzhenitsyn, and also to give a review of literary and literary-criticism works from the "fat" journals. At the same time, I would like to warn the reader not to be distressed if it seems that we are distancing ourselves from the problems of Karabakh, and also from today's situation in the region. As M. Chudakova correctly notes, it is sufficient to recognize that today's situation has been given to us not for months and not for years; then we will be able to change our short-run breathing for long, we will be able to evaluate events in their historical perspective. This will give us patience and will permit us to be more cold-blooded, which, unconditionally, is necessary for the long struggle that lies ahead and, in particular, for quick, but precise reaction. Recognition of the long-term perspective in the crisis situation does not mean defeatism, a recognition of the unsolvability of problems. All of today's problems are, in principle, solvable. We stand on this. A search for the most peaceful, realistic ways for their solution, no matter what, this is what is necessary today.

Armenian Viewers Blast Central TV Commentator's NKAO Broadcasts

90US0121A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 4

["Open Letter to Central Television Political Commentator G. Zubkov"]

[Text] Georgiy Ivanovich!

We cannot, unfortunately, add the word "respected," for juggling and distorting the facts has never commanded respect among any people. And your unique "television serial" from Azerbaijan is a graphic example of this.

During the days and hours of your broadcasts on the VREMYA program, Nagorniy Karabakh and Soviet Armenia—"an equal among equals" in the family of fraternal republics, as we love to often repeat—were under a blockade organized by Soviet Azerbaijan. But in your heartfelt reports you failed to answer and did not even ask the question as to who set up the blockade and for what purpose, and who also severed communications between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, between two parts of the Armenian people that live in the same state. At the time of your trip, there was hardly a more important problem for the country, hardly a "burning" problem than the blockade—a criminal act perpetrated in a country striving to become a law-governed society. But you "didn't notice" this problem.

You must be given credit: You crossed even the threshold of the "measured information" and of the immoral parity of lines and air time and of the responsibility that is being pinned on the two republics for what is happening in the region. From the standpoint of that parity, Sumgait, for instance, was tantamount to Zvartnots. But you went further, and in your reports you tried to accuse the hundreds of thousands of people who were under the blockade and who had suffered the catastrophic earthquake, people for whom the blockade was systematically and single-mindedly depriving of food, medicines, and hope for a rapid reconstruction of their hearth. While in Azerbaijan, you tried very hard to ensure that millions of television viewers throughout the country would not find out about the blockade, which is yet another link in the a single chain of evil deeds initiated by bloody Sumgait.

Judging from your reports directly from the session chamber, you were fully satisfied with the "restructuring" course of the session of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet (a satisfaction you tried to convey to your audience). We will leave that on your conscience. Still, proceeding from that same parity, which somehow created at least a semblance of objectivity, you should have said that many Deputies at the session called for doing away with the NKAO's autonomy, for altering the oblast's ethnic composition by force, and for continuing the blockade pending a "total solution" of the Karabakh question.

You were in a city in which Armenians continue to be persecuted, and from which, after the August "war cry" of the Baku intelligentsia, another 17,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan in a month's time. But the problem of safety and human rights guarantees didn't trouble you in the least (though you have great expertise on this problem in

bourgeois countries). We would like to ask you: What divine mercy is the price and recompense for what you have perpetrated?

But the greatest indignation in our republic arises from your interview with leaders of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. You listened deferentially to pronouncements about strengthening friendship between the two neighboring peoples, about the Azerbaijani people's internationalist traditions. Yet at that very moment economic sabotage was continuing against Armenia and the entire country, an undeclared war.

On the "120 Minut" program, you spoke movingly about the Azerbaijani village that bears the name of Shaumyan, and you concluded from that fact the Azerbaijanis are true internationalists, since they were preserving the memory of a person of Armenian nationality. Indeed, you made a good many discoveries during your "urgent journey." But it is not our purpose to sort them out here.

The injustice and cynicism with which you deliberately deceived the country's television viewers amounted to a betrayal of the entire people. But that's not all. You violated Russian scrupulousness—a national trait of your people.

We simply want to hope that reading this letter will not be the best moment of your life. For the intent of our letter is not to publicly expose your deed (or to simply expose it on a "regional level"), but to expose you in your own eyes—for man has yet to conceive a more dreadful judgment.

Collective of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences M. Abegyan Institute of Literature

Publishers Meet To Review Continuing Paper Shortage Situation

90US0121B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 5 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by A. Kitavtsev, deputy director of the Khudozhestvennaya Literatura Publishing House: "Paper Merry-Go-Round"]

[Text] There's nothing to print books on.

Why? The participants in a conference that was entitled "Material Resources for Book Publishing" and convened by the Cultural Workers' Union Central Committee and the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade tried to answer this question.

There is a catastrophic shortage of paper in the country. Everyone knows this—from specialists to the Pioneer who collects waste paper. Readers, subscribers, librarians, and encyclopedists justifiably complain about the poor quality of books and magazines.

Printers have a special claim against paper manufacturers. They are the first to suffer from supply gaps.

When long-awaited offset equipment arrives, offset paper that is in short supply. When the best grades of that paper are needed, the recipient invariably gets stuck with the worst grades. If the publishing house succeeds in wringing out the paper, then cardboard and binding materials are lacking: It is constantly tormented by a shortage of something.

All consumers have felt the results of the paper shortage—once again, from the first-grader who now receives a textbook with ink marks from his predecessor to the scientist who, instead of a long-awaited durable reference book buys an untidy and flimsy folio.

Are the printers the only ones to blame for this situation? Or just the paper manufacturers, who have no fewer difficulties?

Both have serious complaints against the leadership of these branches. The time has finally come to alter their contradictory and mutually prejudiced relationship.

I work in the field, and my workday always begins with telegrams that make me alternately hot and cold and that could idle the printing presses. First one, then another enterprise reports a failure to receive the proper paper in terms of assortment, quantity, or quality.

When a publishing house receives wrapping paper instead of printing paper varieties, it is forced to make do as best it can. In 1988, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura lost 2.5 million rubles solely on account of such substitutions. Books of inferior quality were published, not to mention the fact that we were forced to sharply reduce the utilization factor for highly productive machines.

The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade failed to receive 11,000 tons of paper from the Kamsk and Syktyvkar Paper Combines. As a result, 55 million books worth 165 million rubles went unpublished. I will cite just three telegrams (out of hundreds).

From Mozhaysk, a request for approval of payment of an additional percentage of above-norm waste, since instead of the required grade of paper for books the printing plant received rolls on which only forms could be printed.

The Krasnyy Proletariy Printing Plant, where the "Kama" variety of offset paper is being tested, reports that the blanket tears, that colors go down poorly, and that dust from the roll gets in the rubber and clogs the typeform. The printing plant is willing to use the paper it received, but it demands compensation for the above-norm outlays required to correct the defects.

And here's a telegram from the supplier in Syktyvkar: State quality-control inspectors at the lumber industry complex have halted the production of offset paper. It proved to be flimsy, but the supplier is urgently requesting that we agree to take it anyway.

What was the role of state quality control in this instance? Whereas we used to be able to put the flawed paper into production on schedule, we now receive even flawed paper after long delays. We are forced to authorize the delivery of paper other than that we were expecting, or else we don't get any. The threat is real, and I could cite a multitude of examples on this score.

Given this situation, one would think that the Ministry of the Timber Industry and the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade should take drastic steps to correct this critical state of affairs and to distribute paper in a more rational manner. In fact, however, the reverse is true. The Ministry of the Timber Industry and a number of paper complexes have preferred to deliberately conceal from the state untapped potential for paper production. State discipline with respect to concluding economic contracts and observing delivery regulations are being flagrantly violated. Late last year, V. Zhiganov, general director of the Tsentrobumprom [Central Paper Industry] TNPO, placed a state order with the Syktyvkar Timber Industry Complex for the delivery of printing paper with an increased weight of more than four grams per square meter. That alone made it possible to conceal more than 20,000 tons of printing paper. In view of the deliberately increased paper weight, officials of the Syktyvkar complex demanded that their customers renegotiate contracts that had been concluded back in 1985 and spanned the period up to 1990. V. Kurdas, Deputy General Director of the Syktyvkar Timber Industry Complex, in letters to the publishing houses and printing plants, literally threatened to halt deliveries to those who refused to renegotiate the contracts.

Unfortunately, the illegal actions of V. Zhiganov and V. Kurdas were supported by B. Zhuravlev, a member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, and by P. Zemlyanskiy, deputy chief of a department of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply. Moreover, foreseeing their customers' refusal, they doubled the printing paper weight in a letter to the Komi ASSR and the Russian SFSR State Board of Arbitration, despite the fact that such paper is not produced now and never has been. On the contrary, it was felt—and rightly so!—that a reduction in the paper's weight per square meter represented an achievement by the Syktyvkar papermakers.

And so report padding continues to flourish, and no one is being held accountable for it. Fortunately, subscribers to periodicals don't yet suspect that the paper shortage is growing and could again strike a painful blow. But it is with bitterness that we open telegrams attesting to the fact that the situation is getting worse.

As we know, the bureaucrat is nobody's fool. He is capable of such subtlety! In 1989, for example, allocations of paper and cardboard were not broken down by quarter for the first time. How the suppliers seized on this! They broke down the deliveries by quarter in the following percentages: 15 percent in the first quarter, 20

percent in the second, 23 percent in the third, and 42 percent in the fourth. Delivery deadlines are being met and bonuses are being paid! But there is and will be no product, for 15 percent of the paper in the first quarter and 42 percent in the fourth is absurd. There's been a catastrophic shortage of it since the beginning of the year, and utilizing 42 percent of the entire delivery in the final three months will be impossible. And don't bother lodging a complaint with the arbitration board—December 31 is a long way off. And so this apparent order has proved to be an outright calamity.

And who if not bureaucrats came up with the idea of transferring official paper grades and cardboard to wholesale trade as of January 1, 1989? What kind of wholesale trade can there be when the commodity to be traded is lacking? The only producer of binding cardboard—the Balakhninsk Combine—has produced, instead of 110,000 tons of output, just 47,000. Where's the market here?

Every year and year round publishing houses and printing enterprises wage a struggle that is beyond their power against suppliers who literally impose their will. But they can't struggle all their lives, they also have work to do.

I've just received another stack of telegrams—from Kalinin, Minsk, Leningrad. And each one contains desperate requests. And paper isn't the only problem. Printing presses are bought for one set of formats and types, but the paper for them is intended for other parameters. The book shortage is forcing people to needlessly fill out annual subscription forms simultaneously for all literary magazines. Yet if we were only to normalize supply, the Khudozhestvennaya Literatura Publishing House alone could produce at least 10 million rubles in additional revenues per year with the same allocation. No additional investments would be required for this. But it is essential to impose order in all links of production, supply, and delivery discipline as quickly as possible.

From the Editors. We've learned how to make sausage without meat, but a book cannot be published without paper. These pointed words were spoken at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the confirmation hearing of N. I. Yefimov as chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press. The nominee confirmed the extremely grave situation in the branch, recalling that there are 34 kilograms of all types of paper per capita in our country—from wallpaper to newspapers, while the Americans consume 290 kilograms per capita annually.

What can be done to improve this situation?

Last year, the USSR State Planning Committee, for the first time in the past 20 years, adopted a program to increase paper production in the country, and in 1995, thanks to the commissioning of new and reconstruction of existing capacity, the country will obtain an additional 2.5 million tons of paper. But that's still six years away. This is why N. I. Yefimov proposed to accelerate the

schedule for commissioning the new capacity, in order to secure at least some of what is needed more quickly.

A second proposal concerned a prudent and solicitous attitude toward the paper we do have. Suffice it to say that our ministries and departments alone consume 130,000 tons of printing paper. Meanwhile, transferring just 30,000 tons to the Committee for the Press would make it possible to publish 100 million rubles' worth of literature.

It was also said at the session that the public could speak its piece when it comes to determining press runs for the literature that is being published; the public could also be entrusted with setting priorities in the publication of literature.

The Cultural Workers' Union Central Committee has launched a worthy undertaking—to strengthen ties among all producers of printed output, from the foresters to the publishers. It is important that the plan not remain a mere piece of paper, which is in such short supply.

Concern Over Continuing Problem of 'Radio Hooligans' in Uzbekistan

90US0125A Tashkent KOMSOMOLET
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by V. Imas, veteran of the Great Patriotic War: "Do We Need Such 'Presidents'?"]

[Text] Esteemed readers, how many intellectuals do you think there are in our republic? According to certain information there are eight. In addition to this batch of "Intellectuals", one can easily find another half a dozen "Presidents", of which Fergana Oblast has only two. The same oblast which is notable for refinement—there are three "Intellectuals" there.

Let us take Samarkand. It just is not in the same class with Fergana. There is not a single "President" or "Intellectual" there, but on the other hand it has its own "Aurora", who, it seems, has overshadowed all the "Presidents" with her brilliance.

And how do you like Kokand, which has its own "Basmatch", and Andizhan, which has "Capitalists"? The whole "Partisan" group is raising its voice, having selected the entire Fergana Valley as its base of operations. It is ridiculous, isn't it? ***

It would be ridiculous if it were not both shameful and dangerous. It is a shame because the question here is radio stations which are operating illegally and cluttering up the ether with their illegal work. The intensity of their work places the republic among the country's leaders in radio hooliganism. As you have already figured out, "President", "Intellectual", etc. are their aliases, which they use as call signs.

This is both dangerous and harmful because by their disorganized noise in the ether they are preventing a

number of radio stations from conducting their productive communications. In this case the victimized parties are the departmental radio stations (builders, geologists, agroindustrial enterprises, etc.), transportation communications (railroad and aviation), international communications, the international emergency radio frequency, etc.

In general, the radio hooligans, or "organ-grinders" as they refer to themselves, are young lads undoubtedly notable for their breadth of training (after all, an uneducated person would not be able to master this art) and strange as it may seem, they are unable to assimilate the overall harmfulness of their activities. We fancy that they are guided by a craving for technology, a love for equipment, and an interest in social intercourse, but this primitive radio communication, which they are conducting with their wretched equipment is just as distant from brilliant achievements, in which practically every ham radio operator takes pride, as that sham "Intellectual" is from an educated, intelligent, and well-bred person.

Radio hooliganism has become obsolete in a number of regions of the country. There is no radio hooliganism in the Baltic republics nor in Belorussia. It is rapidly being eliminated in the other Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. But here in Uzbekistan there is no end to it. And this is despite the fact that each year, hundreds of radio hooligans are exposed and punished by operational-investigative task forces and in spite of the existing statutes.

Fines, confiscation of equipment, bringing people to the militia office, and legal responsibility have not yet been able to influence this phenomenon. What else can be done. Searching for the culprits is a waste of time. Among the organizations concerned with this problem, the leaders are DOSAAF, the ministries of communication, internal affairs, education, and, of course, the Komsomol. Everyone is involved, but no one is responding. The experience of previous years confirms this. To date, there is not a united front for combating this pernicious phenomenon.

We must find a way, or rather ways, to attract, interest, and enlighten these lads so that they will stop being "President", "Basmatch", "Sea Gull", "Aurora", etc. So that they will be able to transmit radio telegrams and establish communications with ham radio operators all over the world and not just with the neighboring operators. In order to accomplish this, all departments concerned must ultimately reach an agreement on their respective roles in the issues of organizing hobby groups and radio schools, supplying radio parts, etc.

A group of "organ-grinders" was discovered quite recently in Angren. By talking with them, it was learned that they would willingly engage in organized ham radio operations, this pastime appeals to them, but, alas, they do not know where to go for assistance. This is a direct reproach of all the organizations that are able to provide

this assistance, and especially, the DOSAAF organizations, which manage a hundred collective radio stations around the republic, including those in Angren. However, for all practical purposes, these radio stations exist for the most part only on paper. It is time to concern ourselves with real business.

Uzbek SSR: Success of New Local Navoi TV Broadcasts Noted

*90US0125B Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 2*

[Interview with Sergey Shkuratko, producer at the Navoi television studio, conducted by an unnamed KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA correspondent: "The Ether of Navoi at Night"]

[Text] *On 31 March 1989, our newspaper reported on Navoi television's first broadcasts. At that time, we ourselves did not yet know how successful this undertaking would be. Everything could have come to an end with the first telecasts, if the backers of the idea—the Navoi Komsomol gorkom's foundation for young people's initiative—had not had sufficient will, perseverance, and resources. Since fifteen programs have already been telecast, one can conclude: everything is in order from the standpoint of will, perseverance, and resources. Therefore, everything must also be in order from the standpoint of the telecasts. Our correspondent reached this conclusion after an interview with Sergey Shkuratko, the producer at the Navoi television studio.*

[Correspondent] Sergey, fifteen programs have been broadcast. Have the viewers responded to them?

[Shkuratko] Yes, the telephone in the studio is ringing continuously—the viewers are calling in to express their opinions of the programs which have been broadcast and are suggesting topics for new programs. The viewers' phone calls and letters have called into being the television program "Boomerang". When we receive a telephone call or a letter from a viewer, a film crew responds to the alarm and meets with an expert or manager and requests an answer.

[Correspondent] Does this help to solve the problem?

[Shkuratko] It helps. For example, there was a complaint on the poor condition of the dormitories at Navoiyazot (Navoi Nitrogen Corporation). We went to the chief of the housing and communal services department at Navoiyazot and asked him to give us an answer. The chief replied, "I will show you the door". This episode was filmed and put on the air. On the next day, we received the corporation's official response, that appropriate measures had been taken and the deficiencies eliminated.

[Correspondent] Thus, you criticized your own sponsor—the Navoiyazot Corporation. Nevertheless, this was chivalrous duel—the television studio acted with journalistic integrity and did not begin to back off from the

problem and the corporation responded in a gentlemanly manner by acknowledging shortcomings. But what else do your viewers write about?

Sergey produces a folder containing letters. I read them.

"What is this law on freedom of conscience? Tell me about it. Fayzulla".

"We request that you show Indian films. The residents of the village Tinchlik".

"You deal with the city's urgent problems in your programs. I am sure that you will also show us the results of the telecasts. A. Irzhayev".

"A written request. We ask you to inspect house No. 46 on Ulyanov Street in connection with poor sanitation. S. Uralova, S. Kabylov".

"Please show the films 'Burglar' and 'Little Vera'. Artur and his friends".

"Please show the video clip with 'Sweet May'. The residents of Kanimekhskiy Rayon. Seven signatories".

Kanimekh? But your programs are only broadcasted in Navoi.

[Shkuratko] Not only. Viewers in rural areas from Gzhduvan in Bukhara Oblast to Kattakurgan in Samarkand Oblast can watch them (editor's note: there is 150 kilometers between these cities). Being aware of this, we broadcast in two languages—Russian and Uzbek. Yarkul Umarov and Gulyam Sultanov, journalists from the zonal radio editorial staff, help to prepare the broadcasts in Uzbek.

[Correspondent] Judging from the letters, which of your programs are popular with the viewers?

[Shkuratko] "From Midnight to Nine O'clock". In this program we talk about the work of municipal emergency services—the fire department, militia, paramedics...

[Correspondent] As a matter of fact, I am certain that the next program will really be an interesting one. Inna Batalova, a militia employee, will introduce viewers to a chronicle of crime and then a roundtable discussion, featuring participants not ordinarily seen on television, will take place. They turn out to be former convicts, who, after being released, created in Bukhara, together with jurists, a council for social adaptation for people returning from prison. The council was created to solve the problems of job placement and housing, which frequently face a person coming out of "the zone". The council members came to Navoi to shoot their film here.

[Shkuratko] Sergey points out, Here is another letter: "Tell us about the problems at the city market. The quality of the vegetables is disturbing. A. Kim". We did one journalistic expose involving the market. We filmed an episode at the Navoi collective farm market and found out that the analyses on the content of nitrates in

the vegetables was not being conducted—the equipment was out of order. The episode was broadcast.

All the equipment began working on the next day. The studio received an endless stream of telephone calls from Navoi residents and they were not only outraged, but they even offered help. In particular, there were several telephone calls from industrial enterprises offering to repair the equipment. The essence of our expose was that we discovered that there is a shortage of local information. Workers at Navoi enterprises most likely knew what happened last week in Nicaragua or Lebanon, but they did not know that the equipment at the collective farm market in their own city was broken down; and therefore, the townspeople were not guaranteed against nitrates in their food. This is what calls a shortage of local information.

[Correspondent] Concerning the question of information. Have you managed to keep your hand on the "pulse" of the city? Aren't there occasions when events escape your attention?

[Shkuratko] It is easier for us now—we have two video cameras.

[Correspondent] But where did the second one come from? You still did not have it quite recently...

[Shkuratko] We conducted a television lottery. A Zhiguli automobile, a Shilyalis television, an Ehlektronika videotape recorder, tires, two Malyutka washing machines, and a sewing machine were raffled off. We sold 37 thousand tickets although initially we had only planned on 30 thousand. The cost of a ticket was one ruble.

Afterward there was a live broadcast of the lottery drawing—similar to the manner in which the Sportlotto drawing is conducted. Telephones were installed in the studio and viewers called in continuously—they could not believe that the program was a live broadcast.

The net profit from the lottery was about 20 thousand rubles. We purchased a Panasonic video camera with this money.

[Correspondent] Sergey, your programs are devoted to very pressing municipal problems. But aren't you afraid to "wallow" in the problems of daily life and on the subject matter of the housing maintenance offices, markets, post offices... How can you counterpose these subjects? Does your studio have a propensity for socio-political journalism and other forms of television journalism?

[Shkuratko] We have given this some thought. Interesting and creative forms will most likely find acceptance on VMV—the evening youth channel. For example, we would like very much for the VMV to include a series entitled "Portrait of a Young Navoi Resident". We already have a hero in mind for this series.

We televised a public opinion poll of young Navoi residents not too long ago. Among other questions was

the following: what advice would you give to our studio. We are interested in young people's perceptions of our programs.

[Correspondent] What advice did they give you?

[Shkuratko] To give more air time to those young people who have a special skill or have made some kind of achievement. We are looking for such young people.

[Correspondent] In other words, the young viewers are interested in substantial talk shows. But you have already attempted to film these "television acquaintances"—Aleksandr Gornostayev, first secretary of the Party gorkom, appeared with you on VMV...

[Shkuratko] Yes, this was an interview with Gornostayev not only as a first secretary, but also as a person.

[Correspondent] Is it true that you are filming part of your studio's material in Aleksandr Gornostayev's office at the Party gorkom?

[Shkuratko] You have been very fortunate with your sponsors. They value your studio, and rightly so. Because, for the present, city television, which was created through the efforts of young people, is broadcasting only in Navoi and Zarafshan. I do not know whether there has ever been anything like this anywhere in the republic. When is your next broadcast?

[Shkuratko] As always, on Saturday, after the second all-union channel concludes its broadcasts.

[Correspondent] Good luck.

Navoi.

Uzbek SSR: PRAVDA VOSTOKA Attacks OGONEK's Reporting on Fergana Events

90US0158A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
22 Sep 89 p 8

["An Open Letter to the Chief Editor of OGONEK, V.A. Korotich: Profound Thinking on the Basis of a Crib Note"]

[Text] This open letter to the chief editor of OGONEK was written and dispatched to its destination a month and a half ago. We did not intend to publish it in our own newspaper. On 5 September of this year, the editor of PRAVDA VOSTOKA met in Moscow with V. Korotich, who promised to look into the question of promptly publishing this open letter in his journal and to advise us of the decision that is reached within two or three days after this meeting.

But two weeks have passed since that time and there has been no answer. It is not the first time that OGONEK, while standing up for perestroyka and glasnost, has denied us an opportunity to make use of this glasnost in order to defend the honor of the Uzbek people, which has been placed in a shadow by the articles "Before and After the Applause," "Cotton-Slave," and "A Mental

Blackout." Thus, subsequent to the first of these articles, we wrote letters and telegrams to M.S. Gorbachev at the CPSU Central Committee and to V. Korotich himself. But then, too, no response followed from OGONEK.

However, with regard to this open letter, after his meeting with V. Korotich, the editor of PRAVDA VOSTOKA personally telephoned him repeatedly. Without result. Finally, they did answer once from his front office only that the chief editor had instructed OGONEK's own correspondent for Uzbekistan to communicate to us the journal's position concerning this question.

But this also has not happened.

In deciding to publish "Profound Thinking on the Basis of a Crib Note" in our own paper, we have been guided by a single goal—to show the bias of the OGONEK articles with regard to our republic and its people, and also to clarify for our readers the position of PRAVDA VOSTOKA regarding the articles we have named.

Esteemed Vasilii Alekseyevich!

OGONEK has been spoiling PRAVDA VOSTOKA with all its attention. An impression has been created that people at OGONEK are worried that our newspaper seems to have gone astray, to have taken a wrong path. In recent times alone, three articles have been devoted to it, in one connection or another.

Of course, in the final analysis, it is up to you to decide what OGONEK concerns itself with, even including the problems of our newspaper. As they say, freedom to the free. And it is not the intense attention being given to the oldest republic newspaper in the country that disturbs its collective and readers, but rather the indiscriminate way in which some bold pens in the capital assess the work of their colleagues in the periphery and, at the same time, the complicated situation in Uzbekistan as well.

Now and then, we have used the pages of our newspaper to complain about such lack of objectivity. But, you will agree, the consolation is small, inasmuch as we are operating in different weight classes: Our readership numbers a million, primarily within the republic; yours—millions from Moscow to the very ends of the country.

Of course, you could restore social justice by the means obligatory for the present times—by letting us speak out in your journal. There has already been an occasion for this. You, of course, will recall the editorial in OGONEK No 50 of last year. We sent you a telegram then. And we wrote a letter to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. We spoke about consolidating our efforts in the common cause. We know that you personally know the nature of our objections to that editorial and you even promised to prepare appropriate materials. Alas, this has not happened. You also did not honor us with an answer.

And, indeed, citing specific examples, our newspaper has demonstrated that OGONEK's editorial and several earlier articles by A. Minkin discredited positive changes that are taking place within our republic, inflamed political passions, and created a false impression regarding processes within the economy, ecology and spiritual life of Uzbekistan. And this was done mainly by dragging up quotes from materials in PRAVDA VOSTOKA. We will recall only certain examples. A telegram from Soyuzselkhozkhimiya is quoted to the effect that, after [the chemical] butifos was banned, it was recommended to the Central Asian republics that they use it in the form of an exception and that we had unthinkingly carried out this instruction in Uzbekistan. But there was no such "instruction" to Uzbekistan. The ending was intentionally excised from the quote: "...besides Uzbekistan." And what is the worth of the example that OGONEK used as evidence of this "unthinking fulfillment?" An order for the use of butifos at the Pakhtaaral sovkhos-technical school in Chimkent Oblast. Somebody's knowledge of geography let him down. This sovkhos is located in Kazakhstan, and this, you agree, is a somewhat different republic.

Further, your journal takes the beginning of the phrase "Attempts to employ butifos in Uzbekistan..." from the materials of PRAVDA VOSTOKA, arbitrarily assigns these to 1988, and again cuts off the ending, which makes it evident that an earlier period was being talked about and that it was PRAVDA VOSTOKA itself which sounded the alarm on this occasion. To the words "The entire country rejoices in the honest cotton of Uzbekistan" in 1988, the journal attached the remark: "obviously, besides the poisoned pickers." We assure you that there were no poisoned pickers during the past years, and the authors of the editorial could not have evidence to the contrary. As concerns the fantasies constructed on the basis of another quote from PRAVDA VOSTOKA—"Two young lads had to be given assistance by doctors," supposedly for poisoning from chemicals, then here we were talking about something else: The trouble occurred **when transporting** the cotton pickers—students at the Margilan medical school. Three young lads had to be given assistance by doctors."

The list can go on. But even without this, it is clear that our newspaper is waging a well thought-out struggle against a cotton mono-culture, against increased use of chemicals, against child labor in the fields, and against the many attempts occurring within the republic to work in the old way. And is it more fitting to distort quotations from materials concerning this and to use materials published by us, which have long since served as a basis for taking measures, in order to create an impression of one's own thorough studies and investigations?

Such, Vitaliy Alekseyevich, is our paper's position. However, OGONEK, which stands for discussion, pluralism, and glasnost, has betrayed its own principles in this concrete case of our objections to the editorial in OGONEK No 50. Moreover, one of the readers of your journal and our newspaper has sent to these publications

a perplexed letter calling the editorial a "black page" for the republic, which it is, not only in terms of content but also with regard to its artistic and printing layout. We have published this letter. Your journal did not afford such a opportunity.

It is true, Vitaliy Alekseyevich, that you personally made an attempt at "peaceful settlement" of the situation. In an interview in the newspaper KOMSOMOLET S UZBEKISTANA on 8 March of this year, to the question of "What is your reaction to the article in PRAVDA VOSTOKA and to its denial of materials concerning infection of Uzbek children by defoliants?", you answered: "We wrote about this with one thing in mind—the health of the children. We did not trouble anybody else..."

But, come, come! You did trouble people. You excited passions by distorted quotations from our newspaper. And don't you know that "skillful" quotation can serve any goals, even the most contradictory ones?

We would not begin to stir up the past if such a method, judging by another article by A. Golovkov, entitled "A Mental Blackout" ("Zatemeniye"), in OGONEK No 29, had not become the criterion of professional mastery for itinerant special correspondents.

The author, who has poured oil on the fire of interethnic agitation in Uzbekistan, will perhaps be set to thinking by the letters and protests which are coming—which cannot but come—to OGONEK. Passions are strained in the most diverse strata of Uzbekistan's citizenry. We will say it straight out: It is clearly evident to people of different nationalities that, in the bloody days of the civil strife between Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks, even the evil tongues of the western radio stations have not created such a surge of alienation between Uzbeks and Russians as A. Golovkov has done. And, first of all, because the author, while deeply misunderstanding the sources and course of events in Fergana, profoundly analyzes them on the basis of a crib note obtained from the former Uzbek SSR first deputy minister of internal affairs, E.A. Didorenko. And, at the same time, also draws halo of a great martyr and prophet above the general's cockade. No, not in a figurative sense. Read (inasmuch, Vitaliy Alekseyevich, as they say that you personally do not see material before it appears in print) "The General's Warning," if only the heading. In it, the author tells how the general brought order to the organs of the militia, combatted organized crime, and, at the same time, prophetically foretold the Fergana events and, because of all this, became a "persona non grata" within the republic.

First of all, to the bright statistics for the capture of bandits and the introduction of order, which the author of the article ties to the general, we will add our own. Many of those who were fired from the organs under the ardent hand of E.A. Didorenko have been reinstated, inasmuch as they were unjustly released from work. During the years that the general headed operational

work in the republic, crime grew steadily. A sharp upsurge in severe types of crime was noted—by almost 35 percent. There was an increase in criminal acts against people's lives, honor, dignity, and property; these grew annually by 26-60 percent.

Of course, this is a "service" not of E.A. Didorenko alone, not even of the MVD as a whole. But just as well, the individual successes which the author demonstrates by using figures taken from the general's own notebook cannot be identified with any single individual. And, what is more, there have been no such successes. The crime situation in Tashkent is especially worrisome. About half of all crimes in the republic are committed here, more than 60 percent of the robberies, every fifth murder, every second theft of personal property, every fourth misappropriation of state property. Every second crime remains unsolved. If these figures do not make an impression, we will touch emotions. During the time E.A. Didorenko was the republic's chief operative, a 25 kilogram bronze plaque with the bust of a two-time hero of the Soviet Union was stolen within ten meters of the MVD building. Those guilty were not found.

With regard to the general's prophecies, the author of "A Mental Blackout" is entirely serious: "Yes, I, if one can say this—about a prophet." And then the article quotes an interview given by E.A. Didorenko to the Tashkent Oblast newspaper on 23 February of this year, in which the general supposedly predicted the future Fergana events, but, he said, the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro had indicated to him that he should "abstain from writing articles with a political evaluation of the interethnic situation in the republic." And, in the opinion of the author of "A Mental Blackout," PRAVDA VOSTOKA played a secondary role: "It is not difficult to guess"—and here he is already making predictions on his own—"what followed the interview. The next day, on 25 February, PRAVDA VOSTOKA published an anonymous answer, giving this the appearance of an editorial article. Several local newspapers reprinted it."

Stop! First of all our paper did not "publish an answer," but rather posed questions. And the session of the Central Committee Buro that took place during these days was not for this reason. Discussion there was not about "writing articles with a political evaluation," but about a political evaluation of failures in the fight against crime and the responsibility of E.A. Didorenko, along with other directors of the Uzbek SSR MVD, for this.

The author of the article may not even have known this; his "prophet" was giving the journalist election campaign information. But where did our colleague get such fragmentary drivel and gossipy whispers with regard to an "anonymous answer" which was "given the appearance of an editorial article?" Has this genre, without a signature, already been forbidden now? Then what about OGONEK's editorial article "Before and After the Applause?" Or are some now permitted to publish editorial articles and others forbidden to?

But no, everything is more simple. The prophecies of the general have dulled the professional conscientiousness of the journalist and a mental blackout has set in. This time without quotation marks. If A. Golovkov would have read that same interview to the oblast paper and our editorial article with his own eyes, and had not followed the general's crib notes, had he simply spoken with the members of the editorial collegium of the newspaper he was quoting, he would not have placed his professional conscientiousness in dependence upon the promptings of interested prophets.

There is a surprising thing. Journalists, political figures, and emissaries from many foreign countries are coming to Tashkent and they consider it a duty to visit our editorial offices, to understand the positions of the newspaper. Incidentally, it is specifically the "prophecies" of E.A. Didorenko, as advertised by the central press, that were one of the reasons for recent visits to PRAVDA VOSTOKA by a delegation of Lebanese communists and by a second secretary from the U.S. Embassy in the USSR. But A. Golovkov is clear on everything on his own!

Surely, in general, if he would stoop to read our newspaper, not only would his creative pride be wounded, but he would also be able to avoid what is clearly plagiarism in his own work. On 20 July, in an article entitled "A Better Means of Protection," we reported that, long before OGONEK, E.A. Didorenko had been called a prophet and seer by IZVESTIYA (on 14 June), KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (17 June), SOBESEDNIK No 29, and others. Moreover, the quotations and commentaries, including those used by A. Golovkov, appear to come from a tape recording that has been circulated.

But, inasmuch as people are quoting our paper without reading it, we will take the liberty of revealing the essence of the matter. The interview in the oblast newspaper produced an explosive reaction. Not because Didorenko talked about the mafia and corruption and about a consolidation of the opponents of perestroika, as many journalists believed, but because he defamed the intelligentsia and specific people whom he named and because of his attempts to heap the responsibility for the criminal boom on everything other than his own sluggishness.

Our newspaper was the first one in the country, long before this interview, to tell about the mafia and the opposition of the "declassé" to perestroika—in columns entitled "The Anatomy of Bribe-Taking" and "Perestroika and the Law," of 20 June and 8 February 1987. The articles were noted by ARGUMENTY i FAKTY which, in No 29, also of 1987, gave a review and cited PRAVDA VOSTOKA. After this, the central press looked into what it called the "Uzbek matter," which on checking turned out to be not Uzbek at all.

It is illogical to suspect PRAVDA VOSTOKA at the same time of some kind of "retorts" about the existence of the mafia and consolidation of anti-perestroika

forces. And there is none of this in our editorial article. It talks about something else. Welcoming the desire of E.A. Didorenko to cast light on the many problems of inter-ethnic relations and the struggle against crime, already in the heading of the article, we asked him a question: "Do We Know a Road Out of the Dead-end?" There were also other ones. If the apparatus of the ministry and the general himself have investigative materials concerning the activity of specific opponents of perestroika, why are these people carrying out their dark deeds unpunished? What is the MVD doing to put an end to the murders, the robberies, the rapes, the arson? And is it right for a person of high office, who was sent to strengthen the republic, to contrast the "we's" and the "they's"? "We" who have come to bring order and "they", all the rest, who are automatically presumed to be mired in corruption and stagnation.

A revelation made by the general has caused surprise—he has recorded ten inter-rayon meetings within Uzbek territory of "thieves within the law"—and his conviction that "informals are camouflaged criminals with pretensions to the role of champions" has not found understanding. And we asked: Really, is the most important thing for the MVD now to keep statistics on gatherings of thieves and not to catch criminals?

There was also a rather delicate question. On the path to a state governed by law, it is permissible to identify people by name in an oblast newspaper, while pinning the label of speculators, nationalists, and the ringleaders of a "witch hunt" on them? As we said unambiguously in our editorial article: If these people are not in step with the criminal code, take the case to court. Otherwise, what we have is defamation from the arsenal of those years when newspapers drew "images of enemies" and called for them to be torn to pieces.

This was talked about at many meetings following publication of the interview. E.A. Didorenko was invited to one of these, in which 400 people participated. He gave his agreement, but didn't come. Eduard Alekseyevich intended to come to a briefing for journalists, but changed his mind. The anxiety of those days is preserved in the dozens and dozens of letters from readers which went into the archives so that their publication would not heat up passions. We think that PRAVDA VOSTOKA's editorial article extinguished them. In any case, this was the opinion reached by the authors of the letters, by participants in the meetings, and by the Uzbek CP Central Committee.

The oblast paper gave the people who had been defamed with its help an opportunity to speak. The Tashkent Oblast party committee, discussing the work of its press organ, noted in a resolution of its bureau that: "The tonality of certain published material suffers from serious deficiencies, such ones as the interview with the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs first deputy minister, E.A. Didorenko, *On the Road to a Dead End...* and certain responses to it. Sharpness and peremptoriness of judgments in newspaper articles provokes hostility toward them."

It is true that the general turned up in Fergana when a governmental commission, the leadership of the USSR MVD and Procuracy, and a large number of operational subunits had already arrived there and when the country's MVD troops had already gone in. So that the fire was put out by people and services, none of which were subordinate to the Tashkent general. And the Uzbek CP Central Committee commission for investigation of the circumstances of the affair in Fergana, the Central Committee Bureau, and later plenums of the Uzbek Central Committee and the Fergana Oblast party committee did not recognize the "clairvoyance" of the republic MVD and its former chief operative. Moreover, addressing all the directors of law enforcement organs, it was precisely stated that they had turned out not to be up to the occasion. And E.A. Didorenko was not alone in abandoning his post. It is true that, more than others at this time, he was successful, with the help of various publications, in creating the image of a prophet. He demonstrated that the best form of defense is attack. And, from the beginning of the Fergana tragedy, he did this with enviable energy, which was not wasted either in the struggle against crime or in interviews with special correspondents from central publications.

This is how the legend being a prophet was born.

But there should also be truth about the hypnotist who instilled this legend in many of our colleagues.

It is possible to correct this blunder. But this, Vitaliy Alekseyevich, now lies your public farsightedness and in your editorial hands.

As regards the tone, the epithets, and the metaphors of "A Mental Blackout," such ones as "Fergana is licking its wounds" (you don't know who is licking wounds?), or conclusions that all the problems stem from our intelligentsia, which has closed ranks with corrupt elements, or conjectures that, before the tragedy, they set about massive preparation of weapons at the enterprises in the oblast and that their directors themselves were practically making false license plates for trucks—then this remains on the conscience of the journalist. Like the political label hung on the republic's government that it, allegedly, "making use of the tragedy," has begun to work money out of the center.

The Fergana events have uncovered the kind of nerve of nationwide sorrow which only an experienced surgeon can be allowed to touch, not a hypnotized itinerant.

7 August 1989

From the editors: This open letter to V. Korotich was signed by the following members of the PRAVDA VOSTOKA editorial collegium: R. Safarov, V. Shalovalov, V. Altunin, V. Degtyarev, O. Filimonov, A. Pukemov, and O. Yakubov. Also placing their signatures on it were the chairman of the board of the Uzbek Writers' Union, USSR Peoples Deputy A. Mukhtarov, and the editor of the newspaper SOVET UZBEKISTONI, U. Usmanov.

Chernenko Period Assessed

90UN0139A *Frunze LITERATURNYY KIRGIZSTAN*
in Russian No 9, Sep 89 pp 97-108

[Article by Kamil Bayalinov: "The 13 months of Konstantin Chernenko or Counting on the Nomenklatura"]

[Text] From the author. I admit that the publication of the offered subjective and personal appraisals of K.U. Chernenko, whose state rule lasted slightly more than a year, will cause an inadequate attitude on the part of the readers and critics. That is why I consider it necessary once again—as was the case with the article on Yu.V. Andropov (*LITERATURNYY KIRGIZSTAN* No 8, 1989)—to point out: The author has not taken as his task the complete elucidation of the country's and CP's life during that period. The offered notes have the imprint of an exaggerated reflection of certain aspects of our reality—a reflection which strengthens this or that story line plot. A reader can easily convince himself of this from the uneven style of the exposition. However, I would like to assure him of my sincerity and my desire to present the historical reality in the manner in which I remember it with all its dialectics and variety.

"What kind of herds—that kind of round-ups. What kind of years—that kind of laws." (Old eastern wisdom).

One can endlessly debate whether or not Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was an accidental figure in the position of CPSU Central Committee general secretary. In any event, it is clear to me today—and not only to me—that he was not! The confusion, bewilderment and questions that were engendered by Chernenko's appointment as chairman of the government commission to organize Yu.V. Andropov's funeral and his subsequent "election" to the highest party post—in accordance with our practices—are completely explainable.

We recognize that we were poorly informed about the hidden role of the multimillion-strong layer of people who direct our society in our name. Since the birth of the administrative system, they have managed to fill and inculcate the masses with the thesis that the people participate in state affairs and management. Using all subordinate institutions—from the repressive to the ideological; playing on the revolutionary aspirations of the masses to change the world and one's life and way of life in the spirit of the 11th thesis on Feuerbach; and also relying on the numerous unintentional benefits and privileges of its class of conformists, which were purchased for a song, this layer, which actually had at its disposal the means of production and their distribution, did its thing.

The leading scholars and publicists of our day—G. Popov, O. Latsis, N. Shmelev, I. Klyamkin, etc.—have sufficiently described the prehistory of the apparat's usurpation of power; there is no need to return to it again.

As a population of executive personnel, the apparat is monolithic. The pyramidal structure of the 18-million

strong apparat, which is cemented together by a community of corporative interests, presents itself in the nomenklatura—the main anti-democratic and, this also means, antisocialist pivotal point of the command administrative management system—a pivotal point that insures the personal dependence of the cadres, who are appointed by the will of the higher-ups in the party state hierarchy and its "leaders," and their complete lack of accountability to the working masses.

The apparat forgives much: immorality in one's way of life (a large part of the Brezhnev team at the center and in the local areas), corruption (Rashidov, Shchelokov, Medunov, Adylov, and hundreds and thousands of others), and even crimes (many members of Stalin's Politburo and company). In possibly the worst case, one "rushed out" of one agency and got into another one within the framework of the existing nomenklatura that permeated all the highest and mid-level stages of party, state and soviet power and public organizations. The nomenklatura did not forgive one thing—treason. He, who raised his hand against the apparat, was doomed to expulsion. Khrushchev, who came to believe in his strength and whom the secretariat apparat had already saved once during the struggle against the Molotov-Malenkov group in 1957, suffered a complete defeat in 1964, losing the backing of his former supporters. Khrushchev suited the nomenklatura until he began to solve questions independently and, thereby, affected the area of its personal interests which consisted of preserving itself. The nomenklatura repudiated Boris Yeltsin—even though a comrade-in-arms of the present general secretary in spirit—as soon as he threatened its sacred thing.

Guided by petty vengeance, the apparat nomenklatura acts not only inhumanely but also in an outright anti-state manner, destroying its apparat apostates. There is no honest game with the apparat. One, who is expelled from the nomenklatura for reasons that have taken shape, ceases to exist for the apparat. No matter how blasphemous it sounds, the human factor snaps into action here! Every apparatchik—the ordinary individual and the billions of his colleagues. The transformed religious instincts of "Keep away from me! Not me!" are being displayed in the new-class subconsciousness in the form of an unwillingness to be involved in the fate of the social outcast: The functionary closes his ears and gets accustomed to the nomenklatura's all-protective shell with all its decaying matter—like a turtle or mollusk. No one wants to die! Especially twice.

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was one of the marshals of the new class education that was placed over the party and maintained by the law of biological reproduction (caste marriages!).

He was born on 24 September 1911 in the village of Bolshaya Tes in Krasnoyarsk Kray. Having begun his career as an apparatchik, he was secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kraykom and, subsequently, the Penza party obkom during the Forties. Feeling his lack of education

(it, nevertheless, did not prevent him from occupying important positions), Chernenko completed the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee Higher School for Party Organizers in 1945. In 1948, he worked on the staff of the Moldavian CP Central Committee where he became a subordinate of L.I. Brezhnev in 1950. Brezhnev had been sent to the republic to fill the position of Central Committee first secretary. Their careers were inseparably linked from that time on.

	L.I. Brezhnev:		K.U. Chernenko:
1956-1960	CPSU Central Committee Secretary	1956, 1960	Advisor to the CPSU Central Committee Secretary; subsequently sector chief in the Propaganda Department
1960-October 1964	Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium	1960-1965	Chief for receptions of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
October 1964-April 1966	CPSU Central Committee First Secretary	1965-	Chief of the CPSU Central Committee General Department
April 1966	CPSU Central Committee General Secretary	1966	CPSU Central Committee candidate member
From 1977	simultaneously USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman	From 1977	Politburo candidate member
		From 1978	CPSU Central Committee Politburo member

When authorizing decorations for himself, L.I. Brezhnev never forgot about his comrades:

1976	Awarded his third gold star (one—Hero of Socialist Labor)	1976	Awarded his first Hero of Socialist Labor star
1981	Awarded his fifth gold star	1981	Awarded his second Hero of Socialist Labor star

K.U. Chernenko's starlit and cloudless career began in 1965 when he was appointed to the position of CPSU Central Committee General Department chief. The specific nature of this distinctive office is such that—from the first to the last day—the people, who surround the

party leader (secretaries, assistants, typists, stenographers, etc.), are in the General Department. That is why its chief—the leader's protégé—is "doomed" to a long union with him and his people are gradually transformed into the leader's "inner cabinet" that soon crushes the staff's other structural subunits under it.

Of the 303 Central Committee members¹, elected by the 27th CPSU Congress (which was held a year after Chernenko's death), at least 107 inevitably passed through the sieve of the Brezhnev selection process, in which K.U. Chernenko—the chief of the "inner cabinet"—played a large role.

When you know about all the "machinations" of the apparat's life, it becomes quite clear why and how this greedy compiler of the ideas of V. Vetrov, V. Pribytkov and other authors, who presented himself as a party building theorist but who was undoubtedly an outstanding practical worker, became the general secretary of CPSU Central Committee.

Without a doubt, Chernenko was a staff worker promoted to an administrative post, who counted on it and who received dividends in the form of a vertical rotation within the above-mentioned nomenklatura. This occurred under conditions of a total absence of glasnost and competition and in a situation of secretiveness and weakness on the part of democratic forces who only charted themselves in an ocean of functional pragmatism that interpreted today's general line—a line that did not go beyond the limits of an intellectual perception of objective reality and the immediate future of the all-powerful party apparat.

The newly revealed general secretary, whom the nomenklatura unanimously elected, began with intensive traditional contacts with the country and party leaders who had arrived for Yu.V. Andropov's funeral. He had to give the impression—especially, abroad—that all problems had been solved in our country.

In two days, February 14 and 15, 1984, K.U. Chernenko met with the leaders of France, India, the FRG, England, Italy, the United States, Cuba, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and many other states. Each of them worked out their problems. Babrak Karmal, for example, requested the usual batch of Soviet souls to maintain the flames of the Afghan ancestral tribal strife.

However, K.U. Chernenko, a very experienced apparatchik, did not forget, of course, that the interests of Western politicians were paramount. Overcoming old age and a painful infirmity, the general secretary created an appearance of good health, spirits and thinking. A great deal depended on this, including the future of mutual relations between East and West. How well he managed this can be partly judged from the reminiscences of Armand Hammer, a well known American industrialist and public figure:

"... Chernenko decided to meet with me not in his Kremlin office, which was intended for official receptions, but in his work office.... Naturally, I wanted to know whether what they said about him being a very sick individual was true. He easily got up from a table, which stood at the other end of the room, and came to meet me, smiling and holding out his hand for a warm, competent and strong handshake. His somewhat pink face and competent mannerisms did not have anything in common with the pale and infirm figure that we had seen on television." The interested reader will find out what happened next from A. Hammer's book "Moy vek—dvadtsatyy. Puti i vstrechi" [My Century—the Twentieth. Paths and Meetings] that the Progress Publishing House published in 1988.

The "old guard" tried to their utmost to create an image within the country. In a speech that G.A. Aliyev gave to the voters, the general secretary's name, which was provided with complimentary epithets, was recalled six times (this—only two weeks after Yu.V. Andropov's death!); V.A. Dolgikh, speaking in Krasnoyarsk Kray, the general secretary's homeland, pronounced the very sacred name seven times, pointing out that the "Soviet people know K.U. Chernenko as an outstanding party and state figure." However, V.V. Grishin, who felt the heat of the coming struggle for the highest vacant position, went further than everyone. Having been registered quickly among the closest comrades-in-arms of the still living general secretary, Grishin invariably placed Chernenko's name after each adjective "faithful," "outstanding," "staunch," "talented," and "steadfast" (eight times!) to the stormy applause of those present. A pointing impetus was given to the remaining nomenklatura—and the carousel of glorification turned! Something like a month after his arrival in his position, K.U. Chernenko with elegant ease moved ahead of I.V. Stalin, who had gotten to his position over the bodies of his political rivals and over the real and imaginary successes of the new authorities; N.S. Khrushchev, who had broken up the "antiparty group" and sanctioned in the end a regime of personal power; L.I. Brezhnev, who had flooded the staff of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers with people from Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia and who had lost during this campaign any sense of proportion, including human conscience in general.

In March 1984, on the eve of the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the "outstanding party and state figure" met with his electors who had undergone a careful selection and instruction... in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses! The "talented organizer of the masses" needed an ecumenical sweep. His faded speech was interrupted 46 times with applause, and the more than 5,000 people drowned out the finale in shouts of "hurrah." Without departing for a second from the text lying in front of him, Chernenko set forth the program for his actions; one was able to understand from it that a school reform was taking shape in the country.

Evidently, Konstantin Ustinovich nourished a tender weakness for pedagogics deep in his heart. This impelled him to complete the Kishinevskiy Pedagogical Institute by correspondence courses in 1953 (while a department chief in the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee!) and to busy himself in real earnest during 1984 with questions concerning the development of public education. However, the time and the situation, in which the formation of Chernenko—the leader—occurred, conditioned the limits of his personal comprehension of secondary school problems. That is why the "reforms" main stress, which the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum affirmed, was only on the pupil's work indoctrination and professional orientation.

Questions about increasing the wages of teachers, who had lost in comparison with so-called non-mental labor workers (the average ratio was 165.6 and 259 rubles), remained on board his "personal perception." The problems of overcrowded classrooms (40-50 individuals instead of the West European norm of 15) were ignored, and eyes remained closed to the 40 percent chronic sickness rate of pupils in Soviet schools due to the absence of reliable medical monitoring. The "others" of public education diffidently passed over in silence the Central Asian tobacco and cotton servitude. No one cast doubts on the quality of the educational process, educational supplies, or even the level of knowledge of the teachers themselves....

The reform was doomed to failure with such an approach. That is what happened.

The country again plunged into an atmosphere of stagnation. "Our steam engine" again found itself in a tunnel. Humorists intoned: "Chernenko Station, transfer to the Brezhnev line."

The course of the "elections" to the USSR Supreme Soviet is indicative in this respect. On Sunday, 4 March 1984, an absolute majority of Tajik workers gave their votes to the "bloc of communists and non-party members" by one o'clock in the afternoon. The voters of Armenia passed them: at 12 noon. However, our Kirghiz voters remained inaccessible: 91 percent of all the voters had voted by 10 a.m. in the republic. As a result, 99.9 percent of the country's entire adult population had exchanged its votes for the sausage and canned stew meat which were sold in abundance in the buffets at the voting areas and, thereby, demonstrated their loyalty to the authority of the apparat and its leader—Chernenko. However, even such an inflated percentage did not suit the more zealous functionaries: the Nakhichevanskoye, Nagorno-Karabakhskoye and Gorno-Badakhshanskoye leadership came off with a complete 100 percent! Generally speaking, "cunning figures" were set in motion everywhere. Newspapers were gay with triumphant reports and communiques. The percentage of plan fulfillment exceeded the limits of the established norms. The people with their hopes and needs finally became lost in the stream of numbers. However, the crimson strip obstinately called for with impunity: "Give 110

percent of the plan!" and "Increase labor productivity by one percent, reduce production costs by a half percentage point"—and ... enter the paradise of plenty. From television screens, photo shop windows, newspaper columns, and magazine inserts, red-cheeked dairymaids and shepherds, trolley bus drivers and depot marshaling yard switchmen covered with decorations (who spoke in the name of the entire working class and peasantry) enticed people into the network of idealism with the allure of a bright future. In exchange, they demanded one small thing: Give, submit, persevere, wait, be eager, labor, ...

Meanwhile, the planned economy was in its death throes. The work of every mechanism, which was being strained by prodigious turnovers, was accompanied by malfunctions in all its systems and units before its technical death. The hands of the instruments began to move beyond the red line; they moved from number to number and told lies shamelessly. Overheating then began. Flames appeared. Everything!... The Stalin five-year plans were fulfilled by only 60 percent. The subsequent peak—70 percent—was achieved in 1975. A headlong fall then occurred: 55, 44, 41 percent ... who is less?

The apparat, however, stubbornly ignored the facts. The propaganda instruments continued to measure beyond the red line. Newspapers continued to tell lies. On 11 April 1984, Chernenko was unanimously elected president of the state. In this, he passed his predecessors. Brezhnev came to this position after almost 13 years; to do this, it was necessary to adopt a new USSR constitution. Andropov—after eight months. Konstantin Ustinovich needed not quite three months. An individual, who had never worked anywhere in an independent section, usurped power in one hour. However, it was no coup, no! The apparat chose him. The unforgettable O. Bender would have exclaimed over this: "They presented the power on a saucer with a blue border."

No, it is clearly not Rio de Janeiro. This is impossible there....

The ice began to break. The ability to think freely and differently became stuck in the icy embrace of the icebergs of obscurantism. From IZVESTIA's pages, A. Baskin and S. Kondratyev stigmatized the "renegades and their sympathizers" and drained the "dirty swamp of the so-called Sakharov hearings" from which "came the stench of double-dyed anti-Soviet propaganda." Improving the Russian language which is very rich in shading, the authors searched for and found a new use for trivial verbs, forcing them to sound fresh although they were not understandable to everyone: Yelena Bonner, for example, "threw out thought;" "sought abroad for a wave of slander, absurd concoctions and every foolishness;" and "traded wholesale and retail in the works of the academician." The authors of the mentioned article defined A.D. Sakharov's ("a shallow, embittered and mercenary individual prepared to sell everything") election platform, which is recognized today and which the leading portion of our society has

voted for, as being anti-Soviet (!), in which "each line—from the first to the last—cries out with hatred for his country and his people..."

This article, which was sanctioned by the apparat's ideologists, described in the best way possible the internal political atmosphere of that period. There is another feature. At the beginning of 1984, V.M. Molotov, who had been expelled from CPSU ranks as one of the participants in the "anti-party group" but who had not turned in his party card and who regularly sent his membership dues to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, submitted a request to the CPSU Central Committee regarding his restoration to the party. According to the testimony of Roy Medvedev, K.U. Chernenko and A.A. Gromyko actively supported it.

As a preventive measure and wishing to protect himself against the unpredictable "jokes" of his aged but extremely powerful comrades-in-arms, Chernenko began to decorate them for political motives without any connection to anniversaries: minister of defense, head of the KGB and, to be on the safe side, chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee. The turn of V.V. Grishin, the prospering Moscow ruler, came next (17 September 1984). The Order of People's Friendship began to shine on the banner of the USSR Union of Writers which resided in the reliable hands of G.M. Markov and the favorite of all the leaders S.V. Mikhalkov. Plants, factories and work collectives were decorated; 16 builders of the Baykal-Amur Mainline, which leads nowhere, received the gold stars of Heroes of Socialist Labor at one time. In light of "Comrade K.U. Chernenko's instructions on insuring the accelerated development (my underlining—K.B.) of nuclear energy," 97 builders of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station were singled out with decorations (among them were the now condemned former director of the station, V. Bryukhanov), 46—with labor heroism medals, and 56—with Distinguished Labor medals. V. Kizim, the chief of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station's construction administration, became a Hero of Socialist Labor for the accelerated commissioning of the project.

Was it from that moment that the clockwork drive of the nuclear detonator under the fourth unit of the ill-fated nuclear power station was cocked? Where else have they been concealed—these detonators in the RBMK-1000 reactors in other stations?

The general secretary did not forget one of the most prestigious training institutions in the country—the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, awarding it the Order of Labor Red Banner "for its many years of fruitful activity in the task of training international affairs specialists." Yes, how could you forget a VUZ which your own grandson had just entered!

I would like to immediately make a reservation, disproving the common opinion that the children of highly placed parents "inherit" their worst qualities (as proof,

they cite to you the examples of Brezhnev's son and daughter and, at the same time, his noble son-in-law; and they recall Vasilii Stalin). As far as I know, Konstantin Ustinovich's children have avoided this fate and are noted for their modesty and sense of proportion. His son, Vladimir Konstantinovich, who worked for a long time as an assistant to F.T. Yermash—at the time, the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography—and who was transferred to the position of a deputy department chief in the committee during his father's 13-month rule. Those people, who had occasion to come into contact with Vladimir Konstantinovich over a period of many years during their work, speak respectfully about him. I had occasion to become acquainted with K.U. Chernenko's daughter, Yelena Konstantinovna, during the summer of 1981 in Issyk-Kul. There was nothing of the flashy, the defiant or the haughty in her. A modestly dressed woman, simple in her personal contacts. No more! A historian by education, she worked during those years in the Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute of the CPSU Central Committee. A sense of proportion was evidently in her nature. You would not say this about her father.

It is widely known that K.U. Chernenko considered himself a theoretician of party applied sciences—party organizational development. A mass of books and textbooks, for which he probably received a sizable honorarium comparable perhaps to the incomes of fashionable writers, was published by him under the editorship of his personal assistant, V.V. Pribytkov.

These books were reissued many times. Politizdat issued "Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata" [Questions on the Work of the Party and State Apparatus] twice—in 1980 (120,000 copies) and in 1982 (100,000 copies). "KPSS i prava cheloveka" [The CPSU and Human Rights] also underwent two NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY editions (1981—50,000 copies and 1982—40,000 copies). Things were somewhat better with "Izbrannyye rechi i stati" [Selected Speeches and Articles]. These were repeatedly reprinted at the time in all party journals and newspapers. Politizdat issued 100,000 copies in 1981. Filled with new "masterpieces" that had entered the "Marxist-Leninist treasury," they saw light in the same amount during 1984. The State Committee for Prices, true, appraised the new addenda at ... 20 kopecks².... How many resources and how much scarce paper went for this! In return, children failed to receive millions of copies of stories; and subscribers—tens of thousands of copies of their favorite newspapers. However, this was little. After several months, a new book of these same "speeches" came out, in which the reciter of the texts prepared by the apparat shared from his position as general secretary "his" innermost thoughts and plans with the mass Soviet readership.

T.U. Usualiyev, a former CPSU Central Committee apparat worker with ten years of service and the first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee at the time, convincingly employed today's popular precept "a

book is the best gift" in 1979 in regards to the CPSU Central Committee secretary, Politburo member, friend and colleague: The book "Partiyalyk zhana manlekettik ishtin stilin chygarmachylyk menen yenukturuunun kee bir maseleleri," which was published under his name and translated into the Kirghiz language by the Kyrgyzstan Publishing House, was presented to K.U. Chernenko who had arrived to present the Order of the Labor Red Banner to the City of Frunze. Chernenko was pleased.³

I can only guess at how many similar books were published in Moldavia, where Chernenko worked up until this; in Kazakhstan,... Let it pass. Chernenko was not alone! This had become the practice since the time of N.S. Khrushchev, who had renamed the Stalin prize (from I.V. Stalin's honoraria and income) and put the newly baked state prize on the state subsidy. Since then, great and small "leaders" had begun to receive honoraria for books, speeches and articles written for them by obliging party men of letters.

That summer, Konstantin Ustinovich flew to Frunze on his personal plane. This "flight" disrupted the schedule of dozens of trips which remained in port "for reasons of non-flying weather." Let us point out: He was not the leader of the state at the time but only one of Brezhnev's comrades-in-arms who eagerly enjoyed such privileges in their own right. From Frunze, Chernenko flew on a Yak-40 airplane to the city of Panfilov in Kazakhstan's Taldy-Kurgan Oblast on 16 August 1979 (the airport runway in Panfilov was not able to accept the large airliner). Naturally, not on a scheduled one. He refused the helicopter and Chaika offered him. He simply summoned the aircraft... from Moscow. The aircraft, which was designed for short distances, covered the 3,746 kilometers in several jumps. After this, it carried its "majestic" cargo another several hundred versts above the clouds in its soft lounge chairs. Chernenko knew that the Soviet Union confidently led the civilized world in the number of flying accidents and catastrophes. He knew that one out of every 500,000 transported passengers died in an aviation catastrophe on our airlines according to statistics (in the United States—one out of four million). Chernenko did not wish to risk his valuable life. That is—only "his" airliner....

Let us return, however, to the narration. The central newspapers found room for laudatory reviews of Comrade Chernenko's works from which their true authors clipped political coupons. Letters were sent from the local areas. The newspaper headlines "readers' opinion" were chock full to overflowing.... Amidst "general elation and unity" the order awarding K.U. Chernenko the Order of Lenin and the third gold Hammer and Sickle medal was signed and published on 24 September 1984... in connection with his 73rd birthday....

Time cures everything. The tablets have for a long time been removed from the houses where the short-lived leader of the state lived and from the city streets that had been renamed in his honor. Musicians from a rock ensemble have set up a dance area on the gigantic

portrait of his "godfather;" in Moscow, one can purchase wholesale and retail in old Arbat masks and money-boxes depicting Brezhnev. V.V. Kuznetsov, who signed the order issuing K.U. Chernenko the third star of Hero of Socialist Labor became lost long ago in the labyrinths of the nomenklatura and sank into oblivion. Our eyes have opened belatedly, we are disowning our past—as if it never occurred. However, it did occur. It still sits astride many of us....

The "brightest" page in Chernenko's activity was the state's foreign policy life during his 13-month rule. With the help of his diplomatic messages that were gray and feeble in style and language, Chernenko tried to establish broad contacts with all the civilized world. However, neither the United States nor the countries in the European commonwealth wished to do business with a political leader who might die tomorrow or the day after; they would then have to begin all over again! The only bright spot on the foreign policy background during the Chernenko period was M.S. Gorbachev's triumphal visit to Great Britain.

Following the dogmatic lines of the distant past, the USSR and many of its allies ignored the Olympic Games in the United States, replacing participation in them with alternative Good Will Games that did not add any sports glory or international prestige to us. Our mass information media said scandalous things about the American Olympics: "The luster of the medals and the poverty of the spirit." This hardly contributed to the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two opposing camps.

True, the leaders of fraternal parties and friendly states traveled fairly often to Moscow. They presented awards and were decorated. Even the "bright sun of the Korean people", Kim Il-Song, lighted up and warmed the far northern capital with his radiance. Francois Mitterrand dropped in and our Finnish neighbors visited us once. This, however, occurred as an act of diplomatic courtesy: There were no agreements on economic cooperation or documents that had a notable foreign policy repercussion as a result of these visits. On the other hand, the rulers of various types of small Third World states participated in visits to Moscow. They negotiated with our leader about something for a long time. After this, newspapers published wordy communiques, which were not conspicuous for their originality of thought.

How often have we invested gigantic resources and forces in the search for a momentary political success and as a result received a doubtful partner whom it was necessary to feed and clothe at a time when our own country was deeply mired in a quagmire of social and economic problems from which we are trying to get out today!

Chernenko was old and incurably sick. However, he found the strength, which so delighted Armand Hammer, to visit the Indian embassy in Moscow on 1 November 1984 on the occasion of the national

mourning for the dead Indira Gandhi. On 5 November, he met with the leaders of youth organizations in the socialist countries, who were losing little by little their influence on young men and women, pioneers and pupils. On 7 November, he stood for the last time on the mausoleum rostrum. Below, the "bulwark and support of the party and the state"—an endless column of demonstrators—marched over the square's paving stones and carried, brought, and shoved portraits and transparencies of the Politburo members, who were standing on the rostrum,—portraits that had been placed by hand on wheels—and panels with loud appeals to "strengthen," "develop," and "fulfill and overfulfill." But to the rear, the cold brick walls and dampness of the moss-covered ground summoned and called to themselves... it is time....

Strength left the sick Chernenko. He was not able to participate in D.F. Ustinov's funeral, his friend and comrade-in-arms. The pain of the loss and the sad thoughts impelled him to render what was necessary to the dead man. This was reflected in the hasty re-naming of the city of Izhevsk to Ustinov. However, it made no difference to Dmitriy Fedorovich.

A meeting between the voters from Moscow's Kuybyshevskiy Rayon and their candidate for RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputy... K.U. Chernenko... took place in the Kremlin's meeting hall without K.U. Chernenko. Viktor Grishin opened the "meeting." "His" speech was read. As the newspaper PRAVDA reported the next day, "those present at the meeting greeted K.U. Chernenko's speech with great satisfaction and ardent and prolonged applause." V. Khalin, the report's author, assured PRAVDA's readers: "K.U. Chernenko's inspiring speech left no one indifferent." A tsunami of "readers' replies" swept over the entire country. The letter writing staff to whose improvement K.U. Chernenko had devoted 24 years of his life had lost its head.

The general secretary's last appearance before the television public was on 28 February 1984. V.V. Grishin, Yu.A. Prokofyev (first secretary of the CPSU Kuybyshevskiy Raykom in the city of Moscow), Yu.I. Kalinin (chairman of the okrug election commission), and V.V. Pribytkov, assistant to the general secretary) presented him with the certificate of his election as a deputy. However, it was already not Chernenko. Supported by the hand of Grishin, he quietly, choking from a bout of asthma, pronounced the words of thanks to the voters for the high trust demonstrated in him and promised to use all his strength to fulfill their main mandate—strength that was not even sufficient to give the speech. How prudent and ruthless must an individual be to drag out the sick and dying general secretary for this television show and hold him up as a laughing-stock in front of 100 million television viewers! According to persistently circulating rumors, Grishin—using Chernenko's senility and weakness, extorted a death-bed will that declared the 70-year-old Viktor Vasilyevich his ... successor. It is difficult to believe this; there are no weighty reasons for not believing it. Even the most recent history abounds

with such examples: Stalin intended Voznesenskiy to be his successor; Hitler—Goering and, later, Admiral Doenitz; Kim Il-Song through the constitution—his son, the “beloved leader” Kim Chen Ira.

On 10 March 1985 at 1920 hours during the 74th year of his life, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, joined the greater, 80 billion, part of humanity which resides, as they say, in the best of worlds.

On that sorrowful day, Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin tried to push the above-mentioned will through the Politburo. Judging from subsequent retirements, Romanov and Aliyev supported him. However, wisdom won out this time. Ye. Ligachev's speech to the 19th Party Conference slightly opened the curtain on this “secret Madrid palace”: “It is necessary to tell the whole truth: These were alarming days. Other decisions were absolutely possible. There was a real danger....”

Moreover, an analysis of the press and of the collective photographs and deductive research permit the following conclusion to be made: M. Gorbachev was not elected quite simply.... He was moved to the third place on the general secretary's right and to the fifth (the 7 November 1984 parade.) This is not a small item. In the language of the nomenklatura, it signifies the real arrangement of strength and the direction of the currents that skirt destructive shoals and dangerous reefs. It is a struggle. However, that is a different subject....

The 11 March 1985 extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum defeated the apparat. The apparat hid.... A precarious equilibrium had arrived.

Having destroyed the old state machinery, October 1917 entered the end of the second decade of the 20th century with a prepared political and legal superstructure. The work superintendents of the revolution, stimulating the heroic efforts of the working masses who had moved on to a bright purpose past the shades of their innocently killed colleagues, laid the basis for it—a basis that corresponded to their understanding of the general laws for the development of socialism's production forces. However, even today its economic structure, after a few cosmetic repairs, has not undergone any substantial changes.

According to Marx, the base has still not undergone any serious, significant or radical change, the superstructure is not changing and, this means, authority will be concentrated in the hands of an all-powerful apparat. Unfortunately, the economic slipping of restructuring is a bitter reality. Against this background, the attempt to break through into a new quality by “a system of civilized cooperatives” and using the locomotive of cost accounting and self-financing is—in my view—an ineffective matter. The leading economists and those who think radically are today calling upon our country's leaders to go further, opening up free economic zones and concessions, attracting as much foreign capital as

possible, and wisely forming a domestic market. In the agrarian part of the new economic policy—give land to those who cultivate it....

Profiting by the economic chaos, the apparat is still forcing various draft laws through which stifle cooperation and free enterprise, limit glasnost and democratization⁴, and attempt—when it is possible—to remove the elite of the pyramidal authorities from under the people's right to criticize them which is guaranteed by the USSR Constitution.⁵

If the “airplane of the economy” does not get out of its dive during the next year or two, the precarious equilibrium will be destroyed once and for all to the benefit of the apparat. It is only waiting for this. Instantly reacting to the increasing demand of the capacious and omnivorous political market, the apparat is offering its services in a vast assortment: Even autocrats, who are inclined toward massive terror, will be found in it; loud-mouthed people with voluntaristic aspirations; and the collectors of all and every decoration... Chernenkos will also be found. Everything will depend on the state of affairs at the moment.

Footnotes

1. Based on the situation in March 1989 before the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum (here and later on—author's comment).

2. Multiplied by 100,000 copies!

3. K.U. Chernenko did not forget the good. His warm attitude toward the republic and its then leader defrosted the Frunze “new construction projects” that had undergone an ice-age during the time of Andropov. The V.I. Lenin Museum, whose third exhibit floor was filled with new works by the fruitful general secretary, was built at emergency tempos. They erected a new building for the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. They opened a new square....

4. The strength of the apparat was also displayed during the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies where a progressively thinking minority found a Bolshevik faction... in the State Duma.

5. Let us recall the example of the antidemocratic Article 11-“Prime” in the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 8 April 1989 and the similar Ukase of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 25 April 1989 (Article 68-“prime”). The First Congress of USSR People's Deputies soon changed them with its decision. However, what pressure from the apparat! And what drive in the response at the local areas!....

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Ukrainian SSR Archives Remain Inaccessible Despite Glasnost

90UN0175A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by I. Sidorenko, chief of Vinnitsa Oblast State Archives Document Preservation and Accounting Department: "What Are the Archives Remaining Silent About... Prisoner of Obsolete Instructions"]

[Text] This has already become an everyday expression: "The archives reveal secrets...." Actually, much of that which until recently was kept under lock and key and was carefully protected from outside view by all types of instructions, has found its reader or researcher, or has been returned to the people. And a person not let in on the details and subtleties of the work of archivists, especially state archivists, may be shown that matters in this field are in step with the times, perestroika has boldly stepped into sacred repositories, cleansing secret collections [of documents] of centuries old dust and the prohibitions of conservatism.

I am forced to disappoint [you]: The majority of the stored documents are gathering dust as before and a rank and file person cannot get access to them. Yes and the archivists themselves, preserving often unique documents of the people's history, continue to lead a paltry existence.

Let us turn to the facts. Previous stereotypes and bans are being broken and all possible obstacles and ossified instructions which hinder matters are being eliminated during the course of perestroika. Judging by everything, these processes must plan to improve procedures for establishing collections, processing, and preserving documents in the state archives and also to increase their accessibility and primarily to cancel obsolete instructions.

However, during the years of perestroika, USSR Gosarkhiv [State Archives] and the republic Glavarkhiv [Main Archives Administration] subordinate to it have essentially not fathered one document that corresponds to the times and sheds light on archive prohibitions. In any case, Vinnitsa Oblast state archives are compelled as before to be guided by clearly obsolete instructions from 20 to 30 years ago which regulate document processing and accounting and microfilm copying operations.

It has already long ago become a parable in the language medium of archive workers to divide documents into ordinary, particularly valuable, for office use, secret, etc. What is the paradox here?

First, these instructions provide only very vague criteria by which documents should relate to some collection or other. And naturally this turns into excessive caution. Archive workers are convinced: Better to place any document in the particularly valuable or secret collections then to experience unpleasantness later...

Second, one can understand from the instructions that only one goal is being pursued by the suggested division of collections—to better preserve important documents. Not to hide them under lock and key but precisely to preserve them. In fact what actually happens? Documents that have ended up in collections other than the ordinary one automatically become practically inaccessible to researchers.

Let us say that up until now a collection of documents for office use exists. It is primarily filled with various resolutions, orders, instructions, and other union, republic, or oblast level documents. Issuing them is prohibited in accordance with appropriate Ukrainian SSR Glavarkhiv directives.

You may ask: What is it about these documents that a simple man cannot read them? It turns out that there are no particular reasons to regard them as secret. But on the other hand, there is an instruction compiled by someone at sometime and no one has rescinded it. And the fact that peoples' trust in the government, archive departments, and similar agencies is undermined by such secrets is of no concern.

A similar situation exists with particularly valuable collections. According to the instructions, each document in a collection must be microfilmed and a researcher may obtain a copy of the film only after this [process has been completed]. The idea and the goal are understood: To spare originals from destruction and to preserve them for our descendants. But how and with what is this carried out? Microfilming equipment is of antediluvian design and does not provide either the quantity or the quality of the material photographed. Microfilm reading equipment is completely antiquated and it simply cannot be utilized. Finally, the shelf life of developed microfilm is so short that they need to constantly photograph everything all over again.

The question arises: Today, can we really not gaze upon the state archives through the eyes of a civilized person? Are we really so indifferent to our history? Oblast state archives, as they did four years ago, continue to operate according to the residual principle, are managing to get by with a minimum of allocated assets, facilities which have not been adapted for preservation of historical treasures, and with primitive technical equipment. And this is at a time when the implementation of all possible "projects of the century" are not spared billions.

I would like to gaze into the future and picture my archives computerized and with tremendous capabilities for providing information to all who desire it, but... I cannot. There is only enough money allocated to repair the building which houses the archives; it is nearly 400 years old. And, similarly, no one is planning to look inside. And what is inside the building? There are nearly 900,000 files in the oblast state archives, including 117,000 from the pre-revolutionary period. Quite a bit of material dates back to the first years of Soviet rule. But almost half of the collections have never been

touched by the hands of the restorers or the bookbinders. We do not have enough money or the required equipment. And as a result, many of the documents will actually not be preserved: They are only haphazardly sorted and tossed onto shelves—in damp, unventilated rooms. And there is no hope for a better fate for them: We only manage to refurbish 1,000 files per year.

This is, so to speak, a view from inside the archival service. And if you look from without? The Ukrainian SSR state archives is obviously convinced that state archives do not need perestroyka. It is true that there was an attempt to reduce management personnel. In the oblast, we eliminated the oblispolkom's archives department. Workers were transferred to us and together we introduced yet one more administrative position. They eliminated it

An ancient scourge of the archival profession is departmental parochialism. Thousands of files and documents which are valuable and of interest to researchers are scattered throughout ministry and department archives and are being preserved haphazardly. According to our

calculations, about 700 files have been completely lost during the last seven years. Furthermore, we practically cannot gain access to these documents.

How do USSR and Ukrainian SSR Gosarkhiv react to this? In March, we received a draft law on the USSR State Archive Collection which once again proposed retention of the 12 departments which maintain documents in their own buildings. We have been directed to only locally check the clerical work and archives of departments. We have been directed without legal guarantees. But, you may ask, how can we check if we have no rights in these departments?

Such unrequited questions regarding the organization of archival operations are not only arising from me. At the end of last year, in accordance with a decision of the oblast state archival party election report meeting, a letter with appropriately critical remarks and suggestions of communists was sent to Ukrainian SSR Gosarkhiv. But the matter has not moved off dead center. Must oblast gosarkhiv continue to live a paltry existence without rights?

Goskompriroda's Vorontsov, Finnish Counterpart Discuss Ecology Issues

90US0050B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Sep 89
Morning Edition p 4

[Article by K. Smirnov: "Glasnost—Now and Always"]

[Text] On the evening of 13 September, Nikolay Vorontsov, the new chairman of USSR Goskompriroda, and Kaj Barlund, Finnish minister of environment held their first press conference.

It was dedicated to the 3rd Session of the Joint Intergovernmental Soviet-Finnish Commission on Cooperation in Protecting the Environment, which was held that same day. The specific measures for environmental protection included serious ones such as reducing air pollution near their common border. This is a general concern. The winds flow mainly from the west to the east. However, the winds shift and the neighbors cannot help but be concerned that in 1988 alone sulfuric anhydride emissions from our Pechenganikel and Severonikel plants totalled 500,000 tons.

There are many such mutual concerns. In particular, there was a discussion of how the construction of a Leningrad flood control system will influence the ecological situation in the Gulf of Finland.

Journalists were also interested in the report about preparations to create Druzhba, a joint Soviet-Finnish reserve, Europe's largest protected mid-boreal zone (containing examples of forest, lake, swamp and hilly ecosystems). This territory will include our Kostomukshskiy State Reserve and in Finland—Ulvinsalo, Elimiusalo, Iso-Paloken-Maariansiarkiat, luortanansalo-Lapinskiui and Lentua. Because our reserve systems differ (the Finns have five slightly different types of reserve territories that are different from Soviet reserves) the statute covering Druzhba will be similar to that of a biosphere reserve.

Last year the government of Finland proposed, and our government supported, an international conference of sub-arctic and arctic countries on problems of protecting the environment. Practical steps have been taken to implement this idea.

Naturally, questions often were outside the range of the press conference's theme, but its organizers did not decline to answer any questions.

A question from the journal PRIRODA ESTONII: Doesn't it seem to you that today there are very strong attempts to play the ecological card in the political game?

H. Vorontsov: This is, of course, true. But it is important to think why there are such attempts. They have a serious, objective basis—the alarming, dramatic condition of the biosphere. Therefore, politicians' actions are based on the need to protect our common home. I understand the aspirations of various republics and countries to strengthen their sovereignty, but I am all the

same an "imperialist" when it comes to saving our common planetary home. The biosphere is the only "empire" and all of us, inhabitants of earth, are its "subjects." When we are talking about our home, we must all put out the fire together.

A question from the SMENA Radio Station: Don't you want to include in the orbit of Soviet-Finnish cooperation the Oka expedition, which young people from our country and several other countries annually make under the leadership of scientists? Incidentally, Oka means "river" in Finnish.

K. Barlund: We will only be happy if ecological cooperation between our countries begins at the most varied levels, starting with childhood and adolescence.

N. Vorontsov: We will enter into dialog, contacts and joint actions with the most diverse ecological movements, even with extremists (and a good undertaking such as the Oka is not, of course, among the latter). Although the Oka River Basin is far from our border with Finland, it has now become the object of ecological concern, especially with regard to the recent accidental pollution of this basin in Orlov Oblast, which we just learned about on the "Vremya" television program.

In closing the press conference N. Vorontsov said that he does not see it as an ordinary event but the beginning of a good tradition. Now and always meetings of USSR Goskompriroda leaders with the mass media will be held regularly, marking the transition to complete ecological glasnost.

Official Explains Goskomgidromet Policy on Release of Pollution Data

90US0050A Moscow NEDELIA in Russian No 33
14-20 Aug 89 p 13

[Article by Yu. S. Tsaturov, deputy chairman, USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology: "'Who Will Give Us a Chance' (This Was the Title of an Interview with Ecologists L. G. Solov'ev and N. F. Reymers, published in NEDELIA No 21)"]

[Text] USSR Goskomgidromet completely shares the serious concern the ecologists in the interview showed over pollution levels and their serious consequences. However, we think it necessary to comment upon some of their statements, including those describing the activities of USSR Goskomgidromet, in order to give the weekly's readers a more complete idea about the system for observing environmental pollution in the USSR.

An objective estimate of pollution in the entire country and in its cities and waters is a necessary condition for the efficient struggle against causes of pollution. Obtaining such information is USSR Goskomgidromet's main duty.

Since 1972 USSR Goskomgidromet has been in charge of the general state services for observing environmental pollution.

To do this, units of USSR Goskomgidromet, jointly with units from the USSR Ministry of Health and agency control services conduct systematic observations of air pollution in 534 cities in which live 113 million people, 62 percent of the urban population. About 2,000 rivers, lakes, reservoirs and all seas in and around the country are subject to periodic monitoring. Throughout large areas in and near cities there is monitoring of soil pollution by metals and other industrial pollutants. In agricultural areas the content of pesticides in the soil is measured.

There is a network for measuring the radiation situation throughout the entire country.

A study of data from 1988 observations shows that the pollution situation is still unsatisfactory.

In particular the pollution of watersheds is very acute. In 103 cities, with a total of 40 million people, on some days air pollution exceeds sanitation standards by a factor of 10, while in 17 cities the factor is over 50. In Volzhsk, Kirovakan, Arkhangel and around the Astrakhan Gas Complex extremely high pollution levels are repeatedly observed. This is evidence of totally unsatisfactory environmental protection work by enterprises in the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry, USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production, USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry and the USSR Ministry of the Gas Industry.

For the country as a whole, in recent years there has been a steady growth in the air pollution by nitrogen compounds. This is primarily due to emissions from motor vehicles and power plants.

At 38 percent of the cities monitored the average annual concentration of nitrogen dioxide exceeds the maximum allowable concentration (PDK).

There is an extremely urgent problem regarding air pollution by substances specific to several industrial sectors: phenol, ammonia, and hydrogen fluoride; their average annual concentrations in cities exceed the PDK. For example, hydrogen disulfide, benzopyrene and formaldehyde exceed their PDKs 3-4 fold. Negative tendencies in the growth of air pollution were observed in 1988 in Magnitogorsk, Alverdi, Ventpils, Fergana, Nizhniy Tagil and Perm, even though these cities previously had high pollution levels.

As a result, in recent years the number of cities included among the most polluted in the country has not declined, but remains at 70.

The observation system has also registered a number of positive tendencies, but their rate is far too low to improve airsheds. This is evidence of the need to sharply increase capital investments in air pollution control work and to improve the efficiency with which they are used, putting priority on the introduction of low waste technologies.

Contrary to the interview, the work of the USSR Goskomgidromet observation network has not been hindered by any sort of agency influence. The committee does not engage in economic activities, its functioning does not require the use of natural resources and is not a source of pollution. Independent information from USSR Goskomgidromet units makes possible an objective evaluation of pollution in the country and, very importantly, of the efficiency of measures by state inspection organs regarding pollution sources and by local USSR Goskomgidromet inspection services.

USSR Goskomgidromet observations are the basis for annual reports on the country, republics, cities. These are given to central and local soviet organs and to economic organizations. They make possible a detailed evaluation of the ecological situation when examining drafts of annual and long term plans for the protection of nature.

Since 1987 all environmental pollution information obtained from the USSR Goskomgidromet network has been widely published in the central and local presses. There are no restrictions on the publication of pollution data, contrary to what L. G. Solovov said in the interview.

In particular, it should be indicated that USSR Goskomgidromet prepares and gives to USSR Goskompriroda extensive factual material on air, water and soil pollution and on problems of climate and the ozone layer. This is widely distributed in this country and abroad in the National Report of the State of the Environment in the USSR. Jointly with the USSR Ministry of Health and the USSR Goskompriroda measures are being implemented to systematically (not less than once every 10 days, and soon after pollution accidents) publish local (now in more than 200 cities) joint analytic material on current levels of pollution, its effects and on environmental protection measures.

All this work is directed at unconditionally assuring glasnost in questions concerning the country's ecological situation. It will be continued by USSR Goskomgidromet and its local units.

And, if as in support of his words regarding "complete ecological glasnost", in his letter comrade Yu. S. Tsaturov enclosed a joint instruction by USSR Goskomgidromet, USSR Goskompriroda and the USSR Ministry of Health to chiefs of republic administrations for hydrometeorology, union republic main state inspectorates for the protection of nature and chief state sanitation doctors in union republics. All of them subscribe to providing the public with systematic and complete information on the environment. It is excellent that now these three agencies will be guided by these principles, for even bad news is better than no news, which creates falsehoods and rumours. However, it is one thing to recognize the need to give citizens correct information, but quite another to really see that this information reaches the public. This is

why we would like to learn from *Nedelya* readers if they are obtaining reliable data on environmental conditions in their city, rayon, oblast and republic.

Zalygin on Bureaucratic Resistance to Environmental Protection

90US0155A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 89
Second Edition p 4

[Article by Sergey Zalygin, chairman of the Ecology and Peace Association: "The State and Ecology: Reflections of a USSR People's Deputy"]

[Text] I shall begin with a detail. What would any of us say if we learned that the members of an examination commission—the acceptance commission at a certain VUZ, for example—who had the deciding authority, included... testees themselves. An absurdity? A joke? Ridiculous? Of course, it is ridiculous, but it is a principle in effect when decisions are being made on multimillion-ruble investments in the national economy, when our economic future is being decided. The fact is that highly important projects for the exploitation of nature—important not so much because of their actual significance as because of the total outlays involved and the unpredictable consequences—are subjected to expert evaluation in which the planners themselves take an active part. That is the rule. Just as absurd as it is rigid.

Once a commission of experts considering the Volga-Chogray project demonstrated its independence. It heard the planners out but did not permit them to vote. And what happened? The plan was immediately labeled unfeasible, even harmful. And what happened then? The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, without refuting a single conclusion of the commission of experts, set up yet another (I do not know how many that made) commission. It was charged with thinking up "new ideas" for advancing the project, turning a blind eye—to avoid a bureaucratic expression—to the independent commission's decision. Naturally, the promoter of the project, first deputy minister in the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and the Ministry of Construction of Water Management Projects P.A. Polad-zade once again took a most active part. Science was represented by Academician B.B. Shumakov of VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin], which is invariably among the originators of all such projects.

That session of the Presidium in November of last year was noteworthy. It was shown on television, and we know who said what.

Academician A.L. Yanshin, a very prominent expert, had this to say:

"The water in the canal is saline. We cannot use it to irrigate anything; it would ruin the soil."

"We cannot, but we must," was the reply to the academician.

Academician A.V. Tikhonov of VASKhNIL stated:

"It will take a hundred years to recoup the cost of the canal's construction."

The answer: But we need it!

The chairman of the Council of Ministers began to have doubts:

"Where will we get the money? The state budget is spread too thin! Where are we to get it, when we know in advance that the builders will not hold the cost at 3.8 billion? Five billion is a realistic figure!"

The all-powerful "we need it," subordinate to no one and to no one's opinion, resounded at that point. N.I. Ryzhkov sighed and affirmed: "We need it...."

This is how we break down common sense, break down "cannot" to the benefit of the libertarian "we need it." This is how we deprive the nation of economics and particularly economy, and not just for a day or two but far into the future. We deprive the state of state morality and are surprised that there is so much theft, embezzlement, padding and window-dressing.

I.L. Abalkina's book "Ekologicheskoye regulirovaniye v khozyaystvennom mekhanizme SShA" [Ecological Regulation in the Management System of the USA] recently came out. Among other things, it states: "...the USA, a nation with a traditionally minimal level of direct methods of state intervention in economic processes, has in the area of ecological regulation taken the path of using primarily administrative and legislative measures" and has achieved extremely impressive results. Why, one asks, are these measures producing results in the USA, while here, where the administration is so powerful, if not all-powerful, we have absurd situations like those just mentioned?

The answer is that in the USA the state implements control over the activities of enterprises and corporations which do not belong to it, while in our country it exercises control over itself. Everything is the state here: ministries, sovkhozes, nature, citizens, music, education. And the state can only control itself. No one else. But then self-control, self-planning and self-cognition are the most difficult and unreliable of all.

The British say: The state is the night guard which protects my sleep; during the day the more vigorously I perform, the less it is needed.

It is the opposite with us. The more resourceful and vigorous the individual, the more obstacles and restrictions he encounters on the part of the state.

That same Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources—now a former ministry—talked endlessly about the benefit of reclamation work and its effectiveness. But just where, when, out of what ministry documents can one get the figures for the losses—if only for

the Aral and the surrounding area, not to speak of the entire territory of the USSR?

The ministry does not have these figures and does not want them. Why not? Why damage one's accountability; why place one's plans, budgets and prestige in doubt? Why, when no one—neither the Council of Ministers nor the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, neither the councils of ministers nor the supreme soviets of the Union republics—ever hold one accountable for them. The losses are "big," "considerable," "lamentable".... This is all we know. If someone were to weigh the pluses and minuses, however—such minuses as the "writing off" of millions of hectares of land as a result of the reclamation and other tens of millions made infertile, in part if not completely, such as the poisoning of reservoirs with waste water, such as the poisoning of people who use that water—what would such a comparison show? The "achievements" would not be worth a cent.

We have yet to establish either an alliance or equality in our relations with nature. We take advantage of its muteness; it asks nothing of us, after all. Not in words, no. But in reality? And with respect to the main question of the times: whether we are to live or not to live. Perhaps never before in the history of mankind has there been such global egotism, whereby people, occupied with the problems of their own existence (occupied aimlessly), have so savagely destroyed life in general as a phenomenon, as a process. And there is no noticeable difference between the right- and left-wingers, between nationalists and cosmopolitans. We are all to an equal degree egotists. We all live in debt, at the expense of our children and grandchildren, and none of us knows what natural resources we shall leave our grandchildren. Furthermore, what kind of genetic stock will we leave? We, the older generation, live on genes which came down to us from previous generations. But today's babies born of parents who drank the poisoned water, ate produce grown not so much in soil as in chemical fertilizers and breathed industrial emissions—what will they pass on to their children? What will their offspring be? Human or not quite human?

And we are resolving the problem of survival with the absurd methods mentioned here.

Nowhere in the world are so many raw materials and natural resources as a whole expended—and most important, squandered—per unit of output (particularly when one considers the quality of the product). The result is that though we are by nature the richest nation in the world, we can list ourselves among the poorest with respect to standard of living.

And it is not just natural resources which are not producing for us, but demographic and psychological ones as well. I refer to the fact that we cannot realize the willingness of citizens to work industriously and honorably, and so they work just any old way and without honor.

We ecologists are accused of dramatizing the situation. Every individual 35-40 years of age can respond to this accusation. It is enough to recall what the Aral area was like 25 years ago and compare that to what it is like now, or to compare the Azov and Moscow areas, Murmansk Oblast, Yamal, the Dnepr area, Ladoga, the industrial Urals or the Kuzbass—actually, any area—to see what has occurred. It is enough to imagine what will have occurred in another 25 years if the same rate and the same principles of exploitation of nature are retained.

It is not an exaggeration to say that with respect to protecting nature it would be appropriate right now to declare an emergency situation, perhaps even war economy measures, over the entire territory of the Union or at least in many of its regions. Why would we do that, though? We tried to do it in the area of Chernobyl, and what came of it? The solution found was... to remain silent about the true situation in that zone.

The establishment of a special committee, Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature], was perhaps the most salient attempt by the state to assume control over environmental protection.

What has been the experience in the 2 years of that committee's existence? What conclusions can we derive?

The first conclusion is unexpected, sad and eloquent. It is that in our self-perpetuating system of ministries and departments this committee has never found a place. A staff could be put together if there were somewhere to set the desks, somewhere to seat the chiefs. A fine location has been found in Moscow, but the question now is whom the new state organ should be subordinate to, who should be subordinate to it and what kind of authority and functions should be vested in it.

If it had been a new Ministry of Oxygen, Ministry of Hydrogen or Ministry of Corn, they would have rustled up everything needed within 2 weeks, submitted reports, confirmed things, assigned duties and sighed with satisfaction: Everything accomplished splendidly. Now things would take off. How they would take off!

It has still not been decided, however, under whose jurisdiction to place this truly and extremely essential committee. Directly under the Council of Ministers, giving it equal status with the other ministries? Goskompriroda must by definition be monitored by all ministries, however. Designate the chairman as a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers? That would be somewhat scary. Would he not have too much authority? Place the committee directly under the USSR Supreme Soviet? The Soviet has no executive apparatus, so this would disturb its status. And Goskompriroda itself, what kind of functions should it have? While the question is being resolved, while Goskompriroda is on hold to see what is to become of it, the question of what is to become of nature is placed on a back burner.

And so.... At a time when the state's ecological condition is extraordinary, catastrophic in many cases, the state

just cannot assimilate the ecological rescue service. It lacks the basic intelligence. Our state bureaucracy cannot take two steps even to save itself. Ecological disasters do not differentiate between chiefs of main committees and miners, after all.

The entire system must be changed, not just in order to be able to eat bread with real butter and not margarine, not to be able to wash with soap, but also in order not to perish.

We need also to alter our forms of ownership. New forms of ownership (not just for our state) would also mean new forms of responsibility, after all, and new laws. All legislation ultimately defines, delimits and protects the rights of this or that form of ownership—personal, cooperative, public, concessionary or state. When there is only one form, state ownership, however, there is nothing to delimit and it is actually impossible to protect anything from anyone.

We need to set a price on water, on land, on all natural resources. That is the only way. Otherwise, it is absurd "people's" ownership without... a price. What kind of ownership and whose ownership can there be without a value on it?

We need to delimit the functions of the client and the contractor.

It is also incredible but also a fact that we, in the person of the state, have combined these two functions, which have probably been delimited since the human society arose and only to recent social science has the experience of thousands of years proved worthless, and that very Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources has for decades defined its own projects, built them itself, released them to itself and given itself bonuses for the quality of projects which either require major repairs a year or two later or were not even completed at all. A total of 3.5 million hectares of our land has been written off as a result of irrigation, 30 million hectares are becoming infertile, 9 million hectares (out of a total of 20 million irrigated hectares) are in need of renovation, while the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources continues on the sly to advance projects for diverting part of the flow of northern rivers into the Caspian and Aral seas, part of the Volga into the Chogray, part of the Ob into Lake Chany and part of the Irtysh into the little-productive chernozem in southern Omsk Oblast, which cannot be irrigated. It is no doubt precisely because of this that the construction period is estimated at 35 years plus 15 years for development. Do we "need this" too? Need it to obtain funds for the project out of the state budget (and this would be 3.6 billion rubles). And not in 35 years, but right now, today!

The "gigantomania" comes from this. A large order is always more profitable to the contractor than a small one. In the West bids are submitted on such orders. Whoever can perform them most cheaply receives them. Here the client and the contractor is one and the same person, for whom the most expensive order is the most

profitable; one receives the most out of the state treasury for it. Initially, when the Volga-Chogray project was just beginning to be promoted in the government, its estimated cost was 800 million rubles. The experts required the planners to perform some "finishing touches" (about which planners dream day and night), and the cost of the project now stands at 3.8 billion rubles.

Another absurdity? Once again, it is our own, socialist absurdity. And we have almost eliminated "dry-land" reclamation, probably the most effective investments—forestry, cultivation technology and agronomic. After all, they are advantageous to the managers but not to the ministry. They are small and inexpensive projects. But are they not what agriculture should rely on for resolving the problem of land improvement? There is no risk whatsoever. The cost per hectare is 30 or so times less than that of hydraulic engineering projects. The latter, as the most expensive, should be employed only where there is irreproachable cultivation. To apply them on poor, weedy land with low-yield crop varieties is like driving a race car on a country road in the woods. The experience of many farms which have withstood the powerful onslaught of the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources—the Leninskaya Iskra Kolkhoz in the Chuvash ASSR (nationally known Comrade Aydak, chairman), confirms this. It is now a state task to introduce dry land reclamation. It is recommended by Professor B.V. Vinogradov as an alternative to the Volga-Chogray project for of renewing the land in Kalmykia. But do you think the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources would let such a profitable order get away!? It has also seized upon a multibillion project for saving the Aral. It first received billions for destroying the Aral ("let the Aral die gracefully," "if necessary (emphasis mine—S.Z.), we shall drain the Aral to the last drop for irrigation"). Now we have billions for restoration work. That's life.

We have worked so hard with Goskompriroda but cannot find a place for it. The Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources simply cannot be eliminated, however, in order to establish, let us say, a comprehensive ministry of agricultural construction. On the contrary, in order to strengthen it, they assigned it the job of... providing the rural area with gas and took the dry land reclamation away from it (just what the ministry needed) and "reorganized" it from the MVKh (Ministry of Water Management) into the MVKhS (Ministry of Water Management Construction). Once again, everything is fine. The people are the same, but the ministry is new, so why bring up old sins? P.A. Polad-zade is in no way connected to those sins. We have to hold accountable former Minister N.F. Vasilyev, a pensioner. But how does one hold a pensioner accountable, particularly one awarded the Order of Lenin for special achievements?

The MVKh contrived to bury 80 billion rubles in the ground in 15 years. How much will the MVKhS bury? It is in a state of complete combat readiness.

Another discovery of our system is that natural resources belong not to the people (although that is what is said), not to Goskompriroda (no point in even mentioning that) and not even to the state, but entirely to the ministries and departments: forestry, agriculture, mining, fisheries and so forth. The production programs of the ministries, which are supposed to originate with Gosplan, are actually developed by the ministries themselves, who call them policy: "water policy," "timber policy," "agricultural policy," "energy policy"—as many policies (hastily approved by Gosplan) as there are ministries. Is this not a triumph of departments? Is it not proof that "we," those very ministries "are the state"? What role has resulted for Gosplan as the first state legal person, as the primary client? Gosplan neither defines nor plans today. It distributes the budget and, lowered to the role of supplier, also distributes funds hand in hand with Gossnab. In his report at the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and in television addresses, N.I. Ryzhkov promised to increase material supplies and reduce the budget deficit within the immediate future. But what are these promises worth? How many unforeseen outlays have we already incurred? A disaster here, a strike there, clashes on ethnic grounds somewhere else. But in addition to everything else, these things cost millions and billions. We live for the barren present and dream: If only it does not get worse. Dreams, dreams—where is your sweetness?!

Since production is entirely in the hands of the state, then the state is obligated also to limit consumption. And it does. We Soviet people do not have to be told what this means. And Gosplan sets the ceilings on how much soap to provide, and where, while the state is deprived of its real functions as the generator of economic policy based on various kinds of ownership. This is how the bureaucracy develops. Distribution is its natural element, after all, and the greater the shortage, the more it is needed. During the time of war communism the state needed a Main Administration for the Distribution of Salt and a Main Administration for the Distribution of Matches. Is that not where we are headed today?

But then Gosplan has far from always been the way it is today. It did not patch holes in socialism but made its policy, not entrusting this to the departments, and did not permit the departments to order it around or pester it with endless requests. It was Gosplan which assigned the departments and syndicates to build the first Soviet GES, the Volkhov, and certainly not the departments imposing its construction upon Gosplan. And this was the procedure everywhere at that time. As the client, Gosplan found contractors and had them submit bids. Whoever could fill the order most cheaply would receive it. This was NEP, large-scale NEP, and not just for the small farmer. The state leased out enterprises and some of the less important industrial branches to concessionaires. The extremely important Moscow-Donbass Main Railroad was leased out, for example. More than half of the retail trade was conducted through cooperatives, joint-stock companies (AKORT [not further identified],

for example) and private stores. This created both competition and market conditions—market reviews were published each month—which are a sign of that authentic economic life which only state monopolization is capable of destroying, of reducing to naught.

State control was exercised over the nonstate organizations, not only and not so much in the sense of financial audits, but of all legal norms of the new economic policy. This fundamentally altered things. The control requirements could not be different for nonstate and state organizations, and since they applied to all, they ruled out the situation in which one state official controls another and they both proceed from the premise that "it is necessary" and "there are instructions."

Why do we need to talk about economic principles when we are discussing ecology? Because any economic flaw immediately affects the procedure for utilizing natural resources. One cannot imagine a healthy ecology if the economy is ill. On the contrary, a malady of the economy is multiplied many times over in the ecology.

Just what is our system doing today toward the ecological healing of the nation? It sets the budget for the article "protecting nature" for the forthcoming year at 3.5 billion rubles (remember that the cost of the Volga-Chogray Canal is 3.8 billion).

The way specified for developing the national economy today is the extensive and ecologically harmful one. After all, while intensiveness means "better less but better," extensiveness advocates "more and more."

We do not have enough energy, so how is the problem resolved? Gidroyekt [All-Union Planning, Surveying and Scientific Research Institute imeni S.Ya. Zhuk] proposes building around 100 GESs to add to the 200 existing ones, which have flooded 12 million hectares of farmland (more than half the amount the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources "improved").

How are we managing the capacities which we have today, however? That is the question. Scandalously, that is how. Many GESs are not operating at full capacity. Furthermore, they are causing harm by not coordinating the operating schedules of the reservoirs with local conditions. The generators at the plants are obsolete, and there are enormous losses in the network. It has been calculated that if we reduced energy losses by 10-15%, we could get by without adding capacities for 3 years. This means without flooding new land and without creating new sources of atmospheric pollution.

We lose 30% or more of the harvest in the field, at elevators and in transport, and we want to make up these losses with new Volga-Chogray canals. That is how it is everywhere: More and more! At the expense of what? At the expense of natural resources, of course. Or take the question of eliminating villages around large cities, specifically Moscow. (Is it a repeat of the elimination of the "unpromising" villages?)

These villages have existed for hundreds of years. The residents have raised livestock and poultry, orchards and gardens there. But no, everything is to be bulldozed. A housing development is to be built there! And in that housing development the victimized residents will receive apartments and a city pass, and instead of producers of farm produce, they will be consumers. Whom were these villages bothering (the village of Fedosino on the Kiev railway, for example), when they were surrounded by hundreds of hectares of empty space?

It turns out that the General Plan calls for this. At one time we told ourselves that the plan was the holy of holies of the citizen's economic, cultural and personal life, that the longer the period covered by the plan, the greater would be its sanctity, and the state and the citizen would feel more at ease and more confident. This gave rise to plans covering a period of 15 years.

But can this be justified in the contemporary world?

Today we plan GESs 15 years in advance under generally the same principle as 30 years ago. But the scientists are promising to replace the dangerous atomic energy plants with safe thermonuclear plants. If so, then the hydroelectric power plants with the adverse flooding of land and the heat and electric power plants with their inevitable pollution of the atmosphere will lose their priority. Just who set the odious period of 15 years? When was it set, and how?

All of the developed nations adhere to the principle of "zero level" of utilization of natural resources. We are not even thinking about this. Just what is a zero level? The resources expended during a certain year—1985, for example—is taken as zero, as the reference point. The permissible increase is set in advance—3-4% annually, for example, even less in certain nations (1-2% in Japan)—and growth of output must be achieved exclusively by improving technology, conserving raw materials and eliminating losses. The world will not survive any other way.

We are the only ones who think "we'll make it someday"!

No, we will not make it. The restructuring is seeking a way out of the situation, not ignoring many alternatives, seeking it in pluralism, in freedom of opinions.

The fact is, however, that pluralism will immediately resolve the problem for musicians. Musicians already play what they want to play and where—almost all night on the Arbat. Economics, however, is not at all a matter of freedom but of intelligent subordination to this or that system based on the experience of generations, which at the same time takes into account the society's most modern needs: not just economic and material needs, but spiritual needs as well.

A new method for resolving what at first glance appeared to be insolvable problems has appeared in the modern

world, and with most active participation by us. It is the method of international cooperation. This method has long been used, but it was hampered by the fact that the world community was split into camps: socialist and capitalist. This occurred during the first half of the twentieth century, and since the hostility was unnatural, the unnaturalness became apparent during the second half of the century.

It has become clear that large states do not have internal problems, that in one way or another all problems become international. This means that we now need to study—yes, study—the experience of other nations. Not just the developed nations, but the developing ones as well. After all, there is more substance in the process of development than in the result as such. Once again, however, we are not giving proper attention to the problem of international cooperation. Published articles on this subject could not be more boring, and there is no public participation whatsoever in its resolution. Ecology needs international cooperation even more than does economics, however.

Ecology, a program of action for saving mankind, is as unthinkable as science without the participation of the broadest segments of the population, of the entire planet. The problem of survival cannot be resolved in a single nation. Holes in the ozone layer do not distinguish between who is right and who is guilty, between neither the nationality nor the social affiliation of people.

The ecologists are aware of this. Is the state?

Whoever established the procedure whereby large-scale construction was begun based on unapproved plans, his expertise is now forcing us to face the need not just to reject the plan but even to shut down construction. Hundreds of millions and billions of rubles will be thrown to the wind, and the land is left deformed by uncaring trenches extending thousands and thousands of kilometers.

Yes, it is time to establish a dictatorship, ecological war communism. A bad thing? Indecent? But is it decent to die of ecological crimes? If we cannot reverse directions, can we not at least enact ecological legislation for the future based on examples existing in the world, hold several trials right now and increase ecological liability? Or is the state incapable of that as well?

The court, of course, should not be a one-way street. For disinformation and for the unjustified discrimination of a state establishment the guilty party must also be held accountable. Our departments have become unexpectedly modest about this, however. The press accused them of all sins, while they only sigh and say that they are not given the opportunity to speak!

By just whom? They should find out who and where. I have more than once accused the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources of state crimes and said that if I am wrong then I should be tried. But no, the ministry remains silent here as well. The magazine *Novyy Mir*

conducted the Aral-88 expedition made up of scientist, legal experts and film makers. It obtained unique information, submitted it to the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources (which had a representative on the expedition) and published the information, and what do you think? Not a single refutation was forthcoming. The department did not defend its honor.

In some states in the USA up to 85 percent of all the plans for utilizing nature go through the courts. The profession of legal ecologist exists there, while our minister who would destroy Aral ("if necessary, we shall drain the last drop from the Aral!") is considered a patriot.

We must ask ourselves: Do we want to live or not? Do we not know how? Are we not able? Not capable? This question is the last means of achieving our possible unification and comprehension. It would probably make no sense to put it any other way now.

Unification between whom? First of all, between public forces and organizations; then between the thinking members of the society and the state.

Both the state and the society now pin great hopes on the Committee for Ecology of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first steps taken by this committee have been vigorous and well-reasoned.

The state's relations with the ecological community must also be precisely defined. Not all of the community's demands can be met, but all of them should be considered. The registration of ecological societies is another matter. There needs to be some order in this matter, since many questionable groups are attempting to acquire the status of a legal person, a staff and funds. The establishment of an ecological foundation arose on the spur of the moment, essentially without the participation of those very societies which it is designed to unite financially, and those societies have no faith in it. The sources of the funds which it receives are still not known. It is apparently from those very departments which the foundation is designed to monitor.

I believe that the Committee for Ecology of the USSR Supreme Soviet should reregister all of the ecological societies.

The international ecological movement is gaining force by the year. It is headed by prominent scholars, but the USSR Academy of Sciences as a whole is still not focusing adequately on these problems. Once again, this is because the state is not demonstrating persistence and consistency. And finally, there is international cooperation. We recently entered into contact with Greenpeace, the world's most powerful green movement organization.

The Ecology and Peace Association (it is supported by the Soviet Peace Foundation) whose ranks include prominent scientists with the daily task of providing

public expert appraisal of plans for utilizing nature, primarily water management plans, advances two proposals:

1) The creation of an international ecological inspectorate similar to the disarmament inspectorates;

2) Working out international ecological norms and based on them, setting up:

—an international judicial commission of ecological experts;

—an international ecological tribunal.

We have discussed these proposals at numerous meetings with ecologists from various nations. We have submitted them also to our MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], where they met with understanding.

Time is passing. Fewer and fewer chances of survival remain.

The future—not the distant but the most immediate future—will show whether we have the strength and ability to take advantage of our last chances.

Ecological Program for Armenian SSR Development Proposed

90US0178 Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
26 Sep 89 p 3

[Interview with Ye.G. Khvatkov, head of the Ecology Sector at the Armenian SSR Gosplan Computer Center, by correspondent A. Gazazyan: "'EPRA' Begins its Path"]

[Text] Perhaps the ecology theme is among those most prominent on pages of newspapers and journals and in radio and television programs. This is understandable—the number of ecological catastrophes continues to grow. It seems as if there is no force capable of standing in the path of humanity's destructive invasion, led in its industrial pressure upon nature and the environment by the ruinous slogan: "Take everything from nature!"

There are increasing calls for the creation of special programs for ecological rescue. Yevgeniy Georgiyevich Khvatkov, head of the Ecology Sector at Armenian SSR Gosplan's Computer Center, has proposed one such program. It is called "The Ecological Program for the Development of the Armenian SSR" ("EPRA"). Possibly it too has some oversights and shortcomings. However, as is known, forward movement is possible only through the search for alternatives and through polemics and healthy discussion, from which the truth can arise.

[Correspondent] Yevgeniy Georgiyevich, we knew about the "Scheme for the Development and Location of Productive Forces in the Armenian SSR for the Period Up to 2005", developed by Armenian SSR Gosplan's Scientific Research Institute for Economics and Planning. Could you describe its basic points? What is it, in

your view, that prevents this program from extricating us from the critical situation that has been created?

[Ye.G. Khvatkov] I think that the main shortcoming in this Scheme is that it is based upon the same so-called "cost mechanism", with all its well known negative facets: sizable production outlays, excessive consumption of most types of materials, energy and labor, the production of products often not needed by customers and, simultaneously, the lack of economic managers with an interest in introducing the newest achievements of science and technology into production. It is no secret that environmental pollution in Armenia has reached a critical level. However, even under these conditions administrative-command methods continue to predominate both in the economic and the social sphere of Armenian society. The general pathway for the long term development and location of productive forces in the republic up until the year 2005 economic is a vivid example of this. Essentially this is the same work done 5, 10 and even 15 years ago. Corrections and refinements follow one another in a continuous series, moving from one five-year plan to another...

We know that in many leading capitalist countries first there is a scientific forecast of problems that have to be solved in the next 20 years. Then there is a determination of the levels of technical potential necessary to solve these problems. Here, however, everything is backward: First there is the number of people and funds, and only then the problems which must be solved. In addition, fashions are followed. For example, at the 26th CPSU Congress it was indicated that the efficiency of reconstructing production and the country's economic growth depends decisively upon machine building. Although this undoubtedly true conclusion applies on the most general level to the entire country, in our republic there was a senseless decision to increase the development rates of the machine building complex, a sector unsuitable to Armenia. The Scheme made provisions for increasing its production volume 3.5 fold by the year 2005; in monetary terms this exceeds 13 billion rubles. By that year machine building would account for 58 percent of total industrial production!

There are also indicative figures on the development of power engineering. Thus, it is intended to reconstruct and expand the Razdanskaya GRES and the Yerevan TETs, construct the 100 megawatt Ye. evan TETs-2 and build 38 small hydroelectric power plants with a total capacity of 162 megawatts on the rivers of Armenia. There were no energy conservation measures at all. The Scheme for Development said nothing at all about using solar energy, wind and biomass.

The Scheme is entirely lacking in forecasts on the newest types of pollution free transportation. One can cite many things in this Scheme worthy of the time of stagnation...

Our task is to find our particular forms of development applicable to our specific region, guided in this by the most fundamental principles. It should not be forgotten

that this search is as continuous as are social and technical development, changes in external conditions, the presentation of new demands and potentials.

[Correspondent] As I understood it, EPRA is nothing less than a total alternative to the Scheme for Development. Is this true?

[Ye.G. Khvatkov] Yes, it is a new path. Essentially, the program, worked out at the Gosplan Computer Center, is still the only acceptable one for the present critical situation of continuing irreversible environmental pollution. It is a program for the ecological development of the republic. It has become necessary because today there is every reason to talk not only of a strategy for the ecological education and development of the people, but also nothing more or less than the very saving of the gene pool of the Armenian nation.

Of course, a lot of difficult work awaits us. However, we are undertaking the very difficult and, at the same time, honorable task of scientifically justifying and outlining new directions in the development of the regional economy, new alternative modes of consumption requiring less energy and nonrenewable resources, making it possible to recycle materials. We have almost reached that final frontier where there is no other alternative but to create an ecological society—an interlinked one, requiring new institutional models and new human relationships and values.

[Correspondent] You call the EPRA an all encompassing strategy for the ecological survival of Armenian society. What does this program include in addition to perestroika in the national economic complex?

[Ye.G. Khvatkov] It includes many other problems in society's vital activities. The cultural program is an important component of the EPRA metaprogram. Based upon extensive data, testing and analysis, there will be scientifically based, thorough recommendations on the aesthetic, artistic, historical and ecological education of younger generations. Equal attention will be given to the increasingly acute problems of recreation ecology. There will be serious research on the ecological aspects of tourism, sports and physical culture. Considerable attention is to be given to ecological museums—an important component in cultural and ecological education. A program for medical ecology will be equally important. We already know the colossal costs of so-called "free" treatment. The basic attention of our researchers will be upon nontraditional searches for optimal alternatives. There will obviously have to be a very thorough study of the dead end in medicine based not upon prevention but upon treatment. We propose a thorough modernization of medical education at all stages of people's lives. Great hopes here are placed upon the creation of an extensive network of "health schools" in the region. I envision an extensive network of International Centers for health. Their trouble free functioning will be very profitable to sectors of the economy such as international medical tourism. Foreign exchange earnings will make it possible

for the republic to more easily solve several other regional health care problems caused by hard currency shortages.

The program gives a prominent place to the many problems in urban ecology: urban construction, architecture, urbanization and infrastructure. People in Yerevan do not have to be told that no other city in the country has so many garages as does the republic's capital or that the city's greenery, an excellent biological filter, is in sorry shape. Vegetation continues to be replaced by faceless grey stone.

[Correspondent] However, let us turn to industry. One has to agree that at the present stage its role will continue to grow, or that general development levels will be judged according to its development.

[Ye.G. Khvatkov] However, does this require that we produce huge numerically controlled general purpose machine tools? Incidentally these require importing into the republic many hundreds of thousands of tons of various metals. I think that the alternative path for machine tool production in the republic today is to produce only science intensive products: laser machine tools, small machine tools for making instruments and, finally, a new generation of physics instruments. In this last area Armenian scientists are able to compete with even the leading foreign firms. For example, at the Ekspo-88 international exposition the world scientific public was genuinely interested in an instrument created by scientists at the Institute for Problems in Applied Physics, part of the Armenian SSR Academy of Science.

Tell me, is it really so important for Armenia to be a mighty industrial power? We are a grape growing region. To the Armenian peasant the vine always represented something more than a source of income. The vine was daily bread and a spiritual mainstay. In forgetting the past, tearing out vineyards and transplanting alien machine tool building and destructive chemical industry to Armenia, we thus completely rejected our past.

There is an alternative to machine building, power engineering and contemporary transportation. I would like to dwell in more detail upon the latter. In Yerevan, located in a basin, with frequent calms, weak winds and temperature inversions and finally, with the country's highest levels of solar radiation, every inhabitant is "offered" each day air containing 2,000 cubic meters of carbon monoxide—the poisonous component of motor vehicle exhaust—per person. It should also be kept in mind that carbon monoxide remains in the atmosphere about 4 months. Given these extreme conditions the transportation problem must be solved first.

First among the other fundamental measures should be the parking of privately owned motor vehicles outside the city limits. This would be done by building collective parking lots and simultaneously removing from within the city limits the tens of thousands of private garages, these "warts on the Yerevan landscape." However, although this is a fundamental measure, it is only a

temporary one for saving the capital air basin. The main thing is to completely eliminate from the main thoroughfares of Yerevan the vehicles that inflict so much damage upon people and the environment, replacing them with electrically powered vehicles: light rail systems and electric taxis on special routes. These and other vehicles have now been operated for many years in several industrially developed countries. It should also be kept in mind that electric vehicles make only about one-fourteenth as much noise as do ordinary vehicles. Consequently, this step would immediately have a double benefit.

The construction of high speed transportation is necessary to most completely handle suburban traffic and to minimize the time required for commuting and getting to recreational areas. Quiet and comfortable overhead monorail vehicles are completely realistic and the least harmful to the environment. Such lines should link the capital with areas for sports, tourists and recreation—Echmiadzin, Gegard, Tsakhkadzor and Sevan. Do we not need a monorail to, say, Stepanakert?

All health resorts should be freed from irreversible air pollution by motor vehicles. In our opinion, these vehicles should be replaced by solarmobiles (for example, the Swiss have a 58 seat bus which is powered by energy from 30 square meters of solar panels mounted on the roof). If these were supplied to health resorts their ecological problems would be completely solved. It may be possible to acquire a group of these solar buses from Switzerland on the basis of an exchange where, having mastered their production we could build our own modification in Armenia, at the Yerevan Motor Vehicle Plant.

Suspended cable transportation systems could help to some extent. You may object that the equipment is not available. However the brilliant solution to this problem, discovered in Georgia, may be a convincing example for us. Georgian specialists proposed using organizations in the republic State Committee for Specialized Transportation as a base for joint enterprises among CEMA countries to produce suspended cable transportation system equipment for all regions in our country.

Our ordinary trolley buses should be converted to power supply from a single contact wire. This will not only reduce the demand for light metals and electrical energy but, most importantly, will make these buses more maneuverable.

[Correspondent] Does your program have alternative proposals for the Armenian chemical industry?

[Ye.G. Khvatkov] Of course, Here it is also important that our studies to improve the structure of chemicals production be based upon cost recovery. New norms for the activities of such enterprises are also an important tool for improving the environment. Because of huge fines, enterprises which cannot completely eliminate their harmful emissions will simply cease to exist. However, it seems to us that the reorientation of many sectors

in the chemical industry and a radical break with the target programs of chemical industry scientists should first of all be in the most promising direction, biotechnology, and the conversion of our chemical industry workers into suppliers of the most efficient good in world trade—the knowledge embedded in fundamentally new waste free technologies and science intensive products. Is this grandiose scheming? By no means! Here is an example of new technology capable of successfully competing with the best foreign products. At the main plant in the Armelektrokondensator Association in Leninakan (prior to the deadly earthquake) trichlorodiphenyl, a highly toxic compound, was used to manufacture products. In this work at the Leninakan they used a technique from the Kondensator Plant in Serpukhov, near Moscow. However, there had long been questions raised about closing that enterprise. The dangerous manufacturing line has been sealed.

At the Yerevan branch of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Power Condensers, part of the Association, they created new types of condensers meeting world standards. We are not exaggerating. In 1986 a state commission compared the quality of the Yerevan condensers with the best in the world—those from Siemens, the West German firm. It determined that the Yerevan models had the best parameters.

[Correspondent] Your metaprogram is extensive, and, in my view, extremely complicated.

[Ye.G. Khvatkov] Yes, it really is a huge amount of work. However, it is also true that a great deal can be accomplished by creative work and by taking the initiative. This is why in rejecting the old cliché: "It is dangerous to work better than others, one must subscribe

to the leveling system", or the more vulgar: "Don't stand out", we are emphasizing the search for talented leaders and are not looking back as we make the transition to ecological activity based upon new human values (instead of the "values of consumption") and are thinking like Svyatoslav Fedorov, who asserted that "in stimulating people 'to work with their brains' we are in practice stimulating science, and this is better than thoughtless, unsystematic financing of some institute. A single talented inventor can replace an entire institute. Therefore, it is socially dangerous not to respect talent or simply to materially underestimate it..." I hope that more extensive research will continue at the Center for Ecologonospheric Research, recently set up in the republic.

Many fear that specific goals, results and simple tangibility are not now sufficient to protect the environment. In creating a republic territorial comprehensive ecological program for develop we want to fill this important gap.

So, the reader has become acquainted with the general features of the Ecological Program for the Development of the Armenian SSR. It undoubtedly contains many interesting suggestions and projects. Possibly some of them will be used in the Armenian national ecological program, some will be used by those who are firmly resolved to struggle for the purity of the environment, and some will become the subject of careful study by inventors or efficiency experts. The editors are interested in the most improbable suggestions from the readers. Who knows, an idea which at first glance seems unthinkable today may become a world sensation tomorrow. After all, the search for paths to ecological stabilization is being actively conducted throughout the world.

Aytmatov Defends Budget Allocations for Culture

90UN0215A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in
Russian 2 Nov 89 p 1

[Speech by Chingiz Aytmatov, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the Commission on Questions of Developing Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, and Protection of the Historical Heritage, presented at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Who Will Support Our Culture?"]

[Text] One young Soviet man, who is now 17 years old and who hails from the Siberian region, left for the USA a year ago so that there, having established permanent residence, he could devote himself to science. The leaders of the university there, convinced by the entrance exams that the young Russian who had come to them had outstanding abilities, gave him a stipend which would correspond to our professor's salary. They created all the conditions which would enable him to study and to do research work at the same time, and moreover, the immigrant's family got a good apartment in a nearby city, as well as credit to buy a personal automobile...

There can be no doubt about what America is gaining in this manner, taking the world's cream of the crop. There can be no doubt that its capital investments into the development of intellect will pay for themselves tomorrow a hundredfold as in no other sector, and there can also be no doubt that its scientific potential is rising, as if on yeast. No more than a few days ago I was amazed by the fact that every seat of a new passenger airliner had its own built-in telephone, which could be used to call any place in the world during the flight. But we are not talking about that.

What was it that motivated the Soviet family to embark on such a long journey, which was far from simple and not always so favorable? The reason for this, we believe, is primarily the attitude of devaluation and disrespect in our totalitarian consciousness, which prefers the common levelling approach as the "revolutionary" and "class" principle towards a highly gifted and extraordinary individual, and towards society's intellectual fund, both in specific cases and on the whole. In this case, it was not only the material difficulties of our life, especially in the peripheral areas, which played their role, but also the fact that the young man was faced with the inevitable fate of being called up for army service, in connection with which his parents had fears about the army's consequences, and not without reason. (After all, no one could guarantee that the fellow would not end up in a unit where rigid "seniority" flourished), not to mention that the interruption in development of current intellect and the distraction to other matters was inadmissible, since [his education] is an ever-increasing creative act. Saving the fate of their son, the parents decided to emigrate. The case, it would seem, is a specific one. Yet it has a correlation to all of our life.

This phenomenon is generally called a "brain drain", and it is the first sign of degradation of culture. It is

explained not only by the country's poverty, but also by false social teachings about the good of general equalization. Culture cannot develop in a full-fledged manner without the priority given to it by democratic society. The brain drain has encompassed not only the scientific environment, especially the technical. The best musicians are leaving the country. At the Moscow Conservatory, whose high caliber of instructional staff was at one time viewed as a world achievement, the staff is currently melting before our very eyes. The most interesting artists, writers, and leaders in film and theatre are leaving... All this cannot help but have an effect on tomorrow's domestic culture. Does this not indicate that totalitarian society, at the outcome of which we are living, in assimilating democracy for the first time is unable to nurture its intellectual elite? And without this, as life has already long ago proven, progress of civilization is impossible. Yet the times have changed, and new measures are needed for solving the problems.

I am saying this so that, in the compilation of our plans and budgets for economic and social development of the state, we do not forget the age in which we are living. To plan by the old gosplan method at the end of the 20th century is already a hopeless anachronism, leading the country to a centralized dead end. Supposedly today we are lighting the way for regional cost accounting, supposedly we are gaining hope that we will free ourselves of the many years of stagnation, but at the same time we cannot forget one most important peculiarity. This peculiarity concerns the development of science and all of culture as a whole. That is, the technological factor today encompasses not only industrialization as such, but the entire volume and multi-aspectuality of current intellect, as the new thinking of the computer culture.

Are we ready for this innovation of the age, and are we doing everything we can to see that we do not find ourselves at the tail end of a rapid escalation of new world intellect?

I am afraid that we do not fully understand the role of the new planetary culture. After all, the capacity for computer thought is engendered from childhood, literally from the pre-school age. This is an irrefutable law. If we now suddenly tried to wipe out computer illiteracy in the country, nothing would come of it. Only the new upcoming generations will be able to adapt completely to that which we have let slip by in recent years. We must make provisions in our plans and budgets for such a development of culture. For this purpose, we need to develop in our plans a special program of computer education for children, to provide for instructor training, and to provide also for the expenditures which all this will entail.

As always, the attitude toward questions of culture is the touchstone on which the intentions of the government are tested, its orientation toward man and toward his spiritual renewal, the need for which, it would seem, is acknowledged by all. In regard to culture, we feel most acutely that duality, that half-measure approach which is

characteristic for many of our departments and decisions. Thus, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies remembers about culture at the very last minute and adopts a resolution on the development of a long-range program for its realization. Inspired by this resolution, our commission performs work on its implementation. A cardinal proposal is presented on convening the All-Union Assembly of People's Deputies on questions of cultural development. The people's deputies of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics, the oblasts and okrugs, and the representatives of national-cultural societies and associations will gather on the basis of equality at this, a sort of "cultural parliament". There is hope that such a broad and representative meeting will allow us to promote the solution of many major problems in cultural development and to define the principles for a long-term program and for legislation on culture.

For a month-and-a-half, the commission thoroughly reviewed the questions associated with the plan and the budget. During the discussion of these documents, from the very beginning we proceeded from a recognition of the country's difficult economic position and strived to reduce additional requests to a minimum. The priorities were thoroughly weighed. As a result, only two major problems were placed at the center of attention. First of all, the immediate resolution of the question of increasing the salaries of cultural enlightenment workers. Secondly, the development of television. The question of wages could no longer be put off because today the workers of clubs, libraries and museums may be equated with pensioners in the level of their wages. For this reason, the cadre turnover defies description. If we wait any longer, as the government has proposed, then perhaps in another year it will be senseless to increase the wages—i.e., there will be no one to increase them for.

It is not necessary to prove the need for developing television. Today this is the primary mass channel of culture and social information. It is the most important guarantee of glasnost. We will recall how much concern there was in the country on the question of live broadcasting from the Congress and from this meeting hall. The development of national cultures and languages of the people of our country requires the creation of television in all krais and oblasts.

After long-term work by the commission, it prepared well thought-out conclusions on the plan and the budget. In the course of discussion of these conclusions in the Plan-Budget Commission, complete mutual understanding was achieved. And now in the draft of the joint conclusion we see two absolutely new positions. As the means for development of culture we are offered, first of all, to deny tax benefits to all artists unions and social organizations and secondly, to reduce by 10 percent, or 200 million rubles, the allocations for television, TASS, and APN.

If this budget is the mirror of our life, then it seems we are living in a "kingdom of warped mirrors". On one

hand, the draft of the law on taxation proposes elimination of taxes on the income of enterprises contributed for the development of culture and art. On the other—it proposes imposing taxes on the income of enterprises of artists' unions, all of whose profits go toward the development of culture and art. According to our evaluations and in the opinion of all the USSR people's deputies involved in the development of culture, this is a direct course toward eliminating the activity of all the artists' unions and undermining their financial foundation.

The logic of the proposal for reducing allocations for television is similar in many ways. In its analysis of the plan and the budget, the commission expressed a number of critical comments regarding the maintenance of television operation, pointing out the inadmissibility of its commercialization. Here, reproaches were expressed to our defense sectors for their inadequate efforts in utilizing the conversion for technical retooling of this entirely peaceful sector. An important place in the commission's conclusion belonged to questions of developing a network of new television centers. In answer to all these comprehensive measures, the draft of the joint conclusion proposes increasing the commercialization of television and the volume of advertising broadcasting, and reducing the state allocation by 200 million rubles. Moreover, this proposal has far-reaching socio-political ramifications which are beyond the intentions of their authors. As yet we do not have such goods or such a state of competition so that hundreds of millions could be collected for advertisements, as is the practice in the West. That means our television will have a choice—either to begin drastic cut-backs on integrated programs, to reduce their effectiveness, which would have a negative effect primarily on glasnost, or to reject the development of a system of local broadcasting, which is an important instrument in activation of socio-political life and harmonization of international relations.

On the whole, the efforts to recarve the meager culture budget are today fruitless. The funds must be sought, and we have pointed this out, by means of continually monitoring all the interrelated chains. If, for example, we find additional paper, then there will be additional money in the budget and the people will have books. Yet this logic demands the breaking of departmental barriers, and it has not received support. But then the question arises: "Who will support our culture?". After all, the budget allocates only 1.2 percent for culture and art. As a comparison, the GDR budget provides for 1.6 percent, and the CSSR—over 2 percent.

Will our budget really become a weighty argument in the hands of those who maintain that our words and intentions will never become a reality? Do all the deputies present here really agree that we can ruin the cultural heritage of the country and its spiritual perspectives merely for the sake of some relatively meager budget funds? Let us weigh it out. Too much has been thrown onto the scales. We are talking already not about money, but essentially about whether we will nurture the culture

of the Homeland, whether we will make our contribution to the development of world culture.

Recent Literature on Afghan War Reviewed

90UN0102A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 42, 18 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Lt Col Petr Tkachenko: "We Have Not Yet Returned...": Stories and Tales of the Afghan War"]

[Text] Time and time again we must persuade ourselves that wars do not end with that long-awaited day when the guns fall silent. They continue in the souls of those who underwent the baptism of fire in them.

It is becoming increasingly more obvious that a wave of works marked by profound psychological insight, and sometimes by merciless frankness, is building in the literature on the war on Afghan soil, and particularly in prose. These are, first of all, works by direct participants of the war.

Unfortunately the voice of the Afghan veterans themselves remained inaudible for a long time, and still continues to be so at the moment. In the meantime there have been opportunities to hear this voice by those who wanted to hear the pain expressed by this voice, and were capable of doing so. First in military songs recorded on tape recorder cassettes, and now in works of prose.

"You are a witness, there's no turning back.
Write the history, with respect for the censors.
And between the lines your wounded battalion commander
Will fill the space between your quotation marks with blood.

Afghan veterans have talked about themselves, without very much respect for the censors, and they continue their confessions today.

The notes of officer Fedor Oshevnev, "May the Cup Pass You By" (LITERATURNAYA UCHEBA No 4, 1989) do not fit within the framework of the story genre.

The hero is captured, the dushman have prepared a terrible, agonizing punishment for him—successively removing his arms and his legs under anesthesia.... He is freed by his comrades in arms. What they free is essentially a living stump that has transformed "into a brain practically locked into itself." Then his athletic wife leaves him. And he ponders the fact that had this woe not befallen him, they might have lived their entire life never suspecting that they were strangers to each other.

A different yardstick of values. Note that while in works written earlier the war itself was the highest yardstick of the test of physical and moral strength, in today's works of prose this yardstick becomes the time of peace, in which they, the Afghan veterans, find it so difficult to achieve spiritual equilibrium. Some never really do....

What is it that allows the hero of the story "May the Cup Pass You By" to maintain a hold on this life? Perhaps the fact that he was once saved by Senior Lieutenant Sergey Vetrov. And now, thinking about his fate, he is unable to decide whether Vetrov should have sacrificed himself to save his life....

The story "There Will Be a Rendering..." (YUNOST No 8, 1989) by Sergey Dyshev, who made his debut with the tale "A Bullet on the Palm" in the Young Guards almanac PODVIG (No 32, 1988), is also a doubtless accomplishment.

Stepan Prokhorov is the only survivor of an ambushed platoon. Having lost all sense of time, he makes his way back to his own side. But just before the battle Prokhorov had given a letter from home to a compatriot of his, Ivanov, who was from the same town. Ivanov's mutilated body is "identified" on the basis of this letter, and buried at home on the assumption that this was Prokhorov....

The author is able to communicate the state of a person who finds himself surrounded by foes in the mountains without food and water. At first it seems that he turns all of his attention to the physical sufferings of his hero. But the real moral sufferings, the sensation of blameless guilt simply because he survived by the whims of chance, begin later for him, when he introduces himself to the parents of his deceased comrade....

It is only the man in the street who believes that the moral conflict of Afghan veterans in society reduces simply to the fact that bureaucrats are not responsive to their needs. This is of course true. But the main thing, I think, is that Afghan veterans carry with them all the memories of this terrible war, the echo of its tragedy, in peacetime. Oleg Yermakov's story "Yellow Hill" (ZNAMYA No 3, 1989) is devoted to this moral adaptation of Afghan veterans. The story is deeply psychological and associative. To our astonishment, the author does not appear to describe anything significant in it—all he attempts to do is transmit the stream of consciousness of his hero.

Using as an example the creativity of Oleg Yermakov, a doubtlessly gifted storyteller, we can already discern some patterns in prose written by Afghan veterans, and trends which have not yet fully developed but which already make their existence tangibly known.

What is important is not the subject itself but the level at which it is personified. Here before us is one more story by O. Yermakov—"Safe Return" (NOVYY MIR No 8, 1989). It seems to me that the subject matter portrayed here is motivated to a lesser extent by psychology and worldly concerns. Let me explain this with one psychological detail. Having served his time, and fulfilled his military and international duty, Orshev hitches a ride with a passing column to Kabul, from where he is to fly back to the Soviet Union. The captain who gives him the ride says in parting, half joking and half serious: "Did you get a few of them, killer?" This statement causes the

reader's conscience to "stumble": Only a person who contemplates events from the sidelines, who is unaware of many things and who is unsuspecting of many things can say such a thing. But he who may have to "get a few" of "them" tomorrow would never say such a thing. Since he also lives in accordance with the merciless laws of war: Kill or be killed....

Here is another Afghanistan story—Aleksandr Segen's "Heat," published in the first issue of the creative literature collection "Slovo" [The Word] (Sovremennik, Moscow, 1989). The story's hero, Sveshnikov, goes to see his only son in a Tashkent military hospital. He is told that Serezha lost both legs. Sveshnikov divorced his wife, but he had not yet told his son—so as not to traumatize him, he thought. He carried the hope in his heart that they would now continue their lives together.... But when Sveshnikov finally gets around to telling Sergey that his mother and father were divorced, he hears the unruffled reply: "You think your problems are big...." And a thought flashes through Sveshnikov's mind which was to now determine their relationship: "It's as if he's my father, and not the reverse." The conversation with his son falls apart. Sveshnikov leaves with the feeling that they would never find spiritual kinship. And he asks his son's forgiveness: "Forgive me, Serezha, for everything...."

Given the openness and tragedy with which the subject is portrayed, I still would not place Afghan prose in the same category as the "hard" literature that is surfacing more and more. It has only a casual relationship to the classics, and usually to Dostoevskiy. But while in the classical tradition the individual remains an individual in the most improbable conditions, what is basically portrayed in modern "hard" literature is how the personality is lost irretrievably beneath the burden of social adversities, how it disintegrates. While the classics maintain faith in the moral revival of the individual, today's "hard" prose does not seem to leave such a hope. On the other hand the Afghanistan literature tends, in my opinion, more toward the classical tradition than toward the new literature. This can be felt for example in the story "Baptism" by O. Yermakov (ZNAMYA No 3, 1989) and in F. Oshevnev's story "May the Cup Pass You By."

"Baptism" ends, it seems to me, with a startling psychological situation. Soldier Kostomygin, apparently morally broken, recalls what happened during the battle in the kishlak. Dushman machinegunners who had fired on the company and killed Medvedev were captured. Before the officers get there, Salikhov kills one of them and Kostomygin himself fires a short burst into the broad chest of the other. But Oparin refuses to shoot. He would prefer to shoot himself than to kill an unarmed man. And Kostomygin hates him for this. Or perhaps because he himself had overstepped a certain line of morality which a person should not cross? Kostomygin is seized by a kind of strange state of indifference, in which he "would have wanted his heart to stop right now. But it doesn't."

The reader is offered what appear to be alternative life positions, but ultimately they converge on the possibilities for the moral revival of the heroes: Oparin, who had not violated the commandments, who had not overstepped the line, awaits retribution for this, while Kostomygin, who had overstepped the line and thus heaped the burden of moral judgment upon himself, awaits another form of retribution.

A similar collision also occurs in the story by F. Oshevnev—in the scene in which the maimed hero talks with his mother.

The new wave of prose on the war, it seems to me, is distinguished not only by a new level of factual and historical truth, but also by psychological and artistic truth. I think that this war literature may provide direction to our contemporary prose in general.

For the sake of justice it should be noted that this "war prose" has its origins in the works of a few professional writers, Aleksandr Prokhanov among them. We now have some new stories from him—"Kindred Spirit" and "Moslem Wedding" (MOSKVA No 2, 1989).

In the story "Kindred Spirit," food supply Depot Chief Warrant Officer Vlasov is a person in a job that keeps him far away from the fighting, but the whims of chance that befall everyone in war lead to his capture by the dushman. He is subjected to terrible outrage—castration. And yet, he survives. This pain, this mark remains with him forever like a curse. What we have here is the personal tragedy of a person who had participated in that war, growing in the story to the proportions of a profound symbol.

Social tragedy is believably portrayed in the story "Moslem Wedding." Intelligence Chief Berezkin is hopelessly enmeshed in the intrigues of Afghan tribal politics. The helicopters he calls in bomb not Makhmudkhan's dushman wedding but the kishlak of an ally, Seyfuddin.... And yet Berezkin had sincerely wanted to help people. But his help turned into disaster for both them and himself. Nothing could ever make up for his fatal mistake. Such is the revenge for interference in an incomprehensible way of life. A question asked of Berezkin by teacher Fazl encompasses the entire depth of the resulting tragedy: "Why do Shuravi [transliteration] deceive those who have become their friends and are prepared to fight with them against self-interested and treacherous people?" And Berezkin the fighting officer had nothing to say in reply.

But even in the Afghan subject matter a certain stereotype is already beginning to surface. Without getting into the artistic merits of the publicistic stories of Vladimir Vozovikov, published in the Library of SOVETSKIY VOIN (No 1, 1989), and of Yuri Teplov in his book "Vtoroy variant" [The Second Variant] (Voenizdat, 1988), let me note just one thing: Doesn't the fact that their titles—"Cherry-Colored"—are absolutely the same suggest a stereotype? Or consider another disappointing example: Viktor Svetikov's story "Don't Leave Your

Loved Ones" from his book "Vershiny" [Summits] (Molodaya gvardiya, 1989). It seems to me that the author is concerned least of all with exploring the spiritual and sometimes pathological states of his heroes. The intonation of his storytelling is provocatively blagostnaya [translation unknown].

I feel certain that even in its best works, Afghan prose has not yet said its last word about the war. What it seems to be doing now primarily is making up for opportunities for exposure missed earlier.

It will apparently be only after returning soldiers find their spiritual equilibrium in our present life, which is running over with social problems, that a real literature about the war will be created.

And then, when the euphoria of radical overstatements, sometimes made as an end unto themselves, cools down, we will return to these events with the object of comprehending them, we will soberly assess not only the costs of our nine-year presence there, but also its moral content.

Returning Afghan veterans are working themselves back into peacetime life. Their subsequent destiny depends of course upon all of us. But we also depend on them as well, albeit not always noticeably. They have introduced a kind of unrepeatable emotional note into our life. They brought with them a new love for the motherland, discovered far away from it and acquired by them at such a high price. They returned to us some degree of the lofty concepts of patriotism, courage and military heroism. They returned to us a keen perception of life—its tragedy, without which our understanding of it cannot be complete. Precious concepts that had been overshadowed by day-to-day troubles were in a sense discovered anew, and filled with new meaning.

As I write these lines I keep hearing the voice of an Afghan veteran, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Mikhaylov, and I remember the words of his song, which appear to be the key to understanding the present situation of the people who fought in Afghanistan and have returned to peacetime life: "We have not yet returned, even though we have become habituated to city streets and tall buildings...." Their final return, I think, will coincide with the time when they will be able to express themselves fully in the literature.

Writers Group 'Aprel' Decries 'Russian Chauvinism,' Defends Baltics

90UN088A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 38, 22 Sep 89 p 8

[Unsigned article: "'Aprel' On the Events in the Baltic Region"]

[Text] The editorial offices of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA received an announcement from the Council of the literary-social movement "Aprel" (Writers in support of perestroika - WSP), headed: "'Aprel' on the events in the Baltic Region."

We are citing an excerpt from this announcement.

"In 1939-40, the fate of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was decided by a cynical, rapacious deal between Stalin and Hitler on apportionment of spheres of influence.

"..The attempts, e.g., by the newspaper PRAVDA (29 August 1989), to reprint reports of the American writer Anna-Louisa Strong and other material from 1940 as proof that Lithuania joined the USSR in a peaceful, 'natural way' cannot stand up to criticism and only give rise to bitter laughter. The same degree of success follows attempts to refer to the constant 99 percent of votes cast in favor of the 'bloc of Communists and those running without a party' in all elections in the Baltic region for almost a half century.

"..The seizure, the annexation of the Baltic republics in 1940 is an undisputable fact.

".. A letter addressed by the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union 'To all the citizens of Estonia, to the workers and intelligentsia of the Soviet Union' contains an open call for the central government to interfere directly in these events, without saying a word about the serious efforts of the Estonians to find compromise solutions to these extremely difficult problems.

"One cannot fail to remember the speeches of several deputies during the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet reproaching the citizens of the Baltics for the fact that they live better than many workers of the Urals and other Russian regions.

"Indeed, only a distorted situation could give rise to such a distorted idea!

"In the Announcement of the CPSU Central Committee published 27 August 1989, we find lines that are in the nature of an ultimatum, hinting at the possibility of direct reprisals.. Isn't this how the Czechs and Slovaks were 'warned' in 1968?

"..Those who are for Russia, must be for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

"There must be no unified Russian chauvinistic front."

Foundation Created to Reconstruct Moscow Church

90UN0088B Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 39, 22 Sep 89 p 11

[Article by Yu. Borisov: "This Is A Monument For The Ages: Center of Conciliation And Unity: A Fund Is Established To Reconstruct The Church of Christ the Savior"]

[Excerpts] For almost an entire year, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA has been publishing material concerning the need to reconstruct in Moscow one of Russia's great monuments—the Church of Christ the Savior, built in honor of the victory of the Russian people in the patriotic war of 1812. These articles became a sort of

referendum, in which the participants spoke almost unanimously in favor of erection of the Church of Christ the Savior on the same site in Moscow where it had stood until December 1931 and in favor of establishment of a fund to rebuild the Church of Christ the Savior.

And now such a fund has been established!

On 22 September, on the 150th anniversary of the day the foundations of the Church of Christ the Savior were laid, a constituent conference was held at the editorial offices of the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. The founders and the trustees of the Fund, which could be established only in our day of revolutionary renewal of spiritual and cultural life, included more than 30 organizations, institutions, and cooperatives. Among them were the weekly LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, the Public Committee to Save the Volga, the Association of Russian Artists, the Fund for Slavonic Letters and Cultures, the Russian Homelands Society of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Screen Arts, "Unity" the Association of Lovers of Russian Folklore and Art, the coordinating council of the creative association "Russian Center" of the USSR Writers Union, the journals NASH SOVREMENNİK and MOSKVA, the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR, the Moscow Instrumental Choir (director A. Afanasyev), the "Duty" Club of Internationalist Warriors of Leningrad, the "Glas" theater of Moscow, the Leningrad division of the Fellowship of Russian Artists, the Military-Patriotic Center "Rodina" of the Leningrad obkom of the Komsomols, the "Otechestvo" [Fatherland] All-Russian Military Patriotic and Artistic Historical Research Center, the Moscow city division of the All-Union Association for Protection of Nature and Culture, the Club of Lovers of the Art of Konstantin Vasilyev, the "Optimalist" cooperative from Novosibirsk, the "Lazur" literary-editorial cooperative of Moscow, the "Otechestvo" patriotic association from Tyumen, the Center for Military Patriotic Youth Clubs of the Moscow City Committee of Komsomols, the Center for International Scientific and Technological Activity, Research, and Social Initiatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Yesenin All-Union Committee of the USSR Writers Union, and a number of others.

The constituent conference was opened and conducted by S. Rybas, deputy editor-in-chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

Participants in the conference, distinguished writers, scholars, artists, public figures, and representatives of the USSR Armed Forces—discussed all aspects of the complex issue of creating a new social institute and expressed confidence that the Fund would become a center that would foster conciliation among Russians no matter where on our planet they lived, would unite the peoples of Russia in the task of restoring remembrance of their history and their spiritual values and culture, and would facilitate the restoration of the Church of Christ the Savior in Moscow.

The conference ratified a charter for the Fund and elected a board and auditing commission. The writer Vladimir Soloukhin was made chairman of the board. Members of the Fund's board include: G. Sviridov, composer and USSR people's artist; I. Shafarevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; the writers, V. Karpets, V. Krupin, Yu. Loshchits, S. Rybas; the sculptors, V. Klykov, V. Mokrousov, and N. Rozov; the artist, M. Kugach; F. Shipunov, director of the laboratory of biospheric research of the Institute of the Lithosphere of the USSR Academy of Sciences; P.V. Florenskiy, doctor of geological sciences; S. Shatokhin, co-chairman of the Public Committee to Save the Volga; Professor A. Darkov; civil engineer A. Ivanov; Major General V. Klinov; Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A. Rutskoy; People's Artist of the RSFSR, M. Nozhkin; official of the Troitse-Sergiyev Lavra (monastery) A. Anisimov; and Yu. Yushkin, director of the historical/literary division of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA.

The constituent conference adopted a message, the text of which is published below.

At the conclusion of the constituent conference, replying to a question put by a LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA correspondent, Major General V. P. Klinov, an instructor at the Military Academy of the General Staff, who had been elected a member of the Fund's board, stated:

"The Fund for Reconstructing the Church of Christ the Savior is specific in nature. Its goal is to restore this memorial to the soldiers who died in the war of 1812, its heroes. Everyone knows that the armed forces have suffered the same ills of stagnation endured by society as a whole. If we are to move away from this stagnant period there must be more unity between the armed forces and the people, more active participation of the community in the affairs of the armed forces and of the armed forces in the affairs of the community.

"After the organization for administering this fund has been set up, I propose that we appeal to the Chief Political Board of the Soviet Army and Navy. Undoubtedly, the Chief Political Board and Ministry of Defense will respond positively, and so, I believe, will the Moscow and other garrisons.

"Monuments such as the Church of Christ the Savior have great educational significance, they perform an enormous patriotic function by fostering respect for our national treasures. The Church was one of the major monuments of our people, our Motherland. In all the annals of world architecture this monument is ranked alongside Kizha, the Kremlin, Isaak Church, etc. By the way, it was built with money contributed by the Russian people and, I believe, not only will state, party and Soviet organs take part in rebuilding the church, but our entire society, our people will offer their contributions for reconstruction of this monument."

The closing ceremony marking the inception of the Fund to Reconstruct the Church of Christ the Savior was a

benefit evening at the "Rossiya" movie theater honoring the 150th anniversary of the laying of the church's foundation.

The evening was opened with a speech by Vladimir Soloukhin who spoke about the erection and destruction of this great Russian monument. When you think, he said, about this punishment, about the destruction of the Church of Christ the Savior, you feel the need to find one definitive word to describe it. Was it voluntarism (arbitrary manifestation of despotic power), thoughtlessness, temporary insanity, ill-will, cruelty, or simply a crime? One keeps returning to the word "desecration." This was a triple desecration: desecration of beauty, desecration of faith, and desecration of the people's memory.

The destruction of the Church of Christ the Savior was the apotheosis of desecration. And it is our duty to resurrect it in its original form on the site where it was erected 150 years ago.

The need to reconstruct this remarkable creation of the architect Ton, and to revive beauty and monuments to the people was noted during the evening by I. Shafarevich, G. Sviridov, V. Krupin, F. Shipunov, Father Valeriy (Suslin), Yu. Loschits, Doctor of Economics M.M. Lemeshev, P.V. Florenskiy, and A. Anisimov. Their ideas were warmly supported by all those present, who with great enthusiasm approved the message of the constituent conference.

Message

Fellow countrymen!

With awe, but with joy, happiness, and faith we are undertaking to reconstruct and rebuild this memorial to our forefathers who sacrificed their lives!

Each people has forefathers! In honoring them, a people defines itself in the present, and can only give the future to their children by continuing to remember them. The worth of a people, its spiritual, moral, and physical strengths have been created through its history. Participation in history is a measure of the worth of sons of the Fatherland and a pledge of their future!

The people of our multinational Motherland have prevailed! After the tragedy of the civil war and social upheavals, our peoples remain true to the fathers' commands, to devotedly love their land, consecrated by the sweat and blood of their forefathers, and to live in peace, willing to lay down their lives for one another.

That is why in fraternal unity, appealing to the defenders of our past, we triumphed in the Great Patriotic War! That is why our conscience and honor are reviving from oblivion and we are again appealing to our forefathers for help in building the life of our state on the foundations of goodness, morality and beauty. We must put our own lives in order; we cannot delay in the task of reviving and developing the people's memory and culture. Through uniting of the people for progress toward a

higher goal of existence, we can overcome both the petty problems of life and the great lack of spirituality into which our youth, the future of Russia, have plunged. Let us unite in this joyful and blessed deed, the restoration of our sacred monuments, so that the light of truth and goodness shines on our Motherland and on our people. And let us unite for this good and righteous deed, the reconstruction of the Church of Christ the Savior.

Our whole people built this church in honor of our victory in the Patriotic War of 1812, in memory of the soldiers who died for the freedom and independence of Russia. The cathedral was built for the ages, as a memorial and as an example, but after half a century it was torn down along with thousands of other churches, palaces and architectural groupings.

The time has come to assemble the stones by assembling the people. We call on each citizen of Russia to stand with us for the reconstruction of this sacred national monument.

WE WILL REVIVE IN MOSCOW, THE ASSEMBLY POINT OF THE LANDS OF RUSSIA, THE CHURCH OF CHRIST THE SAVIOR—THE CHURCH OF MILITARY MIGHT AND NATIONAL SPIRITUALITY!

THE FUND FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST THE SAVIOR

New Tajik Society to Foster Cultural Ties with Emigres

90UN0128A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with U.G. Usmanov, deputy chairman of the Tadjik SSR Council of Ministers, by TadjikTA correspondent: "Payvand": Meridian Lines of Diplomacy"]

[Text] A constitutive conference of "Payvand," the Tajik society for cultural ties with compatriots abroad, will take place in Dushanbe in the second half of October. U.G. Usmanov, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, commented on the upcoming event in the public life of both the republic and fellow countrymen abroad in an interview with a TadjikTA [Tajik Telegraph Agency] correspondent.

[Correspondent] Usman Ganievich, why has this society been created and what are its aims?

[Usmanov] Thanks to perestroika, or the renewal of all aspects of life in Soviet society, new opportunities have arisen for developing economic, scientific, and cultural ties abroad. So popular diplomacy is gaining special importance. One of its results is the extension of ties with our compatriots abroad—with their organizations and their representatives from the creative intelligentsia, from business, and from religious groups—in short, with all foreign citizens who have some relation to us or who show an interest in Tajikistan and want to maintain ties with us. These issues have already been discussed in the press. In the course of the discussion the public suggested

naming the new organization "Payvand"—"Generational Ties." I think that our organization, having set noble goals for itself, will facilitate the development of cultural and friendly ties between our compatriots abroad and Tajikistan. The society will help to more fully satisfy our compatriots' interest in the history and culture of the Tajik SSR; in its language and literature; in the processes of perestroika, democratization and glasnost as well as achievements in science and art in our country.

[Correspondent] So it appears there is a Tajik emigration abroad?

[Usmanov] Of course. And a diverse one at that. It includes representatives of the older generation of compatriots, who left Tajikistan before the October Revolution and in the first years of the establishment of Soviet power, as well as middle-aged people who wound up abroad for one or the other reason as a result of the tragedy of the Great War of the Fatherland. In the post-war years, a number of Soviet citizens were added to these main groups of compatriots abroad—primarily women leaving the country in connection with marriage to foreigners. Some of them have returned to relatives to reunite their families. Among the society's aims is the creation of ties with second and third-generation emigres who know about their homeland from stories and from the nostalgic recollections of their ancestors and who show a marked interest in their roots.

[Correspondent] Usman Ganievich, who can be considered compatriots? Who are they?

[Usmanov] Historical factors have made Tajikistan a homeland for representatives of many nationalities. Over time many of these nationalities have for various reasons left the country, but they have not lost their ties to the republic. These people are considered our compatriots since no fewer than three generations were born and lived in Tajikistan. For example, several thousand of our compatriots left the republic and now live in the FRG (mainly Germans). In Israel, the USA, Austria and other countries live Tajik-speaking Bokharan Jews, who have left the republic but have not lost their ties to it. Are our mutual interests not served by involving them in the work of "Payvand"? And I should add, it is only in this republic that a society such as ours is something new. In other republics similar societies were created much earlier. Organizations for cultural ties with compatriots abroad are functioning successfully there, and "Rodina," the Soviet society for cultural ties with compatriots abroad, unites them all, coordinating and aiding their efforts to carry out their functions.

There is another important stimulus to the expansion of popular diplomacy. According to our data, a significant number of Tajiks, including native Tajiks, is living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Austria, the FRG, the USA,

Canada and other countries. Among the aims of "Payvand" is the establishment of cooperation on the basis of ethnic ties.

[Correspondent] Apparently this is not taking place in a vacuum—it is based on particular experience?

[Usmanov] Of course, we have established the beginnings of cultural ties. For example, a delegation from Tajikistan went to the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of the PRC [People's Republic of China] and had meetings and talks with representatives of the Tajik-speaking public from the city Urumchi and the district Tashkurghan. The delegation also donated a library of works by Tajik authors, national musical instruments, and other works of applied art.

Apart from that, "Payvand" sees to sending abroad materials printed in Tajik using the Arabic alphabet on the history and culture of the Tajik people and on the changes occurring in their lives. The society also sends tapes of Tajik music and songs as well as materials for a photo-exhibition. Incidentally, "Payvand" will print its own publications in Tajik (based on Arabic script) intended for the reader abroad. The foreign broadcasting office of Tajik radio also plans to organize regular broadcasts for listeners abroad under the rubric, "This is the 'Payvand' Society."

[Correspondent] Usman Ganievich, a number of union republics are inviting young compatriots abroad to come for study. Is that possible in Tajikistan as well?

[Usmanov] Absolutely. And in addition we will invite the children of compatriots to our pioneer camps. But that's only a small part of our plans. The program is really quite extensive. "Payvand" will establish and broaden contacts and ties not only with individual compatriots abroad, but also with their organizations. It will assist them in learning about the history and culture of the Tajik people and help create conditions for the younger generation of emigres to study Tajik language and literature. Our society will render assistance to groups and organizations of compatriots towards creating cultural and educational associations, public and private libraries, courses in our native language, and amateur talent groups.

[Correspondent] Of course the tasks before "Payvand" are not simple. For that reason this question arises. Where will the funds to finance "Payvand's" activities come from?

[Usmanov] We have also seen to that. Our means will be income from our publishing activities and from voluntary contributions by various public organizations and by founding members of the society. Part of our financing will come from government subsidies which are set aside for helping social organizations. We are counting on voluntary monetary payments, gifts and endowments from compatriots living abroad and from their organizations.

One should think that members of the society will also make their own contributions towards creating a material basis for "Payvand." By the way, these members can be public organizations, creative unions and associations as well as individual citizens who are interested in establishing and expanding cultural ties with compatriots abroad and in carrying out practical work in this direction.

Belorussian Writer Adamovich on Chernobyl, Solzhenitsyn

90UN0101A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 42, 18 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with A. Adamovich by I. Rishina: "A Quiet Name", date and place not specified]

[Text] The journal publications announced for next year include new pieces by writers who are also deputies—Aytmatov, Adamovich, Bykov, and Granin. This means that, thank God, their concerns as deputies have not pushed their creative plans onto the back burner. The Druzhba Narodov Publishing House intends to print a new story by Ales Adamovich "Kak ya byl krepostnikom" [How I was a Serf Owner]. We arranged to have a literary talk with him, and suddenly the night before there was a call: "I cannot come to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; I am going to a session of the Supreme Soviet." "What for?" "After all, you are not a member of the Supreme Soviet?" "There will be a discussion on the question of emergency measures. I want to speak." And he spoke. And then, at the end of the session, M.S. Gorbachev asked him, Ye.M. Velikhov and Ye.Ye. Sokolov to stay behind for a conversation; N.I. Ryzhkov was also there.

[Rishina] May I ask what the conversation was about?

[Adamovich] It was about a letter which Velikhov and I sent to Gorbachev concerning the post-Chernobyl situation in Belorussia. The problem has gotten much much worse.

[Rishina] I recalled the all-Union writers' plenum held in the spring of 1987 in Moscow and the concerned statement which Adamovich made there; the scale of Chernobyl's consequences for Belorussia was being ignored; instead of localizing radiation in those places where the land was affected, it was being spread throughout the republic and further throughout the country—primarily through foodstuffs: "You eat our cheese, so keep this in mind!" He was talking about those things which all of our press is writing about now, but then...Not a hand was raised to cut off Adamovich's words, which were filled with anguish; all the same it had to be done.

This appearance had its own sequel. A stenographic report arrived in Minsk, and urgent measures were taken there, not with regard to Chernobyl-related problems, but with regard to Adamovich's persistence: how should he be cut down to size, how should he be put in his place? They called him an extremist, someone who panics, a

pacifist, virtually the head of some conspiracy there—what labels they did not pin on him! To read the Minsk magazine POLITICHESKIY SOBESEDNIK there were no worse "enemies of perestroika" than Adamovich and Bykov. Naturally this distresses him, but, of course, it does not subdue him; you cannot break the partisan school.

[Rishina] Are you fighting again? Chernobyl is not letting go?

[Adamovich] For 10 years after 1945 I kept dreaming that the war was still going on. But no matter how terrible it was, it did end on May 9th, and we were left with the land, the river, the forest and the refreshing summer rain. But who will give a date for the end of the Chernobyl tragedy? And other Chernobyls? And when will the land, water and air be returned to the Belorussians, the Ukrainians and the residents of Bryanshchina? On 30 September during the "Chernobyl march" women "from there" marched down the main thoroughfare of Minsk asking about this. Who can answer them and what can be promised? We will be resettled by 1995? I was recently in Zurich and when I spoke to a scientific audience there I laid the blame at the door of the "physicists," as if science were at fault. Some of the scientists were offended; accuse the politicians, they said. They make the decisions. Along with the American Craig Barnes and his German colleagues in the world peace organization "Beyond War," I stayed overnight at the home of the youthful Doctor Hans-Rudolf Zulliger, who is one of the developers of the Swiss AES's. The next morning he gave us a tour of his house. It is not a house but a technical unit which heats itself (through the use of solar batteries) and supplies energy. Our physicist host has directed his own energy in this direction in the search for alternatives to the atomic "future." The scientist himself made a decision without waiting for a decision by the politicians. Our Chernobyl could have done with this Swiss man. Even the radical proposal by A.D. Sakharov to install all AES's underground in rock, seems inadequate to the Swiss; no AES's! And some of our "AES fans" still think we do not have enough of them.

On the other hand, hope sometimes comes from an unexpected source. I began to take heart when the new director of the Kurchatov Institute, Ye.P. Velikhov, spoke at the all-Belorussian rally on 30 September; he supported a humane "Chernobyl formula" put forward by Belorussian scientists: society and the state are obligated to ensure the right and guarantee the opportunity for resettlement in safe areas for every person whom we forbid with hypocritical concern to use the vegetables from his own garden or milk from his own cow, because they present a fatal risk. But we should not use these slippery, ridiculous "bery" units (originally 70, then 50, then 35), which take into account only "background" radiation and not the main element, which is the contamination of food and water; once again the "central" departmental team of L.A. Ilin, vice-president of the Academy of Medical Sciences, backed up by the authority of the Western nuclear-power lobbyists, is

trying to impose these units on Belorussian children—who already have blood running from their noses and ears as a result of post-Chernobyl anemia. Ye.P. Velikhov offered his assistance to send a thousand Belorussian children abroad on a children's exchange program which he established a long time ago. (But of course it does not involve sending Americans to Mogilev or Gomel oblasts.) Moreover, he has suggested sending all the children from the dangerous regions away for the winter—following the example of the opportunities given to Armenian children after the earthquake to recuperate and study in resort areas—and at the same time moving toward a program of complete resettlement.

Those are some of the various programs and ideas which we have. And vice presidents as well. After all, there is "pluralism" here too, and not only in the scientific sphere but also in the moral sphere.

[Rishina] And Belorussian literature in this situation—what is it doing? Is its voice being heard?

[Adamovich] There is journalism and poetry; and some of it is very genuine. Clearly, there is such pain that the cry is being expressed through journalism; we are not up to novels and stories.

[Rishina] And is it accidental that in your new novellas you and Bykov have turned your attention to the countryside rather than to war? Have I correctly understood the title "Kak ya byl krepostnikom" [How I Was a Serf-owner?]

[Adamovich] To write about the fate of our peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, is that not also writing about war? Only war against one's own people.

[Rishina] With regard to Bykov's "Oblava" [The Round-up], which brings back the dark days of collectivization, I have heard that this "subject is new for the writer." By no means. It is also heard with tragic strength in "Znak bedy" [Sign of Trouble] in which the events of the war are related through the fate of the countryside, while the war is used to recheck that which took place in the countryside in the preceding decades. The novella "Oblava" will be printed in the New Year's issue of NOVYY MIR; I read it when an excerpt from it was being prepared for publication in our DOSYE LG supplement. It is a profoundly moving piece in terms of its feeling for the truth.

[Adamovich] I think that in "Znak bedy" and especially in "Oblava" Bykov unburdened the most hidden and most inflamed part of his soul. This came from deeper within him than anything else. In terms of composition and even the situation there is a direct link to "Volchya staya" [Pack of Wolves]. They are hunting a person. Only the novella "Volchya staya" is about the war with the Germans, and it is fascists who are hunting people, while in the novella about the "kulaks" the round-up of the unfortunate peasant is being carried out by the

residents of one's own village, who were also robbed by the Stalinist collectivization. And even one's own son is taking part in it.

[Rishina] This is Bykov's second novella in which a father and son are pitted against each other. In "Karer" [Quarry] the soldier-father, in spiritual anguish and doubt, digging down layer after layer into the quarry of his memory, and next to him the "modern," cold, business-like son who does not waste time, are essentially strangers. And here in "Oblava" there is something even more bitter: the son betrays the father; he is not a child like Pavlik Morozov, he is a grown person, or is he a person? Honor, filial feeling and that which makes a person human have been cast aside; clearly this gap concerns Bykov very much; in the work of such an artist as he nothing is accidental...

I will show you now a letter from one of my correspondents, one of those people who were rounded up throughout the country. N.K. Noskova, a resident of Kurgan, appeals to our conscience and sense of fairness.

"I, N.K. Noskova, am now 66 years old, and my sister is even older; a recent reply from the public prosecutor's office has brought me no less pain than if we had been able, in 1930, to understand the events. But then we were children. During the NEP years Father opened up a shop to sell foodstuffs in the courtyard of our home; he worked hard and took great pains: there were six children, as well as an old lady—father's mother—and nephews who had lost their father. He did not have any employees. When the kulaks were dispossessed, father was not able to pay off his debts, the small hut with the iron roof was sold at auction—our home.

Father left for Central Asia to find work (digging wells). We were kicked out of the house, they took our things, even a blanket. He was hurrying back to us when they took him off the train in Chelyabinsk, identifying him from the photographs which they had taken from us; they took him to prison, then sent us to Kurgan...

We were exiled to the Northern Urals. They transported us in cattle cars.

In 1932 my father died. Six months later Mama died, followed by my sister, brother and other relatives. I lived in two orphanages in Sverdlovsk Oblast. I appealed for rehabilitation.

This is what the oblast prosecutor replied: our father, according to the explanation of long-time residents, owned a shop; he did not keep any hired hands, but people worked for meat. Father extended credit and asked them to work for it.

No inventory of property was found in the oblast archive of Kurgan. If only they had found one. They seized everything! They took felt boots from Grandmother Anna; they threw Frosya out of the cradle and took a shawl and baby blankets; they took the dishes from the shelf and the tablecloth from the table.

They took away Zorka the cow, a representative sold the horse to Kazakhstan, and they scattered us in all four directions, in the winter! As stated in the reply—our dispossession as kulaks was JUSTIFIED! There it is, our humanism! There are no grounds for intervention by the public prosecutor!

Sixty years after the tragedy this episode is considered to be JUSTIFIED. Why does our government not adopt an Ukase Concerning Rehabilitation? After all, the Baltic area has done this for its people!

"I appeal to you, respected A.M., do everything possible so that at last they will decide to speak the truth—that what was done was absolutely a crime against us. Return to our parents their good name, and give us at least some compensation!"

[Rishina] By the way, in "Oblava" Bykov also has a very powerful "children's" scene: they take the felt boots off a little girl in winter. And your novella, is it also about the dispossession of the kulaks?

[Adamovich] When we, the partisans, city people and a few from the countryside went into villages to stay overnight or get something to eat, yesterday's kolkhoz members would frequently ask us: if they do not burn us down or beat us because we are helping "Stalin's bandits" (that is how the occupation newspapers wrote about the partisans), then what—the collective farms again? The same thing again? Forgive me, but this is how it sounded: maybe it is not worth hiding from German death? Well, we of course warmly reassured them (wanting to believe this ourselves) that everything, everything would change after the war... After such a war. After the people had so magnanimously forgiven everything, all the outrages against them, collectivization and 1937, if only Hitler could be defeated! But change did not come. It is my conviction that the post-war years, from 1946 through 1953, were the most tragic period for the Soviet countryside in terms of hopelessness and a total outrage against human feelings. In the terrible 30's and again in the war years, there was at least the belief that this will pass, it cannot fail to go away, and normal life will return. But then, when no sacrifices, when no feats of our villages, partisan or non-partisan, could help to save the peasant from the new kolkhoz lawlessness, from hunger, theft and harsh taxes on every apple and chicken, then came the paralysis of all hope. But we, many of us students and city-dwellers, lived our own lives; prices fell, and somewhere there, beyond the passport pale, our serfs received insultingly low rewards for the labor-days they put in. Count how many there were for each of us: two or 2.5? That is the origin and reason for the title: "How I Was a Serf-Owner."

Even now I remember the feeling of shame I had for my fortunate status as a student three years after the war when I visited our partisan haunts, shame for my bicycle, my sportily rolled up sleeves and pants held back with clips. I walked into the hut where Gorbekha, our former partisan messenger, lived. "Well, how are you doing

here, managing?" She had a bed with no pillows, not a single piece of finery, and in general nothing but a little mound of new potatoes by the window and a chicken tethered by the leg.

"What happened, have the Germans been to visit you?" There is no way you can stay, idiot, enough of your jokes! But the woman for some reason with a grimace of a smile on her face answered: "Ah yes, the revenue inspector was here. He took everything. For taxes. And what will I pay with? Only this chicken, and the kolkhoz even takes that out of my food allowance."

And then in order for you, today's people to understand the meaning of the phrase which she then uttered and the degree of injury and hopelessness which it reflected, as the smile was immediately replaced by tears, you must know that her husband, an irreplaceable partisan messenger was killed by the Polizei, that her son was killed at the front, and her daughter in Germany. And here are her words, the most terrible I have ever heard: "If only for a war like that!..." Not for someone else but for herself she wished the very worst, as if she had earned it by such a life, by such a fate. That, she said, is what we deserve!...

[Rishina] Five years ago V. Belov had a very powerful, penetrating story in YUNOST entitled "Takaya Voyna" [Such a War]; in it a soldier's mother who is on her own is visited at the kolkhoz by the tax collector; he is the same age as her son who was killed, and he takes the only thing of importance in her whole life now—a samovar.

[Adamovich] When they try to suggest to us today that the people's memory of the past has been completely wiped out, that the kolkhoz system is a "great gain of socialism," that it is the foundation of our future prosperity, you will recall that L. Tolstoy, after all his fruitless letters to the tsar and unheard appeals, wanted (according to his secretary's recollections) to look him in the face and say, as a child would: "phooey". And what else can one do if all the words of truth and all the facts and figures are met once again with appeals "to strengthen socialist competition." No, do not think that my next novella is a way of saying "phooey." Although, who knows, it is possible that we will make a serious break with the past only when we can laugh at it. But for now it is too painful.

[Rishina] On this subject there is an outstanding piece, an absolute classic: "Matrenin dvor" [Matrona's House]. But tell me, the picture of you with Solzhenitsyn, when and where was it taken?

[Adamovich] A smiling Solzhenitsyn! You do not find that very often. But, perhaps he was smiling because the person facing us was not taking mug shots for official records, full face and profile, but rather Vasil Bykov, who was also, as I recall, smiling happily (which was also quite uncommon). Yes, this was taken in his room at the Hotel Moskva. Vasil called me, and we came for a writers congress: "Drop in, we have a guest." I dropped in: there was Solzhenitsyn—pale, with an indentation in

his forehead, the face of peasant schismatic with blue eyes which held your gaze, and some tragic aspect in his whole physiognomy. I saw that kind of visage only during the war—on people who were to die soon afterwards. But, to my great joy, the feeling proved to be deceptive. But possibly that is the way it was: as a man who had already walked beyond the pale of death, nothing terrified him any more and for this reason he had embarked on open, single-handed opposition to the entire system. I already knew that Solzhenitsyn was working on a book about our camps, the title did not contain the word "gulag," but it did contain "ice" or "icy." I do not remember exactly. I will not say from whom I learned that, I am not authorized to do so, but this is the way it was said: screw everything, screw the whole system! It was something like "The Icy Archipelago."

On the eve of the Fourth Writers' Congress (this was, it seems, 1967), Solzhenitsyn sent out his own letter of appeal to the congress: about the rule of censorship, about the intolerable punitive functions of the Writers Union, and, well, about what kind of persecution they were now carrying out against him, Solzhenitsyn. The letter did not reach me in Minsk, because I had already left for Moscow several days before the congress. I went to NOVYY MIR (I had to see Yefim Dorosh), and there I saw Solzhenitsyn sitting on a sofa in A. Berzer's room. Berzer called me. Solzhenitsyn suddenly jumped up and in the hurried way he did everything he said rapidly: "I sent you a letter. Did you receive it?" You sent it to me?" "Not to you alone. To Bykov..." And he named Bril and Karpyuk as well, I think. "You didn't receive it?"

Our short conversation kept returning to the question of whether they would forward the letter to me and whether I would read it... It was noticeable that the matter of whether or not it would be discussed at the congress was very important to him.

By the way, this meeting had an unexpected "post-script": on that same day the telephone rang in the apartment of Maxim Tank, the chairman of the Belorussian Writers' Union. "Who is deceiving whom? Is Adamovich deceiving you or are you deceiving us? He has already met with Solzhenitsyn." The voice belonged to Pilotovich, who was then the chief Belorussian ideologist. He had a gift for being able to talk with any Lenin Prize winner, with a classicist or with the lowliest clerk in the office; he could talk with anyone. It turned out that they had sent me to the congress instead of a sick comrade; that is how everything came together in the ideologists' heads: they did not send me by accident, and it was no accident that I met with Solzhenitsyn.

[Rishina] What did you talk about there in the hotel? You did not just have your picture taken, did you?

[Adamovich] He talked about his "Avgust Chetyrnadtsatogo" [August 1914], while Bykov and I, I cannot remember what we talked about. As it turns out, during the war he passed through Belorussia, and was in exactly

the same area, on the Western bank of the Berezina, where our partisan detachments had dealings with his division. We were going to the army people to cadge weapons and ammunitions (as it happened, we took the extras if the situation was bad). So we might have laid eyes on each other as early as the end of 1943. That is my Solzhenitsyn story. Nothing special. Yes, and when he was leaving Bykov, I accompanied him to the stairs. I invited him to have lunch in a restaurant. "I don't go to restaurants," he said very sharply. Then he added more gently: "You don't need to see me out." And he walked away with the careful and resilient vehemence of a person who is both pursued and persecuted at the same time. Later he sent a letter to Vasil in Minsk and passed on greetings to the restaurant lover "A.M."

[Rishina] Solzhenitsyn's return to the pages of our magazines is an enormous literary and public event. In this connection one hears expressed the opinion that with the current polarization of forces, all the groups will be pulling him toward their side.

[Adamovich] Well, this is not the first time this has happened in literature. Little boats surround an ocean liner, and each one would like to pull the giant into its own little bay. And the fact that it has a completely different embarkation point is something they do not wish to know. The scale of this very Russian person and artist, who for many belongs in the ranks of Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy, is such that he simply cannot fail to be the vehicle for the expression of universal ideas. He would be that no matter what he wrote about: whether it is Matrena, Stalin, or the Russian language. And the fact that he is frequently inconvenient, sometimes for one group and sometimes for another, is also normal. And was it "easy" for those revolutionaries who had to deal with Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy? With what feeling of superiority did they judge the Tolstoyan and Dostoyevskian "extremes" (non-violence, the human underground), and yet how our times have confirmed their views.

The Sovetskiy Pisatel Publishing House has just published a fundamental work, a book by Yuriy Karyakin entitled "Dostoyevskiy i kanun XXI veka" [Dostoyevskiy and the Eve of the 21st Century]; a feeling of surprise runs through the book: how could he know all this about us?

Yu. Karyakin's book helps us to read anew pages already read and reread, to understand from a truly universal position the truth of Dostoyevskiy and the truth about Dostoyevskiy—a great Russian writer-humanist; it helps us to understand him with the hope and thought: "how can one save oneself, one's country, one's clan and all life on earth?"

No, I will say it better with the words of Karyakin and Dostoyevskiy: "...Dostoyevskiy was convinced and convinces us of something else: there is nothing more infectious than the naked truth, straightforward honor

and unvarnished beauty." "Truth is greater than Nekrasov, greater than Pushkin, greater than the people, greater than Russia and for that reason we need to desire one truth and search for it, despite all the advantages which we can lose because of it, and even despite all the persecution which may come to us as a result of it."

For him, a lover of Pushkin, a lover of the Russian people, a lover of Russia, it was probably not easy to say this ("Truth is greater than Nekrasov, greater than Pushkin, greater than the people, greater than Russia, greater than everything..."); nonetheless, he said it, convinced that this truth, which unites all humanity, exists and that it was Pushkin who took this secret truth with him to the grave, and without him we are guessing at it..."

[Rishina] We keep talking about very serious matters. But does our public and literary life provide some happy subjects to talk about?

[Adamovich] And why not? Quite a few such subjects. For example, last year in Barcelona I met Andrey Sinyavskiy at a symposium on the problems of Soviet perestroika, and after seeing what merry eyes this slow-moving bearded fellow has, I thanked him for helping me to write "Karateli" [The Punishers] and for making collective documentary books. You do not understand? Nor did he understand my joke, which is also the truth. I had to tell the story of how I became a "non-signer."

It is well known that they persecuted "signers," those who signed in defense of an author or a public figure, but here everything was the other way around. I have in mind the reaction of Moscow State University's Soviet Literature Department to the arrest of its "product," Andrey Sinyavskiy (he was a former graduate student in the department). Here is what was amusing: if at that moment the author of the angry letter addressed to Sinyavskiy and Daniel, A.I. Metchenko, who was required to make it collective, as well as the dean, A.G. Sokolov, had been told that they were operating according to a CIA scenario, they would have been taken aback, and they would have referred to a completely different organization. I was interested in asking Sinyavskiy how accurate Yevtushenko was in his story about Robert Kennedy. Supposedly the latter, over the noise of running bathwater, informed him about an act of the CIA, which threw out to our services the information about a certain Abram Terts—they were missing our anti-intelligentsia campaigns.

Yes, this is all true! Andrey Donatovich unexpectedly confirmed this, and then he and his wife began to recall how they themselves guessed it and then found out about it. What was the CIA's purpose in this? To stop up the fountain of our propaganda on the subject of the persecution of progressive figures in the West.

It was a kind of "greeting" from colleagues to colleagues! Remember that in Bykov's "Zapadnya" [The Trap] a worker in the German SD (Security Service) also sends "greetings" to our Smersh.

Well, to continue about the "non-signer." I went to the department, knowing full well that it would be better not to go, and all the more so when our very kind secretary, understanding everything, even suggested: "I will say I could not find you." But I was terribly curious to see not only "them," but also to see myself in such a situation. Sitting on the right side of a couch was Metchenko, who usually looked sort of offended; at a table sat Sokolov, as always friendly and insincere, and next to him the professors, all worthy and respected people. "Well," rejoiced the dean, irradiating the new victim of an important measure with a happy smile, "our young professor, who is also a writer, will correct our style." Metchenko for some reason scowled even more and took greater offense.

"But, after all, I did not know your Sinyavskiy (you taught him, you clear yourself) and I have not even read anything of his." "But that is easy to rectify," the dean exclaimed carelessly, laying his hand on a thick photocopy of Sinyavskiy's novel "Lyubimov" [Lyubimov] and his articles. "Where can I sit down here?" "You will read it?" "Yes, of course, I have to know what is in it. Especially since there still has been no trial."

I sat down at a small table, and having opened it to the first page, I immersed myself in it. I understood, of course, that he who laughs last laughs best. And how they would laugh at me tomorrow. But in the meantime this was my stage entrance; I would return to them in advance perhaps only a part of what I would receive when I spoiled the entire ritual. The dean rose to the occasion (it was truly ridiculous—10 people sitting and watching one person reading a long novel!), and remembered: where is such and such a member of the department? Sick? Oh, how unfortunate, a colleague is sick and no one has gone to visit him. He sent messengers to go and see him and at the same time to bring back his signature on the letter. Well, I will not drag things out, the way I dragged them out there—for an hour or two. From what I saw and read I got an idea of the works of Abram Terts. They had already brought the signature from the "sick" docent. A painful silence hung over the room. The dean looked at this impudent fellow: well, are you going to continue to make fun of these worthy people? I could not keep it up and moved aside the papers. "The novel is bad (I told this to Sinyavskiy in Barcelona as well; he did not take offense). It is written by a literary scholar, not by an artist." "There, you see!" "But you do not put someone on trial for for writing a bad novel! And the article about socialist realism is interesting."

The others began to talk: indeed, let Metchenko sign the letter, he is the author. The dean clapped his hands: "He (i.e. I) is with us temporarily, but the honor of the university is dear to us." I was afraid that after I left they would add my signature. However, the article did not appear at all. I do not know what prevented it. But the deed of the "non-signer" was judged properly and, it seems, at the state level. Because this episode dragged on for more than a year in Minsk as well. There the apparatus

was already laughing. However, it did not laugh last. Life is short, but we have been persuaded of this more than once. And I hope that we will become convinced of it once and for all.

[Rishina] But how did they nevertheless allow you to be voted in as a corresponding member of the Belorussian Academy in those years?

[Adamovich] Three times they did not permit it, and only the persistence of the Academy president, N.A. Borisevich, and the book which came out at that time, "Ya iz ognennoy derevni..." [I Am From a Fiery Village], which softened the heart of P.M. Masherov, a former partisan, played a role. As you see, literature helped me to become a corresponding member.

[Rishina] And the doctoral dissertation was on what?

[Adamovich] The Belorussian novel. Problems of the genre.

[Rishina] Today literary opposition is of a very different nature. At that time, in the 60's and 70's, artists did not get along well with the authorities. Today they cannot find a common language among themselves.

[Adamovich] Yes, because everything has come together in one tight knot: our literary affairs, socio-political questions and even the concerns of all humanity. Everything is being resolved simultaneously. The situation developing in the country is, to put it plainly, dangerous. Here is a serious problem among others. The wave of revolutionary perestroika rising up from below at some level must meet with that which was started and ran from the top down. The reaction of M.S. Gorbachev to the miners' strike was optimally reasonable and favorable. But is our reaction to the position "of above" always and in everything so reasonable? I have in mind not the miners but above all our brother member of the intelligentsia, including our brother-writer. In one letter a former children's home resident complained that he never had a "quiet name." That is, no one ever pronounced his name quietly, without screaming. But did our people have a "quiet name" all those years, those decades? We have forgotten how to talk quietly with each other. Stentorian voices rang out at the Supreme Soviet session of 3 and 4 October on the introduction of a "state of emergency."

[Rishina] We did not see it on TV.

[Adamovich] I was not struck so much by the people and forces which would like to free themselves with one blow from the nightmare of the forthcoming alternative elections for the republic and local soviets, from all these commissions on bribes and privileges, and would like to begin to rule by means of military force; N.I. Ryzhkov answered them, and this we were able to see on TV. But I was more struck by certain quite democratic deputies—how easily they succumbed to the cries of panic from the "emergency supporters" about a complete collapse with cold and hunger if the country is not deprived for 15

months (an in the meantime?) of those rights which perestroika has already provided; for example, there was even the suggestion of taking away from the miners what the government had promised the government. I understand that the democrats had their own considerations with regard to immediate benefit; they will squeeze the inter-fronts with their strikes, and maybe Pamyat as well.

It is almost like the Krylov fable: the helpful bear brandishes a cobblestone in order to kill a fly on the forehead of his sleeping friend the peasant...

The restraint of the chairman stopped (and at the very edge) both the stubborn "emergency supporters" and the democrats who had started to slide.

Today a wave is rolling in again: all evil lies in the cooperatives! Again the appeals to the feelings of tired, irritated people—perhaps they will forget who dragged us into these dead-ends and when. And again appeals to expropriate. Steal what has been stolen! What comes to mind unbidden is this: how far afield have we been led from civilized forms of development and civilized methods! Are we not able to do it any other way? Is that why other peoples look at the flying troika with mouths agape? And especially because as it speeds forward, it also comes back: a mistake again, we went to the wrong place. With the cult, with collectivization and much else. Yes and what about it? We recognize our mistakes later. Maybe it will return one more time to that first fork in the road before the bogatyrs "in commissars' helmets" and take the usual road, along which other, not so epic peoples travel and travel, more slowly, but always in one direction. And it has turned out, as Ch. Aytmatov said at the First Congress of People's Deputies, maybe they have gone farther than we have along the socialist main road. A law-governed state, and everything that accompanies it, is that too simple for us? But does such simplicity not contain the truth and the path leading to that very well-being and justice for the sake of which we have made such a mess of things?

State Commission on Chernobyl Travels to Affected Areas

90UN0079A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
30 Sep 89 p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Government Commission on Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident"]

[Text] From 26 July through 13 September, field sessions of the Government Commission on Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant [AES] Accident (Chairman: V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers) were held in Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts of the Belorussian SSR, Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, and Bryansk Oblast of the RSFSR. Executives of USSR ministries and departments, local party, soviet, and economic agencies, and representatives of the public took part in the commission's work.

The commission's primary attention was focused on solving problems associated with implementing previously planned and new measures to safeguard the health of people residing in the rayons that were subjected to radioactive "contamination" as a result of the Chernobyl accident. It was noted that practical application of the protective and treatment and prevention measures had made it possible to establish conditions under which the people's cumulative individual radiation doses for the years 1986 through 1988 did not exceed the maximum permissible values set for that period by the USSR Ministry of Health [Minzdrav]. It is expected that the dose for 1989 will be significantly below the maximum permissible.

At the same time, there are not enough physicians and intermediate-level medical personnel, the turnover rate for these personnel is high, the public health material base is weak, and a shortage of medicines and certain kinds of medical equipment is being felt in many rayons subjected to radioactive "contamination." Cases of increase in particular diseases of a general nature among the people of these rayons are being insufficiently analyzed.

The Government Commission has charged the USSR Ministry of Health and the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Belorussian SSR Councils of Ministers with taking steps to bring the staffs of public health institutions in the affected rayons up to strength, and to supply the institutions with the lacking medical equipment and devices, medicines, and preparations, and has charged the USSR State Planning Committee [Gosplan] with finding the necessary funds for purchasing special medical instruments.

Disruptions occur in supplying the population of these rayons with brought-in food products, fuel, and soap and other washing agents. Too few manufactured durable goods, including refrigerators, washing machines, and vacuum cleaners, are being supplied to the rayons. The RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR State Agroindustrial Committees [Agropromy] have slackened control over implementation of the measures that make it possible to obtain good-quality agricultural products on "contaminated" fields and private subsistence farms.

Appropriate responsibility assignments have been made in these matters.

USSR Civil Defense has been charged with the decontamination operations in these rayons, and with increasing the operations' effectiveness. The attention of the RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR Councils of Ministers has been called to the fact that effectiveness of the decontamination can be significantly improved if the decontamination is carried out in conjunction with asphalt paving of the roads, general public works development of the terrain, and the accomplishment of necessary agricultural reclamation measures around the populated places. It has been demanded that

the executive committees of the Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies for the aforesaid oblasts provide assistance to the civil defense units in the form of certain kinds of earthmoving equipment, and that they increase their control over the performance and acceptance of decontamination operations through extensive public participation.

The commission noted the population's lack of individual radiation dosimeters, and took notice of the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power and the Nuclear Industry's (Comrade Tychkov, deputy minister's) announcement that 1,500 units of these will be produced before the end of 1989, and about 100,000 units in 1990.

The Government Commission examined problems associated with the work being done in outlying areas to prepare for the 1989-1993 resettlement of residents of certain populated places (according to the agreed list) in which the conducting of decontamination and agricultural reclamation measures will not ensure the individual radiation dose limit set by the USSR Ministry of Health as harmless to the people's health during their lifetimes. It was noted that foot-dragging in the execution of USSR Council of Ministers Order No 912 of 24 May 1989 concerning this matter is being tolerated in a number of places. The commission has demanded of the RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR Councils of Ministers and the executives of the local agencies that they expedite the work on resettling the citizens from these populated places, and has recommended resettling the families with children from them first.

In the city of Chernobyl, problems of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant's reliable operation, including exercise of the necessary control to ensure the safety of Project "Cover Up" ["Ukrytiye"], constructed over the destroyed reactor of four of the plant's power-generator units, were examined by the Government Commission. Assignments have been given to the Union Ministries and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers for conducting further work in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant's 30-kilometer zone for the purpose, first of all, of ruling out environmental contamination. In the city of (Slavutich), the commission examined the status of the city's construction.

A draft of the Belorussian SSR state program, prepared by the republic's government, for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the period 1990-1995, which is presently being examined by the central economic agencies, interested USSR ministries and departments, and the USSR Academy of Sciences in accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov's delegation of tasks, reached the Government Commission at the end of August. The draft program calls for additional measures to safeguard the health and improve the material and social-amenities status of the population residing in territory subjected to radioactive "contamination," including the resettlement of citizens from particular

populated places and the construction of housing, public health facilities, schools, etc.

Similar programs are being prepared in the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and these must be submitted to the Government Commission before 10 October.

For purposes of increasing the health protection and improving the financial status of the population in the rayons subjected to radioactive "contamination," proposals of the RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR Councils of Ministers about according the residents of these rayons a number of additional benefits and preferences, and concerning an increase in the length of workers' vacations, a prenatal vacation and a partially paid vacation for child care to women, wage and salary conditions, pension supplements and grants-in-aid to unemployed retirees and disabled persons, an increase in the grant-in-aid for children to underprivileged families, and other matters, will be examined in the Government Commission after thorough familiarization with the state of affairs in the localities.

It is planned to examine these matters on 5 October, at a Government Commission meeting, with the participation of interested ministries and departments, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [VTsSPS], and the union republic Councils of Ministers, and to make appropriate recommendations to the USSR Government.

Belorussia Testing New Dosimeters in Contaminated Regions

90UN0103A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
11 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by V. Bibikov: "At the 'Sosna' Tests"]

[Text] The first experimental series of the "Sosna" portable individual dosimeters has been prepared by the Belorussian enterprise Ekran. After testing in regions that have been exposed to radiation, it will begin serial production.

The Presidium of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences had occasion to see an article with the ordinal number 4. A small oblong black plastic box, which fits on your palm, that has on its front three buttons and a liquid crystal display for showing readings, like the ones on electronic watches that are familiar to everyone. A.V. Stepanenko, Belorussian Academy of Sciences vice president, pressed one of the buttons, and after about 20 seconds a buzzer went off, signaling that the measuring period was over, and an evaluation of the exterior alpha radiation appeared on the screen—0.014 millirentgens per hour. This corresponds with a normal background. On the other side of the instrument there is a meter for measuring beta radiation, which is necessary for checking food products, clothes, and so on. It would be enough to bring the instrument, let us say, into a forest, and it will signal with a sound if a person enters a zone where radiation exceeds the norm.

"In its time, a contest was announced for the best dosimeter for individual use, in which 41 projects were entered," said Aleksandr Vasilyevich Stepanenko. "Three of these, including Sosna [pinetree], which was created at the Belorussian Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Energy, were named the best by the jury. After its completion, Sosna was recommended for production. It is impossible not to notice the enthusiasm with which the specialists from the Ekran enterprise, the Integral association, the Belorussian State University, the Minsk Radio-Technical Institute, and the academies have solved this problem. They have had to overcome many problems, including those concerning the acquisition of a series of important articles."

It is assumed that already next year 10,000 of these instruments will be produced. The cost of each one is about 80 rubles. It is obvious that, in order for each family living in the region that has been contaminated by radiation to have this sort of "toy," local organs and industrial enterprises will have to share the burden of the purchase.

It is worth noting that the instrument was developed and prepared for manufacture in record time. The creative collective that should receive the credit for this success will continue working on creating an entire array of dosimeters. Not waiting until these extremely necessary domestically manufactured instruments appear in abundance, Belorussian scholars are using all of their strength to find other ways, as well, of monitoring the affected territory.

Chernobyl's Human Cost to Kharkov Oblast Described

90UN0103B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by V. Bolotov, chairman of the Kharkov Association of Participants in the Elimination of the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES, and V. Balazyuk, member of the Association's council: "The 'Chernobyl' Union"]

[Text] A little over three years have passed since the day of the Chernobyl tragedy. In such a short time, the participants in the liquidation of the effects of the catastrophe have been carried into the ranks of heroes, the saviours of humanity and... consigned to oblivion. Both us, striding into the nuclear hell of our own free will, and those who found themselves there by accident, not even suspecting their participation. In emphasizing the "spiritual Chernobyl," respected medical academicians are diligently leading both the people and the government into error. Only at the Congress of People's Deputies did USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov hear from the deputies about the catastrophic situation in Belorussia, where 120,000 people are in need of immediate evacuation. Only after this did the republic's government develop a special program for extending aid to these people. How much time has been lost? How much strength did it take to force the powers

that be to admit the horrifying reality? And the reality is us—we who marked by the atom. In Kharkov Oblast alone, there are several tens of thousands of us. It is impossible to give an exact figure. It would become incorrect tomorrow. Leaving widows and orphans, very young men are departing from life.

We will be courageous and admit that this is unavoidable. But why then at times in the human sea do our attempts to chain ourselves to life, to hold onto it as long as possible, seem helpless? In Kharkov Oblast, 9,000 people are in need of yearly stationary treatment. And this is highly qualified treatment. Whereas in the department of radiation pathology at the Institute of Medical Radiology, only 20 places have been set aside for Chernobylites. In order to get through the course of treatment, one needs to lay in a supply of patience and to wait one's turn. But this, too, is a luxury that Chernobylites in different regions, where there are neither institutes or specialized stationary hospitals, can only dream of. Incidentally, the administration of the institute assured us that after its repair, it will give the entire department over to the victims of the AES. And the Chernobylites believed. We have shown up at institute subbotniks [volunteer work days]. But in the end, we were simply deceived...

One of the first gatherings of Chernobylites, in June of last year, is hard to forget. Two hundred people came to the courtyard of the Institute of Medical Radiology. The wife of Grisha Kucher spoke with pain about how the Lyubotin gorispolkom has refused to provide her with coal. About the fact that in this matter, no privileges are issued to Chernobylites. While in the family there are three small children, an elderly mother, and a hopelessly ill husband. The first act of mercy was a spontaneous collection of money for that unfortunate coal.

Our representatives found their first pilgrimages from office to office extremely difficult. In almost every case, they received refusals. The one organization that gave us shelter was the Red Cross obkom. We are fighting together, you cannot say it any other way. Some things are working out. The Kharkov gorispolkom has adopted a decision on Chernobylites' rights to privileges.

We forge on, meeting on our way first compassion, then the granite of alienation. The Twentieth City Student Hospital offers Chernobylites twenty beds in convenient double occupancy rooms. But at the same time, our rooms are being taken away at the Institutes of Neurology and Psychiatry, and Labor Hygiene and Occupational Illnesses. The resolutions, orders and directives that deal with participants in the liquidation of the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES remain locked behind seven bureaucratic stamps. And that is why there is no place to get the answers to vital questions like the procedure for issuing medical form V-1 [indistinct], the registration of disability, receiving unemployment, and so on and so forth. Behind all of this—there are people. Before Chernobyl, Vladimir Zalyap worked as a driver, and had a good salary. Now, he has been

declared completely disabled, and lives with his son on a pension of 120 rubles, getting the expensive coal from other people. On the same pension, Artur Kolesnikov maintains two children.

Human kindness and attention are the first medicine. But we get little, very little of it from society...

Reappraisal of Educator Makarenko Urged

90UN0127A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 89 p 4

[Unsigned article: "Shall We Re-Read Makarenko?" (Excerpts from a new book by writer Yuriy Azarov, "You Wouldn't Get Up, Old Man")]

[Text] Edward and I had our first clash. I wrote a series of articles in which I threw a gauntlet to the followers of Makarenko. "This is a sellout. A stab in the back! This is indecent, if you like!", Kosobokov yelled at me. "It is a mean trick that our most sworn enemy would not conjure up to compare our trend-setting school to a concentration camp. Makarenko was recognized during his lifetime because the authoritarian pedagogy resented his democratic spirit and his focus on independence."

"That's why Makarenko is so dangerous," I answered in a calm voice. "He is dangerous because he was talented. In that he sang praise not to an outside dictatorship, but to an innate one, when violence is happily accepted by those who are subject to it. Makarenko came up with an array of primitive dogmas which can be easily embedded in teachers' minds - for a collective, through a collective and in a collective. School is a factory! Great! We don't care about individuality! Qualms, harmonious development and mercy are bourgeois terms. We are developing a parallel action pedagogy, which means that we do not give a damn for one person's sufferings as long the collective goose-steps towards to the promised victories at trumpets' blare. The Makarenko's dicta have outlived themselves!"

"Makarenko is great! This is a universal truth," Edward railed. "It was the universal truth that Stalin was great. Makarenko is a follower of Nitzche, if you may, but upside down. I read one of his letters recently. 'I came outside at night and a world created by me was lying at me feet...' Neither Corczak, nor Pestolozzi, nor Owen, nor Shchatskiy would ever have said anything like this. They always placed the child so high that you would have to stand up on your tiptoes and reach up just to come level with him."

"C'mon, that's too much!"

"It's not too much. I am just convinced that if a teacher does not share his epoch's concerns, he stops being a personality. Just note that unlike his teacher, today's neo-Makarenkoites are amazingly lackluster. They are all alike. They inherited the suppression logic from their teacher and keep chanting: 'Teacher's dictate first, active's dictate second and collective's dictate third'.

Krupskaya once highlighted this pernicious element in the system of your dear Anton Semyonovich. Makarenko's pedagogy boils down to the formula - diktat multiplied by joy and multiplied by labor. A brother of yours told me about a Maranin, a Kolyma boss, who wanted to make his starved and worn-out convicts see the bright side of the world. Camps had a well-oiled machinery of brigades, commanders, joint units which enforced self-protection, self-rule, self-discipline and self-sufficiency! Some people would like to apply this version of diktat cum discipline de major in our schools. Moreover, it is codified in numerous rules about students' duties who are not allowed to think, nor to speak up, nor to love, nor to sit, nor to stand."

"No, we are against such authoritarian attitudes. And Makarenko was against it. But I stand for a strict regime without which genuine independence is not possible. I am all for an iron-fist discipline, since it is the only one that can give complete individual freedom. I advocate punishments since they alone can help raise a strong person. But all this blah-blah about empathy and humanism is nothing but a bunch of baloney. I am defending Makarenko! Our pedagogical ideals are associated with him. Our future... Criticism of Makarenko will roll us back...."

"That's right, roll us back to the old revolutionary intellectuals, to culture."

"Can't you get it, you dimwit?" Kosobokov's face became red with fury, "I'm telling you again that one should not challenge Makarenko now. This will cause disarray in our ranks, harm the common cause. We need unity now as never before. At least to bring the old men down, if nothing else. You have made enough mistakes as it is, coming with your articles..."

"Clan unity is never genuine," I said.

Even now I still regret that I did not wrap up my argument with Kosobokov.

To tell you the truth, I was not 100 percent sure that I was right. The bacilli of the Past, which I acquired and nurtured, were boiling in my system and in my consciousness, finding no out-let. These bacilli were brewed on the premise that it is UNITY, abstract unity, and not spiritual riches, nor kindness, nor beauty that should be safeguarded, promoted and multiplied at all cost.

My articles made Kosobokov fly off the handle:

"Makarenko is a Stalinist?! You are nuts. It means you and I are Stalinists too, aren't we?"

"You hit the nail on the head," I replied.

"But you've come out of him. You have always loved Makarenko."

"I still love him".

I did not lie. I really loved the great devotee. I knew his works almost by heart. In pedagogy, he has played a role similar to that of Mayakovskiy. I was infatuated with Makarenko's personality - his steel rod nerves, unceasingly high spirits, an unmitigated faith in his own capabilities and children's creative power. A world of subtle children's vibrations was practically nonexistent in our pedagogy, although I would not have believed it if somebody had told me about it. "It's a lie!" I would have yelled the same way Edward did. Makarenko's tragedy was not clear to me at that time. He who set up an educational system for the colonies as an NKVD officer was put in the dog house and ostracized by his own people. His wife told me this story. "Every night Anton Semyonovich listened to knocks and murmurs. 'They've come probably to take me.' He jumped out of bed once, but there was nobody. It was the wind that threw a dry vine against the windowpane." It was at that point that I asked: "And did Anton Semyonovich have a brother?" "That is nothing but rumor. He had no brothers. His enemies are spreading rumors that his brother was in the White Guard and now lives abroad..." Even Makarenko had to keep it quiet and hide it, since he did have a brother, and several years later I happened to read his articles about Anton Semyonovich. Vitaliy Semyonovich Makarenko did live in the FRG at that time, wrote about himself and his great relative.

Makarenko absorbed in himself the most fearsome elements of the Stalinist ideology - erasing individuality, abandonment of the intellectual traditions of the Russian and classic pedagogy, renunciation of the Ideal, an ideal of an all-round and harmonious personality that was held aloft by all peoples in all times. Makarenko decried this Ideal as idle talk. He saw his ideal, at least according to his own words, in a GPU officer, a ramrod and strongly built devoted Party member, at odds with a Russian intellectual, oblivious of such things as morals, kindness and beauty, the one rejecting those categories as petty-bourgeois. The leader [Stalin] held the same views. One can easily find outside familiarizes too between these two "great educators of the world." Both are modest, meticulous, somewhat dry, both hate empty ethical discussions, reject Dostoyevskiy and reject such ethical categories as consciousness, mercy, empathy. Both are the men of the extremes. "Oh, yes!" yells Makarenko, surrounded by children who caught colony inmate Prikhodko stealing. He then grabs his gun, puts it again his head, pulls the trigger - misfire - and faints. Educators dump two bucketfuls of water on his head, he regains consciousness. What about children? They are beating Prikhodko up in the meantime. Like the "helmsman", Makarenko knew how to work up real fury among trustees and knew how to cast a bleeding body for everyone to see - look my subjects, my psyche and my nerves will be strung out again like the rods of steel and my heart will become ironcast again and let everyone know that I shall have mercy for none, our people will have no mercy. Everyone who is against us will be thrown down the precipice. Only one element seems to bother Makarenko in this active showmanship - one

should not pay with one's nerves for such social striptease. He has to find a solution. And he finds it. One should imitate anger and passions- like a true actor would do it without fail - to stir up a storm capable of tearing everyone to pieces to teach a lesson to everyone, the same way it was done to that culprit of Prikhodko. Everyone should remember for many years to come what is in store for those who have violated a pedagogical law.

These two "great men" seemed to have embodied a new type of personality. Makarenko set example for his students and educators, and Stalin did it for the country's citizens. "The New Human Type" is the subtitle of Henri Barbusse's book about "the leader of all peoples." This new type tried to prove that democracy, freedom, individualism and love for human beings were Menshevik slogans, Trotskyite twists which should be wiped out from Soviet education and Soviet school. Makarenko elaborated on Stalin's theory of having no individuality, no freedom, no love which were perceived as the scourings of the bourgeois world. We are all for a collective as a system of relationship where everything is interlinked, under control and subject to rule. A teacher is not a magician or a miracle worker in the Christian mold, but a businessman who has a rigid control over the Bolshevik technology of making each individual an element of relationship and all relationship forming a system. If at least one individual misbehaves, defying a teacher's diktat, the relationship should be immediately blown out. "What I mean by a blow-out is bringing a conflict to its very extreme," taught the great pedagogue, "to a point leaving no room for evolution, no litigation between the individual and society, when the question is put point blank - either to be a member of society or to leave it. This last extreme can assume different shapes - as collective anger, denunciation, boycott, resentment. It is important for them to be expletive to create an impression of society's utmost resistance." These musings so accurately describe the environment of 1937, when all Soviet collectives without fail were expected to express those types of attitudes to those who found themselves in trouble. Makarenko also describes the psychological condition of the people who have been badgered by the people's collective will. "Shocked to the very foundation of their relationship to society, directly confronted with its power, they have practically no time left to choose and to decide since they are being swept in an avalanche... Falling under the emotional impact of collective movement at the same time, they explode in themselves very many ideas. Hardly does the debris goes up in the air when new ideas replace them, the ideas about collective's powerful truth and force..." This leaves no time for analysis because consciousness is not required, this leaves no time for cerebration and therefore self-analysis has been withdrawn from educational practice; the only thing that is left is to follow the collective will on the premise that that will was born in the world for the first time as the most just and the greatest. That is why Makarenko insists on keeping everybody in high spirits. Indeed, these blowups and pushing an erring individual into a chasm should be

done cheerfully, happily so that the collective could briskly rush towards the set goals.

Deliberating about Kosobokov, I cannot but stumble against the same contradictions that used to tear me and many of my friends apart.

Kosobokov finds appealing the following of Makarenko's deliberations: "The intellectuals were wedded to the belief in a unique role of kindheartedness, in a special role of a beloved teacher, in the supernatural significance of interest and in such absurdities that an educator should be sensitive, kind, love children, an enthusiast with a heart full of love for the most spoiled child - what nonsense. Who needs to count on 'fitful loving hearts?!' Maybe the enemies need this?! But we Bolshevik pedagogues need to have confidence in the future, to be merciless towards the enemies, who might have been our friends once and who might have rendered great services to the revolution. Pedagogy is a social phenomenon. Here we should proceed from the great life that the country is living... The same logic should prevail in every Soviet educational institution - for a collective, through a collective, in a collective. And cheerfully by all means. Smiles, Laughter, Jolly Guys, Jolly Teachers!"

This enthusiasm for hidden violence and lies was inside me, Kosobokov and many other people. We were out-and-out Stalinists because we betrayed not only the culture of the past, but we betrayed our fathers. We betrayed the very idea of democracy, justice and revolution. We betrayed without realizing that we did it. Each of us consisted of two halves as it were. One rejected Stalinism. The other admitted moral lawlessness, justified the very essence of our Philistine falls.

Strange as it might seem, I observed this duality in the next generation of trend-setters. They also advocated good methods, but denied the individuality both of a child and their own.

A Few Questions to the Author of the Book

"Do you subscribe to the stand taken by your hero?"

"I'm more categorical in evaluating Makarenko. I believe that his tragedy, as that of many other 'representatives of the epoch' of totalitarian Communism, lies in their betraying themselves, their talent and innovative spirit. I object to a teacher professing: 'I do not care about individuality, I am dealing with a collective.' I do not regard Makarenko as a wasted person either. He is near and dear to me because of his denied scholastics and climbing on the pedagogical Olympus. He has the traits essential for a genuine teacher-researcher, such as an integral view of a growing person, of a collective and of an educational institution. A born teacher (God-given), he served evil forces."

"A new pedagogy is emerging in the period of new thinking..."

"And it cannot do without Makarenko no matter how it tried. To renounce him would be tantamount to renouncing everything that used to torment not only the proceeding epoch of authoritarianism, but the entire proceeding cultural and historical practice. Many teaching ideas and discoveries, fused with the spiritual experience of such thinkers as Dostoyevskiy, Vladimir Solovyov, Berdyaev, Rozanov and Shchatskiy, will unfailingly prompt new generations of teachers to look for drastically new solutions."

We do not think that all the readers will unanimously subscribe to Yuriy Azarov's opinion. The editorial board plans to give the floor to his opponents.

Blue-Print for a New School

We shall discuss new goals set for school, new goals for education under this feature title. We hope to learn what you think as well.

Activism of Lvov Komsomol Described

90UN0133A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 89 p 2

[Untitled article by own correspondent S. Romanyuk on the Lvov Komsomol]

[Text] I risk coming across as a reactionary, but I will defend the Party apparat. This is about the Lvov Komsomol gorkom.

The protagonists in my story are three komsomol gorkom [city party committee] first secretaries—Orest Yaremchuk, Aleksandr Shlapak, and Gelena Gritsko. That is the order in which they succeeded one another.

They are very different people, but they have in common the ability to lead others. I say these words fully aware of the times, which allow for no degree of inexactitude, much less exaggeration.

OREST

He arrived at the gorkom at the very end of the "period of stagnation." He did not begin a clean sheet. Certain democratic traditions, to the degree that they were allowed in those times, already existed here. His job was to significantly expand them.

The first thing he noticed then was that the Komsomol was completely divorced from politics. But this seemed normal to everyone, and what seemed to recommend the Komsomol organization most highly was its role in carrying out wise directives.

Orest created the best operations contingent in the country. What did they do? He smiles. Well, he says, whatever you like. They patrolled the city, stopping teenagers in T-shirts with foreign slogans and making them change into Soviet jerseys that had been bought with Komsomol money. They created personal economic accounts and created mounds of unnecessary paper work. They announced who had dropped out

without being removed from the Komsomol register and created a list of GTO ["Ready for Labor and Defense"] pin-carriers and sportsmen with official ratings.

In short, the usual apparat "tyagotina" [not further identified] prevailed at the gorkom.

Times changed quickly, and April 1985 brought changes in many people's way of thinking. One evening department chief Sheyka visited Orest.

—Here's an idea!—he said.—Let's create an informal association in the gorkom and call it, say, "Association of the Lion."

—And what is your informal group going to do?

—We'll focus on culture, ecology, history...time will tell.

At first the "Lion Cubs," as the fledgling informal group was nicknamed at the Komsomol workers' initiative, received our support with the authorities. A conflict flared up entirely unexpected.

The fellows declared Saturday the day for providing public services and amenities for the ancient castle, a valuable cultural monument, towering above the town. Thousands of people responded. Lvov had never witnessed such a working holiday. The "Association of the Lion" all at once became the city's most popular organization. And where there is popularity, there is power.

As to whether it was out of envy or fear I will not venture a guess, but the fact is that the authorities decided to subordinate this "informal" initiative to their own will. In the quiet of their offices a resolution took shape: ecological Saturdays would become monthly events. This decision ruined the whole thing. The "Lion Cubs" refused to carry it out.

Did the principle of disobedience or the thirst for independence manifest itself in this conflict? It is hard to say. But who knows what fate would have awaited the association if the Komsomol gorkom had not taken their side. This was the first black cloud to pass between the Komsomol gorkom and the higher authorities, who had become accustomed to hearing a cheerful affirmative response to every request they made.

And there's more.

The door of the gorkom opened to all of those who were active. And since that time it has almost never closed. The Komsomol workers pushed their still-born resolutions to the side and went out into the streets, to the people. They all felt Yaremchuk's authority behind them and could only guess what his subordinates' liberties would cost him and how many lectures he would have to hear from his senior comrades.

And even after that there was the "vertep" [Ukrainian ecclesiastical folk puppet theater] incident. The idea of reviving "kolyadki" [Ukrainian Christmas rites], which

go back several centuries but which in the last decades have been driven underground, came to life with new force.

Some were already prepared to use the idea to their own purposes and to give the project an anti-soviet character. The "Lion Cubs" forestalled these intentions.

The Party gorkom summoned Yaremchuk.

—Did you give your blessing to this? Angels and devils are walking about town under the aegis of the Komsomol!

In a year "vertep" had become an all-city holiday.

The "Lion Cubs" breathed new life into "gaevki" [traditional Ukrainian songs] and returned the ancient art of Guzul "krashanki" [Ukrainian egg decoration] to the townspeople. A new ensemble, "Don't be blue," originated in the association and quickly developed into a dramatic studio, acquiring an independent creative life. This was Ostap Stakhiv's group, which had fallen into disfavor, having sung folk songs and become a Lvov favorite.

The "Association of the Lion" was also a socio-political organization. But life took its normal course, and the people's unbridled activity gave rise to new informal associations. Extreme radicals and nationalist groups made their presence known as well. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which did not hide its separatist goals, appeared. A year ago it did not have as much of an influence over the masses as it now has, and I dare say that if the authorities' actions had been more reasonable and far-sighted, this organization would hardly have met with this kind of success.

Even then the situation was such that immediate, bold and concrete actions were needed. However, the impression was formed that many on whom a response depended pretended that nothing was happening. No decisions from above were proposed. And was it worth awaiting wise advice when it seemed that events were beginning to develop quickly? The Komsomol gorkom made its decision: it organized a debating club and entered into open discussion with the informal groups. The gorkom debating club developed into an all-city club. The debates were raucous and issues remained open. Logic suggested that one should seize the initiative.

The hot July of 1988 set in. The city was asking itself: Why is there no monument to T.G. Shevchenko in Lvov?

The question is in order, as is the one that follows it—the language problem. This is how the first unsanctioned meeting, attended by thousands, took place. A correspondent of the oblast "youth group," Vika Andreeva, led the meeting. It is here that Ivan Makar, then a member of the UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Union], suggested erecting a monument to Stepan Bander as well. The idea of a Popular Front was raised for the first time.

This was already becoming serious. But the idea of a popular movement was considered absurd; the hypnosis of the forbidden had them in its sway. And only the "short-sighted" komsomol dared to ponder this seriously.

Yaremchuk submitted the question to the gorkom buro. They decided to call a special plenum. Those "at the top" advised against it. The gorkom was able to gather its most active members. They thought it expedient for the Komsomol to take part in the creation of a democratic front or patriotic movement (the question of a name was being discussed). On the spot they chose an action committee to draft a declaration and regulations for the future organization. Parallel to this, informal groups were working on preparing the very same documents. A struggle of ideas lay ahead. Its cornerstone was the problem of political initiative. Who could seize it? The question was put point blank. And there was a regular session of the political club. Documents of the democratic front which were drafted by Komsomol members were approved by a majority of votes.

The newspaper "Leninist Youth" reported on this in its pages and announced a gathering on August 8 of all of those wishing to join the popular movement for perestroika. The Komsomol gorkom was named as the place for the meeting.

A victory? Alas...

On that very day a meeting of the Party obkom [oblast committee] took place. They pointed out the mistakes of the Komsomol gorkom. The secretariat of the Komsomol obkom duplicated the decision. "Leninist Youth" retracted its report and the meeting was called off.

—Do you plan to leave your Komsomol work?—the hint was made to Orest several days later.

He left to become deputy shop superintendent at a Lvov enterprise.

ALEKSANDR

He considers Yaremchuk his teacher. They became acquainted long ago. Sasha headed the primary organization at a polytechnical institute and was active in gorkom work. Then he became an obkom zavorg [head of the organizational section] and went to work for the republic's Komsomol central committee, although his heart and soul remained with the other gorkom members.

Before his departure Orest asked that Shlapak be allowed to return. They honored the "last request" of a former secretary who had fallen into disfavor.

Shlapak arrived at the gorkom at perhaps the most difficult time. Everything had to be taken from the beginning.

Attitudes towards him in the collective turned out to be complicated. To some he seemed too demanding of his subordinates. A person with such an amazing capacity for work expects the same attitude towards the task at hand from others. He was able to allure people with his ideas, and clearly this quality played a decisive role.

Sasha is a person of firm convictions. For him the Komsomol was neither service nor career. But the world in which he was to confirm that had changed.

The pre-election campaign of the spring of 1989 was upon us. Shlapak became a member of the district electoral commission. He opposed a number of its decisions and caused considerable discomfort in the relations among many important people.

He opposed the dispersal of meetings taking place in Lvov. He did not support the candidates who were unpopular among the people but who suited those at "the top." In two out of three districts the elections did not take place. The city Komsomol, of its own free will excluded from the pre-election campaign during its first stage, decided to act against the will of the authorities. They quickly met in a plenum and advanced the candidacy of Orest Yaremchuk (!) and the head of the gorkom department, Yuriy Sorochik.

The pre-election agitation spread by the gorkom is remembered to this day. Orest ceded to the poet Rostislav Vratun, a favorite in Lvov. Yuriy came out as a victor.

Their participation in the elections not only confirmed anew the power and authority of the Komsomol gorkom, it also led its members to make political decisions after discussion in a plenum. A fundamental evaluation was given to the electoral system and a number of its elements were acknowledged to be inadequate. And when a few months later a republic-wide law was published on the elections to local soviets, a gorkom group emerged to draw up an alternate draft! It was soon published and drew lively interest from the voters.

The gorkom first secretary made an almost decisive contribution to the preparation of that document. He is generally accustomed to doing everything himself. Now no one can imagine Sasha as having ever read a report or resolution written by someone else. He's a born analyst. In conversation with him I have more than once been amazed at his ability to subtly analyze a situation that has arisen or find his way out of the most difficult situations.

—What is most important for the Komsomol today?—I asked him.

He did not answer right away.

—We have to clarify our position in two directions: with respect to informal groups and with respect to the CPSU. The very nature of relations with informal groups is a turn to pluralism. The Komsomol has no right to claim a monopoly position in the youth

movement; we should struggle for every young person who recognizes our league. As to our relation to the CPSU, here I would like to be understood correctly. We have a common platform with the CPSU, but our tactics and methods should be our own. And we should not be the ones to call ourselves the CPSU youth organization—the Party itself should decide whether or not to recognize us as such based upon our actions.

This is the program the gorkom first secretary presented at the Komsomol obkom plenum—and he was elected its first secretary.

GELENA

About two weeks before the elections I asked her whether she wanted to return to the gorkom. The young woman answered seriously:

—Yes—and added—If my candidacy is proposed.

...She was working as secretary of a school Komsomol organization when Yaremchuk suggested she join the gorkom. This happened by chance.

Gelena stood at the sources of the creation of the debating club which had made so much noise in town and had announced the idea of a popular movement for perestroika. When the Komsomol's "action" was denounced, she was invited to join the obkom and become a zavuch [head of the curriculum department] at one of the schools. She wrote a statement of her own accord. A year had passed almost in vain—she was unable to find herself.

Her candidacy was proposed. She became first secretary of the Lvov Komsomol gorkom. She understands how difficult it is to keep up its reputation. And now...

This chapter of my story is unfinished. Life goes on. The Lvov Komsomol gorkom is operative...

EPILOGUE

Much has changed in Lvov in the last year. A popular "Rukh" [not further identified] for perestroika has been made—no one has managed to control the explosion among the masses. But these days others determine politics. The authority of radical informal groups, with whom not long ago the Komsomol was blamed for having discussions, has increased considerably. The views of thousands of townspeople have changed, and again—alas!—not under the influence of socialist ideas. The confrontation of societal forces is growing.

People are beginning to understand that the times require compromises.

Not long ago at all, already after the tragic events of October 1, informal groups gathered again at the gorkom. Among them were representatives of the Union

for the Independence of Ukrainian Youth, whose charter declares a break with the Komsomol a condition for membership.

Isn't it possible that not ultimata, but solid reasoning will facilitate dialogue in the future?

And perhaps the competition among ideas and ideals will become decisive in the struggle for supporters of perestroika, the process we began together and which we must continue together.

Estonian SSR Komsomol First Secretary Plenum Speech

90UN0116A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 23 Sep 89 p 1

[Speech of Estonian SSR Komsomol First Secretary Urmas Laanem at the 9th Estonian SSR Komsomol Central Committee Plenum: "On the Convocation of the 21st Estonian SSR Komsomol Congress"]

[Text] The struggle between the old and the new characterizes today's situation. Each link in our political system is in constant development; breakthrough processes are now taking place in society during the course of which, in particular, people are gradually freeing themselves from dogmatic thinking. A crisis of development appeared in Soviet society in which the tendencies of creative and free development are fighting against the so-called factors of ideological necessity deeply rooted over the course of decades.

Even at the Estonian SSR Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] Central Committee Plenum before the last one, we were convinced that in such a sociopolitical situation, those institutions not born of life itself would be the first to fall into dysfunction, among them, the Leninist Communist Youth League. At that same plenum, we also spoke in some detail on the weakness of the Youth League. It was stated in the plenum's decision that as one of the links of the sociopolitical system, the Estonian SSR Komsomol is experiencing a deep crisis in its internal development and under the influence of external circumstances. This is the natural and objective result of our society's development. Today's model of the Estonian SSR Komsomol has lost the trust of the majority of its members.

The time which has passed since this plenum has shown the correctness of this assertion. The general crisis appeared first of all in the Komsomol, which was somewhat legislative (having the right of legislative initiative, but not exercising that right in actuality), and somewhat executive (in the name of the interests of all youth and its members, but without state financing). The Youth League also tried to be somewhat political, however, this did not concern the rank-and-file organization member, since no room for politics was found in its charter rights.

The general crisis has not spread, and has shaken all other official institutions which had maintained the status-quo for years.

The criticism and opinion resounding at our plenum on the further fate of the Komsomol as a whole found their support in Moscow. The last Komsomol Central Committee Plenum manifested dissonance in Komsomol development which had until this time been kept in the dark; there, bold opinions were uttered on the future of the Union of Soviet youth. It is felt today that in the existence of the Komsomol, which had been ossified for decades, new tendencies toward animation are being shown; fundamental concepts which until today had been declared sacred and inviolable are being replaced with logic and independent thinking. Voices are being heard about the changes in the Komsomol structure more now than at any time previously. They are most vociferously demanding the creation of a Komsomol organization of Russia, and that, apparently, is just a matter of time. But nevertheless, the Komsomol is not changing quickly enough and in a manner satisfactory to the expectations of the Estonian SSR Komsomol members. All of this shows that what is happening in the Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia is not some sort of exception, some sort of deviation off to the side from normal development. This is only a part of a large and broad process, when each structural unit strives to find for itself a correct and appropriate place in that gigantic structure which was being erected until this time. The Estonian SSR Komsomol Central Committee members confirmed at the plenum that the development of processes in the youth leagues is gathering speed, and that the situation is changing such that today's framework hampers further movement forward. It was thus decided to convene a Komsomol congress which, according to preliminary plans, is slated to be held in the spring of next year. Apparently, fundamental questions will be put forward for discussion at the congress, questions concerning the existence of today's entire Komsomol. The Komsomol has already changed with the creation of the Communist Youth League of Lithuania; it no longer is what it had been before.

The Estonian SSR Komsomol leadership seeks to resolve two problems simultaneously: This is the participation in the creation of foundations for an integrated youth policy and an evaluation of the activities of today's Estonian Komsomol together with the prognosis and definition of the tendencies and opportunities for its development. We understand that the development of an integrated youth policy is a matter not just for the Komsomol, but for the time being, no other youth associations prepared to collaborate seriously in this area are visible.

Reproaches were made that the Estonian SSR Komsomol leadership, in order to salvage the organization's authority, is concerned not with its League members specifically, but the range of problems of all youth. We feel that it is incorrect to put the issue this way, because the Estonian SSR Komsomol is to this day first

and foremost a youth organization, and its weakness is in the very fact that it raised, but was in no condition to resolve, the actual problems of young men and women.

We are in need of a fundamental change in work with youth; only then can the young change their attitude toward society. At the same time, relying on experience accumulated over decades, we must all the same lay at the foundation the thought that it is cardinal impossible to change only one part of a single large system. Otherwise, this would be a regular change for the sake of change, and for those who need cardinal transformations, this would be a regular compilation of programs, a redistribution of armchairs and duties. The latter may be avoided only in the case that changes ensured by political, legal, and economic movements are realized in the large system. Indeed, state youth policy, absent until this time, did not ensure a system of defense of youth's interests. The departments and ministries each took up the issues concerning youth in their own way, within the framework of their own specifics and without any serious links among themselves. From time to time, more or less broad decisions or resolutions were made for improving work with youth, however the predominant portion of them were designated for execution by the Komsomol, even though it was known beforehand what the real strength of this organization is. There is not known a single comprehensive plan for satisfying and defending the interests of youth adopted at the Government or Supreme Soviet level. Discussion of the problems with youth have up until now been limited to conversations with Komsomol Central Committee secretaries. In effect, not one single central department has taken on itself responsibility for developing an integrated youth policy in the republic. Since the Estonian SSR Komsomol has turned its attention to this circumstance on more than one occasion, the opinion had been asserted that the Komsomol itself is the most fitting organization for the development of such a policy.

At the previous plenum, we resolved to secure the participation of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet in working out a mechanism and policy for defending youth's interests. At this time, a working group has been formed under the Supreme Soviet Presidium; it includes Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies, representatives of various youth associations, and scientists studying youth problems. By means of the working group's activities, these problems must reach the republic's leadership. However, a more complicated stage remains—how the problems put forth will find their settlement.

The state youth policy, just as the work with youth on the state level, concerns a wide circle of issues: indoctrination, education, labor, everyday life, recreation, purposeful organization of leisure time, building and maintaining youth health, the role of young men and women in the processes taking place in society, and the management of them. Work with youth is geared toward creating for young men and women opportunities in society equal to those of other social groups. We now need not only to develop a program for a way out of the economic crisis,

but a serious understanding of what conditions for development we may provide for the current young generation.

Society as a whole abused the trust of young people for decades, exploiting its energy and enthusiasm for stopping up of economic holes. "Public work," the existence of a system of shock construction to which young Komsomol members were summoned (not always at their own initiative) were devalued with time and turned into an ineffective "element of organic necessity" of the state.

That which is stated above only confirms that we need a state youth policy.

Let us now return to the Estonian SSR Komsomol. The statement resounded at meetings with the Komsomol aktiv, and in the press as well: If at the plenum in May of last year we had undertaken something radical, convened an Estonian SSR Komsomol Congress in the first half of this year, then it would have been possible to save the organization, but now it is already too late. By all appearances, there is a grain of bitter truth in this statement. It is known that forecasting is a responsible matter; it requires political wisdom, objective information, and experience. We are all gifted with hindsight, and now, looking back, we can say that if at the plenum which took place in May of last year we had managed to overcome the pressure of the then-conservative leadership of the Communist Party of Estonia, and get across to the republic leadership information on the actual state of affairs in the Estonian SSR Komsomol, along with information on the knot of youth problems, then in the future, it would have been possible for the Estonian SSR Komsomol Central Committee to advocate youth interests more successfully. It is also possible that the Estonian SSR Komsomol Congress in May of this year could have put an end to the disintegration of the republic Komsomol, at least formally preserving the mass organization. However, no organization members' genuine activity was realized through the Estonian SSR Komsomol even then. In summing up, it may be said that the results were otherwise, and no more positive.

There is no doubt that each of us has his own idea of the future, yet sometimes in our dreams we are torn away from reality, and it seems to us that what we desire is already in our hands. But it is clear that it is not right to accept the desirable for reality. In addition, we do not exist in some sort of closed system; we are connected to the large system (the all-union Komsomol, the republic, the USSR as a unity) only in the capacity of a subsystem. Changes in the Estonian SSR Komsomol involve changes in the all-union Komsomol, in the republic's youth movement. Almost all of us are convinced that there is no future for today's model of the Estonian SSR Komsomol. Today's Estonian SSR Komsomol is only a territorial unit of the all-union Komsomol. We must still create an independent democratic youth organization—the Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia. It is easy to reject the current Estonian SSR Komsomol; it is

much more difficult to realistically evaluate its inner development potential, and program its impending future while taking that into consideration. In the dust of sundry well-grounded reconstructions and reorganizations, we must remember that an association consists of members, and it exists for its members. Therefore, our Youth League must change in the manner demanded by its members. They should also draw their own conclusions with regard to the silent passive voice.

Sociologists are now preparing research dedicated to youth's political activity and value system. As a result, we must receive objective information about youth during the course of the preparation for the Estonian SSR Komsomol Congress.

At the previous plenum, we presented for public discussion program documents prepared by the temporary creative collective. On all levels, the members of our organization had the opportunity to freely put into practice the fundamental positions formulated in these documents. Granting such freedom of exchange would be unaccustomed enough in and of itself, since it required a great deal more independence of thought of the primary and city (rayon) levels than previously required. In essence, the opportunity was granted for an evaluation of one's own situation and correspondingly, one's own potential for free action. In place of the previously accustomed practice, when decisions or directions (in compliance with the principles of democratic centralism) released from above were subject to absolute execution, this time it was required that work be constructed fundamentally differently in the localities. It had to be understood, could the documents mentioned serve as the basis of the organization's renewal or transformation, and if not, then why not, and what principles had to be reflected in them.

This activity has forced a new comprehension of the content and existence of the organization, finding a path for it. Certain Komsomol staffers put greater emphasis on the political aspect of the organization's activity, others on the socioeconomic. By a known analogy, during the course of the discussion, the creation of the ideological platform of the Communist Youth League of Estonia was set out upon. This position was announced in the press as well. One would like to hope that both those drafts already proposed and those still in the shadows will draw the response not only of Komsomol staffers, but of the wider youth environment as well. This will yield a basis for discussion both today, on the eve of the rayon conferences, and at the congress.

The majority of city and rayon Estonian SSR Komsomol conferences will come up in the near future. It is clear that they will now be substantially different from those held previously. From the familiar report and election meetings, a transition must be made to a discussion of how things are going to be further. First and foremost, the attention of the forums' participants should be turned toward the desires and requirements of the youth of the cities and rayons, toward the aspiration of young

men and women to associate in the organization, as well as toward the organization's existence in the rayon, and toward the bases which have become a foundation for fulfilling its function and putting its goals into practice. It is obvious that in many city and rayon organizations they feel that the city and rayon Estonian SSR Komsomol organization in their current form have exhausted themselves, and that fundamental reforms are necessary for further movement forward.

The Estonian SSR Komsomol Buro finds that all rayon and city Komsomol conferences must analyze their organization's activity during a report period, and plan possible prospects for the Estonian SSR Komsomol.

Considering the current situation and the urgency of the issues which have arisen, it is necessary to convene the 21st Estonian SSR Komsomol Congress. The buro proposes to convene the congress 24 and 25 November in Tallinn. The congress must give an objective evaluation of the path covered by the Estonian Komsomol, find a way out, and plan the future.

Now, on the norm of representation at the congress. The situation existing today interferes with forming an objective idea of the actual membership of the Estonian SSR Komsomol. The current calculation system, despite yielding information on how many all-union Komsomol members we have, does not say anything about how many members there are in the Estonian SSR Komsomol who genuinely support this organization. We know that an extremely significant portion of those on the roster of Estonian SSR Komsomol members actually are not such members.

If we want the congress to be a genuinely active forum, then there must be gathered there those young people who are really interested in a genuine renewal of the League. We realize that the Komsomol organizations of the union republics have their own image, however, the rayon and city organizations of the Estonian SSR Komsomol differ from them. Therefore the Estonian SSR Komsomol Central Committee is introducing a proposal to select as delegates 15 members of the League from each rayon and city organization, in addition to one delegate for every 500 members. This would be a sensible compromise from among the diverse and numerous proposals.

The congress delegates should have in their pocket a mandate from the Estonian SSR Komsomol members who elected them, in order to resolve the serious problems associated with the Estonian SSR Komsomol. In order that this mandate be ensured by trust, the matters associated with youth problems on the scene should be studied deeply at rayon and city conferences, as well as matters associated with the fate of the Estonian SSR Komsomol as a whole. In the hope of holding a constructive discussion, the decisions of the city and rayon conferences must be presented to the congress. While considering the decisions handed in from the localities, and comprehensively analyzing the current situation, the

21st Estonian SSR Komsomol Congress must find a path to the realization of the requirements of that part of youth belonging to the League.

Social Tensions Among Tashkent University Students Cause Concern

90US0203A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 12 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with Alisher Ilkhamov and Igor Pogrebov, associates of the Tashkent University sociology laboratory, by correspondent Andrey Semerkin: "The Student and the Capital"; time, place not given]

[Text] I look but I do not recognize. The same lecture halls. It would seem, the same kids. We study the same subjects as before... Yet something has changed. Some sort of nervousness has appeared, excitability, intolerance... Why? I conversed with two instructors in the trolley bus riding from the VUZ city to the center of Tashkent.

The new moods in the student milieu trouble not only teachers. They undoubtedly trouble parents, undoubtedly, Komsomol workers. Some time ago they began to trouble the militia. These moods also trouble the residents of Tashkent, the republic's largest student city.

Our correspondent speaks with associates of the Tashkent University sociology laboratory, candidate of philosophical sciences Alisher Ilkhamov and Igor Pogrebov, about the new moods in the student milieu.

[Correspondent] So, changes are taking place in the students' social behavior. It is impossible not to notice a definite intensification of the abruptness and the aggressiveness of the behavior. As a result, conflicts became possible in the VUZ city in April, and in the imeni Leninist Komsomol park in September. What do you think, why is this? What are the causes?

[Pogrebov] The causes are the old, unsolved social problems. They are engendering tension precisely today, when many restrictions on the manifestation of public behavior have been lifted.

[Ilkhamov] During one of the "roundtable" discussions at the Uzbek CP Central Committee, the thought was even expressed that the reason for the tension is a feeling of social infringement upon the students coming from various republic oblasts to study in Tashkent.

[Correspondent] Infringement? Of what?

[Ilkhamov] These students have fewer opportunities for access to the material things than the city dwellers have...

[Pogrebov] ...and that the "golden youth" have in abundance.

[Ilkhamov] Living conditions, opportunities to dress in fashion, to spend spare time doing something interesting are different for the student arriving and living in a

dormitory and his contemporary who grew up in Tashkent. If the parents of the student arriving from elsewhere do not have the possibility to reliably support him in the financial sense (and in large families, there is no counting on great financial support), then a fairly noticeable social distance arises.

[Pogrebov] The standard of living is always somewhat higher in the capital than in the provinces. In that sense, Tashkent is no different from other capitals. Some people are scarcely bothered by the differences in living standards; for others, they are perceived painfully.

[Ilkhamov] If the non-Tashkent students who come to the capital to study had a steady opportunity to earn a little money on the side, then the distance between them and the native Tashkenters could be lessened. It should not be forgotten that a portion of the students is forced to find an apartment on the outside—there is not enough space in the dormitory. A private apartment costs money, and not a small amount.

I see the same scene from the trolley bus every day on the way to work. Vagrants [bichi] and the homeless [homzhi] gather at an unofficial labor exchange in Chorsu Rayon, and along with them are...students. Everybody knows this; your newspaper has written about it as well. If there were an official structure for students, helping them find work efficiently, work with enough flexibility as far as payment is concerned, then the exchange in Chorsu would have serious competition. And the social distance of which we speak may be shortened somewhat, as soon as the students coming from elsewhere have a chance to earn some money.

However, under the conditions of a command economy, introducing such a structure is complicated.

[Pogrebov] In the meantime, the demand for working hands is very high. A paradox...

Firms of student services exist both in socialist countries and in our country's major cities. The range of their possibilities is almost unlimited, from everyday tasks to intellectual assistance: Purchasing airplane tickets, picking up parcels, apartment repair, furniture hauling, child care, tutoring for slow pupils, design work... There are such firms in Tashkent as well, particularly under the Komsomol city committee. Perhaps it is worth thinking about expanding these structures?

[Correspondent] Let us say that there is a certain social distance among the various groups of Tashkent students. What does that entail in the spiritual sense?

[Ilkhamov] Upbringing in the provinces is of a much more traditional nature than it is in the capital; it is more closely linked to the features of the everyday life of the East, to elements of Islam. From these positions, it seems to the student coming to Tashkent from a rayon center or a village [kishlak] that the capital residents are deviating

from what in his view is the correct style of behavior. The social distance we are talking about is perceived from this angle as well.

[Pogrebov] It seems that in a village locale, the living conditions have the most pronounced effect on upbringing. It is everyday life, and not religion, owing to its patriarchal nature, which forms the stereotypes of behavior. Since the students who come to Tashkent do not find here the accustomed life, the accustomed norms of behavior, they feel that the city dwellers are violating that correct, folk, national way of life, of which these students consider themselves to be the representatives.

[Ilkhamov] And they lay all the blame for the situation which has been created on the city dwellers, who have accepted the influence of European and world civilization to a greater extent.

[Correspondent] Women suffered during the conflicts which unfortunately took place in Tashkent in the spring and fall. What do you think, why specifically women?

[Pogrebov] It is harder to handle men; they might resist. That is why aggression was directed against women.

[Ilkhamov] Not only that. There are deeper reasons here—ethno-cultural, historical. The feeling had been that we had finished with the old way of life, with prejudices, and we are bravely striding toward a bright future. But in actuality, this is only what we proclaimed.

Imagine a young man who has come to Tashkent from a distant oblast. At home, his behavior was precisely regulated by a tradition style and tenor of life. That includes the regulation of his attitude toward women.

In the capital, he is allowed to be himself. And "explosion" of inclinations takes place. Everything that was stifled by upbringing at home finds open expression here.

[Correspondent] But at times that expression is of an aggressive nature...

[Ilkhamov] Yes. By virtue of that same social distance between the students coming from elsewhere and the "golden youth" which drives to classes in their own cars, have their own apartments, and are well-provided for financially... It would seem that everything is accessible—contact with girls, video bars, discotheques, but actually, the student from the dormitory lacks certain psychological qualities, and attributes, such as fashionable clothes, and the money to enjoy the pleasures he is striving for. A sort of inferiority complex arises. Inclinations are suppressed once again, and at times they find their outlet in anti-social acts, including hooliganism.

[Correspondent] It would be naive to hope that during an interview, we could propose an entire program for bringing harmony—that is a very complex task. But you could probably express working hypotheses for a future program?

[Ilkhamov] First and foremost, it is impossible to resolve social problems by volitional or forceful means. The sad experience of other republics, the Transcaucasus, for example, convinces us of this. An easing of social tension can be reached only through the population's economic activity.

Our proposal to expand the student services firm thus takes on a special meaning. The firm is needed not only to redirect the students to creative activity, but also to overcome the social distance between various strata of Tashkent's student youth. Thus, it is proposed that we struggle not against the consequence, but against the cause of anti-social manifestations. If this goes well, then the use of harsh administrative measures so out of tune with democratization will not be required.

Historical experience, including that of the East, shows that the population's dissatisfaction grows proportionally to a reduction in the standard of living. It is time to acknowledge the obvious, and give the students a chance to earn some money.

[Correspondent] I do not dispute the idea that it is necessary to raise the students' standard of living, but I would like to note that the main task of student life is study. In our conversation, we are analyzing matters of the students' everyday life, leisure, and income, and yet we should not lose sight of the academic process. In your view, what changes in the tenor of academic life of the republic's VUZs have become urgent? What must be changed so that studies play a more important role in the student's life?

[Ilkhamov] This is very serious issue. We thought about it for a long time in our sociological laboratory, and came to the idea that it makes sense to create branches of Tashkent VUZs in oblast centers. These must be serious, prestigious educational institutions, well equipped. The best pedagogues should be entrusted to teach there, and their labor should be stimulated by increased pay. Prominent scholars and public leaders should be asked to head these.

Training in such VUZs must be prestigious. It must be done in the Uzbek language, and include study of the traditional culture of the East, and the traditions of Muslim culture. The range of specialties in which students will be trained in these VUZs must be thought about in particular.

[Correspondent] In other words, it is proposed that a parallel system of education be developed. Analogous ideas are already being brought to life in other republics—I have in mind the organization of Lithuania's Vitautas University in the city of Kaunas. But why do you propose creating these VUZs in oblast centers? What will this yield?

[Ilkhamov] The possibility for a smoother transition from a traditional system of family upbringing to life in an academic institution. The students will get their education not far from home, but in social surroundings

closer to them, and in their native language. The very socialization of the students will be flexible and gradual. This will allow the existing contradictions to be smoothed out.

[Pogrebov] Of course, questions will arise, how compatible is all this with the existing academic program? On the other hand, it is impossible not to see the break between the existing unifying programs and regional, national features.

A parallel system of education only legalizes tendencies which already exist in life. Of course, objections to the study of elements of Muslim culture in VUZs are possible, but how effective is it to fight reality with bans? Elements of Muslim ethics present a real interest for a portion of students. On the example of other socialist countries, isn't it better to legalize the students' interest in religious matters?

Will a parallel system help make a jump in the development of education in our republic? Will it resolve existing problems or will it only put them off for some time? It is difficult to say. For now, it is clear that serious thinking about the restructuring of all spheres of student life is needed. Too many social, pedagogical, economic, and psychological problems have accumulated here. They form a solid circle, in the center of which is the modern Tashkent student.

Supreme Soviet Committee on Alcohol, Drug Problem

90US0151A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 89
Morning Edition p 1

[Article by S. Chugayev: "Sober Thoughts About Sobriety"]

[Text] In 1987 some 17 percent of this country's population considered it impossible to achieve success in the struggle against drunkenness, alcoholism, and drug addiction. In 1988 the number of pessimists doubled. In that year 58 percent of the population no longer believed in victory over this social evil.

Such were the results of sociological studies cited by K. Trubilin at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Preserving People's Health. This session was devoted to the problems of stepping up the fight against drunkenness, alcoholism, and drug addiction in our country.

The invited specialists—representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR Ministry of Health, GKNT [State Committee for Science and Technology], State Committee for Public Education, as well as other departments and public organizations—by using the above-mentioned statistics, presented the deputies with an extremely vivid picture of the truly complex situation which is evolving in this country today. The scope of drunkenness and drug addiction is growing. Nowadays, by registered accounts alone, there are 5 million persons

afflicted with the disease of alcoholism. Some 20,000 persons die every year from causes connected with alcoholism. There is a continuing increase of crime associated with "drunkenness."

The threat to the future generation is also increasing. The number of children with mental defects increased from 900,000 in 1984 to 1.1 million in 1988. Today in the special schools of the RSFSR alone 260,000 children of schizophrenics are enrolled. During the first eight months of this year 133,000 juveniles were subjected to administrative punishments for drunkenness. In short, the brief decline which was noted shortly after the well-known decree of 1983 has been transformed today into a powerful and precipitous leap upward.

However, as noted by the deputy G. Koromyslov, we must take a sober attitude toward sobriety. Therefore, there was no talk of a "summary law." The closest thing to such a measure was, perhaps, the proposal set forth by the deputy N. Amosov to place the production of alcoholic beverages under the committee's control, and the deputies strove in vain to subject the "May Ukase" [?] to criticism. More to the point, on the other hand, were those speeches which noted its timeliness and necessity. It is another matter what attitude has been taken toward implementing it in the localities....

In speaking to the deputies, A. Demenkov, administrative chief of the USSR Ministry of Health, stated that since 1981 the number of drug-treatment institutions in the country has increased by a factor of 3.5. This is certainly a gratifying statistic. But this same A. Demenkov in the concluding portion of his speech noted that more than half of these very institutions are in urgent need of repairs, and many of them simply must be closed down because of their accident-prone condition. The fact of the matter is that the local directors, in reporting about the opening of the new dispensaries, failed to point out that they have allocated the worst areas to them. They evidently consider that alcoholics and drug addicts, as persons who have broken away from society, do not deserve anything better. And the Ministry of Health has obviously been completely satisfied with such a statistic. Does this not comprise the secret of the low level of efficiency shown by this kind of treatment facility? And another cause is the low level of skills possessed by the medical personnel, as mentioned by the deputy M. Fatullayev.

The social and economic changes occurring in our country are also introducing their own adjustments. For example, such a phenomenon as group egoism. At one time considerable delight was expressed with regard to the opening of drug-addiction consultation offices at industrial enterprises. Today, in connection with the conversion to cost accounting, a mass closing down of such offices is proceeding apace, as reported by the representative from the Ministry of Health.

It has become unprofitable for enterprises to undertake courses of treatment for alcoholics and drug addicts. And

what is to be said about them if, according to data of the State Committee for Public Education, last year one out of every three graduates of schools, PTU's [vocation-technical schools], and tekhnikums could not find a job? This year even certain VUZ graduates have encountered this problem. Should it be a source of surprise that the principal increase in the number of juveniles who are drunk on the streets is accounted for by those who are neither studying nor working anywhere?

Problems of the social and legal protection of those persons suffering from the diseases of alcoholism or drug addiction became the subjects of special discussions at the committee session. The deputies supported the joint proposal made by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Ministry of Health with regard to reforming the system of preventive-treatment facilities for workers. The reform is based on the principle of protecting the patient's rights. It proposes that the emphasis be placed on treatment at polyclinics. Only in the most extreme cases, whereby a patient maliciously refuses treatment and presents a danger to society, could he be sent for compulsory treatment and incarceration. Moreover, such a decision must be taken not merely by one physician, as is the case at present, but rather by a special commission. Even the decision of this commission could be appealed.

"The problems of combatting alcoholism and drug addiction have been examined many times," the deputy B. Rogatin emphasized in his speech. "Documents have been adopted, and programs have been drawn up. And all these programs have failed because they were based on administrative measures. Beginning with the present session, we must proceed with the desire to conceive the principal and operative trend of our work as ensuring a healthy life style...."

In the decree which they adopted the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Protecting the People's Health drew the particular attention of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and the union-level Academy of Pedagogical Sciences to the inadmissibility of violating the time frames of developing and introducing a comprehensive program of combatting drunkenness and alcoholism. These scientific organizations were assigned the task of preparing such a program as far back as 1985. Seventy-three ministries, departments, and public organizations were involved in working this out. The program was worked out, coordinated, revised, and re-coordinated.... At the present time, as the deputies were informed by V. Knyazhev, a representative of the GKNT, it is in the hands of the USSR Council of Ministers. It is not known when it will be adopted. And, after all, it is based on that same comprehensive approach to ensuring a healthy life style.

Deputy B. Rogatin proposed a return to the 1985 decree. "In this decree," he said "everyone paid attention primarily to administrative measures. And they forgot, for

example, about that part of the decree which speaks about the responsibility of economic managers to construct sports facilities. Have many be built during these years? In 1985 it was decided to fully provide the Soviet people's needs for sports equipment by the year 1990. Programs were worked out, figures were specified, and those persons responsible were designated. But where is the sports equipment itself?"

The deputy demanded that the USSR Council of Ministers and its Bureau for Social Development return to such requirements in the "May Decree" and adopt measures to carry them out.

Goskomstat Data on Infant Mortality Notes Undercounting

90US0183A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 45, 11-17 Nov 89 p 3

[USSR Goskomstat report: "Infant Mortality in the USSR"]

[Text]

INFANT MORTALITY IN THE USSR

Number of Deceased Children Less Than One Year Old

Year	In Thousands			In Thousands of Births		
	Total	In Urban Areas	In Rural Areas	Total	In Urban Areas	In Rural Areas
1975	141	68	73	30.6	25.8	37.0
1980	132	67	65	27.3	23.5	32.5
1985	140	69	71	26.0	21.7	32.0
1986	141	69	72	25.4	21.1	31.4
1987	142	70	72	25.4	21.1	31.5
1988	134	66	68	24.7	20.7	30.4

The level of infant mortality is one of the most important medical and demographic characteristics of the state of the population's health. In the USSR, approximately 25 children of 1,000 newborns die during the first year of life.

Infant mortality in the nation is currently 2.4-5.0 times higher than in the U.S., France, Great Britain, the FRG, and Japan. The lowest indicators in the world—not more than six deceased children less than one year of age per 1,000 births were noted in Japan, Sweden, and Finland.

The level of infant mortality is significantly differentiated throughout the nation's territory. The highest indicators (37-53 per thousand) are in the Central Asian Republics where at the same time the highest birth rate is also noted.

Minimal indicators were in the Lithuanian SSR and Latvian SSR where 11-11.5 children per thousand die during the first year of life.

Infant mortality is one of the most important indicators for assessing the work of public health agencies. For the purposes of embellishing the actual state of affairs, certain medical institutions conceal cases of death, qualify instances of death as miscarriages, and so forth. There are cases where parents do not record infant deaths at ZAGS [Civil Registry Office] agencies. According to data from inspection conducted by state statistics agencies, undercounting of infant mortality in individual territories of the Central Asian Republics totals up to 86 percent, Transcaucasus Republics—60 percent, Moldavian SSR—60 percent, RSFSR—50 percent and, Ukrainian SSR—19 percent. Despite systematic work in this direction, the state of accounting of children's deaths is not improving. Analysis shows that the actual level of infant mortality in rural areas of the Central Asian Republics, Azerbaijan SSR, and Kazakh SSR is 1.5-2 times higher than the accounting data which is based on recorded deaths.

Aids Situation in Armenia

90US0046A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
22 Aug 89 p 4

[Interview with Albert Khachaturovich Mayrapetyan, Armenian SSR deputy minister of health, by N. Malkhasyan: "At a Dangerous Boundary"]

[Excerpts] *Dear Editor! Recently there has been an increasing number of reports in the press about the disease that journalists have come to call the "20th century plague"—AIDS.*

We have been given advice as to how to avoid infection, we have been warned about the danger that awaits us, but we have been given little information about what kind of disease this is, what are its symptoms and its incubation period.

Through your newspaper we would like to have answers to these questions and know what is the AIDS situation in our republic. I would think that those answers will be of interest to other readers as well.

M. Davtyan

To answer these and other questions we turned to A. Kh. Mayrapetyan, Armenian SSR deputy director of health, candidate of medical sciences.

[Malkhasyan] Albert Khachaturovich, let's begin with the primary question that concerns all the inhabitants of our republic: Do we have people infected with AIDS in Armenia?

[Mayrapetyan] At the present time there are more than 280 virus carriers in the Soviet Union, and as of today two virus carriers have been recorded in Armenia. The first is a foreign student about whom many in the republic have already probably heard. After he was found to have the HIV virus he was immediately deported beyond the borders of the USSR. His circle of friends was tested. The second infected person is a local

resident who worked for two years in one of the African states. In accordance with the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 1987, he was cautioned about the criminal and moral responsibility of spreading this disease and the need to take precautionary measures within his own family.

[Malkhasyan] And we have the necessary steps to diagnose AIDS in our republic?

[Mayrapetyan] That work is being done at the Republic Diagnostic Center at the Scientific-Research Institute for Hematology and Blood Transfusion in the city of Yerevan. There is another such center in operation in the city of Leninakan which serves the populated areas of the Shirak region.

Our Republic Center was one of the first in the Union to start, beginning in 1987, to undertake AIDS research. And as early as August of the same year we in Armenia began observation of the population groups defined by decree and regulated by the corresponding order of the USSR Ministry of Health.

The primary groups to be tested for the AIDS virus are donors, pregnant women, and hemophiliacs as well as persons comprising the so-called risk groups, i.e., persons infected with venereal diseases, persons leading disorderly life styles, drug addicts, homo- and bisexuals, and others.

We are also testing in the prescribed manner local residents who have spent more than one month abroad as well as foreign citizens who have come to Armenia for an extensive stay.

[Malkhasyan] Albert Khachaturovich, tell me please if residents of our republic can undergo voluntary testing for AIDS?

[Mayrapetyan] Of course, this can be done by anyone who wishes. To facilitate that task we have opened an anonymous AIDS diagnostic center in Yerevan. Incidentally, 460 persons have already been voluntarily tested at the center and all of them had negative readings.

Any citizen can call telephone number 35-05-15 to make an appointment to come to the laboratory. A blood sample will be taken with a disposable syringe, no questions will be asked of the visitor, he will be given a numbered receipt and that is all. The next day the person can call to find out the test results.

[Malkhasyan] By the way, Albert Khachaturovich, what is the situation in our republic regarding disposable syringes and contraceptives?

[Mayrapetyan] This is one of today's most important problems not only for our republic but for the entire Union. For the given period of time we so far don't have a problem with disposable syringes. We received a sufficient supply of disposable syringes and other medical instruments in connection with the earthquake. However, the need for that equipment was not completely

satisfied. The resolution of that problem will depend upon the timely arrival of future shipments.

As regards preventive materials, the problem of supplying the full measure of needed items is still an unresolved problem both for the residents of our republic as well as for the entire country. We raised these two problems at the national ministerial level.

I must say that steps are also being taken in the republic to resolve those problems. In particular, there is a real hope that we shall be able to produce disposable syringes through cooperation with foreign firms.

[Malkhasyan] And lastly, Albert Khachaturovich, what advice would you like to give our readers?

[Mayrapetyan] First of all, avoid casual sexual contacts. Moreover, sex education should be properly given to the young in the elementary schools.

We must prepare our younger generation for a healthy family life without false timidity, and we must caution youth against sexual perversion for the sake of their own future. After all, sooner or later sex life will interest the teenager, and it is better that the youngsters learn about the intimate aspect of life not from random contacts but from adults who possess the essential knowledge and tact.

For surely it is only this kind of objective and delicate transmission of information that can protect the inexperienced juvenile from pernicious consequences to his health and future.

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17 Jan. 1990